An examination of the application of corporate planning in the four major organisations within the nationalised transport sector in the United Kingdom with special attention to the British Railways Board. by Williams, D. G.
        
University of Bath
PHD
An examination of the application of corporate planning in the four major
organisations within the nationalised transport sector in the United Kingdom with








If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:
openaccess@bath.ac.uk
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. May. 2021
An Examination of the Application of Corporate Planning, in- 
the Four'Ma.ior Organisations within the Nationalised Transport 
Sector in the United Kingdom, with S-pecial Attention to the
British Railways Board
Submitted by D.G.’ Williams M.Sc., FCCA., 




Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis 
rests with its author. This copy of the thesis has been 
supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood 
to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that 
no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it 
may be published without the prior written consent of the author.
This thesis may not be consulted, photographed or lent to other 
libraries without the permission of the author and the Chief 
Planning Officer, British Railways Board for ten years from the 




INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest.
ProQuest U641744
Published by ProQuest LLC(2015). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Microform Edition ® ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
SUMMARY
In this thesis, the author examines the theories concerned 
with the process and procedures of corporate planning and 
compares this theoretical situation with the practical 
application of corporate planning undertaken by the four major 
organisations within the nationalised transport sector in the 
United Kingdom, viz - British Railways Board, National Freight 
Company, National Bus Company emd British Airways. A comparison 
is made between the experience of these organisations and, in 
respect of one of them, British Railways Board, an assessment 
is made of the success with which its corporate planning has 
been applied. The theory versus practice comparison and the 
assessment of success lead to the provision of a number of 
recommendations which the British Railways Board might adopt 
to enhance the success of its corporate planning.
During the course of the discussion contained within the thesis, 
a considerable amount of information is provided concerning the 
four organisations. This is designed to facilitate an under­
standing of their nature, size, markets and financial situations, 
all of which impact upon their approaches to corporate planning. 
Attention is also paid to their relationships with Central 
Government and Local Authorities which also influence their 
corporate planning activities.
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During the last twenty years, considerable strides have been 
made in the development of corporate planning theory and in 
its application in many organisations of various types and 
sizes, in what is generally described as the Western Economy.
The process of corporate planning and related procedures have 
attracted a considerable amount of enthusiasm, some scepticism 
and a great deal of effort to promulgate and achieve its 
claimed benefits, on the part of academics and practitioners 
alike. However, relatively little attention has been paid so 
far to establishing the success of the use of corporate 
planning, partly because of its infancy and partly because of 
difficulties of measurement.
1.1. Purnose of Thesis
This thesis seeks to examine the theory of corporate planning 
and compare that theory with practice in connection with four 
United Kingdom nationalised transport organisations. It will 
also assess and comment upon the success of its use in respect 
of one of those organisations - the British Railways Board.
The other three organisations involved are the National freight 
Company, the National Bus Company and British Airways. Since 
all four corporations are nationalised transport organisations^ 
this facilitates consideration of the extent to which corporate 
planning has been undertaken in a context which is wider than 
that of a single corporate entity - in this case the nationalised 
transport sector.
In more formal terms, this thesis is designed to :-
1. Compare the approaches to corporate planning of the British 
Railways Board, the National Freight Company, the National 
Bus Company and British Airways with the established theory 
and between each organisation,
2. Consider the extent to which coordinated corporate planning 
has existed in the nationalised transport sector.
3. Assess the success of corporate planning in the British 
Railways Board.
4. Provide recommendations which the British Railways Board 
might adopt to enhance the success of its corporate planning.
Items 3 and 4 are regarded by the author as the primary 
purposes of the thesis for two reasons. The first reason is 
that, with a perceived general lack of research into assessing 
the success of the application of corporate planning, in and by 
organisations, this will make a useful and not insignificant 
contribution to knowledge. The second reason is that a 
comprehensive appraisal of the impact of its corporate planning 
process and procedures, with related recommendations, will be 
helpful to the British Railways Board. Indeed, some of the 
recommendations are already receiving attention, having already 
been accepted during the research and discussion stages.
Items 1 and 2 are, consequently, regarded as secondary purposes 
but are nevertheless important in their own right. The 
comparative study incorporated in Item 1 is designed to add to 
knowledge in this area and to establish whether the four 
organisations which, superficially, seem similar in many
respects, have each adopted approaches to corporate planning 
which are significantly different to established theory and 
to each other. Some of this information is also vital to 
considerations in Item 3 and 4 since any differences compared 
with established theory, in respect of the British Railways 
Board, are likely to have an impact upon the success of its 
use of corporate planning.
The author’s interest in this area of research stems mainly 
from his M.Sc. studies at the University of Bath in 1973/74 
and his subsequent involvement in aspects of the corporate 
planning process and procedures of the British Railways Board 
during the three years 1973 to 1977. During these occasions 
he developed a keen interest in the theoretical nature of the 
process and procedures and their operation in practice. Indeed, 
his M.Sc. dissertation, which dealt with the growing involve­
ment of Non-metropolitan County Councils in transport planning 
(following Section 203 of the Local Government Act, 1972), was 
fundamentally concerned with placing that issue within a 
corporate planning framework.
Since January 1978, the author has not been engaged in corporate 
planning per se but in management accounting in the capacity of 
Senior Finance Officer, Budgets, London Midland Region, British 
Railways Board and, since September 1980, as Chief inance 
Officer of that Region. He has observed, with concern, a lack 
of involvement of the General Managers and Chief Officers of 
the five Regions of the British Railways Board in its corporate 
planning process and procedures. This has enhanced his desire
to establish the overall situation and make recommendations for
improvement.
1.2. Hypotheses to be Tested
In undertaking the tasks outlined, a number of hypotheses will
be tested. These are that :-
1. The four organisations studied may have developed corporate
planning processes and procedures which are at variance
with generally accepted theory and also differ one with
another.
2. Each organisation may have found it necessary to develop its 
corporate planning process and procedures according to its 
own perceived needs rather than with central guidance.
3. There may be little evidence of the organisations contribut­
ing to a wider nationalised transport sector corporate 
planning activity.
4. Elements of the general theory of the process corporate 
planning may need to be modified to suit the special needs 
and characteristics of the organisations.
3. Each organisation is likely to be committed to computer­
isation of much of the corporate planning process/procedures 
to provide more ’thinking time' and evaluation of altern­
atives .
6. There may be, in each organisation, a lack of attention 
paid to the development of non-financial objectives.
7. There are likely to be generally accepted measures of 
success which can be used to assess the success of the 
application of corporate planning.
8. These success criteria can be used in respect of the British 
Railways Board.
9. Because of external economic factors, the corporate plans 
produced by the British Railways Board in recent years 
are not likely to have been successfully implemented and 
may have undergone considerable change.
10. To some extent, the value of corporate planning to the 
British Railways Board may be in the process itself and 
not just in the plans.
1.3» Structure of Thesis
The structure of the thesis is designed to deal with the 
purposes and hypotheses identified. This will be undertaken 
in four Parts. Part 1 contains Chapters 2 to 4. Chapter 2 
explains the research methodology and Chapters 3 and 4 
represent, fundamentally, a survey of literature relating to 
corporate planning. Chapter 3 provides details of some of the 
published theory relating to the process of corporate planning, 
It also contains details of survey evidence of the benefits of 
corporate planning. It culminates in a general summary of the 
total process produced by the author, which is provided to 
facilitate the practical comparison. This summary is intended 
to structure the theory comparison and eliminate any problems 
which might otherwise be caused by the use of different and 
sometimes interchangeable terms which appear in the published 
theory. It includes a model of the main elements of the total 
process of corporate planning. Chapter 4 provides details of 
published theory in respect of related corporate planning 
procedures, but dealing only with forecasting, corporate 
modelling, sensitivity and risk analysis and, budgetary
control.
Part 2 contains chapters 3 to 9 which are intended to provide 
sufficient background information concerning the four organ­
isations studied to enable a reasonable understanding to be 
obtained of their nature and size and how they fit into the 
overall nationalised transport sector in the United Kingdom.
This information will be seen to be material to the development 
of their corporate planning activities. Chapter 3 considers the 
nature and size of the nationalised transport sector itself and 
how it fits into the United Kingdom economy and overall transport 
sector. It continues by placing the four organisations in the 
context of the nationalised transport sector and then compares 
the organisâtions in terms of markets, culture, growth, organis­
ation structures and financial situations. Chapters 6 to 9 
provide further background information in regard to each of the 
four organisations, respectively. In view of the special 
attention being paid to the affairs of the British Railways 
Board, the chapter relating to that organisation (Chapter 6) 
provides a considerable amount of historical information. This 
is specifically designed to assist understanding of the 
strategic considerations discussed in chapter 11 and the 
’success’ assessment contained in chapter l6, which will depend 
partly upon an analysis of financial and physical performance.
Part 3 contains four chapters (chapters 10, 12, 13 and l4) 
which detail, respectively, the practical approaches to 
corporate planning adopted by the four organisations. In each 
case, a comparison is made with the theoretical material
provided in chapters 2 and 3« It also contains a chapter 
(chapter 11) which examines the corporate plans produced by the 
British Railways Board since 1974. This is designed to provide 
information which is required for the 'success' assessment. 
Because of the relative size of the Railways business, within 
the overall British Railways Board organisation, emphasis is 
placed upon the 'corporate' plans in respect of that business.
Part 4 contains chapters 13 to 17 which deal specifically with 
the four purposes mentioned earlier and the ten hypotheses. In 
chapter 13, the theory versus practice situation is summarised 
and a comparison is made between the approaches to corporate 
planning of the four organisations. At this stage, the first 
six hypotheses are tested. Chapter l6 commences with consid­
eration of the nature of the success assessment and proceeds 
with an analysis of the features identified, in respect of the 
British Railways Board. Finally, chapter 17 contains conclusions 
drawn from the analysis provided in chapter l6 and makes 
recommendations to the British Railways Board,designed to 
improve its corporate planning process and procedures. The 
remaining four hypotheses are tested in this chapter.
All references are provided in sufficient detail to enable the 
specific book, article, Government publications, etc. to be 
identified in an alphabetical list which appears immediately 
after chapter 17. Additionally, all Tables and Figures have 
been numbered in a separate sequence for each chapter to 
facilitate cross-referencing. Many of the detailed figures 
relating to chapters 6, 11 and l6 are contained within
Appendices for ease of reference and to assist the brevity of 
those chapters.
1.4. Use of Thesis
The conclusions and recommendations contained within Chapter 17 
and the information on which they are based have been debated 
with a number of senior BEB managers and formally discussed 
and agreed with the BRB’s Principal Rail Planning Officer and 
the Finance Office (Planning).
Additionally, during the period of finalising the thesis, the 
author was invited by the BRB's Director of Finance to assist 
with an examination of the effectiveness of control methods 
in the BRB, to be undertaken in October/December I98I by a 
consultant from Price Waterhouse. That consultancy exercise 
originated from the consideration by members of the board that 
the recent deterioration in the financial results and prospects 
of the Railways business (see Chapters 6 and I6 for details) 
might lead the Department of Transport to appoint a firm of 
consultants to conduct an investigation into similar issues.
Thus, the BRB initiative was designed to pre-empt that 
possibility.
It was agreed with the Director of Finance and the consultant that 
it would be appropriate to start from the author's research 
findings. The consultant was also supplied with the detailed 
analyses on which some of the findings were based (see Chapters 
6 , 11 and 16 - Section 16,3. and the Appendices) and advised by 
the author that these had been painstakingly researched and
discussed with a number of BEB planning executives, and could 
be taken on trust. This offer was accepted without hesitation.
In company with the author (on most occasions), the consultant 
has interviewed a large number of BRB managers at headquarters, 
regional and divisional levels. Apart from asking open-ended 
questions concerning control systems in operation, the 
consultant has spent much of each interview attempting to 
obtain corroboration of the research findings supplied by 
the author. At the time of typing the final draft of this 
thesis (November I981) most of the interviews have taken place 
and it is clear that there is almost unqualified acceptance by 
the consultant and BRB executives of the author’s conclusions 
and recommendations. The consultant has expressed his gratitude 
for and acknowledgement of the information and assistance 
supplied by the author which has greatly assisted his 
investigation.
A second Price Waterhouse consultancy exercise is proceeding 
concurrently. This relates to an examination of administration 
costs with a view to recommending means of reducing them. The 
author has not been directly involved in that exercise but has 
provided his views on structural and other changes that he 





Prior to commencing the study contained within this thesis, 
consideration was given by the author to the overall structure 
of the research and the most appropriate method of proceeding 
with the field research. Throughout the entire period of study, 
the structure of the research has remained as originally 
intended but one change, which will be detailed in this chapter, 
has taken place affecting the originally conceived ideas on the 
approach to part of the field research.
The structure of the research was designed, as set out in the 
model which appears in Figure 2.1. From this model, it will be 
seen that there were twelve separate tasks identified of which 
eight were seen as being necessary to encompass before the main 
purposes of the study could be tackled. The first of the 
twelve tasks was the identification of hypotheses which, apart 
from representing the author's viev/s on what might be the 
likely outcome of the research, would also ensure that there 
would be full consideration of a number of issues which 
appeared to him to be both conceptually challenging and useful.
The second task was the literature search in respect of the 
theoretical nature of corporate planning. It was quickly 
established that there are a substantial number of books, 
articles and other references in this field many, ostensibly, 
dealing with the overall process of corporate planning and, to 
a degree, the procedures which can be incorporated under that
11
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umbrella title. It was found convenient to separate process 
from procedures in the literature search and eventual 
exposition. This was because the process of corporate planning 
was established by the author to be so complex and far-reaching 
that it would inhibit consideration of procedural issues if 
attempted concurrently. However, it was also established that 
no single item of literature dealt fully with the process of 
corporate planning, in that elements identified in other 
references were not encompassed. In respect of corporate 
planning procedures, it was found that some of the literature 
did not place the individual procedures ip a corporate 
planning context but there was little difficulty in observing 
a high degree of agreement between the theories expounded.
The third task was to synthesise the theoretical findings to 
enable a clear-cut position to be identified (see Chapters 3 
and 4) and also to structure and facilitate the comparative 
study established as one of the purposes of the thesis.
Because none of the literature was found to contain a model 
which was judged by the author to be sufficiently complete 
and also because of the general complexity of the topic, the 
author considered it necessary to develop a more comprehensive 
model of the process of corporate planning, bringing together 
the elements of the process exposed during the literature 
search.
The fourth task was to conduct a literature search in respect 
of the nationalised transport sector and the four organisations 
covered in the study. This literature search was not only
13
related to books and articles but to Acts of Parliament, other 
Government publications (including those published by the 
Central Statistics Office) and documents published by the four 
organisations themselves e.g. annual reports and accounts. It 
was considered from the outset that it would be essential to 
have a good understanding of the nature, size, culture, markets 
and financial situations of the four organisations and how they 
have changed in recent years, since these features would be 
likely to be material to the development of their corporate 
planning activities.
However, it was also recognised that it would be necessary to 
supplement this information by conducting field research within 
the four organisations. This was identified as the fifth task, 
which was dealt with largely through interviews and, in respect 
of the British Railways Board, a detailed examination also of 
internal documents and files.
The sixth task was seen as being the need to synthesise the 
material obtained during the literature search (task 4) and the 
field research (task 3), in order that a clear picture could be 
presented of the features identified (see chapters 3 to 9). As 
discussed in chapter 1, it was considered necessary in respect 
of the British Railways Board, to obtain and record a consider­
able amount of historical data which would be required to assist 
the success assessment which the author considered would depend 
partly upon an analysis of financial and physical performance.
The seventh task was the field research into the corporate
14
planning activities of the four organisations (see chapters 
10, 12, 13 and l4). This was intended to be undertaken on an 
unstructured basis by merely asking those persons mainly 
involved in the corporate planning activities to explain their 
organisation's approach to corporate planning and then ask 
questions on aspects which appeared to be different to the 
established theory. This worked well in respect of the British 
Railways Board where the author, by virtue of his position, was 
able to examine the relevant internal records and interview the 
senior people primarily involved. It proved unworkable, however, 
in respect of the National Freight Company, the National Bus 
Company and British Airways since, quite reasonably, they wanted 
to restrict the amount of contact to a level which, although 
consistent with completing the research, would minimise the 
inconvenience to their senior planning executives. Consequently, 
it was decided part-way through this task to design a structured 
interview programme which was used to structure discussions 
with senior executives of these organisations, as follows :-
NFC - Director of Corporate Planning
NBC - Director of Research and Strategic
Planning and Planning Manager
BA - Head of Corporate Planning and 
Head of Economic Planning
A copy of the structured interview programme is ^provided at the
end of this chapter. It will be observed that a draft copy of
part of chapter 3 of this thesis (the synthesis of corporate 
planning theory) was supplied to the executives listed above to 
assist the discussions. Further, whilst the field research
13
contained in the fifth task was largely conducted in earlier 
unstructured interviews, the opportunity was taken to 
incorporate some of its features in the structured interview 
programme to validate, update and supplement information which 
had already been supplied. The questions contained within the 
structured interview programme were considered by the author to 
be those which would best identify the nature of the process 
and procedures in the three organisations, within the context 
of the theoretical position established under tasks 3 smd 4.
The eighth task was the comparison of the approaches to corporate 
planning of the four organisations (task 7) with the theoretical 
position (task 3)» taking into account the impact of the 
salient features concerning the organisations which had been 
identified in task 6. Additionally, comparisons between the 
organisations were considered by the author to be useful. The 
information relating to this task is contained in chapter 13, 
wherein consideration is also given to the extent to which 
coordinated corporate planning exists in the nationalised 
transport sector. This last issue was separately identified as 
the ninth task. Five of the hypotheses were to be tested in 
connection with task 8 and one under task 9*
The tenth task was to conduct field research into, and summarise 
the content of, recent corporate plans produced by the British 
Railways Board (see chapter 11) as a further component of the 
success assessment. Considerable difficulty was experienced in 
collating the required information since none of the internal 
corporate plan publications provided all of the data which was
16
sought and it was necessary to resort to extensive extraction 
from internal memoranda and working papers, Additionailly, 
changes of layout of forecasts in the various plans meant that 
a compromise layout of the tables and appendices in this 
thesis had to be designed by the author to recognise the 
availability of plan data. This compromise-also had to 
recognise the availability of data concerning actual financial 
and physical results obtained under task 6 . It was necessary, 
in respect of some of the forecasts, to make calculations using 
BR3 inflation indices to maintain a consistency of approach. 
Details of many of these problems are given in the Table of 
Appendices which also identifies the sources of the data 
provided.
The eleventh task was the assessment of the success of corporate 
planning in the British Railways Board (see chapter l6) drawing 
upon the comparative study (task 8), the field research into 
recent BRB corporate plans (task 10) and the synthesis of 
salient features relating to the organisation (task 6 ).
The twelfth and final task was to develop conclusions and 
recommendations for the use of the British Railways Board 
concerning the success of their corporate planning activities 
and, where relevant, the areas where improvement potential 
could be established (see chapter 1?). These conclusions and 
recommendations were to stem solely from the results of task 11. 
At this stage, the remaining four hypotheses were to be tested.
Permission to conduct the field research was obtained from the
17
National Freight Company, the National Bus Company and British 
Airways by writing, initially, to the Chairman of each 
organisation. Positive responses were received from senior 
planning executives and meetings subsequently arranged. In 
respect of the British Railways Board, a written request was 
made to the then Financial Controller, who provided his 
permission after consulting the then Chief Executive (Railways). 
Subsequent contact with BRB planning executives has been on a 
personal basis.
At no stage was it considered appropriate or practical to attempt 
to obtain the information required in the field research by way 
of a postal survey/questionnaire. Such a procedure would have 
required an extremely detailed questionnaire and a degree of 
commitment from the persons interviewed during the field 
research which could not have been reasonably expected under a 
postal survey approach.
18
STPUCTüRiiiD INTERVIEW/ Pr<0G?.Aî2-'iS - National Frei&ht Corporation, 
National Eus Company and British Airways
1. What is the broad structure of your organisation from 
Board level down to the lowest management level? V/hat 
functional specialisation exists within that structure?
2. What is the size (staff numbers) and organisation structure 
of your Corporate Planning department? What professional 
disciplines/backgrounds do its members represent?
3. What are the formal structural relationships with Government? 
What significant informal relationships exist?
4. How does the process of corporate planning in your organisation 
compare with the attached model (Fig. 3*8) and the related 
notes (Section 2 of Chapter 3), in respect of each of the 
stages described, viz:-
- Assessment of Needs
- Determination of Objectives for the corporation and 
for the subsidiaries
- Determination of related Goals
- Determination of Policies
- Development of Strategy through the process of Internal 
and External Appraisal
- Preparation of Outline Strategic Plans
- Preparation of Operating (or Action) Plans
- Interface with Annual Budgets
19
- Implementation of each level of the process
- Feedback in respect of each level of the process
- Control action at each level of the process?
Particular attention will be paid to the involvement of the 
separate organisations in the overall process.
5. Where there are differences, why do they exist?
6. To what extent are the Government, Trade Unions or any other 
external organisation involved in the process?
7. What are your corporate planning procedures in respect of:-
- Forecasting (Time Periods, Price levels, Techniques)
- Models
- Investment Appraisal and Control
- Risk and Sensitivity Analysis
- Budgetary Control
- Aspects of Costing specifically used in the above procedures 
(such as apportionment of joint costs)
- Monitoring of the Corporate Plan?
' (N.B. There will be follow-up questions in this area where 
the procedures differ from established theory).
8. How many corporate plans have been produced, in which years 
and covering what time periods?
9. V/hat significant changes have been made to the corporate 
planning process or procedures since the production of the
20
first corporate plan? Are any further changes agreed or 
under consideration?
10. What use have Government made of the corporate plans? Are
they regarded jointly as the primary medium of dialogue in
respect of future developments and a criteria for control?
11. What training is provided to persons involved in corporate
planning?
12. Are outside consultants used in any cart of the rrocess?
21
CHAPTER 5
CORPORATE PLANNING THEORY - PROCESS
During the last twenty years a considerable amount has been 
written about the theory and practice of corporate planning. 
Examination of this literature shows that much of it is 
incomplete, with many authors preferring to concentrate on 
particular aspects rather than the entire process and its 
related procedures. In this chapter, it is intended to explore 
some of the important literature on the process of corporate 
planning and draw out the theoretical views thus expressed.
This is meant to produce a fairly detailed view of the process, 
based on the published work of some of those who are clearly 
(on the evidence of the search) regarded as the main 
theoreticians in the field, with other references where 
considered useful. This information is given in Section 3*1*
However, in order to create a firm footing for the practical 
comparisons to be examined in Parts 3 and 4, it is considered 
by the author to be necessary to prepare a synthesis of the 
main features of the process of corporate planning described 
in Section 3*1* This is attempted in Section 3*2. by way of 
containing the author’s model of the process of corporate 
planning. This model will be seen to be a frequent reference 
point in respect of much of what appears in Parts 3 and 4 and 
will also be used to structure that discussion.
Consideration of the theoretical aspects of corporate planning 
procedures are delayed until Chapter 4. This pre-supposes that
22
a distinction can be drawn between the process and the 
procedures of corporate planning. In fact, such a clear cut 
distinction is not completely feasible because they are not 
mutually independent. However, it is considered reasonable and 
helpful to deal with matters such as forecasting, model building, 
investment appraisal and control and, to a large extent, 
budgetary control under the heading of procedures. This prevents 
clouding the vital issue of the process of corporate planning 
with largely procedural detail and enables that detail to be 
dealt with separately in more depth and within an overall context.
3.1. Corporate Planning Process - Published Theory 
As mentioned earlier, during the last twenty years, a considerable 
amount has been written about the theory and practice of the 
process of corporate planning. A number of academics have become 
clearly identified as the ’high priests’ of corporate planning. 
Some of the most notable of these are Ansoff, Ackoff and 
Steiner in the U.S.A. and Argenti and Hussey in the United 
Kingdom. Their names have become almost synonymous with the 
process itself. This is not to say that corporate planning was 
’invented’ in the early part of the 1960’s. That could not be 
a reasonable observation since, under various titles, forms of 
long-range planning were under discussion many years earlier.
A prime example of this was the early work of Drucker who, as 
long ago as 1953 included ’setting objectives’ as one of his five 
basic operations in the work of a manager. Going back further, 
Fayol (1949) counted planning as one of six activities in an 
industrial organisation and, in 1938, Urwick, regarded it as one 
of seven general management functions.
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In a more complete and formal sense, however, or as described in 
1974 by Hussey as a 'complete way of managing a business', 
corporate planning became established during the 1980's.
During that decade, the main influences came from the U.S.A. 
where the work of Ansoff was particularly important. Ansoff 
provided a very detailed approach to the strategic aspects of 
corporate planning in his widely distributed book entitled 
'Corporate Strategy' first published in I963. In his own 
words he set out to examine 'partial analytical insights into 
strategic business problems' developed over the previous 10 
years and 'synthesise and unify' them 'into an overall analytical 
approach to solving the total strategic problem of the firm.'
More will be said of the Ansoff approach later in this section.
For the moment, however, it is considered appropriate to define 
the process of corporate planning before looking at the nature 
of the complete or 'overall' process. Immediately -following 
this, details will be given of two published models of the 
overall process but it will be seen that they are not complete. 
This adds a further reason for providing the author's model of 
the general theory of corporate planning in Section 3*2.
However, they provide a partial framework for the remainder of 
this Section.
Argenti (1974) has described corporate planning as 'a systematic 
approach to clarifying corporate objectives, making strategic 
decisions and checking progress towards the objectives.' He 
considered the term 'corporate planning and control' to be a 
more correct description of the process because of the need for
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checking of strategic results also. This theme has been taken 
up by others, including Hussey, as will be seen in more detail 
later. Denning (1971) described it as ’a formal systematic 
managerial process organised by responsibility, time and 
information, to ensure that operational planning, project 
planning and strategic planning are carried out regularly to 
enable top management to direct and control the future of the 
enterprise. '
Hussey (1974), regarded corporate planning as 'a complete 
dimension of management, around which can be structured a total 
approach to running a business.’ He related it to the Drucker 
analysis of management tasks by stating that it 'includes the 
setting of objectives, organising the work, people, and system 
to enable those objectives to be attained, motivating through 
the planning process and through the plans, measuring performance 
and so controlling progress of the plan, and developing people 
through better decision-making, clearer objectives, more 
involvement and awareness of progress.'
Anderson (1973) considered corporate planning to be 'the 
systematic preparation of forward loo-king strategic plans 
defining the objectives to be pursued in the long, medium and short 
term, within the framework of corporate policy established by the 
board of directors for the business as a whole.'
Each of these and many others have tended to imply or, in some 
cases have stated,that the corporate entity under consideration 
was a 'business', a 'corporation', a 'firm' or a 'company'. This 
view was not shared by all, however, and the case was well made
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by Stewart (1971), Bains (l972) and others that the concept of 
corporate planning is equally applicable to other forms of 
corporate entity such as a Local Authority, i.e. County Council, 
District Council, etc. Indeed, as will be seen later, in his 
1979 book Ansoff recognised this point, having earlier concluded 
that corporate planning could only be applied in profit- 
orientated organisations. Additionally, Argenti (1974) went as 
far as to state that whilst ’most of the literature on corporate 
planning is concerned with this form of planning within business 
organisations, my own opinion is that the greatest need for it 
lies in the non-company organisation.’ He postulated three 
reasons for this view, viz:-
1. The size, number and social importance of these organisations 
is growing much faster than business organisations.
2. It is difficult to state precisely what is the purpose (in 
terms of objectives) of these organisations.
3. The development of techniques, such as cost benefit analysis, 
which help to quantify these objectives.
Much of the constant reference to forms of ’business’ entity seems 
to stem from the early literature emanating from the U.S.A. and, 
as will be seen later, a concentration on financial objectives. 
This was not unusual since the main practical application has been 
in the commercial sector. In 1974, Argenti stated, without dismay 
since he regarded the progress as being ’not unreasonably slow’ 
that :-
'Ey the mid-Sixtees approximately three quarters of the 
largest five hundred companies in America and Japan were 
reported to be using formal systems of long range strategic
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planning or were about to do so. But, by the early 
seventies, there were still some large companies in 
America and Japan who were not using the corporate 
planning approach; in Europe there were many; all over 
the World the number of medium-sized companies not using 
it must have been enormous; hardly any types of 
organisation - national and local government, government 
agencies, charities, institutions, trade unions and so 
on - hardly any of these were using it.*
At least Argenti, in this statement accepted the principle of 
the need for corporate planning to be used in all forms of 
organisation, although most of the remainder of the book referred 
to, dealt with the ’company* entity. There is no evidence to 
suggest that the world-wide situation observed by Argenti has 
been transformed during the last seven years but the development 
of corporate modelling (referred to in Chapter 4) has given the 
application of corporate planning a fresh impetus to the greater 
adoption of corporate planning as the appropriate ’complete way’ 
of managing an organisation of any type. Research evidence in 
this regard is given in Chapter 4.
Moving from definition to explanation, it is now considered by 
the author to be useful to explore the concept of corporate 
planning by reference to its main constituent elements and by 
reference to a model of what might be close to the total 
process. However, a model fully suitable for that purpose 
could not be found although many covered large elements of 
the process.
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For example, in its simplest form, perhaps, Argenti (197^) 
provided a model of the process as shown in Fig, 3«1« This 
model isolated some of the fundamental elements as will be 
clear later, but like many others, was not sufficiently 









Fig. 3 »1 » The Corporate Planning Process (Argenti,197^)
However, a more comprehensive model (one of four reproduced) 
has been provided in Hussey's book, referred to earlier, which 
is reproduced on the next page as Fig, 3*2. This model was 
reproduced by Hussey from an approach developed by Urwick Orr 
and Partners Ltd. This model is the one which will be used, 
as far as possible, in this section, to structure and analyse 
the process of corporate planning, thus placing the other 
theoretical views and quotations into context.
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strategic and tactical planning although the dividing point is 
not clearly defined. It starts with the question of determining 
'objectives', with interactive connections with 'company 
performance, strength and weaknesses', on the one hand and 
'external environment', on the other. These relationships are 
not features of some theoretical observations (e.g. Argenti,
1974 and 1980) on the determination of objectives but, instead, 
on a later stage in the corporate planning process - the 
development of strategy. To do so might build in an unnecessary 
constraint in the development of objectives. However, it is 
difficult to argue that, in practice, informal consideration of 
these issues would not be made when objectives are set and, in 
any case if a strategy is set which does not achieve or even 
improves upon the objectives, then it is widely acknowledged that 
the appropriate step is to revise the objectives. Additionally, 
Hussey (19?4) recommended that a comprehensive appraisal of 
strengths and weaknesses should be 'one of the first steps in 
the process of preparing long term plans and should provide both 
the platform from which the objectives are established and the 
baseline of the strategic plan.'
In his 1969 book, Ansoff described objectives as 'decision rules 
which enable management to guide and measure the firm's 
performance towards its purpose.' He added that a firm has both 
'economic' objectives and 'social' or 'non-economic' objectives. 
The economic objectives were described as 'aimed at optimising 
the total resource-conversion process' and the non-economic 
objectives 'are the result of interaction among individual 
objectives of the firm's participants.' The economic objectives
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have been given pride of place by Ansoff as ’forming the main 
body of explicit goals used by management for guidance and 
control of the firm,’ He described the non-economic objectives 
in such a way that they are not really objectives at all, by 
explaining that they ’exert a secondary modifying and constraining 
influence on management behaviour,’
The Ansoff approach, as described in I965, was summed-up by his 
belief that a firm was essentially a ’money motivated purposive 
social organisation’ where, traditionally, the ’measure of success’ 
has been ’profit’. He added that a firm ’seeks its objectives 
through the medium of profit’ and through conversion of its 
resources into goods and/or services and then obtaining a return 
on these by selling them to customers. Thus, the resource 
conversion process mentioned earlier. He added further that, 
consequently, ’the primary economic objective was to optimise 
the long-term rate of return on the ’equity’ employed in the 
firm.’ This view was based on the ’key idea’ of selecting 
profitability (’a measure of return on resources’) rather than 
profit (’excess of revenue over costs’) as the ’principal 
attribute’.
In stating his views on objectives, Ansoff accepted the opinion
of Drucker (1958) that profit maximisation would be an
unrealistic objective, although maximisation of the ’long-term
return on resources employed’ was the ’central purpose of the
firm*. Indeed, in his own words, he based his ’system of
objectives’ on the following premises :-
’1. The firm has both (a) ’economic objectives aimed at 
optimizing the efficiency of its total resource-conversion
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process and (b) ’social* or non-economic objectives, which are 
the result of interaction among individual objectives of the 
firm’s participants.
2. In most firms the economic objectives exert the primary 
influence on the firm’s behaviour and form the main body of 
explicit goals used by management for guidance and control of 
the firm.
5. The central purpose of the firm is to maximize long-term 
return on resources employed within the firm.
4. The social objectives exert a secondary modifying and 
constraining influence on management behaviour.
5. In addition to proper objectives two related types of 
influence are exerted on management behaviour: responsibilities 
and constraints.’
These views were based partly on the theories developed by Cyert 
and March (1963) who argued that ’organisations do not have 
objectives, only people have objectives.’ Thus they concluded 
that the objectives of a firm could only result from a 
negotiated concensus of the objectives of the influential 
participants. However, it will be observed that Ansoff only 
allowed this approach to influence his thinking on the 
’secondary’ non-economic objectives.
Within this framework, Ansoff developed a theory that optimising 
the return on investment, relating to owner’s equity, was the 
appropriate objective for both the short term and the long term 
in any firm. In regard to the short terra, which he described 
as the ’proximate’ period (3 to 10 years) where a ’firm is able 
to construct forecasts with an accuracy of, say, plus and minus 
20 per cent’, Ansoff regarded optimising the return on investment 
(R.O.I.) as being the correct answer. In regard to the long 
term, he also regarded optimising R.O.I. as the correct measure 
but sought to overcome a problem that ’accurate R.O.I. 
forecasts and measurements cannot be made for the long-term 
period’ and he brought in a number of ’goals’ as ’proxy- 
measurements.’ These goals are tabulated in Fig.3 .3» and it
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Figure 3»5 - Hierarchy of the Long Term Objective.
(Source: Ansoff, 1965).
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will be observed that they cover a large number of financial and 
non-financial issues. The theme of 'goals* was given a similar 
meaning by Ackoff (1970) who commented that 'Desired states or 
outcomes are objectives. Goals are objectives that are 
scheduled during the period planned for.'
However, in his 1979 book, Ansoff took a different view of the 
purpose or objectives of an organisation. He defended his 
1969 views as being a correct 'prescription' but valid 
'provided that it is applied in an appropriate organisational 
climate.' However, he moved to the opinion that it was necessary 
to recognise that the 'purposiveness' of any organisation 'ranges 
from aggressive optimisation to passive maintenance of the status 
quo,' Additionally, referring to profit and non-profit 
organisations collectively as 'Environment Servicing Organisations* 
(E.S.O.), he also recognised the value and need for corporate 
planning outside of a business context. Indeed, and somewhat 
akin to the Argenti approach noted earlier, he stated that 
'It is safe to predict that the enormous and growing social 
investment will lead eventually to adoption of an ROI-like 
concept in the management of non-profit ESO's.'
Argenti (197^) preferred to use Return on Shareholders Capital 
(ROSG) as the correct measure of the objective of a company, 
regarding ROI as an unsatisfactory measure because the value of 
the assets employed will vary according to accounting practices.
He argued that shareholders capital is a more precise measure 
and represents the 'purpose' of the company, measured in terras 
of 'the stream of dividends' received 'over the years together
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with the value of the shares’ when they are sold. He recommended 
that targets should be set which may be ’satisfactory’, 'very 
satisfactory' or 'a minimum threshold', the first two choices 
being 'arbitrary' but which should be ideally related to a 
'performance-risk curve', which would be valid in principle for 
all shareholders of the firm.
The Ansoff concept of non-economic objectives was converted by 
Argenti into 'ethological objectives' without any significant 
change of meaning. Argenti added that 'the ethos adopted by 
most companies was mainly conditioned by a consensus of opinion 
in society modified by the traditions of the company, legislation, 
the value judgements of top managers.' Thus, the Argenti approach 
to objectives was that a 'purpose' objective (i.e. ROSC) must be 
determined first and then 'ethological' objectives but with the 
ethos being dependent on the purpose and not vice versa. This 
latter point was justified on the basis that the ethos does not 
feature in the performance-risk curve for shareholders. Argenti 
added that questions of ethos would, therefore, only affect the 
strategy and not the 'purpose', i.e. the ROSC objective.
Hussey (1974), on the other hand, varied this approach by stating 
that there were four types of objectives, viz :- 
'a) The primary, or profit, objective of the business, set in 
advance of strategy.
b) The secondary and mainly narrative objectives, again set in 
advance of strategy.
c) Goals which are time-assigned targets derived from the 
strategy.
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d) Standards of performance (often identical with goals) 
assigned to particular individuals.'
The secondary objectives were said to 'describe the company's 
future identity' taking into account such matters as nature and 
scope of business, geographical sphere of operation and its 
relations with its employees, customers and society.' They 
would thus include non-financial objectives. Both the
primary and secondary objectives were recommended to be
regarded as 'map-grid references rather than as the bull of a
dart board' whereas goals, which /are derived from statregy'
are considered necessarily as being 'always expressed in 
quantified terms' and 'defined against time' since they would 
be used to monitor performance.
Despite the use of the term 'secondary objectives' it is clear 
that Hussey did not share the Argenti view that they would not 
affect the 'purpose' objective. Instead, he described his four 
types of objectives as a 'concept' in respect of which 'each 
of the elements bears some relation to the others.'
He also tackled the difficult question of how long should a 
planning period be? i.e. for how far ahead should objectives 
and strategy be set? His view was that 'Each company should 
try to select a planning period which satisfies its particular 
and unique needs.' These, he argued, would need to take 
account of : -
- business cycles if they can be identified
- economic life of significant assets
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- lead time of major strategic developments (a view 
held by Thomas, 1977)
- practicability of forecasting
- creating and maintaining management interest
He concluded his consideration of this issue by adding that 
whilst a company might produce a formal strategic plan 
(discussed later) for a period of as little as 5 years, which 
will mean setting objectives for such a timescale, it would, in 
many companies, be necessary to construct strategic scenarios 
for a much longer period (say 15 years) to give the strategic 
plan a wider perspective. This would be undertaken during the 
stage of strategy creation and selection.
Returning to the Urwick Orr model in Fig. 3*2., it proceeds
to 'Establish Standards of Responsibility' as the next stage
in the process. Hussey (1974) used the term policies to
describe this element of the planning process adding that : -
'In any modern business there are hundreds of policies and 
procedures which must be applied if the organisation is to 
function at all. Definition provides a measure of uniformity, 
precision and control, and ensures that they are understood 
by all those who need to understand them. V/here policies and 
procedures are of a "permanent" nature they may beneficially 
be enshrined in books of regulations and standing orders.
Every company has a host of these permanent areas: think for 
a moment of the areas of personnel*, purchasing, office 
stationery, and general administration - although in many 
companies they are often implicitly rather than explicitly 
defined.
Careful attention to this area is a useful aid to better 
corporate planning. Often definition of a policy will lead to 
a recognition that it is incompatible with the plans and needs 
changing: if it is not defined it may be unknown to the people 
who would realise that it is inappropriate. The point should 
not be laboured, for there are no new principles involved, but 
it is nevertheless worth making.'
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This theme has been shared by many writers including Steiner 
and Miner (l977) who explained a policy as being management’s 
expressed or implied intent to govern action in the achievement 
of a company’s aim and also as an attempt to clarify the ’values' 
of an organisation. Thus, policies represent for some writers 
what ethos represents for Argenti, except that Argenti's view 
that ethos does not influence objectives does not appear to be 
wholly shared.
The question of the determination of 'values' preceding objectives 
and as a framework for policies did not feature in the Urwick Orr 
model and has tended to be underplayed in much of the literature. 
However, it was central to the Cyert and March thesis and thus 
to the thoughts of Ansoff in regard to non-financial objectives.
Thomas (1977)î without mentioning the term 'values' itself, 
described this element well by stating that it is necessary for 
top management to 'perceive' the 'nature of the business they are 
in' and, in determining objectives, consider : -
'(i) What is the place of the firm in its industry and what, is 
their expectation of where they would wish it to be?
(ii) In what activities or expertise would they regard 
themselves as being especially expert and/or having 
particular responsibilities?
(iii) Do they see the achievement of (i) and (ii) as being in 
any way dependent on achieving far greater control over 
their immediate environment?
(iv) Do they see themselves as having any particular loyalties 
or responsibilities of a local, regional or national 
character?'
Returning to the Urwick Orr model in Figure 3*2., its next stages 
are 'Evaluate Alternative Courses of Action' and 'The Strategic 
Flan'. These were related to earlier elements of 'Establish
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Standards of Responsibility’ (i.e. policies), 'Assess Company 
Performance, Strengths and Weaknesses' and 'Assess External 
Environment'. The interaction of the elements represents a 
reasonable summary of the process of developing strategy which 
is matched by much of the literature.
Hussey (1974), for example, in respect of the need to assess the 
external environment, considered that it was necessary for a 
company to have a 'perception of its future environment' which 
can 'become the basis of all long-range plans' and concerning 
which it would be necessary to make 'assumptions' about the 
'course of future .events'. In explaining these assumptions 
and their related forecasts, he added that:-
- Apart from 'providing a foundation for plans', they
'also have a coordinating effect' since they 'must be 
common to all areas of the company'
- 'Only assumptions which really affect the company should 
be included in the plans'. This implies that 'some form 
of screening process must be set up to select those 
factors which really do have an impact on the company'
(He suggested that the planner or a 'think-tank' group 
of managers should do the screening)
- The assumptions should cover events outside the control 
of the company and those within, the latter thought by 
Hussey to be those needed at operating plans level rather 
than at the strategy stage.
- It is necessary to identify the perceived quality of the 
assumptions - leading eventually to the production of 
contingency plans. This requires that the assumptions
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should 'be used in a number of positive ways as the basis 
for understanding the nature of the risks the company 
faces and for actions which eliminate or reduce those 
risks.
- 'The whole process of setting planning assumptions calls 
for much creative corporate thought. It is a task which 
should not be skimped, for failure to put adequate effort 
into planning at this stage may bring all the subsequent 
plans tumbling down like a house of cards.'
Sutton (1980) described the process of determining the assumptions 
concerning the external environment as 'Environmental and 
competitive audits', whereas Higgins (I98O) used the phrase 
'external appraisal' and stressed the impact of Government 
influence and social pressure. Thomas (1977.) preferred the 
term 'threats and opportunities analysis'. He stressed the 
need for determining 'prospective changes in the environment, 
their desirability or otherwise, some estimate of probability, 
and of timing and scale, so as to enable an assessment to be 
made of how much time the firm has in which to deliberate and 
act, if this is what appears to be required.' He considered 
that it was important to ascertain 'the vulnerability of one’s 
own firm to the loss of independence by a leading supplier or 
outlet.'
In regard to the assessment of company performance, strengths 
and weakness, or 'internal appraisal' (Higgins, I980),
Hussey (1974) developed a comprehensive framework which involved 
an appraisal of the following items : -
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’a) Trend of results
b) Sources of profits
c) Risk
d) Manufacturing activity
e) Rationalisation of resources




j) Use of resources’
Hussey stressed the importance of this strengths and weaknesses 
appraisal, and described it as a 'corporate appraisal'. He 
noted that this process would produce a 'capability profile'
(also noted by Ansoff - 1965) for each activity undertaken by the 
firm. This was in line with the suggestion made first by 
Denning (l97l) and closely related to the concepts of identifying 
'discete competence' and 'product differentiation' as noted by 
Thomas (1977).
However, in terms of determining strategy, as a prelude to 
preparation of 'The Strategic Plan' (in Figure 3«2.), in the 
light of the external and internal appraisals, it is clear from 
references contained within much of the literature that the 
work of Ansoff was particularly important.
In an article published in 1972, Ansoff described strategy as 
'decision making rules for the guidance of organisational 
behaviour'. This was explained further in his 1963 description
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of the concept of strategy which;-
’a) provides a broad concept of the firm's business,
b) sets forth specific guidelines by which the firm can 
conduct its search, and
c) supplements the firm's objectives with decision rules which 
narrow the firm's selection process to the most attractive 
opportunities.'
It is clear from the above (and generally accepted in the liter­
ature) that Ansoff regarded strategy as the direction in which 
the firm has to travel in order to achieve the objective, i.e. 
the means to achieve the ends. He added that the choice of 
strategy would be heavily dependent upon the external and 
internal appraisals discussed earlier. What was particularly 
important about the Ansoff approach, however, was his concept 
of the 'cascade' approach to 'gap closure' which he summed up 
as the 'adaptive search method for strategy formulation.'
Under Ansoff's 'cascade' approach the first step was to 'decide 
between the two alternatives: to diversify or not to diversify 
the firm.' The second step was to 'choose a broad product- 
market scope for the firm from a list of broad industrial 
categories.' The third step was to 'refine the scope in terms 
of characteristics or product markets within it.' This approach 
of 'successive convergence' was described as being more 
suitable than the 'usual method of management science' which, 
in Ansoff's words, required 'emuneration' and 'evaluation' of 
all the 'final alternatives.'
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Within each step of the 'cascade* Ansoff considered that the 
procedure would be to :-
1. Establish a 'set of objectives'.
2. Estimate the difference (the 'gap') between the aspired 
results and the anticipated results (described by Ackoff, 
1970 as the 'reference projection') if the firm were to 
continue with the current (perhaps implicit) strategy.
This would be undertaken on a broad and estimated basis.
3» Propose 'one or more courses of action (strategy)'.
4. Test these for their 'gap-reducing properties' and accept 
a course 'if it substantially closes the gap; if it does 
not, new alternatives are tried.'
Ansoff added that 'no assurance is obtained that the decision 
rules selected represent in any sense the best of all possible 
choices.' He thus described the process as having been designed 
to produce a result which is really 'satisfizing rather than 
optimising its behaviour.'
He placed great emphasis on the significance of the 
diversification decision using what he described the 'commonly 
used' names of the various types of diversification alternatives 
'horizontal' integration, 'vertical' integration, 'concentric' 
integration (where there is a 'measure of common thread' through 
'marketing or technology or both') and 'conglomerate' 
diversification (where there is 'none'). As part of this 
consideration he identified the importance for 'synergy' as a 
component of strategy, where the 'firm seeks a product-market 
posture with a combined performance that is greater than the 
sum of its parts'; or as Thomas (1977) put it later 'the
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opportunity to exploit opportunities for improved performance 
arising from joint as opposed to separate action in a 
combination of product markets. Under the Ansoff approach 
four 'types' of synergy were noted viz:-
1. Sales synergy - including common distribution channels,
sales administration, warehousing, advertising, 
sales promotion and past reputation.
2. Operating synergy - including higher utilisation of
resources, spreading of overheads, common learning 
curves and 'large-lot' purchasing,
3. Investment synergy - including joint use of plant, common
stocks, transfer of R & D, common tooling smd 
machinery.
4. Management synergy - including pooling of competence and
knowledge.
Argenti (1974), whilst accepting that 'It is the opening and 
closing of the gap between target results and forecast results 
which acts as the signal for a review of strategic decisions', has 
stated that the 'product-market strategy' element of the 
Ansoff approach was not sufficiently comprehensive. He has 
preferréd (similarly to Steiner, I969) to postulate the 
'strategic structure of a company' which would be 'the totality 
of its individual strategies.' The elements of the strategic 
structure which he identified as being included in the 
strategic structure were markets, products, physical facilities, 
services, research, finance, employees, supply lines, 
distribution and management.
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Argent! argued that there were five methods of determining a
strategic structure, viz:-
(a) ’Hunch (or intuition or entrepeneurial flair)'.
(b) 'Asking business questions' such as 'what business are we 
in' providing a 'provocation to wider thinking' and a 
'stimulons to creative thought'. Argent! accepted that 
this was not, in itself, an analytical or creative tool 
but did not dismiss its use.
(c) 'Budgets' as a form of bottom-up planning. Argenti stated 
in this regard that 'Budgets should come out of the 
corporate planning process rather than form an input', 
thus rejecting this method.
(d) 'Project Appraisal' which Argenti again described as a 
bottom-up approach, which involved a manager in submitting 
a project to his superiors who would evaluate it. Argenti 
considered that such a process would be inadequate in the 
absence of a strategic structure.
(e) 'Strategic decision-making systems' which should be used in 
the light of six 'factors affecting strategic decision.'
These factors, not surprisingly, were:-
- purpose (i.e. objectives)
- ethos (i.e. policies)
- expected performance (for the gap analysis)
- strengths and weaknesses
- changes in the environment
- risk
The strategic decision making systems were boiled down by Argenti
into two types. The first ('in the absence of entrepeneurial
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flair') would be to take ad hoc decisions 'whenever it was thought 
that a decision should be taken' and the second would be to 
design a system that explicitly takes into account each of the 
six factors noted above. In this latter regard, Argenti 
concluded that;-
'Given an infinite horizon there are infinite structures. It is 
simply not possible to evaluate more than a very few of these 
alternatives and, I am suggesting, one way of reducing the number 
of alternatives to a manageable few is to eliminate all those 
that do not make use of the company's strengths or fail to 
correct weaknesses or fail to deal with threats or to exploit 
opportunities. These are four of the criteria; a fifth is that 
any proposed structure must be one in which the managers feel 
confidence - confidence that it is a practical proposition in 
the real world, confidence in its potential to meet the 
performance-risk curves for the company. Furthermore the 
managers must bear in mind that in the future the company may 
not be able to take many of the actions that it now takes 
because of the increasing severity of the constraints imposed 
upon it by society and reflected in its ethos.'
Thus, he suggested that there were six criteria by which to test 
any proposed strategy, viz:-
'1 Can it be shown that this strategy gives the company a
performance-risk curve similar to the one selected by its 
shareholders (and managers, employees, etc.)?
2 Has the company the necessary competence to carry it out?
3 Does it eliminate or reduce the company's outstanding 
weaknesses?
4 Does it allow the company to exploit any opportunities that 
may occur in the future?
5 Does it sufficiently reduce any of the severe threats that 
may face the company?
6 Does it call for any action that is or may become 
objectionable on moral or social grounds?'
These six criteria formed a 'sieve* through which any proposed
strategy would be passed and Argenti considered that 'ideally
only one will do so but in practice several will' and may have
to be a matter of personal judgement by the managers. This
leads on to the stage of evaulating a short list to 'determine
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whether any of the remainder are likely to have the 
performance-risk profile that the company requires’ leading to 
the final selection.
In respect of the evaluation stage of the proceedings, Argenti 
has argued - that company models are particularly valuable 
(these will be discussed in Chapter 4), particularly since each 
potential strategy needs to be tested as to risk. By following 
this system, Argenti has considered that a company can specify 
’both the strategic structure towards which the company is to 
move and the individual strategic actions which will bring it 
about.’
The approach to strategy determination suggested by Hussey (1974) 
started off with the assumption that ’the company has set its 
objectives, defined its social responsibility, established all 
the assumptions on which it will base its plan and now fully 
understands its strengths and weaknesses. He has fully 
supported the concept of ’gap analysis' and described 'filling 
the gap as what strategy is all about.' He considered that basic 
strategic alternatives can be classified according to the matrix 
given in Fig. 3*4.
Thus, strategic decisions could be related to :-
(a) Improving the performance of the company's existing products 
in the markets in which it currently trades,
(b) Providing new products to current markets, this being 'often 
a logical way to exploit particular marketing knowledge and 
capability possessed by the company'.
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Market
Product ' Current New
Current (a) (c )
New (b) (d)
F iff. 5 » 4. Analysis of Strateffic Alternatives (Hussey)
(c) Selling current products to new markets which is an 'area 
where synergy can be fairly high, as development here can 
often bring economies of scale in production and general 
management.'
(d) Diversification.
In dealing with these alternatives, Hussey debated three 
different philosophical approaches towards making the final 
choice of strategy - 'satisficing, optimising and adaptavising' 
as developed by Ackoff (1970). The satisficing approach 
was, in effect, similar to that proposed by Ansoff since, 
although he postulated the setting of optimal objectives for 
a firm,his adaptive search process produces a result which is 
'satisfizing rather than optimising' its behaviour. This was 
because a course 'is accepted if it substantially closes the 
gap'. However, it is interesting to note that the Ackoff 
description of 'satisficing' was that 'It usually yields 
conservative plans that comfortably continue most current 
policies, correcting only obvious deficiencies. Such planning 
therefore appeals to organisations that are more concerned with 
survival than growth.
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Hussey (l9?4) added that satisficing planners produce ’one point'
plans i.e. plans containing a single set of strategies and
related forecasts and commented that ’Thus an artificial
certainty is given to all planned actions. As it is assumed
that the organisation is flexible enough to cope with the unexpected,
there are seldom formal systems for monitoring and controlling
the plans.'
Hussey stated further that the ’optimising planner takes a 
completely different view of his job. He aims always to take the 
best course of action and relies heavily on operational research 
and mathematical models. He formulates all of his objectives 
and goals in quantified terms - and tends to ignore all those 
which he cannot so quantify.’ Ackoff’s view on this was that 
’This can distort the value of his work and produce justifiable 
discomfort in the consuming managers who must moderate 
quantitative results with their own qualitative judgements on 
important problems which have not been taken into account.’
Hussey has declared himself as having a bias towards 'adaptavising 
planning' although he added that 'as in so many other aspects of 
management there is probably no one correct measure.' He 
explained that : -
- 'Adaptavising is accompanied by the belief that the main
value of planning lies in the process and not the plans 
themselves'
- 'The adaptavisor believes that another main purpose of his
plans is to prevent crises from arising - to adapt the 
organisation and systems so that difficulties are avoided'
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The adaptavisor identifies certainty, or virtual certainty, 
where 'the best solution is to ensure that adequate plans 
are made and actions committed so that the company may 
exploit these events.' He also identifies risks, in 
terms of ’varying degrees of probability’ where he 'will 
prepare a series of contingency plans to cover every 
foreseeable possibility'
Hussey's views on the determination of possible strategic 
alternatives involved the 'management team rather than the 
planning staff alone' and are summed up in the following 
quotation:-
'There are probably three main schools of thought over the way 
in which the strategic net should be cast when the company begins 
to fish for its alternatives. The first is that it should be 
solely an opportunist. Full-scale selection and screening 
techniques as described here are not required under these 
circumstances: all that the company need do is to try to keep 
itself in the situation where opportunities come its way. The 
second school of thought is that the net should be thrown as 
wide as it will stretch in an effort to draw in every single 
opportunity that it is humanly possible to identify. This 
needs a_ very extensive screening and evaluation process which, 
for many companies, may be beyond their resources. The third 
school of thought is that most chief executives are only able to 
work in certain industry areas and have a definite concept of 
the type of activity they would be prepared to take their 
companies into. In effect the broad field is described in the 
company's objectives, and it would be wasting effort to try to 
fish for opportunities in other areas. Even so, the size of the 
fishing ground may still be very extensive. As with so many 
other aspects of corporate planning, the 'right' answer is the 
one that fits the company. And as the company develops and 
changes so it may change its viewpoint and find another 'right' 
answer.'
He described screening out strategic alternatives, arranging 
them in recommended selection order and evaluating their 
prospects as 'an important staff planning function' but that the 
task of final selection should be dealt with by the management
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team. His approach to the processes of screening, grading and 
evaluating were largely geared to the use of computer models 
and particularly those which use a simulation approach and 
which thus enable each alternative to be 'evaluated on a case 
study approach' whilst, at the same time, considering 'sensitivity'
and 'risk' analysis. The use of such models will be considered 
in Chapter 4.
Returning to the model in Fig. 3»2., it is now appropriate to 
consider 'The Strategic Plan' which follows the determination of 
strategy. Argenti (1974) did not deal specifically with the 
need for a strategic plan and moved from determining a strategic 
structure to setting targets for parts of the firm. However, in 
his 1980 book, he perceived the need for the preparation of a 
'five-year budget that shows everyone how the performance of the 
whole company - the existing parts of the company together with 
any new additions called for by the strategies - matches up to 
the corporate targets, how the resources are to be allocated, 
how the total cash requirements are to be met, and so on.'
Hussey (1974), considered the content of a strategic plan in detail, 
however, without confusing matters by the use of the term 
'budget'. He developed a framework for the content of the 
strategic plan which is summarised below:-
a) Introduction
Describing the scope of the plan and its relationship with 
other plans
b) Assumptions
Those on which depend a proper understanding of the plan
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c) Primary Objective
'A statement of the profit objectives of the company, 
expressed in the way that is most useful for the company*
d) Secondary Objectives and Constraints
'The statements of purpose and other similar objectives 
should be clearly stated, as should the self imposed 
constraints under which the company intends to operate'
e) Strengths, Weaknesses : The Current Situation
'The main strengths and weaknesses of the company as 
defined in the corporate appraisal and subsequent work*
f) Statement of Expected Results
Containing 'the key figures using the company's standard 
accounting definitions'. This should 'illustrate profits, 
cash flow, and the main efficiency ratios'
g) Risk and Sensitivity
'Although risk should have been taken into account during 
the strategic selection process, whatever strategies are 
finally selected will still carry some risks'
h) Strategies
- By 'present operations' and the 'strategic alternatives' 
described earlier with their sub-divisions, as appropriate.
- By 'business centre' for each.
- By 'geographical area of operation'
- By 'order of importance to the company'
This summary should give an account of the main actions 
proposed in the fields of 'marketing, production, 
acquisition and divestment. It should also show 
organisational changes which result from these 
strategies, manpower policies, financial policies and
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where relevant, ancillary policies such as public 
relations.'
i) Contingency Strategies
Details of 'strategic courses of action reserved for 
contingency purposes.' He added in this regard that 
'In ideal circumstances, every strategy should have a 
portfolio of contingency plans' but 'in practice it is 
usually necessary to concentrate on a few key areas, where
failure would have a significant effect.'
This structure took Hussey into the areas of financial planning, 
organisation and manpower planning as elements of the strategic
effort. He regarded each as one of the components of strategy.
In regard to financial planning, he considered that financial 
plans will 'positively identify the financial needs, problems 
and opportunities' which 'has real value when it is overlaid by 
the financial strategy which will involve the selection of the 
means of financing, management of surplus funds, ways of avoiding 
the incidence of taxation and changes in the company's general 
policies.' He added that 'Financial strategic decisions may act 
as a constraint on broader strategic thinking drawing the 
investment line which the company may not overstep’ or acting as 
'a goal to stimulate further capital investment so that liquid 
balances are reduced.'
Organisation and manpower planning were seen similarly with a 
need to develop a strategy for each to ensure that they match 
future needs. The manpower planning was stated as requiring, 
inter alia, a personnel strategy, which should include an
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industrial relations plan, ^
Moving away from the strategic area, the model in Fig. 3*2. 
takes us into the area of tactical planning, although the model, 
itself, is unclear as to the precise dividing line. This is 
generally regarded as relating to the development of the detailed 
'action' plans (or 'programming' - Anthony and Dearden, I98O) 
required after determination of the strategies and the strategic 
plans, and can presumably be related to the four headings in the 
Urwick Orr model - 'Organisation Planning, Product/Market 
Development Planning, Resource Development Planning and 
Operations Planning' (see Fig. 3*2.).
This approach was similar to that discussed by Ansoff (1963) who 
recommended the creation of three plans after the preparation 
of a 'strategic plan' which itself summarises 'objectives, 


















This element of the process is often described under a single 
heading - the preparation of 'Operating Plans'. Indeed this 
description was used by Hussey (19?4) as his next stage in the 
process of corporate planning. He distinguished two types of 
operating plans - long term and short term and described these 
elements of the process as 'One of the foundations of a sound
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corporate planning process' which places 'each operational 
area within the overall strategic framework.' The length of 
time covered by the long term operating plans was considered 
to be about five years but perhaps even longer with full details 
of what is expected to occur, particularly in terras of marketing 
and production. The case was made strongly for full involvement 
of the managers responsible for the implementation in this 
element of the process. Hussey added that 'having decided the 
broad parameters, the chief executive should expect the line 
managers themselves to demonstrate what they should do with the 
area of business entrusted to them and how they intend to go 
about providing their share of the action which will attain the 
corporate objectives.'
Thus, the tactical decision making, within the framework of the 
agreed strategy, would be left to line management down to the 
level appropriate to the organisation. The level, according to 
Hussey was 'any major unit' where the 'prime responsibility to 
prepare a long range (operating) plan must fall upon the man in 
charge' with the assistance of 'all senior managers with a major 
responsibility for a part of that unit.'
In regard to short-term operating plans, Hussey described these 
as the 'tactical plans' and as an expansion of 'part of the 
long-range (operating) plan*, probably covering a period of 
'a year'. The period of a year was chosen by Hussey because 
'a year is a reasonable amount of time to handle in detail and 
has the added advantage that it can be closely linked with the 
annual budget. Thus, the annual operating plan and the budget
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become two sides of the same coin, and together provide 
documentation that is capable of tight management control.'
Hussey related both the long and short term operating plans to 
project plans which 'have a time-span which is related to the 
project itself.' These project plans cover not only investment 
projects but also 'marketing of a new project' and 'development 
of a new technology.' He added that 'Ideally there should never 
be a need to investigate a project unless this has appeared in 
the long-range plans' but he accepted that this can happen 
particularly where 'new opportunities' or 'environmental 
changes' arise. He considered that project planning needs to be 
'a sub-system in the corporate planning process' the components 
of which are 'a method of short term capital budgeting; a 
routine which ensures that each step in the project planning 
process is undertaken at the right time ; rules for the appraisal 
of capital expenditure; and a method of control.'
This tactical area of corporate planning leads into the question 
of implementation of the strategy through implementation of the 
'action' or 'operating' plans and, thus, the stages of 
monitoring progress and taking control decisions. These latter 
stages, which were not identified in the Urwick Orr model
(Figure 3*2.), involve the use of budgets which are discussed
in procedural terms in Chapter 4.
Hussey (1974) regarded budgets as follows - 'I like to think of
the annual budget as the quantification in financial terms of 
the annual operating plans, which itself derives - as we have
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seen - from the long range plans.* This approach was similar to 
that of Higgins (I980) who considered that the budgeting process 
’provides the essential quantification of the first year of the 
plan. ’ Hussey went on to explain that actual results should be 
monitored not only against the budget but against the operating 
plan and, thus, against the strategy. He made the point strongly 
that, from the monitoring element, emerges the need for corporate 
planning to be a rolling process with a need to recognise that 
the operating plans and even the strategy will need to be revised 
on a regular basis, usually annually. However, he added that 
•When a fundamental change occurs it may be necessary to update 
a part or all of the plan outside the normal planning cycle - 
a ,task made easier where the company has contingency plans.'
He also recommended preparation of a yearly report on the planning 
activity as part of the corporate plan revision cycle. This 
report would be designed to identify
- 'A comparison of progress of the company against its 
long-range plans, including a note of revisions to plan 
which may have been made from time to time.
- An analysis of the progress of the past year, its successes 
or failures and the reasons for variances.
- The implications of the past year on future plans.
- Ways in which the planning procedure may be improved.'
It is clear that the process of corporate planning as discussed 
in the foregoing has obvious organisational implications. No 
organisation could embark upon such an all-embracing management 
process without it affecting the management style and, according 
to changes in strategy, the organisation structure. Indeed, it
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was observed by Chandler as far back as 1962 that strategy 
('in time') determined structure.
Argenti (1974) argued,in respect of the structural changes
required to implement corporate planning,that 'there are
probably three stages of development through which corporate
planning will pass in any company.' Firstly, it would have no
formal system and would either not be making strategic decisions
or would make them in an ad hoc way. Secondly, as the company
grows, it would 'either form a planning committee, or nominate
a systems supervisor, or appoint a corporate planner or form a
corporate planning department.' At this stage, Argenti argued
that 'the chief executive will play a major role in and show
close concern for, the corporate planning activities.' The
third stage was said to occur 'when corporate planning becomes
part and parcel of the way the company is managed.' At this
stage, Argenti argued that corporate planning 'becomes informal
again but ingrained and habitual among the senior executives.'
He continued by adding the following statement
'It will then no longer be necessary to employ a formal 
system designed to force management attention on to 
strategic questions. Indeed the senior executives may 
come to accept that strategic planning is their main task 
and will increasingly delegate short terra management 
problems to carefully chosen subordinates. When that 
stage is reached, and few companies in the World had 
reached it by the early Seventies, it may be possible to 
eliminate the post of corporate planner and to abolish 
the corporate planning department. At least it may be 
desirable to move the corporate planner into a Management 
Services Department along with other specialists in 
operations research, behavioural science, commercial law
and so on .......  from there he will be able to advise
on planning technicalities.'
This third stage, seems to the author to be rather idealistic 
and it is generally accepted that the process of corporate
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planning can only be properly effected with the preparation of 
formal corporate plans under the coordinating influence of a 
corporate planner/department. Indeed, Hussey (1974) remarked 
that ‘Much of the impact of corporate planning throughout the 
World still depends upon the professional corporate planner,’
He argued that it was necessary for the corporate planner to 
be at the right level of seniority, a person who would be 'on 
equal terms with the senior management of that company. He 
should be a member of the board or management executive 
committee.' This was considered necessary because he needs to 
develop a 'rapport' with the chief executive and should function 
as 'an extension of the chief executive' with 'mutual support 
and confidence.'
He continued by arguing that the corporate planning function has 
to operate at both the 'strategic (the duty of the chief 
executive and his team) and the operational (the duty of line 
managers) levels' and facilitate their integration. He added 
the very telling remark, however, that
'At all times it is worth remembering that the real planners 
in any company are the managers. The job of the planner is 
to make things happen; to coordinate all planning efforts ; 
to help the company more clearly see the issues that affect 
its future and the alternative paths it may take to 
systemise planning procedures in the company, including 
control methods; to analyse and evaluate various issues ; to 
draw the plans together. It is no part of the planner's 
job to replace any manager's duty to perform the planning 
elements of management.'
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This description was followed by the suggestion that ’a large 
planning department is something to be avoided' with the 
contention that 'As a general principle it may be said that 
the employment of every additional person in the planning 
department is a relative degree of failure, something to be 
undertaken only when it is essential that no other answer is 
possible.' Instead, Hussey argued that the planning process 
should involve 'as many of the company's employees in the system 
as is humanly possible.' This was essentially a modular approach 
whereby the various departments in an organisation are responsible 
for their own elements of the process with the corporate planning 
department performing a coordinating role. This included the 
provision of specialist advice which Argenti (1974) argued should 
be obtained from existing specialist departments, rather than by 
adding specialists to the corporate planning department.
Additionally, Hussey considered that, in larger companies with 
divisions, subsidiaries, etc., it was appropriate to 'put 
divisional planning managers in the major divisions or
subsidiaries of the company, reporting to the chief executive
of that division or subsidiary, with a functional relationship 
to the central planning manager.'
In summary, it is clear that the process of corporate planning 
represents a considerable step forward in the field of
management; so much so that it represents a recipe for a 'way of
management' which is complete in itself absorbing all other 
processes and techniques. As such, it may be that it cannot be 
followed by a better approach, but merely further refinements
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within the scope of the overall process as discussed.
Such a statement begs the question 'has corporate planning 
paid-off in the organisations in which it has been introduced?’ 
There are relatively few answers to this question to be found 
in the literature; it clearly being a very difficult question to 
answer. What published responses exist stem from surveys of 
organisations as distinct from the sort of in-depth study that 
is required to be taken in this research (i.e. in respect of 
the BRB).
In the USA there have been a number of such surveys. That 
published by Ansoff, Brandenburg, Fortner and Rodosevich (1970) 
provided statistical evidence that 'planning paid off in 
connection with the success of acquisitions in American firms.
Tn respect of relative economic performance. Bowman added in 
1976 that the return on investment in large firms engaged in 
corporate planning (over a period of five years) was better than 
that for firms which did not. The differences were significant 
in that the median ROI for the top quartile - those who were 
engaged in corporate planning - was 17.1% and the bottom 
quartile - those who did not - was 5*9%.
Thune and House (1972) conducted a survey of six U.S. Industrial 
groups involving what they described as 'formal' and 'informal' 
planners, measuring their performance in terras of increases 
in sales, increases in earnings per share, increases in earnings 
on capital employed and increases in earnings on assets. Their 
results showed that formal planners performed better than
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informal planners.
An international survey, covering firms in Australia, Canada, 
Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom, conducted by 
Steiner and Schollhammer (1975) discovered that in all countries 
except Japan, at least 75% of the planners consulted were not 
dissatisfied with the results they had obtained. Further their 
satisfaction was generally greater in firms which had adopted 
formal corporate planning arrangements and had more experience 
of that process.
■In the United Kingdom, Shawki and Grinyer, conducted a survey 
in 1974 which covered 48 companies covering many different 
industries and with annual sales varying from ^9a to £l500m 
(median £190m). This survey sought to ascertain what the managers 
of the companies perceived were the main improvements in general 
performance as a result of corporate planning. Overall, 44% 
expressed satisfaction with their planning systems with 
perceived benefits in some areas being particularly significant. 
These perceived benefits are summarised in Table 3*1»
Clearly, the managers responding to the survey were of the 
opinion that there were identifiable benefits, although it is 
interesting to note that less than half perceived an improvement 
in profits and growth. ^This survey confirmed the results of an 
American survey conducted by Aquilar, Howard and Vanoil in
1970.
A later survey(conducted in 1976) by Higgins and Finn called for
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Per cent
Perceived improvements in - of respondents
1. Awareness of problems, strengths
and weaknesses 89.4
2. Profit and growth 4?.9
3. Information and communication 39.6
4. Systematic resource allocation 35.4
9. Coordination and control 29.2
6. Morale and industrial relations l6,7
7. Quantification 4,2
Table 3.1. Perceived Improvements Resulting from
Corporate Planning (Shawki and Grinyer)
subjective assessments of a marginally different nature. They 
obtained the cooperation of 96 UK companies with annual sales 
from £l9m to £2000m and asked the Planning Executives and the 
Chief Executives to assess success of their company’s corporate 
planning on a four point scale. The Planning Executive's views 
are summarised in Table 3.2.
Success of 
Planning
Length of Time (i.e. Experience) :in Planning -
2 2 - 5 6 - 1 0 7 - 10 Total
0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/
il il il To
Great Success 0 0 3 5 6
Success 3 13 19 19 54
Limited Success 0 19 16 5 40
Failure 0 _0 _0 _0 __0
1 12 27 100
Table 3.2. Success of Planning - Planning Executives' Views 
(Higgins and Finn)_______________________________
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This table indicates a generally favourable attitude in the part 
of the Planning Executives which was surpassed by the views of 
the Chief Executives. The latter group were asked a slightly 
different question, the results of which appear in Table 3»3«




No Benefit  -
100
Table 3.3. Values of Planning - Chief Executives’ Views 
(Higgins and Finn)____________________________
Clearly, the published evidence suggests that corporate planning 
has generally ’paid off. It will be seen in later chapters 
whether that generalisation can be applied to the British 
Railways Board.
3.2. Corporate Planning Process - A Synthesis of General Theory 
It would be quite possible to conduct the research in the four 
chosen organisations and produce information which can be 
related back to the theoretical position expressed in the previous 
section. However, as intimated at the beginning of this chapter, 
this might tend to be somewhat unstructured and possibly confusing 
Consequently, it is intended in this section, to prepare a brief 
synthesis of the theoretical situation, based on a model of the 
general process, or what the author perceives to more or less 
constitute the general process of corporate planning.
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This will have a two-fold benefit. Firstly, it will be a useful 
model in itself, rather more so than any examined during the 
literature search. This observation is not meant to be a 
fundamental criticism since most academics in this field have 
produced useful models for parts of the process and have often 
explained these in depth. Secondly, it will provide a solid 
foundation for the practical comparison ensuring a common 
understanding of terms and their relationships. However, this 
does not mean that no cross-referencing will be made in later 
chapters against specifically attributed items in Section 3«i«
The author's general normative model of the process of corporate 
planning is provided in Fig. 3 «5. It covers the process 
within the various definitions given in Section 3.1. and within 
the author's own definition which is as followsî-
Corporate planning is the process by which a business or 
other type of organisation can define and continually 
re-define its overall role, purpose and direction, and 
systematically move towards and monitor their achievement.
As such, the model confirms that the process of corporate 
planning is meant to be a total way of management, not just a 
technique or even a collection of techniques. To appreciate 
this further it is considered by the author to be useful to
examine briefly each of its stages in turn and then take a fresh
view of the model in its totality.
It will be seen that the model starts with the determination of
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Figure 3*5 - A Model of the Process of Corporate Planning.
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shape of the 'values’ which may have taken a long time to evolve. 
These values may be extremely varied in nature and cover a host 
of items which suit the requirements of the organisation. For 
example, it might have developed a fairly clear-cut social and 
environmental philosophy which is linked to attitudes towards 
product quality, service, location of markets, disposition 
towards external rules and regulations, employment of manpower, 
use of materials, environmental pollution and many other matters. 
Further examples of values may be disposition towards change, 
survival consciousness, and attitudes towards growth rates, 
market position, technical innovation and financial gearing.
In a business corporation or other non-public organisation, these 
values will be influenced mainly by those of its top management, 
shareholders, employees, customers and Government. As the power 
balance between these sections changes, so will the values of 
the organisation change. In nationalised industries and other 
public organisations, the nature of the influences is similar 
but Government has more influence and top management less. In 
these circumstances, values are often partially imposed by rules 
and regulations which reflect the values of another tier of 
management (i.e. the Government) which equally often have 
fundamentally different motives, aspirations and timescales to 
those of commercial organisations or, indeed, to the Boards of 
the nationalised industries. Ideally, these values should be 
discussed and agreed before the later stages of the corporate 
planning process are undertaken.
The values attempt to sum up major influences and set a
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consistent pattern of response to them. In an ideal world, 
this would be dealt with at the outset, since the response is 
critical to the further elements of the model. Since every 
step of the model is subject to a large number of influences, 
the key issue would be to sort out and weigh the major 
influences at this point into a summary of values which then 
become guiding principles. This aggregation of values is not 
easy. Even in theoretical terms, there are difficult conceptual 
problems which relate to the quantification and comparison of 
qualitative variables such as ambition and emotions. In the 
practical world, this is further complicated by the political 
processes that either explicitly or implicitly, openly or 
covertly, affect the determination of values. However, 
irrespective of the method by which they are determined or 
whether they are expressed in formal or informal terms, these 
values are a necessary pre-requisite for the determination of 
’policies' and 'objectives'. Moreover, there can be little 
doubt as to their existence if objective setting is undertaken 
in an explicit form. They represent in many ways the culture 
of the organisation and the overall response to the question 
'what business are we in?' They relate fundamentally to the 
management style and are often the result of an evolutionary 
process. In practice, values held are frequently implicit 
rather than explicit, but the decision-makers should strive 
to make them more explicit. This eases the conceptual problems 
of measurement and comparison, and facilitates the development 
of a questioning approach which is important in corporate 
planning.
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Following the steps in the model, one proceeds to the term 
’policies’, which may be defined for the purpose of this 
exposition as a set of internal, often ethical, rules and 
regulations which stem from some of the values and act as a 
set of constraints on the strategy. Like the values, the 
policies would normally be quite varied in nature and might 
cover, in considerable detail, attitudes towards such matters 
as capitalisation, quality of product and service, employment 
in a particular area, ethical codes of practice, obedience to 
the laws of any country, trade union membership, marketing in 
a particular area, safety and advertising. It may be 
considered from this explanation that the policies can be 
merely repetition of the values. Indeed, to some extent they 
are, but there are distinct differences. Values provide an 
overall scale of needs and aspirations, and policies provide 
rules and regulations on how the organisation is to behave in 
society. Thus, policies may provide detailed analyses of the 
vital constraints on the running of the organisation. Even in 
a formal corporate planning environment, values and policies 
may be more often implicit than explicit but, ideally, they 
should be the latter, since implementation of plans is largely 
dependent upon the understanding of those responsible for the 
achievement of the ’objectives’.
This is even more necessary in the determination of ’objectives’ 
which has been described in the model as the ’purpose’ of the 
organisation. The expression of objectives allows the 
conversion of the values into concrete anticipated results. 
Objectives should not be pious hopes, but represent the expected
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and well defined attainment level given the ’strategy' and 
’strategic plans' which follow (as influenced by the policies) 
and the level of ambition created at the values stage. They 
should be fairly long term and may cover about 3 years, 10 years, 
13 years or even longer if considered necessary. Most 
organisations would consider 10 or 13 years more than adequate, 
bearing in mind that, as will be seen later, corporate planning 
is an ongoing process. However, the length of time is best 
determined by the nature of the organisation and its competitive 
environment. A further determining factor should be the nature 
of the main assets employed and, in particular, their expected 
useful life. Thus, for example, a bus operator renewing his 
fleet every five to eight years may be happy to look 3 to 10 
years ahead. On the other hand, a manufacturer of petroleum 
products requiring heavy investment in refinery plant might 
require a much longer term view, to justify the potential of 
his prime investment.
As observed in Section 3»1- some authors have expounded the 
primacy of financial objectives, in the shape of such outcomes 
as return on investment. Other such objectives could be return 
on capital employed, return on share capital, absolute level of 
profits, absolute value of assets, earnings per share or level 
of dividend. These issues are very important and one or more 
financial" objective will almost certainly be chosen as 
part of the total package of objectives for any organisation. 
However, the author would contend, with some support from the 
theories examined in Section 3.1, that corporate planning is 
incomplete with financial objectives alone. The objectives of 
an organisation should embrace other facets of the values, as
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relevant and be as specific as possible in the form of a list 
of aspired outcomes covering all key issues. These might 
include various outcomes such as financial (perhaps more than 
one), market share and distribution, product/service quality 
and distribution, manpower and employee satisfaction, technical 
innovation, social, environmental and corporate images.
The alternative approach which regards non-financial aspirations 
as constraints on achievement of the over-riding financial 
objectives is, in the opinion of the author, gradually being 
regarded as being out of step with the times, with organisations 
wishing to develop and display their social awareness apart from 
establishing quasi-financial objectives such as market share or 
plant capacity. In addition, it is as well to note that, during 
the last ten years or so, public and Government pressure has 
tended to make organisations more aware of their wider social 
responsibilities and has created the growing demand that they 
become more accountable for their actions. Some of this pressure 
has produced legal constraints in the United Kingdom such as 
legislation concerned with race relations, equal pay, employment 
protection and various measures covering environmental pollution. 
These add to the need for the development of non-financial 
objectives, rather than merely regarding them as constraints 
working against the financial objectives, or just necessary 
conditions of financial achievement.
In a business corporation or other non-public organisation, the 
objectives will be set by the top management in line with their 
values which in turn would recognise the outside influences
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noted earlier. In a public organisation, including the nationalised 
industries, there may be laid-down objectives which result from 
rather selective laid-down values. More likely, however, there 
will be a minimum financial objective coupled perhaps, but often 
without (as will be seen later), a minimum product/service 
objective. However, some discretion usually remains with the 
top management who can thus expand or extend the objectives, 
as they consider necessary but again as influenced by Government 
departments.
The model in Figure 3»3« describes the next stage as the 
determination of 'goals'. The goals of an organisation need to 
be absolutely specific and represent a quantified sub-division 
of the objectives, usually in the form of a set of targets 
involving numbers and dates. As such, they are 'marker points' 
on the road to the objectives and are needed to assess progress 
at every level which follows. The choice of goals needs to be 
undertaken with considerable care and realism, since they are 
often crucial to determining the suitability of the objectives 
and monitoring subsequent progress. Most objectives can be 
subdivided into goals and every effort should be made to ensure 
that this occurs. However, it is recognised that there might be 
some objectives which do not lend themselves to this sort of 
quantification. This might be the case, for example, in the area 
of social objectives. However, it is important to make such 
aspirations as explicit and tangible as possible.
The most difficult area of the model follows and that relates 
to the determination of 'strategy' which, in line with the
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objectives, should also be long term. As noted in Section 
the term strategy denotes the direction in which action should 
be taken to achieve the objectives and the intermediate goals. 
Thus, it represents the 'means' to achieve the objectives which 
become the 'ends'. Strategy sets the direction in which the 
organisation will grow and develop (or decline). In itself, 
it results in no action. That depends on the 'plans' which 
follow.
The development of strategy requires both an external and internal 
appraisal of present and future circumstances. The external 
appraisal amounts to a detailed examination of the organisation's 
environment, not just as it is but as it is expected to change 
and even how the organisation's strategy might change it. This 
would normally be translated into a series of planning 
assumptions. The internal appraisal consists of an examination 
of the organisation's strengths and weaknesses including an 
assessment of how they too can be changed.
The very nature of the process of strategy formulation makes 
it essentially a headquarter's process, capable of arriving at 
strategies which might not be even postulated at a lower level.
It is clear from the literature search information given in 
Section 3*1., that the determination of strategy involves 'gap' 
analysis, strategy creation, strategy evaluation and strategy 
selection, all of which involve a large amount of forecasting.
This is an extremely difficult process which, on the evidence 
provided, requires a considerable amount of time, thought, skill 
and effort.
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The author considers that it is not practical for him to 
recommend that an organisation must follow the Argenti approach, 
the Ansoff approach, or any other ’comprehensive' approach since 
the determination of strategy is partly a political process 
and may only be as good as the skills of the people involved 
and the attitudes which they bring to bear on the problem.
Thus his view on this process is, therefore, that it is only 
practical for top management in any organisation to proceed as 
their values, objectives and policies dictate and as time, 
skills and resources permit. However, they should attempt to be 
as knowledgeable as possible about the potential benefit of adopt­
ing a structured approach similar to one of those outlined in 
Section 3»1« and, wherever possible, make use of computer 
models to assist the strategy evaluation and selection process.
Additionally, the author considers it important to produce, 
evaluate and select contingency strategies which can be input 
into the strategic plan. These would be based largely on 
events contained within the external appraisal to which 
particular risks should be ascribed. Again, computer models 
(sensitivity and risk analysis as described in Chapter 4) might 
be used in this part of the process.
Having determined the sense of direction, the next stage in the 
model in Figure 3»5« is the preparation of a 'strategic plan' 
which converts the selected strategy into approximate actions 
and consequences with associated forecasts. This should be 
long term also, but be more refined in the earlier years to 
correspond with the later stages of the model. The forecasts
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used at this stage would largely be those already available from 
the strategy selection stage, but in more detail. Its content 
would be in the shape of anticipated yearly/year-end financial 
and physical position statements, assuming a staged 
implementation of the strategy, but without the precise details 
of the year-to-year actions having been established - only their 
broad outline. Again, details of the chosen contingency 
strategies would be required, in the form of a contingency 
plan stating, broadly, the revised strategies to be followed 
and their expected outcomes. This should be preceded by details 
of the impact on the strategic plan forecasts if the contingent 
events occur without any of the contingency plans being brought 
into effect.
To make the strategic plan into a comprehensible document, it 
would be necessary to provide a preamble dealing with values, 
policies, objectives and goals. By doing this, the strategic 
plan becomes what many organisations (including those covered 
in this research) describe as 'the corporate plan'.
The strategic plan would provide the basis for a more detailed 
'action' or 'operating plan' which represent relatively firm 
proposals, covering a shorter timescale, and not broad 
statements of intent. Indeed, whilst a strategic plan would 
contain forecasts broadly answering the question 'whatshould 
we reasonably achieve within the strategy?', the action plan 
would be concerned with making a series of medium term choices 
relating to what should be done at the tactical level and, 
moreover, determining appropriate courses of action through which
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this may be achieved. Such action plans would need to be 
jointly prepared and agreed by headquarters and the local 
management responsible for their implementation. These 
courses of action would also involve forecasts for the medium 
term, e.g. about two to five years ahead. The information 
(i.e. actions) contained within an action plan should be in 
considerable detail to ensure that there is no doubt as to 
their timing or what is intended of them. They would cover 
areas such as:-
- Corporate development, e.g. specific and dated decisions 
on diversification and major investment
- Marketing (and distribution) e.g. product development, 
pricing and advertising
- Production (and supply) e.g. new production methods, new 
installations and changed levels of resources
- Manpower - e.g. requirements, supply and conditions of 
service
- Finance - e.g. detailed forecasts in profit and loss / cash 
flow, format, investment requirements and 'pay-offs' and 
sources of finance.
At this stage,the emphasis with respect to forecasting moves 
towards the area of investigating the future results of tactical 
decisions that may be taken within the confines of the strategy. 
This would be achieved by forecasting the likely outcome of a 
number of tactical alternative courses of action in some detail 
and then selecting those thought to best fit the strategy. No 
account would be taken of the 'strategic' contingency plans in 
this stage of the process, the assumption being that the chosen
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strategy will be implemented.
Moving further down the model, it is necessary for the budget 
stage to represent a commitment to the first year of the action 
plan agreed at all management levels. This process requires 
the establishment of separate budgets for resources, profit and 
loss and cash flow within each functional department and below.
The interface between action plans and budgets is important 
because it represents a change of flow within the planning process. 
Whereas the stages of the model prior to the action plan stage 
would be a headquarters activity, the budget stage intimately 
involves managers at all levels. Moreover the budget stage 
requires information being built up from the lowest levels 
of the organisation and ’negotiated' at each level above. This 
'bottom-up' approach may be contrasted with the 'top-down' approach­
es of the earlier stages of the model, the two coming together 
at the action plan stage, that action plan having been jointly 
prepared. As such, the criteria for acceptance of the budget 
(and investment projects) becomes its compatibility with the 
action plan.
The model continues with 'implementation', 'feedback' and 
'control'. The term implementation is self-explanatory but 
the others require some comment. The feedback process implies 
the generation of information concerning the success of the 
implementation measured in the light of all the previous stages, 
so that corrective action may be taken if necessary. Control 
means taking the corrective action required by receipt of this 
knowledge, which may require that action be taken at any one.
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or a combination of, the earlier stages. Feedback and control 
measures would, in an ideal world, be automatically generated 
and based on a continuous supply of information. However, apart 
from continuous budget monitoring and regular monitoring of 
implementation of the action plan (perhaps quarterly), a regular 
(at the end of each planning cycle - usually annually) 
examination of and report on the progress towards achieving 
the forecasts contained within and the underlying philosophies 
of the earlier stages of the model is needed.
The continuous nature of planning is recognised in the model.
This is achieved by using a 'rolling' system frequently 
updating the forecasts. The planning cycle, as this is often 
called, would usually be annual. Furthermore, the interactive 
nature of planning is explicitly recognised in the model by 
assuming that each stage within the model may react on one 
preceding it, and others, and require their revision. For 
example, if a strategy cannot be found to meet the objectives 
then some change in the objectives may be necessary. The arrows 
in the model identify this process. Taking the example just 
mentioned, the arrow leading from strategy direct to feedback 
would be the route taken if such a situation arose. This in turn 
might lead to a reassessment of the objectives, values or 
policies of the organisation.
From this description of the corporate planning process, it can 
readily be observed that it absorbs financial planning, 
manpower planning, marketing planning and production planning 
into one coordinated activity. Financial planning is, therefore, 
concerned with the financial elements of each stage in the
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process and not merely selected items such as budgetary control. 
Likewise, manpower planning is concerned with the manpower 
elements of each stage of the process. However, corporate 
planning is not merely the sum of these elements of planning 
but is concerned with harnessing them to produce a state of 
compatibility and combined purpose which creates a synergy-like 
situation from which benefits ought be accrued in addition to 
the sum of the benefits derived from the individual parts. Thus, 
as discussed earlier, it is not just a technique but a 'way of 
management'.
To take this point a stage further, it is considered by the 
author that an organisation could, however, arrange its 
financial planning process with almost the same degree of 
comprehensiveness. This could be achieved by creating 
financial objectives only. In these circumstances, the other 
elements would become secondary and would not be subject to the 
objective setting process. Indeed, the author is of the opinion 
that it is the presence of non-financial objectives which 
elevates corporate planning above the level of what might 
otherwise be described as comprehensive financial planning.
This view is not shared in the literature on this subject.
This logic could be taken even further if the only objectives 
were those concerning marketing, production or manpower 
attainment. In each of those circumstances, the remaining 
elements would become of secondary importance. However, this 
situation is unlikely to exist in any organisation since 
financial objectives are almost certain to be required. Thus,
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in the model which has been outlined, the presence of non- 
financial as well as financial objectives is, in the opinion of 
the author, of paramount importance in the establishment of a 
theoretically correct corporate planning process. With 
financial objectives alone, organisations undertaking what they 
may describe as corporate planning are undertaking a form of 
financial planning which is more sophisticated than that term 
is usually meant to imply.
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CHAPTER 4
CORPORATE PLANNING THEORY - PROCEDURES
The theoretical process of corporate planning discussed in 
Chapter 3 requires a considerable related body of theory in 
what the author has chosen to describe as procedural issues. 
This chapter examines some of the theoretical work which exists 
in this area under the following headings:-
4.1. Forecasting
4.2. Model Building
4.3. Risk and Sensitivity Analysis
4.4. Budgetary Control
In doing this, only those aspects demonstrated in the 
literature to be most vital to the main purposes of this thesis 
will be discussed. However, it has been necessary for the 
author to make a decision on what topics might not be covered 
in this chapter. This was a very difficult decision to make, 
in that corporate planning is such an all-embracing process 
that there is hardly a management process or procedure that 
could, theoretically, be omitted. For example, theories on 
marketing, pricing, decision-making, capital budgeting, costing 
and organisational development could perhaps have been included 
in this chapter or in Chapter 3» In the event, the author has 
again taken a lead from the literature on corporate planning 
which, to the extent that the writers have considered such 
issues at all, have tended to deal with aspects of the topics 
which are discussed in this chapter.
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4.1. Forecasting
It was established in Chapter 3 that, at nearly all of the 
stages of the corporate planning process, it is necessary 
for the forecasts to be prepared to facilitate decision making. 
Indeed, Argenti (1974) stated that 'A very large proportion of 
the time devoted to corporate planning is spent on forecasting.' 
These forecasts might be in respect of the anticipated position 
before or after a planning decision or, frequently, both.
In a management science sense, however, forecasting is a process 
of figure prediction which, itself, encompasses a number of 
techniques. These techniques are useful in their own right 
and many will be used in corporate planning. Which techniques 
will be used and for what purpose will depend on the stage of the 
planning process and the perceived needs of the organisation.
This is partly a question of time-scale where, for example, the 
amount of detail and accuracy required of a one-year budget 
would be greater than for the' tenth year of a strategic plan.
But, it is also a question of purpose. In an uncertain world, 
the purpose of forecasting is clear. It is to unravel some of 
the complexity that surrounds each business decision so that any 
general data available becomes information pertinent to the 
situation being studied. Wood and Fildes (1976) have described 
forecasting as an attempt to create a bridge that links data 
one currently has with data that would would like to have but 
cannot obtain directly. They go on to suggest that the purpose 
of the forecast is either to accept the forecast future and to 
make optimal decisions within the framework or, alternatively, 
to seek to influence the predicted future; that is, to change 
the forecast future. Thus, forecasting is not just a collection
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of statistical techniques; it is a managerial activity concerned 
with providing information and understanding for decisions and, 
in so doing, influencing both the decisions and the decision­
making processes.
The nature of forecasting procedures is likely to change 
depending on the level being considered within the corporate 
planning process. At the strategy evaluation level, it is 
likely that the forecasts will be naive (in the sense of a 
lack of statistical sophistication), macro (in the sense of 
looking at general trends), based on judgement, intuition, 
flair, but not on extrapolation of hard data. Furthermore, it 
is unlikely that the techniques used will be concerned with 
determining, at this stage, any causal relationships. They 
are more likely to be concerned with drawing broad scenarios 
of what may be the picture in the distant future sb> that 
planners may view the pic'tures.
This scenario building process enables the organisation to 
adopt the Wood and Fildes approach and to :-
(a) View the likely future environment and the organisation *s 
likely place in it, given its current strategic direction 
(explicit or implicit),
(b) consider how to get the best out of that scenario and/or
(c) consider how it may be possible to change that scenario 
to the advantage of the organisation.
Moving down the levels through action plans and budgets the 
nature of the forecasting procedures is changed. At the action
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plans level it will usually be necessary for the forecasts to 
become more quantitative in nature. Instead of trying to judge 
among alternatives, the forecasting emphasis would be more 
concerned with the determination of as precise an evaluation as 
possible of the selected alternatives. It might also be that 
forecasting at this stage would be concerned with investigating 
the relationships that determine the forecast variables. That 
is, the forecasting methods will be concerned with explanation 
as well as prediction. By the time the budgeting stage is 
reached the forecasts will be used in a control sense, in that 
they will provide the mechanism by which ’negotiated commitments’ 
will be achieved (see section 4.4.).
In terms of techniques, there are many forecasting techniques 
which might be used in corporate planning. Two classifications 
seem to cover the ground adequately. The first is that 
produced by Chambers, Mullick and Smith (1971)• They placed 
forecasting techniques under three headings - qualitative 
methods, time series analysis and projection methods, and 
causal methods. A summary of their approach is given in Fig. 4.1
Time-series analysis 
Qualitative and projection______  Causal
Delphi Moving average Regression model
Market research Exponential smoothing Econometric models
Panel consensus Box-Jenkins Intention to buy and
Visionary forecast X-11 anticipation surveys






Fig. 4.1. Summary of Forecasting Techniques
(Chambers, Mullick and Smith, 1971)
84
The first category might be regarded as the 'naive' type which 
would be concerned heavily with the scenario building part of 
the planning process i.e. generally in the strategy and 
strategic plan stages. Under the Delphi technique the 
forecaster can seek the advice of a panel of experts with respect 
to likely future scenarios. Unlike a 'brainstorming' exercise 
the panel makes its predictions dispassionately in the sense 
that the panelists do not meet. Instead, a questionnaire is 
usually sent to each of them to be returned to the investigator 
at the centre, who then combines the information and sends it 
back out to the panelists to see if they wish to change their 
views in the light of other experts considered opinions. This 
'to-ing and fro-ing' might go on for a number of rounds.
The important characteristic of this type of forecast is that 
it does not rely on hard data or extrapolations from the past. 
Thus, it is able to predict 'turning' points more quickly than 
statistical techniques because it does not assume that what has 
happened in the past is likely to happen again ; that is,the 
panelists do not necessarily extrapolate past trends. Argenti 
(1974) argued that 'he has the impression that this technique is 
emerging as the most popular of all the newer long range fore­
casting methods, partly perhaps because it is basically simple 
and partly because it is not essentially mathematical.'
Market research is described by Chambers et al as a 'systematic, 
formal and conscious procedure for evolving and testing 
hypotheses about real markets.' The panel consensus technique 
is based upon the assumption that several experts can create
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a better forecast than one. Under this technique communication 
is encouraged unlike the Delphi technique. The visionary- 
forecast technique is described (by Chambers et al) as ’A 
prophecy that uses personal insights, judgement, and, when possible, 
facts about different scenarios of the future. It is 
characterised by subjective guesswork and imagination; in 
general, the methods used are non-scientific.• Finally, the 
historical analogy technique is based on the assumption that 
there will be a similarity pattern relating to, for example, 
the introduction and growth of an earlier new product.
The second category of techniques rely heavily on extrapolation.
They are usually grouped under the general heading of time- 
series analysis although, as with the naive methods, there are 
many individual techniques hidden beneath this umbrella title.
The important characteristic of these techniques is that they 
are not so much interested in explanation as in prediction.
These types of forecasts are concerned with what the future is 
likely to be without attempting to explain what management 
action may be needed to ensure that future. Moreover, the 
techniques are generally univariate, i.e. only one variable is 
used in the prediction process and this tends to be time.
Thus, these techniques rely heavily on the assumption that 
what has happened.before is likely to happen again, in almost 
precisely the same form, in the future. Time-series analysis 
techniques might be used in the strategy or strategic plan 
stages of the model in Figure but are more likely to be
used in later stages of the corporate planning process, 
particularly the action plan stage.
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The moving average technique, is described by Chambers et al 
as 'Each point of a moving average of a time series is the 
arithmetic or weighted average of a number of consecutive 
points of the series, where the number of data points is chosen 
so that the effects of seasonals or irregularities or both are 
eliminated,' Exponential smoothing is similar to the moving 
average technique, except that more recent data points are 
given more weight, Under the Box-Jenkins tecknique, the time 
series that would be used in exponential smoothing is 'fitted 
with a mathematical model that is optimal in the sense that it 
assigns smaller errors to history than any other model. The 
type of model must be identified and the parameters then 
estimated.'
Chambers et al describe the X-11 technique as one which 
'decomposes a time series into seasonals, trend cycles and 
irregular elements.' Finally, the trend projection technique 
is one which fits a trend line into a mathematical equation and 
then projects it into the future.
The third class of forecasts, the causal types, usually involve 
the use of quite sophisticated statistical procedures. The 
first two and most common of these are those involved with 
multiple regression, involving analysis on a multivariate 
basis and where hard data is available. They are involved 
primarily with establishing the relationships between variables 
so that management action may be taken in the light of these 
relationships. Thus, they are concerned with explanation, 
although, of course, every explanatory model is also a
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predictive model. Causal techniques would normally be used in 
the action plan and budget stages of the corporate planning 
process.
The regression model relates a variable to other external or 
internal variables and estimates an equation using the 'least- 
squares’ technique. The econometric model takes this procedure 
further using a system of interdependent regression equations 
that describe an activity, producing a more comprehensive 
analysis and forecast.
Intention to buy and anticipation surveys are surveys of the 
general public designed to determine their intentions to buy 
a product or derive an index that indicates the present 
’feelings about the present and future and estimates how this 
feeling will affect buying habits.’ The input-output model is 
a 'method of analysis concerned with the inter-industry or 
inter-departmental flow of goods or services in the economy or 
a company and its markets. It shows what flow of inputs must 
occur to obtain certain outputs.'
The economic input-output model represents the combination of 
the input-output model and an econometric model. The diffusion 
index is an index obtained by establishing the percentage of a 
group of economic indicators that are going up or down. The 
leading indicator technique relies on a time series of an economic 
activity whose movement precedes a movement of another time 
series in the same direction. Finally, the life-cycle analysis 
attempts to identify phases of product acceptance by 'the
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various groups such as innovators, early adaptors, early 
majority, late majority and laggards.’
A second classification produced by Hussey (1974) had a large 
number of similarities in its detail, although six main 
categories were identified. His classification is summarised 
in Figure 4.2. with brief explanations in brackets where the 
Chambers et al descriptions do not match sufficiently well to 
make further description unnecessary.
1. Product Life Cycle
2. Statistical Growth Pattern
2.1. Simple Growth Pattern
2.2. Moving Averages
2.3* Exponential Smoothing 
2.4. Mathematical Trends
3. Marketing and Market Research Methods
3.1. Comparative Studies (analogous circumstances)
3.2. Leading Indicators (frequently economic indicators)
3.3. Experimental Market Research
3.4. Intention to Buy Surveys
3.5. Marketing judgement (experience and common sense)
3.6. Other Surveys, including consumer usage and attitude
surveys





Combining a group of other forecasts
6. Technological Forecasting
6.1 , Delphi Technique
6.2. Scenarios (a sequence of possible events)
6 .3 . Impact Analysis
6.4, Extrapolatiye Techniques (based on technological trends)
6 .3. Morphological Analysis (analysis of all the
technological requirements of a product and the 
relationships between them)
Fig. 4.2. Summary of Forecasting Techniques 
(Source : Hussey, 1974)
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Hussey matched this classification with a series of principles 
which can 'assist’ the choice of the ’best method.’ In brief, 
he considered that the company should recognise:-
a) The purpose of forecast and the degree of accuracy required.
b) The ability of the company to use the forecast.
c) Its cost-effectiveness.
d) Whether the technique is understandable to the management of 
the company.
e) The speed at which the forecast is needed matches the choice 
made on technical grounds.
f) The frequency with which a forecast will be made.
In a survey of 67 managers on the use of forecasting techniques,
Fildes, Jalland and Wood (1978) found that the subjective 
estimate method was by far the most used and was rated as the
most useful. A summary of their survey findings is given in
Table 4.1.
It is interesting to note that the ’subjective estimate’ 
technique was described by Chambers et al as the ’visionary
forecast’ technique but in Hussey’s list the closest comparison
is the 'Marketing Judgement’ technique. It will be seen in 
Part 3 that, no matter the words used to label the ’subjective 
estimate’ technique, it has had extensive use in the corporate 
planning activities of the four organisations covered in this 
research.
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% Managers % Managers
Used Personally Rated as Useful
Subjective estimate 66 67
Trend projection 34 64
Moving average 43 37
Graphical methods 31 63
Panel opinion / delphi 30 42
Customer / supplier surveys I6 N/A
Exponential smoothing I6 31
Econometric models 13 28
Box-Jenkins 0 3
Table 4.1. Summary of Survey on Forecasting Methods 
Used by Managers_________________________
(Source : Long Range Planning, August 1978)
It is evident from the literature, that some of the forecasts 
used in the strategic and tactical planning stages of corporate 
planning might be .in the form of, or be supported by, investment 
project appraisals. At the strategy stage of the corporate 
planning process, it is necessary to evaluate a number of 
strategic alternatives to facilitate strategy selection. 
Similarly, at the action plan stage, it is necessary to evaluate 
tactical alternatives and again make choices on how best to 
proceed. At the strategy stage, it is quite likely that 
capital investment will be a significant feature of each 
alternative. Even at the tactical level, this might well be of 
some significance.
At the policies stage of the process, it may well also be that 
a 'ceiling' level of total capital investment is fixed by the 
organisation for each year which will have a bearing on the 
project choices that are capable of being made. That situation 
is known as one of the forms of capital rationing, (Bierman and 
Smidt, 1971) and is quite prevalent. Indeed, it applies to all
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nationalised industries with the Government setting annual 
'Investment Ceilings' for up to four years ahead, subject to 
annual (at least) review.
In dealing with the appraisal of such capital expenditure, be 
it at the strategic/action plan stages, or separately as part 
of a project authorisation procedure, it is now 'almost 
universally accepted' that ' discounted cash flow' is the 
'most appropriate technique for appraisal' (Hussey, 1974), 
However, mention of the term discounted cash flow takes one 
into the area of considering the much wider topic of capital 
budgeting, the theory of which has been described by Bromwich 
(1976) as being concerned with:- 
'What specific investment projects should the firm accept?
What total amount of capital expenditure should the firm 
undertake?
How should this portfolio of projects be financed?'
This has presented the author with a dilemma of considering 
whether to :-
a) provide an exhaustive analysis of the theories connected 
with capital budgeting and related matters, based on a 
literature search, or
b) just make a very brief reference to discounted cash flow
as is done in most of the literature on corporate planning.
In the event, and as stated on page 1 of this chapter, it has 
been decided not to deal with the immense topic of capital 
budgeting (that would take a further thesis). Instead, it is
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intended to note just a few basic points on the use of 
discounted cash flow.
Very simply and again to quote Hussey (1974) ’DCF may be 
described as an attempt to take into account the time value of 
money on the basis that £1 received this year is' worth more 
that £1 next year (because of the interest that can be earned 
with it.' He went on to explain that there are three main 
measures of performance:-
a) 'Net present value at the end of the project.......it
cumulates the cash flows of each year of the project 
(discounted at the chosen rate), providing a simple one- 
figure measure of the results for comparison between 
projects.'
b ) 'Number of years before payback.' He acknowledged that this 
technique might also be taken at 'undiscounted figures' and 
other literature, e.g. Bierman and Smidt (1971)» dealt with 
the 'payback period' method as one of the methods which did 
not take account of the time value of money,
c) 'Internal rate of return (sometimes known as DCF yield).
This calculates the theoretical interest rate which, if used, 
would produce a net present value of NIL,'
That somewhat simplistic exposition did not deal with the many 
complications associated with determining the discount rate by 
reference to cost of capital i.e. 'the opportunity cost of 
funds used to finance a project.' This would be related to the 
many sources of capital and the risks involved, creating a 
situation where it would be 'more apt to describe the cost of
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capital as the required rate of return on projects.' (Bromwich,
1976).
Nevertheless, it is considered by the author that, in noting 
Hussey's remarks and related comments, sufficient has been 
said in this section to relate investment appraisal techniques 
to the process of corporate planning to enable some consideration 
to be given to this relationship in Part 3»
To conclude this discussion on forecasting, it is necessary to 
consider how to deal with inflation in the context of forecasts 
used in the various stages of the corporate planning process. 
Argenti (198O) has stated that 'Planners have to make their 
minds up very clearly indeed as to how they intend to deal 
with inflation. He postulated two options, the first being 
the use of 'constant value' (or 'real terms') figures, which 
would include expected real price changes, and the second being 
to make the forecast 'with inflation built into the figures' 
sometimes described as 'current-value' forecasts. This problem 
had been highlighted by a number of writers, including Hussey
(1974) and'Carsberg (1974), the latter in the context of 
forecasts used in investment appraisal.
The Argenti view was that the constant value forecasts were 
more meaningful and much more useful in discussions with exec­
utives, particularly when dealing with forecasts in terms of 
periods of time exceeding one or two years. However, recognising 
that a forecast which excludes inflation 'will not truly reflect 
a company's cash-flow position', he concluded that 'all
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forecasts have to be made twice: once in constant money and again 
in inflated money.'
Hussey, on the other hand, argued that forecasts should 'try 
to be as close to reality as possible' and recommended that 
they should 'allow for the effect on costs and income of 
expected price changes.' A secondary reason which he offered 
was that 'monitoring and control, already difficult, becomes 
almost impossible if the figures are not at current prices.'
The Argenti view on this latter point was that, in order to 
evaluate a company's past performance, 'all the figures have 
to be converted to constant values in order to make the real 
trends or movements of turnover, profits, material prices, 
and so on intelligible.'
Carsberg (in the context of investment appraisal and monitoring) 
shared the Hussey view. He made the point that, in order to 
calculate the real price changes for inclusion in the constant 
price forecasts it was necessary to firstly estimate the 'money' 
(i.e. including inflation) cash flows and then strip out the 
forecast inflation to leave the 'real' (i.e. constant price) 
cash flows. He described both forecasting procedures as being 
arithmetically equivalent (in DCF calculations, one would use a 
money rate of return in respect of cash flows including inflation 
and a real rate of return in respect of constant value cash 
flows) but added that the two stage procedure is 'pointless' 
and leaves him with the 'impression that the best method of 
appraisal is to estimate money cash flows and discount at a 
money rate of return.'
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The author's view is that strategic plan forecasts for more 
than one year ahead are meaningless to managers if they are not 
expressed in constant values,i.e. allowing only for real price 
changes. However, in order to be able to monitor results, it 
is useful to have forecasts which include inflation, rather 
than have to reduce actual results to an earlier price level 
(per Argenti) for comparison purposes. Consequently, the 
author would contend that both sets of figures should be 
produced and that, in monitoring differences between the 
forecast (including inflation) and the emerging result, a 
distinction should be drawn between differences caused by 
non-achievement of real price changes and non-experience of 
anticipated inflation levels.
4.2. Model Building
Perhaps the most exciting and potentially far-reaching development 
in corporate planning in recent years has been the development 
of corporate models, normally using a computer, designed to 
deal with major elements of the corporate planning process.
This development was explained in considerable detail, with 
related research material, in a book written by Grinyer and 
Wooller, first published in 1975 and partly revised in a second 
edition published in 1978.
Grinyer and Wooller explained that all models are 
'representations of reality' and that 'corporate models are 
sets of related expressions that represent the key operations 
of the company.' They added further that 'all corporate models 
are used for some aspects of financial planning' but that 'they
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are also used to aid marketing, distribution, production and 
other major decisions of a primarily non-financial nature.’
In essence, therefore, they are used for major elements of 
the corporate planning process outlined in Chapter 3i where they 
can reduce the amount of time spent on dealing with the various 
stages and their forecasts.
However, it has been found by Naylor (1979) that 'Despite 
dramatic increases in the usage of computer-based planning 
models since 1970, relatively few corporations have successfully 
integrated their planning models into their planning process.
In many cases, planning models are treated as if they were merely 
mathematical appendages to the planning process rather than 
tools to be integrated into the planning process.' Naylor made 
a strong point of the need for such integration to get the best 
out of the use of corporate models and outlined a six step 
approach for doing so. In summary form, these six steps were:-
1) Neview of the planning environment
A 'planning audit' of the organisation's
- organisational structure
- management philosophy and style
- business environment
- planning process
2) Specification of the Planning Requirement
A statement of the planning requirements of corporate 
officers at all levels detailing
- data required for planning and forecasting
- types of external events which may affect the company
- major business strategies to be considered
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- types of ’what i f  questions which should be considered
- reporting arrangements
3) Definition of the Goals and Objectives for Planning
A summary statement of goals and objectives at the various 
organisational levels.
4) Evaluation of Existing Planning Resources
An evaluation of the existing resources available in the 









5) Design of an Integrated Planning and Modelling System 
Specification for an integrated system taking into account 
eight basic elements -
- Planning system including
- Financial planning models
- Marketing planning models
- Production planning models
- Integrated planning models
- Consolidated planning models





- User orientation of the system
- System availability
- Software system
6) Formulation of a Strategy for Integrating the Planning
Model into the Planning Process
This involves seven major elements
- Create an organisational framework for developing, 
implementing and maintaining the model, and for 
integrating it into the planning process.
- Change planning process as necessary to match steps 2 and 
3 mentioned earlier.
- Modify databases, forecasts, models, reports and computer 
software to make these planning tools more compatible with 
the planning needs.
- Specify the human and technical resource requirements and 
obtain as necessary.
- Conduct an educational programme to familiarise management 
with the use of the planning and modelling system.
- Prepare an implementation schedule.
- Prepare a 'budget* for the project, assessing its benefits.
Grinyer and Wooller identified corporate modelling as producing
a number of significant benefits. These are summarised below:-
They can provide -
a) Greater accuracy and speed of forecasting company performance
b) A means of quickly checking on the internal consistency of
planning assumptions.
c) Freedom to explore a wide range of alternatives, as opposed
to the few possible with manual calculations.
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d) A release of management time, by reduction of routine
calculations, for thinking about strategic problems and 
their solution.
e) Fuller allowance for links with other aspects of the business,
when evaluating a proposal.
f) Fuller understanding of the internal complexities of the
company by decision takers.
g) Deeper insight into the risks inherent in proposed projects.
h) A means of highlighting the key aspects of both existing
business and new projects,
i) A tool for showing managers the extent to which reported
performances will be affected by errors in estimates.
Clearly, these benefits would have a significant impact in an 
associated corporate planning context. However, five potential 
'limitations' were also noted by Grinyer and Wooller, viz:-
a) They deal only with quantitative (measurable) aspects
whereas, in strategic problems, qualitative (immeasurable) 
factors are important and sometimes dominate decisions.
b) They will only do what they have been designed to do.
c) The output of most models is dependent on the ability of the
company to provide good estimates for at least the critical 
factors.
d) They cannot create the alternatives, only help managers to
choose the best of those tested.
e) Because the process by which strategic decisions are reached
within companies is political, participants in this process 
may sometimes use their corporate model to justify a position 
already taken, rather than rigorously evaluate alternatives.
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It is clear that the potential benefits considerably outweigh 
the potential limitations and the growth of corporate modelling 
has given further evidence of this. As early as 1973» a random 
survey conducted by Grinyer and Wooller showed that 9% of the 
largest U.K. companies (’The Times 1000') had or were developing 
corporate models. Since then Naylor (1979) has stated that 'Nearly 
2000 firms in the United States, Canada and Mexico are either 
using, developing or experimenting with some form of corporate 
planning model,'
Recognising that organisations deciding on the use of corporate 
models have to make an initial 'make or buy' decision,
Grinyer and Wooller (1978) described the broad alternative 
decisions as
' * Buy a model ready made from a (computer) bureau.
* Develop a tailor made model specifically for the 
company by use of:
* A general purpose programming language or a 
modelling system (special language for corporate 
modelling available from a bureau).
* Consultants and/or own staff.
* Specialist modellers and/or accountants, managers 
and other ultimate users, among own staff.'
They went on to explain that the 'evidence available suggests 
that, rather than use such off the shelf types, companies 
construct models which represent their own operations and 
accounting logic more faithfully.'
There are a number of different types of models and the Grinyer
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and Wooller classification is summarised below:-
a ) Simulation
Here the model would be used to explore possible alternative 
actions by imitating the operations of the company. This 
involves representing the key operations of the company in 
the model and expressing their relationships together with 
a set of basic assumptions. Alternatives are generated by 
changing either the input or where necessary their relation­
ships. They can also be generated by changing the basic 
assumptions, (see sensitivity analysis in Section 4.3.).
Most corporate models are of this type and it will be 
recalled that the use of simulation models was described in 
Chapter 3 as being particularly relevant to strategy 
evaluation and selection, 
b ) Optimisation
A variation on this approach is the optimisation model which 
seeks the best solution, given any set of assumptions. In 
this case, the definition of best must be specified e.g. 
largest return on capital employed and a mathematical 
routine such as linear programming incorporated to establish 
the 'best' solution,
c ) Deterministic
Here certainty is usually assumed and a single factor is 
used to vary a forecast already prepared by a set amount.
This enables the model to produce a 'what i f  response, e.g. 
'what if wages increase by ' This model could deal with 
two or more factors provided that the assumption is made that 
one, both, etc. are certain to occur. This type of approach 
is most suitable for use in conjunction with sensitivity
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analysis (see Section 4,3.) which, in turn, can greatly 
assist the production of contingency plans.
d ) Probabalistic
The same principles apply here except for the substitution 
of measures of risk instead of certainty and the related 
ability to cope with more than one factor to a different 
extent. This requires the use of probability distributions, 
which are explained further in Section 4.3., in a 'risk 
analysis' context. Again, the interface with the production 
of contingency plans is important.
e ) Representation of Financial and Physical Flows
Here the operations of the company are represented by a series 
of inter-related physical flows, relating to materials and 
services. They can help deal with problems of product mix 
and machine capacity. They can also be converted into 
financial values, and would frequently be consolidated into 
another part of the corporate model (e.g. simulation). This 
form of model might have inbuilt rules prepared on a 
heuristic basis (i.e. in the way human decision takers would 
proceed) to deal with certain occurrences. Many of the 
causal relationships would be based on statistical analysis 
or on direct observation of the operations of the company.
f) Organisational Levels Included
This'rather ungainly title refers to the need to have a model 
at corporate headquarters level which summarises the fore­
casts of the usually more detailed models at the subsidiary, 
divisional and operating unit levels.
Models within types b) to e) above were summarised under the
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single title of 'Analytical Models' by Flower (1973).
With each of these types of models in mind, Grinyer and Wooller 
made the case for a suite of models, each dealing with different 
aspects of the planning process rather than a single 
'monolithic' corporate model. They described this as à 'modular 
approach' which had several advantages, viz : -
a) The all-embracing model can be too large and expensive to 
produce.
b) They take a long time to develop and can be out-of-date by
the time they are completed. This tends to 'erode enthusiasm.'
c) Their complexity can make it difficult to incorporate 
amendments.
d) The smaller models do not have these disadvantages and can
be built more quickly and cheaply.
e) They are easier to understand by the users.
f) They can be added to more easily.
g) They allow closer identification with management with more
direct value to them in their separate capacities.
h) They permit construction by different people as long as 
each is properly documented.
i) They can be more easily updated and usually cost less to
produce.
This approach was supported by Naylor in 'Step 3 ’ of his approach 
to integrating a corporate planning model, noted earlier. He 
emphasised this point when considering the responsibility, 
development and use of the model by stressing the need for the 
involvement of all users of the outnut.
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In summary, it is clear that the development of computer-based 
modelling systems has begun to have and will almost certainly 
continue to have an expanding role in the application of the 
process of corporate planning. This will apply in respect of 
most of the stages of the corporate planning process described 
in the model given in Fig. 3»5« » but particularly the stages 
from ’strategy’ down to ’budgets’ where the speed of evaluation 
of alternatives and risks can be an important feature. The 
extent to which the four organisations covered in this research 
have used, or are intending to use, such computer models will 
be established in Part 3»
4.3. Risk and Sensitivity Analysis
It has been made clear in the foregoing that the process of 
corporate planning involves extensive use of forecasting at 
most of the stages of the model in Fig. 3»3. However, it has 
also be stated (but was probably already self-evident) that 
there is no way of producing wholly accurate forecasts because 
of the risks and uncertainty that surround future events. This 
problem has been evident for a very long time but some (e.g. 
Drucker, I98O) would argue that a new state of ’turbulence’ 
emerged ’sometime during the 1970's’ making planning the course 
of future events much more challenging than it used to be.
Techniques for dealing with risk (where probabilities can be 
assigned or as Merrett and Sykes (1973) have put it 'situations 
of a type which people or businesses can insure themselves 
against') and uncertainty ('where there is very little certain 
knowledge') have been developed over the years mainly in
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connection with investment project appraisal. These have 
included sensitivity analysis (or sensitivity tests), risk 
analysis and various methods of dealing with total uncertainty. 
Some of these have been incorporated into the more general 
forecasting requirements of the corporate planning process.
It is not proposed to discuss here the methods of dealing with 
total uncertainty which relate, fundamentally, to investment 
project appraisal but, instead, to consider sensitivity and 
risk analysis.
Sensitivity analysis is merely an assessment of how much a 
forecast would change if a single variable, contained within 
that forecast, were to change by a set degree. For example, 
if in respect of a strategic plan, the managers responsible 
for the forecast were wishing to test the risks associated 
with that forecast, they could indicate the main areas and 
likely extent of risk and evaluate each in turn. They might, 
for instance, consider that there is a possibility that the 
predicted market share is overstated by 10?o. The sensitivity 
analysis would be designed to indicate the revised forecast 
reflecting the reduced sales figures and the associated effect 
on costs and resources.
In the context of investment appraisal, Merrett and Sykes
(1975) regarded sensitivity analysis as 'the first stage in 
the evaluation of risk' wherein 'it is necessary to determine 
the critical variables, the sales realisations, costs, lives, 
etc., which are critical to the acceptability of the project.’
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They went on to state that the 'first use of sensitivity 
analysis is to ascertain whether or not a project falls into 
the fail-safe catetory.'
Again, in the context of investment project appraisal its main
advantages were stated by Argenti (1974) to be as foilows:-
'1, It shows which are the most important assumptions 
underlying any proposed project.
2. It indicates just how bad (or good) the project could 
be if the worst (or best) happens.
3. It does not rely for its efficacy on any estimates of 
probability.'
One of the prime potential benefits of sensitivity analysis is 
that it can provide a basis from which to begin constructing a 
strategic contingency plan. This is because it should demonstrate 
the impact on the forecasts relating to the strategies being 
evaluated of the possible critical risks if they occur. The 
computer models discussed in Section 4.2. are eminently suitable 
for this purpose.
However, sensitivity analysis suffers from one disadvantage, noted 
by Argenti (1974) that 'one may only test the effect of one 
parameter at a time.' There can be very few forecasts which 
are only at risk in regard to a single variable. Nevertheless, 
many forecasts will rely mainly upon the integrity of one or two 
key variables and in measuring the possible effect of these, 
sensitivity analysis is generally acknowledged as a very useful 
procedure.
In some ways a more powerful procedure is, however, risk analysis.
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which depends upon the ability of forecasters to assess the 
riskiness of the constituent elements of a forecast in 
probabablistic terms. Under this method, probabilities are 
assigned to the constituent items of receipts, expenditure or 
resources (or groups of items), giving the distribution of each. 
Summation of these differing distributions could be achieved 
through the use of 'Monte-Carlo’ simulation or a stastical 
method. Under Monte-Carlo simulation, recommended by Hertz 
(1964), an attempt is made at imitating the main characteristics 
of the forecast. This involves creating probability distributions 
which relate to these characteristics and assigning, 
proportionately, a series of numbers within a set range at 
selected intervals. These distributions are combined through 
the use of random numbers, using random number tables or 
computer generation. The net result is a forecast of the most 
likely financial outcome with best and worst parameters 
expressed in financial and probability terms within a normal 
distribution. The most likely outcome would usually differ from 
the original forecast.
The most significant difficulty associated with the use of 
Monte-Carlo simulation is not the processing of the data. This 
can be handled quite quickly and cheaply by use of a computer 
model. Instead, it is the problem of forecasting the shape of 
the probability distributions applying to each element of the 
forecast. This requires a good deal of thought, effort and 
discussion. Many managers who provide forecasts find it very 
difficult to think in these terms.
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A statistical method generally regarded as being useful in this 
area relates to an analytical method suggested by Hillier (I963) 
and developed by Wagle (196?). The procedure was summarised 
in an article by Harris (l979) and described by him as one 
which 'is easy to comprehend', can be undertaken 'by hand' 
rather than by computer and which 'produces a quick and dirty' 
assessment of whether a plan (forecast) is'in the right ball 
park' rather than a more precise evaluation which, theoretically 
should result from the use of Monte-Carlo simulation. The 
procedure described by Harris required that the plan or project 
forecast for each year of that forecast be broken down into a 
small number of key elements. In the example provided by 
Harris six elements (making up the profit) within a five year 
constant value forecast were used; with receipts being divided 
between volume and real price increases and costs being similarly 
divided but also between staff costs and other costs.
The next stage was to assign to each of these allegedly 'most 
likely' forecasts, best and worst ranges to three standard 
deviations (i.e. 99*7% probability). Again this was described 
as being a difficult operation requiring considerable thought 
and discussion but not as difficult as creating a distribution 
curve as required under Monte-Carlo simulation. The net result 
would be a series of estimates which would generally indicate 
a skewed distribution for each element in each year. In the 
hypothetical example provided by Harris, the overall difference 
between the worst and the most likely figures was greater than 
the difference between the best and the most likely. This was 
described as 'not an unusual situation, reflecting the fact that
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many forecasts are inclined to be optimistic.'
The next stage in the procedure was described as a 'process of
aggregation to provide probability assessments for use in risk
analysis.' This involved the use of 'Beta distributions which
place a heavy emphasis on the general reliability of the most
likely figures.' This involved the use of the formula:-
mean = worst + best + (4 x most likely)
6
and then the variance by the formula:-
variance = (best - worst)^
3^
On the assumption that the attributes of each element of the 
forecast were mutually independent, Harris explained that an 
aggregate variance could then be produced, the .square root of 
which would be the standard deviation of the profit figure. 
When multiplied by 3» this gave the ranges round the mean at 
three standard deviations. Because the central limit theorem 
would apply, the overall probability distribution would be a 
normal distribution curve. Statistical tables relating to a 
normal distribution curve could then be used to assess the 
probability of any profit level ^between the new best and worst 
figures being achieved, including the 'revised most likely' 
result.
The difficulties with using this method, accepted by Harris, 
were that independence of variables was assumed and the use of 
the central limit theorem demanded that variables must not be 
highly skewed, must be large in number and skewed in both
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directions. None of these restrictions applies to the use of 
Monte-Carlo simulation. However, the summation of beta 
distributions was described as a simple method which might be 
used by organisations on a ’walk before you run’ basis.
4.4. Budgetary Control
To conclude this chapter, a few brief comments on budgetary 
control are needed in a corporate planning context. Budgetary
control is probably one of the most widely practiced systems
of management control. It is used in most corporate
organisations, in both the private and public sectors, whether
or not they are involved in corporate planning. Budgets 
represent an important interface between planning and action. 
This interface has been described by Hopwood (1980) as 
follows :-
'by facilitating the separation of planning and control 
from action, budgets and other mechanisms for financial 
control have played a key role in enabling the centralised 
control of ever larger groupings of activities.'
It is generally recognised (e.g. Anthony and Herslinger 1975 
and Welsch 1971) that the essence of budgetary control is to 
identify personal responsibility, which means ensuring that 
budgets are prepared and monitored in respect of the 
responsibilities attaching to all 'managers' within the 
structure of the organisation. To ensure commitment, it is 
necessary for these budgets to be prepared on a 'bottom-up' 
basis, following the structure of the organisation. From the 
bottom level (e.g. cost centre) upwards, it is necessary for the
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(annual) budgets to be reviewed and agreed producing personal 
commitment to their achievement. Normally, budgets would be 
prepared on a physical basis (e.g. resources) first and then con­
verted into monitory units. They would also be analysed over 
time periods e.g. months within the accounting year.
Given the operation of a corporate planning process, the 
criterion of acceptability of budgets would be compatibility 
with the action plan which should have been prepared jointly 
with the managers concerned with its implementation, as far down 
the organisation structure as possible. But, because the 
budget is likely'to contain the greatest amount of pertinent 
and accurate data, the action plan might need to be modified to 
accommodate the knowledge obtained through the budget preparation. 
This, in turn, might require revision of the strategic plan. The 
vital issue is to reconcile the budget and the action plan as a 
solid foundation of control.
An annual budget would normally be prepared in considerable 
physical and. financial detail, the level of detail being greater, 
the lower down the organisation structure. This has to be the 
case because the budget is a control document which, through 
its regular monitoring procedures (perhaps monthly), provides 
an early warning of tactical and even strategic issues that are 
not proceeding as planned, facilitating control action.
The motivational aspects of budgetary control are stressed in 
much of the literature (e.g. Otley, 1977)» the issues involved 
being related primarily to : -
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(a) The need to identify personal management commitment through 
’agreed' budgets,
(b) Ensuring an understanding among non-accounting managers 
of the financial situation of the organisation.
(c) Establishing clear identification of external factors (over 
which the manager has little influence) and internal factors 
(over which he has substantial influence).
(d) Maintaining an efficient, regular reporting and monitoring
system which not only identifies the variances from budget 
but permits discussion (at all levels down the organisation 
structure) on what corrective action should be taken.
(e) Taking such action and thus promoting the view that the
information is useful.
(f) Ensuring that, in the frequency of reporting, a balance is 
maintained between administration costs and the need for 




THE NATIONALISED TRANSPORT SECTOR
In this chapter, it is intended to consider the nature and size 
of the nationalised transport sector in the United Kingdom and 
how it fits into the United Kingdom economy and overall 
transport sector. It will also place the four organisations 
covered in this research into the context of the nationalised 
transport sector and compare the organisations in terms of markets, 
culture, patterns of growth/contraction, organisation structures 
and financial situations. This is meant to provide backcloth 
information in respect of matters which affect the corporate 
planning activities of the four organisations. It will be 
supplemented by further backcloth information, specific to each 
organisation, in chapters 6 to 9.
The nationalised transport sector consists, in the main, of five 
of the United Kingdom nationalised industries. The five 
organisations are :-
British Railways Board (BRB)
National Freight Company Ltd. (NFC)
National Bus Company (NBC)
'British Airways (BA)
Scottish Bus Group (SEG)
It also contains the British Transport Docks Board and the 
British Waterways Board but these are excluded from the analysis 
contained in this chapter since they are not primarily providers 
of transport. Together, the expenditure of the five 
organisations listed above amounted, in 1980, to the equivalent
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of 2.8% of the expenditure on goods and services within the 
Government's calculation of the gross domestic product of the 
United Kingdom. Additionally, they employed 1.6% of the 
United Kingdom working population, with the British Railways 
Board alone employing 0.9%.
The Scottish Bus Group is by far the smallest of these 
organisations, performing, in Scotland, a function similar to 
that conducted by the National Bus Company in England and 
Wales. It was made clear in the introduction to this thesis 
that the SBG would not be covered in this thesis but this 
omission is not considered by the author to be significant in 
the context of this research.
It should not be thought, of course, that the nationalised 
transport sector represents anything like the entirety of the 
overall transport sector in the United Kingdom or even in Great 
Britain. This much is clear from an examination of Government 
statistics on transport and, in particular, 'Transport Statistics 
Great Britain I969 - 1979.’
In respect of the quantity of passenger transport, for example, 
the total (Great Britain) passenger miles in the years 19&9 and 
1979 were as depicted in Table 5.1. It can be seen that by far 
the biggest mode of transport has been private vehicles which 
accounted for 80% of passenger miles in 1979. The rail share was 
only 7.4x of which the bulk (6.6% of total passenger miles) was 
related to British Railways, most of the balance being in 
respect of the London Transport Executive.
113
Thousand Million Passenger Miles/Percentage 
1969 1979
Nos % Nos %
Road
Buses and Coaches 36 13 32 11
Private Vehicles I81 73 244 80
Pedal Cycles 3 1 __2
Total 220 91 278 92
Rail 22 9 22 7
Air (incl. N,Ireland 
and Channel Islands __1.2  0.5 __1.7  0.6
All Modes 243 100 302 100
Table 3.1. Passenger Transport in Great Britain I969 
and 1979___________________________________
(Source - 'Transport Statistics Great Britain I969 - 1979',
mso, 1980)   ■_____
Within the buses and coaches mode, which accounted for 10.6% 
of the 1979 passenger miles in Great Britain, it is not possible 
to obtain accurately the National Bus Company proportion, since 
NBC do not publish (or produce) its passenger miles. However, 
a measure of the NBC proportion can be obtained by examining 
the analysis of passenger journeys in Great Britain in 1979, 
given in Table 5»2. Apart from analysing journeys by type of 
operator, this Table also contains details of the journeys by 
type of service.
From this Table, it can be assessed that NBC have provided a 
significant percentage of passenger journeys under most of the
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Passen ger Journeys by Type of Service (Millions)
Excursions
Stage and Private
/ Express Tours Contract Hire Total
Public Operators
NBC 1727 9 3 4l 13 1793
LTE 1233 1 1234
PTE’s 1971 12 10 1993
Municipal 997 1 10 11 1019
SBG 329 1 IG _1 330
Total 6237 11 7 79 36 6391
Private Operators l86 26 276 188 709
Total 6443 44 12 1 ^ 226 7100 *
/ bus stop services, sometimes described as stage -carriage
* includes 9m tram journeys
N.B. Arithmetical differences are caused by independent 
roundings
Table 5.2. Passenger Journeys by Buses and Coaches in 
Great Britain in 1979 Analysed by Type of 
Operator and Service_______________________
(Source - 'Transport Statistics Great Britain 1969 - 1979’»
types of service. The percentages in 1979 were:-
Type of Service %
Stage carriage 27
Express 20




However, it is clear from examining published data in respect
of receipts per passenger journey. that the NBC proportion of
bus and coach passenger miles must be much higher than suggested 
by the distribution of passenger journeys. Of course, pricing
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policy is a material factor in respect of receipts per journey 
as well as distance, but the very nature of IIBC operations 
(discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter 8) suggests 
that the average distance travelled by each passenger by NBC 
will be higher than other public operators with the possible 
exception of SBG. Details of the average receipts per 
passenger journey, again in 1979, are given in Table
Average Receipts per Passenger Journey 
______ by Type of Service (Pence)______
Excursions
and Private
Stasre Exnress Tours Contract Hire Tota]
Public Operators
NBC 21.7 264.0 152.2 28.1 80.2 23.9
LTE 13.1 19.0 13.2
PTE's 14.4 33.8 18.5 20.4 14.4
Municipal 13.3 20.9 18.1 17.3 13.4
SBG 24.3 739.4 208.7 31.4 39.2 26.4
Total 16.5 266.1 133.6 26.0 45.8 17.4
Private
Operators 19.3 32.7 126.2 57.0 Ï9.4 42.4
Total 16.6 105.7 152.2 34.6 3G .7 19.9
Table 5.5. Average Pec eipts per Passenge r Journey by Buses
and Coaches in Great Britain in 1979 Analysed
by Type of Operator and Service
(Source - 'Transport Statistics Great Britain 1969 - 1979 1,
HMSO, 1980)
Using tjiis additional evidence, it is assessed by the author 
that the proportion of buses and coaches passenger miles in 
Great Britain, in 1979, provided by NBC was approximately as 
follows ; -
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Type of Service %
Stage 33
Express 30




Thus, by applying the figure of 30% to the figures given in 
Table 3.1, it is possible to assess that NBC accounted for 
approximately 3.3% of all passenger journeys in Great Britain 
in 1979. This assessment is accepted by NBC planners.
In respect of the air mode, described in Table 3.1, the figures 
relate to Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Channel 
Islands. However, passenger traffic of that description 
represents only a minor proportion of the total passenger miles 
conveyed by British Airways. But, by way of comparison, it 
should be noted that the 'domestic' (in this case United 
Kingdom and Eire) passenger miles in the year ended 31 March 
1980 conveyed by British Airways amounted to 1.2 million, 
compared with a total of 1.9 million passenger miles in 1979 
recorded in Table 3.1.
The existence of British Airways is not fundamentally related to 
domestic flights but to the conveyance of passengers, goods and 
mails on international flights. It is by far the largest United 
Kingdom airways operating company, particularly as a result of 
its schedules services. Details of the passengers carried and 
passenger miles conveyed in scheduled services operated by all 
UK operating companies and British Airways, in 1979, are given 
in Table 3.4.
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Passengers Carried Passenger Miles
(Millions) (000 millions)
All UK Operating Companies 13.1 27.3
British Airways * 12.3 24.8
/O /o
BA % of Total 82.8 90.2
* Figures relate to year ended 31/3/80 and are thus 
only approximately comparable
Table 3.4. Passengers Carried and Passenger Miles of 
All United Kingdom Operating Companies and 
British Airways in 1979____________________
(Source - 'Transport Statistics Great Britain I969 - 1979’, 
HMSO, 1980 and British Airways Annual Report and Accounts
1979/80)_________
Turning to the transport of goods, the total (Great Britain) 
tonne miles conveyed in the years 1969 and 1979 were as depicted 
in Table 3.3. These figures exclude coastal shipping (which 
amounted to 24.2 thousand million and 20 thousand million in 
1969 and 1976, respectively). This avoids confusion since a 
large part of coastal shipping consists of the carriage of oil 
and petroleum products between Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. The rail share relates entirely to the British Railways 
Board. It excludes parcels traffic conveyed in passenger trains 
and thus the bulk of Post Office parcels traffic. However, the 
share attributed to road conveyance involves the NFC, independant 
hauliers and organisations/individuals operating their own 
vehicles.
The T'lFC and independant hauliers together are generally 
described as 'public haulage' and the organisations/individuals 
operating their own vehicles as 'own-account' operators in
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Tonne Miles (Thousand million) 
1969 1979
Nos % Nos %
Road (excluding work done 
by foreign vehicles) 31.8 74.7 63.0 77.3
Rail (excluding parcels 
conveyed on passenger 
trains) 13.7 22.7 12.4 l4.8
Inland Waterways 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Pipeline 1.7 2.5 6.4 7.6
All Modes * 69.3 100.0 83.9 100.0
* excluding coastal shipping
Table 5»3« Goods Transport in Great Britain I969 and 1979
(Source - 'Transport Statistics Great Britain I969 - 1979',
HI'ISO, 1980)__________________________________________________
Government statistics. The figures for 1979 in respect of goods 
moved by road in Great Britain are analysed between these two 
headings in Table ^,6, There is no equivalent figure available 
for NFC but a comparison of the NFC vehicle fleet against the 
number of vehicles operated by public hauliers (303,700 at 
30 September 1979), published in 'Transport Statistics Great 
Britain 19^9 - 1979' suggests that NFC carries about 7% of the 
total goods traffic conveyed in Great Britain by public 
hauliers and, consequently, about of the total conveyed by 
all modes. The NFC estimate of these comparisons amount to a 
little less than 10% and 3%, respectively, in I98I taking into 
account an assessment of the impact of comparative vehicle 
sizes and the number of additional trailer vehicles and 
containers.
Relatively speaking, very little 'domestic' goods traffic is
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Tonne Miles (Thousand million)
Nos %
Mainly Public Haulage 39.5 6O.8
Mainly Own-Account 25.5 39.2
65.0 100.0
Table 5.6. Goods Transport in Great Britain by Road in 1979
(Source - 'Transport Statistics Great Britain 1969 - 1979', 
HMSO, 1980)__________________________________________________
conveyed in Great Britain by air and thus it is excluded from 
the figures reproduced in Table 5*5. Excluding mails, it 
amounted to 6.3 million tonne miles in 1979 (source - 
'Transport Statistics Great Britain 1969 - 1979’), only 0.01% 
of the total included in Table 5.5. The British Airways 
domestic carryings amounted to 6.0 million tonne miles in 1979/80 
but that figure included Northern Ireland and Eire and is not 
therefore a fully satisfactory comparison.
On the international front, however, British Airways is by far 
the largest UK based operating company as can be seen from 
examining the 1979 results depicted in Table 5.7.
Turning to the comparison of the four organisations in terms of 
their markets, culture, patterns of growth/contraction, 
organisation structures and financial situations, it is clear 
that there are similarities but also considerable differences. 
These differences will be seen in Parts 3 and 4, to have had a 
bearing on the question of the extent to which coordinated 
corporate planning exists in the nationalised transport sector
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Tonne Miles (Millions) 
Mail Goods
All UK Operating Companies 109.0 658.7
British Airways * 105.7 6l4.4
% %
BA % of Total 97.0 93.3
* Figures relate to year ended 3l/3/80 and are thus only 
approximately comparable
Table 5.7. Net Tonne Miles of Mail and Goods Carried by 
all United Kingdom Operating Companies and 
British Airways in 1979______________________
(Sources - 'Transport Statistics Great Britain I969 - 1979’, 
rl'ISO, 1980 and British Airways Annual Report and Accounts
1979/80)______________________________________________________
and on their individual approaches to the process of corporate 
planning.
In terms of markets, it is a common misconception to associate 
the word monopoly with the activities of the nationalised 
industries. A monopoly situation exists to some extent in 
respect of British Telecommunications and the Post Office (in 
respect of letter mails rather than parcels) but it is much less 
so in respect of most nationalised industries, and particularly 
those in the transport sector. Indeed, Thompson and Hunter 
(1973) have commented that 'One of tfhe most significant facts 
about the industries nationalised in the immediate post-war 
period is that none of them is a complete monopoly.'
The British Railways Board operates, for example, in a diverse
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market, each part of which has its differing problems and 
potential. Looking first at its Passenger business, it will be 
made clear in Chapter 6 that this consists of four market 
sectors. The Inter-city sector is regarded by the BEB as the 
only 'commercial' sector within its Passenger business which, 
despite Government grant arrangements covering the entire 
Passenger business loss, should be run as a profit-making 
concern. Trading in that sector is mainly conducted in 
competition with motor car travel but also with the 'express' 
services provided by NBC, private coach operators and the 
domestic flights provided by BA.
The London and South East sector is probably the nearest the 
BEB gets to a monopoly situation with the distribution of 
London commuter traffic in 1979 being as depicted in Table 5.8.
The BEB share of the market, expressed in terms of passenger 
miles, has not changed significantly in the last 20 years (it 
was 33.8% in 196I and 39.5% in 1971) and it is generally 
thought by the BEB that its market share is a 'fairly captured 
market', with the alternative modes being difficult to adopt by 
most of the rail users because of journey times, traffic 
congestion and parking difficulties. Even so, the market share 
in 1979 of 39.3% was a long way from a monopoly situation with 
London Transport buses and underground trains attaining a 
slightly larger share (4-2.5%) and private transport l8.2%.
The Passenger Transport Executives (PTE) sector is regarded by the 
BEB as the one area of successful moves in the direction of 





British Rail 421 39.3
London Transport
- Rail 343 32.0
- Bus 112 10.3
876 81.8
Private Transport 
Private Car 173 16.2
Motor cycle and 
pedal cycle 22 2.0
18.2
All Transport 1.071 100.0
Table 3.8. London Commuter Traffic 1979
(Source - 'Transport Statistics Great Britain 1969 - 1979*, 
HMSO, 1980)_________________________________________________
operate stage-carriage bus services, in some instances in 
conjunction with NBC, have developed road/rail interchange 
arrangements and have supported the continuation and development 
of those rail services which they see as being more advantageous 
to the consumers than bus services or motor car useage. This 
has not led to a restriction of freedom of choice but has meant 
that, in some cases, and for social/environmental reasons, 
special efforts (such as lower prices subsidised by the PTE 
grants) have been made to make rail services more attractive than 
they would otherwise be.
The Other Provincial services are operated in competition mainly 
with motor car travel, but also with NBC/SBG bus services and, 
to a small extent, municipal bus services. The strength of this
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competition (particularly motor car) is such that there has 
been a very large reduction in patronage since the Second World 
War which resulted in the withdrawals of services (’Reshaping' 
report) discussed in Chapter 6.
Moving to the BRB Freight business, again the main competition 
has been in respect of road transport, both public hauliers 
(mainly independent hauliers but also NFC) and 'own-account' 
transport. The advent of motorways, other road improvements, 
larger and more efficient lorries has led to a substantial run 
down in the quantity of rail-borne freight since the War. It will 
be seen in Chapter 6 that this has led to the development of the 
trainload concept under which the BRB is attempting to retain 
that portion of the traffic to which it feels best suited i.e. 
long distance heavy loads. All attempts at staying in the 
general merchandise traffic field have been concentrated on a 
selective basis on 'Speedlink' and 'Freightliner' services, 
basically serving main conurbations and ports. It could be 
argued that the high volume of NCB coal traffic conveyed by 
train (particularly that to power stations) constitutes a 
monopoly situation. However, the BRB consider that this traffic 
is best suited to rail and remains with the BRB because of the 
competitive price which is charged and not for social/environ­
mental or even political reasons.
The Parcels situation is equally competitive. In respect of 
C & D parcels (i.e. requiring collection and/or delivery by 
road), the main competitors have been the NFC, the Post Office 
and a very large number of public hauliers and own-account
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operators. For many years, the BRB has made losses in this sector 
and has considered that there has been general over-capacity 
causing some operators (certainly NFC and the Post Office) to 
suffer poor financial returns. The BRB proposal to withdraw from 
the C & D sector on 1 July I981, which will be discussed further 
in Chapter 6, was related to this problem.
In respect of the remaining BRB parcels traffic, known as 
'station to station' (S to S) parcels, the competitive 
situation is not the same in that the BRB consider that they can 
occupy a particular niche in respect of newspaper. Post Office 
and, to a lesser extent. Red Star traffic. however, even in 
these areas, anxiety exists about whether the newspaper and 
Post Office traffic, which to a limited extent has been switched 
to road in recent years (mostly own-account), might be 
transferred in larger quantities if the price levels are not 
kept to a very competitive level.
Similarly, competitive situations exist in respect of some of the 
BRB subsidiary businesses. In particular, the cross-channel 
ferry competition is very intense and, in the last two years, 
has produced a 'cost-cutting war' which has severely affected 
the profitability of Sealink UK Ltd and BR Hovercraft Ltd.
In respect of the National Freight Corporation, the main 
competition has stemmed from other public hauliers, own-account 
operators and, to a relatively small degree, the BRB, in respect 
of its Speedlink and Freightliner services. It was noted 
earlier that this competition is so extensive that NFC occupies 
less than 5% of the total market. This amounts to less than 10%
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of the 'public haulage' market share.
Competition to NFC is provided by 125,300 public-haulage 
operators (Source : Transport Statistics Great Britain 19^9 - 
1979 - with 'operators' meaning number of holders of operating 
licences). Almost 90% of these operators run 3 vehicles or fewer 
and only 300 (approximately) run 100 vehicles or more. The NFC 
is by far the largest road freight haulage business and it is 
also the most diverse.
NFC planners describe the competitive situation as being 
'cut-throat' with a heavy emphasis on aggressive marketing, 
involving keen pricing and reliability. It will be seen shortly 
that the NFC approach also involves a high degree of 
specialisation.
Moving to the National Bus Company, its stage-carriage operations 
are run mainly in competition with private motor car travel and, 
to a lesser degree, BRB Other Provincial Services but also, to 
some extent, in competition with municipal and private bus operators 
In some municipal areas there are service coordination agreements 
in' conjunction with local authorities (see Chapter 8). The NBC 
portion of the passenger transport market is described by NBC 
planners as not being related to any particular socio-economic 
group or even to non-car owning families. Instead, it is 
considered that a large part of the traffic relates to members 
of one-car owning families. As discussed earlier, the NBC 
share of the stage-carriage market amounted to approximately 
33% in 1979.
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In respect of its express coach services, the main competition 
stems from the BRB, private motor car travel and private coach 
operators. It was noted earlier that the NBC share of the 
express coach market amounted to approximately ^0% in 1979*
Since 1980, as a consequence of a change of legislation, 
concerning road service licences, the private coach competition 
has become more intense. This has resulted in severe price cutting 
and NBC consider that this has actually increased their market 
share. Details of the revised situation are given in Chapter 8.
In terms of the structure of the express coach market, it is 
clear from a survey of long distance journeys, conducted in 
1978/79 (Source : ’Transport Statistics Great Britain 19^9 - 
1979’), that the main users tend to be in the lower socio-economic 
'worker' groupings, plus students, housewives, retired people, 
disabled people and unemployed people.
The main competitors in the excursion and tours market are the 
private coach operators who also feature heavily in the contract 
and private hire market. Details of this competition, in terms 
of passenger journeys, has been provided in Table 3»2.
Finally, in respect of British Airways, the international 
competition is very fierce, with most industrialised countries 
having one international airline and the United States of 
America having no less than six large airlines. Using output 
statistics of available tonne kilometres and passengers 
published by the International Air Transport Association (1981),
BA is the fifth largest airline in the v;orld. however, those
129
statistics do not include the USSR state-owned airline or 
Pan American Airline, and BA planners consider that BA is really 
the sixth largest international airline. On the other hand, they 
describe BA as having the largest route network in the world, 
serving the largest number of countries.
International competition is restricted in terras of routes and 
services by a large number of bilateral agreements negotiated at 
Government level. However, the passengers and freight customers 
at most airports generally have freedom of choice as to which of 
the available airlines to use. General overcapacity in 
scheduled services, the growth of charter services and the 
recent (1979) elimination of large scale and long-standing 
price fixing arrangements (discussed in Chapter 9) have led to 
severe price-cutting in the last two years on the part of al.1 
of the international airlines. This has been particularly 
prevalent in respect of trans-continental flights.
The situation in regard to domestic UK flights is also highly 
competitive with the BRB inter-city services and Aer Bingus (to 
Ireland) being the main competitors. It was noted earlier 
(Table 5.1») that the BA share of the total domestic passenger 
market (measured in passenger miles) in 1979 was very small but 
it represented almost 8% of the market share held by the BRB and 
l8% of the hRB inter-city market share.
It is interesting to note that, because of excess capacity and 
low prices,many of the International Air Transport Association's 
(lATA) 111 members are in some form of financial difficulty.
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In 1980, they collectively sustained losses of £602m (Financial 
Times 26 October I981) and the Director General of lATA 
predicted that ’There is little hope of a return to profitability’ 
in 1981. It will be observed in Chapter 9 that the BA loss in 
1980/81 was a very substantial proportion of the overall lATA 
figure.
In summary, the market situation being experienced by each of the 
four organisations covered in this research is one of high 
competition but from varying sources and with varying degrees of 
intensity. The amount of cross-competition noted in earlier 
paragraphs is not as significant as that from outside the 
nationalised transport sector i.e. motor cars (BRB/NBC), private 
haulage and own-account vehicles (BRB/NRC) and international 
airlines (BA), The main associated similarity arises from the 
fact that each organisation has had to develop a reaction to the 
growth in this external competition. This reaction has been a 
considerable stimulons to the corporate planning activities of 
each of the organisations. Indeed, as one would expect, each of 
the organisations has developed a different culture related to 
a large extent, to the markets in which they operate. These 
varying cultures will also be seen to have a considerable 
bearing on the corporate planning activities.
The BRB culture is one which fully accepts the status of the 
organisation as being nationalised and, in respect of the bulk 
of the Passenger business, also being subsidised. Indeed, the 
subsidy is regarded by BEB management as a ’contract payment’ 
for providing socially necessary services. Apart from the
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Inter-city sector, the remaining sectors of the Passenger 
business are regarded as social services which should be 
subsidised by Central and Local (PTE’s in the main but with a 
few services supported by shire counties) Government to the 
full extent that receipts do not cover costs. This also applies 
to investment in these three 'social’ sectors, where the attitude 
is that it is up to Government to provide the funds necessary to 
replace the assets when they are life expired. This replacement 
is generally seen as being on a like-for-1ike basis but with
electric multiple units being substituted for diesel multiple
units if the Government is prepared to provide the additional 
investment funds. The Inter-city sector is, on the other hand, 
regarded as the 'cream' and receives the largest amount of 
management time and effort (and investment funds) to ensure its 
development. Here the accent is on developing faster trains 
which will reduce journey times between large towns and cities
and on the desire for a massive extension of main-line
electrification for commercial rather than social reasons.
In terms of varying the market share, on the Passenger side, 
the attitude is that it is necessary to maintain the status 
quo in the L & SE and Other Provincial sectors. No expansions 
or contractions are seriously postulated and the only growth 
which is seen to be likely is related to suburban 
electrification projects. Growth in the Inter-city sector is 
also seen as being related mainly to investment. This applies 
also in PTE areas where the intention is that any developments 
will wholly or largely funded by the PTE's.
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Over-riding all of these considerations there have existed two 
primary attitudes. The first is that passenger price levels 
should always be as close as possible to the perceived market 
price. This has led to the existence of a high price / low 
volume Passenger business where the accent has been on keeping 
the Government's Passenger grant to a minimum level rather than 
attempting to maximise some form of socisQ. benefit. It will be 
established in Chapter 6 that the BRB does not have a meaningful 
non-financial objective and thus considers that its price/volume 
attitude has been correct. However, it will also be seen in 
Chapter 6 that, the attitude to passenger price levels has begun 
to change in 1981 as a result of the economic recession and the 
advent of the express coach price-cutting situation. Experimental 
prices are being introduced covering journeys (with some 
restrictions) from large towns to London at fares which are 
approximately one-third of normal, which^ if extended, would result 
in a fundamental shift in the pricing strategy.
The second attitude concerns safety where every effort is made 
to ensure that safety standards are of an extremely high order. 
Whilst it has not been quantified, it is generally accepted within 
the BRB that this attitude adds heavily to running costs and 
investment needs. Standards of safety are regularly monitored 
by the Department of Transport (Railways Inspectorate) who also 
lay down a large number of operating rules and equipment 
specifications.
Turning to the Freight and Parcels businesses, these are seen as 
being wholly commercial. However, the emphasis is not placed
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upon a search for growth but in maintaining high, (’market') 
prices and in rationalisation of operating practices with a 
view to reducing resources to a level consistent with traffic 
offered and, more recently, that which is considered to be best 
suited to rail.
It will be seen in Chapter l6, that these resource and cost 
reduction aspirations (mainly those related to the Freight 
business) have not been wholly achieved in the last five years. 
This non-achievement has been partly connected with a lack of an 
aggressive attitude towards implementing change. This has been 
related in many ways to the natural opposition of the three main 
Trade Unions and the comprehensive consultation procedure which 
has to be followed in connection with every proposal. Indeed, 
the opposition was such that there has been a 'no-compulsory 
redundancy' agreement which has meant that all manpower resource 
reductions have had to be linked to natural wastage.
By contrast, the NFC culture is one of an aggressive search for 
change. Since its creation in 1969, an attitude has been 
developed that it is essential to create financial viability 
and not remain as yet another 'loss-making nationalised industry' 
To this end, considerable efforts have been made to rationalise 
operating practices and withdraw from unprofitable traffics and 
those with a doubtful future and move into new and generally 
specialised areas with greater and longer lasting potential. The 
recent moves towards de-nationalisation (discussed in Chapter 7) 
are viewed with considerable enthusiasm because it is believed 
that the Company has a viable future and does not need the
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protection of Government ovmership or the additional disciplines 
that go with it.
NFC planners have explained to the author that the search for change, 
which has resulted in the development of specialised activities 
and contract-based traffic was spurred on by the large losses 
which were sustained in 1973» That resulted in NFC management 
resolving to make the business more robust and less liable to 
suffer heavily in times of industrial recession. As a result 
of these efforts, NFC has evolved from being largely a general 
haulage contractor to being what they describe as a 'diverse 
freight business, capable of weathering economic storms.'
Turning to the National Bus Company, its culture, like that of 
the BRB, wholly accepts the status of being nationalised and 
recent Government suggestions of de-nationalisation (see 
Chapter 8) are not viewed as being necessarily capable of 
achievement, except on a small scale i.e. selected companies or 
services. Its endeavours are addressed mainly to attempting to 
maintain the size of the stage carriage networks whilst staying 
within the financial constraints laid down by Government. This 
has placed the emphasis on a constant search for operating 
improvements and related resource reductions. However, the 
scope for cost savings within NBC has not been found to be 
sufficient to match the losses of̂  passengers to other modes 
(mainly private motor cars) and this has meant that subsidies have 
been necessary. This has generated considerable efforts at 
maximising the service deficit grants which, since 1973» have been 
available from Local Authorities. Consequently, this has led to
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a culture of working closely with local authorities (mainly 
county councils) and ensuring that their perceived needs and 
conditions are met.
In respect of the express coach services, the emphasis until 
1980 was on maintaining the route structure and maintaining 
price levels as high as possible (i.e. as close as possible to 
the perceived market price). However, since 198O , and for the 
reason noted earlier, a more aggressive price cutting attitude 
has been struck with a totally new level of market price being 
in operation. This has resulted in a new attitude of attempting 
to obtain an increase in the market share, largely at the expense 
of the private coach operators but also the BRB.
British Airways planners describe its culture as aggressive and 
fundamentally concerned with expansion and commercial viability. 
Expansion aspirations are directed into capturing a larger 
share of a growing market for scheduled international services 
conveying passengers, mail and freight and also for air tours. 
High quality services, extensive advertising and, since 1979, low 
price levels, are seen as the main means of achieving this. 
Additionally, British Airways has attempted to maintain its wide 
variety of routes even though many of them could not be justified 
in wholly commercial terms. However, some reductions are now 
being contemplated (Autumn I98I) in order to reduce losses.
This desire for expansion has been coupled with the need to 
replace older aircraft and has led to the purchase of larger 
aircraft with a significantly increased payload. As in. the
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BRB, one of the most vital considerations is safety which has 
been given a high ranking in all investment and operational 
decisions. During the last decade, there has been no great 
emphasis placed upon reducing resources, including manpower, 
because of the essentially expansionist philosophy and because 
of productivity improvements being generated by traffic growth 
and increased aircraft payload. However, in an attempt to 
reduce the heavy losses experienced in the last financial year 
(year ended 31 March I981), a change of emphasis has obtained and 
special effort was made to reduce manpower by changing working 
practices. This process is continuing and has now become an 
essential feature of the BA culture. Further details will be 
given in Chapters 9 and l4.
The patterns of growth or contraction experienced by the four 
organisations have, of course, been related to the market 
changes and cultural features noted in preceding pages. Summary 
details are given in the following paragraphs, drawing upon 
more detailed information given in Chapters 6 to 9.
In respect of the BRB, which was created on 1 January I963, it 
will be seen, in Chapter 6, that the volume of Passenger activity 
measured in terms of Passenger miles was, in I98O , approximately 
equal to the level in 1963# Within that figure there has been 
a substantial decline in what are now regarded as Other Provincial 
services offset by increases in Inter-city travel. By contrast, 
there has been a very large (32%) reduction in freight 
tonne miles since I963 and an even larger (approximately 30%) 
reduction in parcels carryings.
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These Other Provincial (Passenger), Freight and Parcels reductions 
which have been almost wholly related to competition from the 
private motor car / public (not NFC in the main) and own-account 
haulage, have resulted in massive reductions in resources 
since I963. Many of the details are recorded in Chapter 6 but 
it is well to note here that they include the following:-
1963 to 1980




Passenger Coaching vehicles 32
Freight vehicles . 87
Staff numbers 37
* Railways business only
In NFC the extent of growth/contraction in traffic carried 
since 1969 (the effective date of its creation) is difficult 
to measure in volume terms. This is because NFC does not 
publish or produce data in respect of the volume of business 
in terms of tonne miles or tonnes carried. Instead, reference 
has to be made to turnover and vehicle mileage. In regard to 
turnover, this increased from <£l68m in 1969 to £432m in 1979. 
However, allowing for inflation (using the retail price index 
increase as a proxy for inflation - Source : Central Statistical 
Office Economic Trends), the 1969 turnover was approximately 
equal to £346m in 1979 price levels. The 1979 level therefore 
represented a decline in carryings of 21%. This was more than 
matched by a 31% reduction in vehicle mileage during the same 
period.
In terms of resources, however, traffic vehicles were reduced by
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37%, the aggregate tonnage capacity of those vehicles by 34% 
and staff numbers by 47%. The relatively larger reductions 
in resources compared with traffic carried has reflected the 
rationalisation of operating practices, withdrawal from 
unprofitable traffics and the increased specialisation strategy 
noted earlier.
In NBC, the volume of business has declined since 19^9, the 
first year of its operation. The reductions have been due, 
in the main, to growing competition from private motor cars.
Measured in terms of passenger journeys, there has been a 42
reduction in carryings between 19&9 and I98O . NBC have attempted 
to rationalise services and operating practices (e.g. crewing) 
to offset the related volume reductions in turnover but have 
been unable to make wholly matching cost savings. F or example, 
they have only been able to reduce vehicle miles by 19%, public 
service vehicles by 23% and staff numbers by 27%. As noted 
earlier, this has led to losses being sustained and to the 
need for Local Authority subsidies to maintain services that 
might otherwise have been withdrawn.
Finally, the volume of British Airways traffic has increased ‘ 
substantially since its creation on 1 April 1972. This growth 
has been related primarily to an increase in the size of the 
overall world-wide market for air travel, in respect of 
scheduled and air tours passengers, mail and freight. As will 
be seen in more detail in Chapter 9, this has enabled BA to 
increase its inherited (i.e. the results of the merged 
companies forming BA) passenger miles in 1971/72 (year ended
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31 March) by 124% by I980/81. Tonne miles of mails and freight 
have increased by 73% and 83% in the same period. Overall 
tonne miles including passengers have increased by 117%.
BA have managed basically to carry this increased volume of 
traffic without increasing the number of aircraft, flights 
or manpower. This has been achieved through the replacement 
of its older aircraft by new aircraft with a considerably 
larger carrying capacity.
The organisation structures of the four organisations reflect 
the nature of the markets in which they operate, their cultures 
and, as will be seen in Part 3, the strategies which they have 
developed. The NFC situation is similar to that of NBC. Both 
have placed considerable emphasis on the distinctive nature 
of the individual groups/companies and the central headquarters 
of both is small, operating as a form of holding company.
On the other hand, the BRB and BA each operate a single large 
business (Railways business / Airlines Group) with a number of 
considerably smaller 'subsidiary' businesses. These 'subsidiary' 
businesses are not generally subsidiary to the large business 
but to the main board. The management structures of both the 
BRB and BA are such that there is no completely clear-cut 
identification of an organisation structure which is solely 
responsible for the management of the Railways business or the 
Airlines Group, respectively. Instead, many board members and 
other executives have joint responsibilities i.e. for the 
corporate entity and for the running of the main business.
l4o
Moving finally to the relative financial situations of the 
four organisations, it will.be seen in Chapters 6 to 9 that 
each is in some financial difficulty (partly as a result of the 
current economic recession) and that each has sustained losses 
in a number of years since its creation. The NFC has recently- 
undergone its second capital reconstruction (involving a 
reduction in capital liabilities to the Department of Transport), 
on this occasion as a prelude to impending denationalisation.
On the evidence provided in Chapters 6, 8 and 9, it seems likely 
that each of the other three organisations will also shortly 
require some form of capital reconstruction involving, in the 






This chapter contains a considerable amount of information, 
additional to that provided in chapter 5, concerning the 
British Railways Board, In terms of length aind detail, it is 
much more comprehensive than chapters 7 to 9 which cover the 
other three organisations dealt with in this thesis. The 
reason for providing the additional detail is that it is 
considered necessary not only to provide the information 
designed to facilitate sm understanding of the nature, size 
and problems of the organisation (as in chapters 7 to 9) but 
to provide a good deal of financial and other data (from 1975 
to 1981) which will be used in the ’success' assessment under­
taken in chapter I6. Additionally, the author considers it 
appropriate to provide a fairly detailed historical perspective 
as a background to the strategic considerations discussed in 
chapter 11.
With these points in mind, it is intended to divide this 
chapter into three sections, as follows :-
6.1. Nature, Size and Historical Perspective
6.2. Financial History
6 .3. Current Financial Situation and Immediate Prospects
6.1. Nature, Size and Historical Perspective 
The British Railways Board (BRB) is a large and important 
nationalised industry which has seen halcyon days, is adapting 
itself to environmental change and has a future which is not
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certain. It is not one business but many, all coming under the 
umbrella title of the British Railways Board, or in public 
relations jargon, ’British Rail'. The entire complex is a very 
large and varied business. It is one of the largest employers 
in the United Kingdom; it employed just over 239*500 people at 
the end of I98O, which represented about 0.9% of the United 
kingdom labour force.
The main businesses within the BRB are 
Railways
British Rail Engineering Ltd (BREL) 
British Transport Hotels Ltd (BTH) 
British Railways Property Board 
Sealink (U.K.) Ltd 
British Rail Hovercraft Ltd 
Freightliners Ltd 
Transportation Systems and Market 
Research Ltd (Transmark)
Known collectively 
as the 'subsidiary 
businesses'
The British Railways Board was created on 1 January, 1963* 
under the Transport Act, 1962. The Board members are charged 
with the overall responsibility of running all of these 
businesses, most of which were inherited from the British 
Transport Commission. The main organisational structure is 
given in fig. 6.1, where it can be seen that the boards of the 
businesses are responsible to the main board members. This 
they do through their managing directors, or equivalent in the 
case of those which are not limited companies. The chairman of 








of the BRB. The chief executive of the Railways business is also 
a full-time board member. He is responsible for the general 
managers of the five geographical regions of the Railways 
business. In May 1981, there were eight full-time and seven 
part-time members of the British Railways Board. The chairman 
is one of the full-time members and each of the remaining 
full-time members has executive responsibility. The board 
membership responsibility structure was changed in January 
1977* Prior to that date it was a board on which no member had 
executive responsibility. The board is responsible to the 
Secretary of State for Transport who appoints all board
members, including the part-time members who do not represent
any special interests such as Government, trade unions, etc.
There are a number of other organisations above the BRB to 
which it owes a measure of responsibility and the most 
significant of these are given in fig. 6.2. The BRB does not 
work in an independent manner; the controls over its operations 
are considerable and stem in the main from the organisations 
quoted. The relationships with these organisations are complex 
and related to individual aspects of running the business. In 
theory, contact with central government departments is via the 
Secretary of State for the Department of Transport but, in
practice, direct contact at lower levels frequently occurs or
joint discussions, e.g. with the Treasury, are held. The 
Department of Transport has responsibilities with respect to 
establishing and/or agreeing objectives (including cash limits), 
setting policy guidelines, strategy approval, plan approval, 








these. The Secretary of State is, in turn, responsible to the 
Cabinet and Parliament to ensure that the board manages its 
business in line with statutes and directives. The board is 
not autonomous as is that of an ordinary public company. The 
statutes and directives represent major disciplines and 
constraints, many of which would be present even if the BRB 
were in a profit-making situation.
The individual businesses within the BRB are self-accounting 
but are not autonomous. They are analogous to divisions in a 
large company. They make decisions concerning the day-to-day 
running of the businesses and the implementation of strategy 
but have no independence in matters of a strategic nature or 
in respect of large investment (i.e. in corporate planning). 
Indeed, there is a high degree of central control over all 
strategic decisions. However, as will be made clear in 
chapter 10, each business plays a large part in the development 
of its portion of the strategy and a 'corporate plan' is 
prepared for each business as well as an overall corporate 
plan.
The board members exercise their responsibilities through a 
number of functional chief officers who are in day-to-day 
contact with the Railways business regional general managers 
and the managing directors (o]̂  equivalent) of the subsidiary 
businesses. They also have links with the functional 
officers of the Railways regions and their equivalents in the 
other businesses. Details of the chief officer structure are 
given in fig. 6.5. This chart indicates the executive
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relationship with the full-time board members and one of the 
part-time board members. The remaining part-time board members 
relate to the chief officers as necessary as, indeed, does each 
full-time board member in regard to matters outside his direct 
responsibility. Information concerning the involvement of 
board members and chief officers in corporate planning will be 
given in chapter 10.
To consider the nature and size of the BRB in more detail and 
in an historical perspective, it is useful to consider each of 
its constituent businesses in turn, with particularly detailed 
reference to the largest business - the Railways business. This 
is undertaken in the sub-sections which follow,
6,1,1, Railways
This is far and away the biggest and most important business 
and consists of a railway network covering much of Great 
Britain, providing Passenger, Freight and Parcels services. In 
terms of turnover, it represents in I98I about 8 3 % of the total 
business. In organisational terms, it is divided into five 
regions - Eastern, London Midland, Scottish, Southern and 
Western, Apart from the Scottish, these regions are in turn 
divided into divisions. They are all further divided into 
areas. Each region is headed by a general manager whose status 
is considered in the BRB to be similar to that of a managing 
director of one of the larger subsidiary businesses. The 
regional and divisional organisations are functionally 
constructed, broadly covering marketing (passenger, , freight 
and parcels separately), operations (running of trains and
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terminals) mechanical and electrical engineering (maintenance 
of permanent way and structures), signal and telecommunication 
engineering (maintenance of trackside signalling and 
telecommunications equipment), management accounting (most 
financial accounting is centralised at BRB headquarters), 
personnel (industrial relations and general staff matters) and 
planning (which, in this context, is in respect of investment 
programming and monitoring). The divisions and areas are of 
four types: traffic, mechanical and electrical engineering, 
civil engineering and signal and telecommunication engineering.
An attempt was made to standardise the organisation by 
eliminating the divisional level following a consultant's 
report (McKinsey & Co) but this was abandoned in January 1975 
because of union and staff opposition and the likely high 
costs involved in staff movement and general dislocation of 
administration if the recommendations were followed. However, 
since that time, the numbers of staff employed at divisional 
headquarters' offices has been greatly reduced, partly as a 
result of centralisation of work at regional level. Fresh 
consideration is being given to the concept of elimination of 
a tier of management at least in respect of some functions.
The Railways business covers three sub-businesses which are the 
Passenger business, the Freight business and the Parcels 
business. To a large extent, these businesses share the same 
resources, particularly track, locomotives and administrative 
manpower,
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The extent of these resources gives a good guide to the size of 
the Railways business. Details of the significant items are 
provided in Table 6,1, under key dates, selected, apart from 
51/12/80, because of their significance in terms of legislation 
which will be described shortly. Derivatives relating to some 
of these items have already been quoted in chapter 5»
It can be seen that there have been significant reductions in 
the resources owned and used by the Railways business in the 
28 years of the existence of the British Railways Board, These 
changes have been related to the changes in market conditions 
noted in chapter 5 » legislation and to a few major decisions. 
Details of the legislation and major decisions will be provided 
in section 6,2, For the remainder of this sub-section, it is 
intended to pursue further the nature and size of the three 
businesses within the Railways business, with reference to the 
historical information given in Table 6,1, and other, largely 
physical, data.
The Passenger business is the largest business measured in terms 
of receipts and utilisation of the largely joint resources. 
However, this v/as not the case in 1963» when the Freight * 
business was the largest under these criteria. This change has 
been brought about by the decline in Freight carryings and 
resources, rather than by expansion of the Passenger business. 
Indeed, during the period 1965 to I98O, the size of the 
Passenger business carryings has, in fact, changed comparatively 
little overall, as can be seen from the evidence given in
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Poaitlon ag at 
1/1/61 11/12/68 11/12/7L 1l/l2/80
ÏOM. Nos. Nos. Nos.
Bes^^ges
Bouts Wllss I7,h8l 12.LL7 11.289 1Q.96U
Trade Wiles
Banning linss 33,695 25,271 22,1(88 21,811
Sidings 13,888 8,705 6,780 5,1(57
1(7,51(3 33,976 29,268 27,268
Terminals 
Passenger with
Trei^t and Parcels U,306 2,6l6 2,355 2,366
Freight only 2,1(79 598 1(18 1(09
Parcels only 16 21 17 12
6,801 3,235 2,790 2,787
Marshalling Tards , 602 18U U9 3U
EST Tehlelea
Power Cars - - » Il(2




Diesel 3.683 1(,326 3,619 3,078
Electric 178 329 352 3OI
Steam 8.767  3  I  3
U.658 3,971( 3,382
Coaching Pehicles
Diesel Multiple Unit U.110 3,810 3,1(27 3,257
Slectrie Multiple Unit 6,996 7,31(8 7,156 7,558
Locomotive Hauled 22,715 8 ,3 8 6 7,15U 5,56?
Total Passenger . 33,821 19,5l(l( 17,737 16,382
Non - Passenger 12,1(82 7,260 5,501 1(,G26
1(6,303 26, Sou 23,238 20,1(08
Freight 7ehicles
Wagons 862,61(0 1(37,1(12 21(1,1(29 119,507
Containers 1(6,535 28,1(70 3.99U 18O
909,175 1(65,882 21(5,1(23 119,687
Total Seats/Berths 1,809,lU3 1,190,510 1,105,83U 1,090,1(17
Total Capaeitv of ^eiafat 
Tehicles (Tonnes) 11,31(8,126 7,356,186 U,600,372 2,769,139
Staff (including corporate) Uli(,61(6 257,059 199,1(68 178,059
Table 6 .1. Railways Business Resources at Selected Dates




196? 1^6^ 1974 1980
Passenger Miles (millions) 19,575 17,800 19,200 19,700
INDEX (100) (91) (98) (101)
Passenger Journeys (millions) 938.4 831.1 732.8 760.2
INDEX (100) (89) (78) (81)
Passenger l'ailles per Journey 
(miles) 20.9 21.5 26.3 23.9
INDEX (100) (103) (126) (124)
Passenger Loaded Train Miles 
(millions) 217.0 184.0 183.5 203.1
INDEX (100) (85) (83) (94)
Passenger Miles per Loaded 
Train Mile (miles) 90.2 96.9 103.5 97.0
INDEX (100) (107) (113) (108)
INDEX - 1963 = 100
Table 6.2. Passenger Business - Carryings and Train Miles 
_____________1963, 1968, 1974 and 1980______________________
(Source ; BPB annual renorts and accounts)
It is interesting to note that, in terms of passenger miles, the 
1980 carryings were approximately equal to the 19^3 level despite 
a relatively significant decrease in passenger journeys. This 
has resulted from a 24/6 increase in the average distance per 
passenger journey. The level of passenger loaded train miles 
was only G% lower in I980 than in 19^3 and, with such little 
change in the level of passenger miles, this has produced a 
small (8%) increase in passenger miles per loaded train mile, 
compared with the I963 situation.
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During the years 19^3 to 1980, the number of Passenger and 
jointly used assets has, however, been reduced considerably and 
the absence of a similar overall decline in passenger miles and 
passenger loaded train miles has indicated a substantial 
improvement in productivity - i.e. in respect of asset 
utilisation (the financial and social consequences of this 
will not be discussed until Section 6.2). This view can be 
drawn from comparing the wholly Passenger indices shown in 
Table 6.3, which has been prepared from data given in Tables 6.1 
and 6.2.
Index (1963 = 100)
1963 1968 1974 1980
Passenger Miles 100 91 98 101
Passenger Loaded Train Miles 100 85 85 94
Passenger Coaches (incl. HST) 100 58 52 50
Passenger Seats/Berths 
(end of year) 100 66 61 60
Table 6.3. Passenger Business - Selected Performance Indices 
_____________1963, 1968. 1974 and 1980_________________________
It is not possible to make a similarly conclusive observation in 
regard to the reductions in jointly used assets but, in total, 
they point to the same situation. For example, the reductions 
in track mileage, locomotives and terminals recorded in Table
6.1. far exceeded the changes in passenger miles.
Finally, before moving on to the Freight business, it is necess­
ary to note that, in recent years for planning and control
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purposes, the Passenger business has been divided into four 
sectors. These are Inter-city, London and South East 
(L. & S.E.), Passenger Transport Executives (P.T.E.) and 
Other Provincial. The Inter-city sector covers express trains 
between major towns and the London and South East sector covers 
the London commuter area. The Passenger Transport Executives* 
sector covers the commuter services wholly or mostly within 
the boundaries of the six metropolitan counties in England and 
one in Scotland (Strathclyde). The remaining 'green field' 
services are grouped together and known as the Other Provincial 
sector.
Between 1974 and I98O the passenger miles were recorded as being 
distributed as shown in Table 6.4. Over these years, there have 
been some changes in sector definitions, but the figures given 
serve to provide a good idea of the relative dimensions of each 
sector.
Year (Thousand Million)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Inter-city 8.2 8.8 8.0 8.4 9.0 9.4 9.2
L. & S.E. 8.2 7.3 7.1 7.3 7.6 7.7 7.7
F.T.E's ) 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.5Other Provincial) 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3
19.2 18.8 17.7 18.2 19.1 19.9 19.7
Table 6.4. Passenger Business - Sector Passenger Miles 
____________ 1974 to 1980_________________________________
(Source ; BRB internal records)
As will be made clear in Section 6,2, the reduction in
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passenger miles recorded in 1976, compared with 1975» resulted 
largely from resistance to price increases. This had its most 
marked effect in the Inter-city sector, the other large sector 
(L. & S.E.) consisting mainly of the carriage of London 
commuter traffic which are less able not to travel or to 
travel by an alternative mode. However, in comparing 1974 
with 1980, there was little significant change in the total 
passenger miles and, correcting for changes in sector 
definition, the increase was almost wholly recorded in the 
Inter-city sector.
Turning now to the Freight business, it is clear that it has 
undergone considerable change since 1963» This change is 
portrayed in Table 6.3, where it will be observed that the 
main physical fact describing the extent of the carryings - 
freight net tonne miles - recorded a drop of 32% by I98O. This 
was close to the reduction of 36% in freight tonnes carried 
and did not, therefore, reflect any marked change in the 
average length of haul.
However, the reduction in freight loaded train miles has been 
almost twice as great as the reduction in freight tonnes and 
freight net tonne miles. This has resulted in a considerable 
improvement (93%) in the level of freight net tonne miles per 
loaded train mile, reflecting a doubling (approximately) of 
the average train loading. This has represented a substantial 
improvement in productivity which has been well matched by
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Haul (Miles)
INDEX
Freight Loaded Train Miles 
(millions)
INDEX
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- Carryings and Train Miles 
and 1980____________________
(Source : BRB annual reports and accounts)
reductions in the number of Freight and jointly used assets. 
The key(and wholly Freight) indices are shown in Table 6.6, 
which has been prepared from data given in Tables 6.1. and
6.3.
As in respect of the Passenger business, it is not possible 
to make a similarly conclusive observation in regard to the 
changes in jointly used assets but those recorded in Table 6.1 
(i.e. track miles, locomotives, terminals, marshalling yards 
and manpower) showed equally marked reductions.
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Index (1963 = 100)
1963 1968 1974 1980
1 Freight Net Tonne Miles 100 93 85 68
Freight Loaded Train Miles 100 66 56 35
Freight Vehicles 100 51 27 13
Freight Vehicle Capacity (end 
of year) 100 65 4l 24
Table 6,6. Freight Business - Selected Performance Indices 
_____________1963, 1968. 1974 and 1980__________________ .
For planning and control purposes, the Freight business has, in 
recent years, been divided into two sectors known as Trainload 
and Wagonload (or more accurately 'less than trainload'). 
Carryings in the Wagonload sector require intermediate 
marshalling into trainloads, frequently on more than one 
occasion. This marshalling activity is not generally required 
in respect of Trainload sector traffic. The Trainload sector 
traffic is subject to negotiated contract rates, many of which 
have price variation clauses which tie price increases to 
United Kingdom inflation indices such as the Wholesale Prices 
Index. Negotiated rates also apply in the Wagonload sector 
but here scale rates are frequently used because much of the 
traffic is ad hoc in nature.
The Freight busdness traffic is also analysed by commodity.
In summarised form, the commodity analysis is provided in 
Table 6.7. Here, it can be seen that the substantial 
reductions in Coal and Coke and in Iron and Steel carryings, 
reflecting the decline in those industries, has been the
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Trainload and Wagonload Tonnes 
Carried in Year (Millions)
1963 1968 1974 1980
Coal and Coke 153.9 124.7 88.0 94.2
Iron and Steel 39.9 39.3 31.0 12.9
Other - comprising Food and 
Drink, Earths and Stones,
Building Materials, Chemicals,
Petroleum Products, Motor
Vehicles and Miscellaneous 44.9 46.6 30.1 38.9
Freightliner Haulage and 
Other Items - - 7.2 7.3
238.7 210.6 176.3 153.5
Table 6.7. Freight Business - Commodity Analysis 
_____________1963. 1968. 1974 and 1980_____________
(Source ; BRB internal records)
major cause of, the overall reduction in freight tonnes carried. 
If one includes Freightliner traffic haulage, other 
commodities have remained, in total, fairly constant.
For strategic (discussed later) and market requirements 
reasons, there has been a marked switch in the relative 
proportions of Trainload and Wagonload traffic in recent years. 
The trends since I968 are given in Table 6.8. There has also 
been the development of 'private-owners' wagons with a marked 
trend towards this type of transit, which requires a long-term 




Trainload Tonnes 31 75 88
Wagonload Tonnes
Total Tonnes 100 100 100
Table 6,8, Freight Business - Percentage Distribution of 
Freight Tonnes Between Trainload and Wagonload 
____________ 1968, 1974 and 1980_____________________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
The strategic aspect of the switch from Wagonload into 
Trainload has been accompanied, since 1971» by the development 
of ’Speedlink* which is a faster Wagonload service, using large 
high speed wagons, serving large conurbations 
with limited intermediate marshalling. As will be seen in 
Chapter 11, the BRB intended, by about I983» to eliminate the 
old Wagonload network and develop the Speedlink system to cater 
for the conveyance of general merchandise, including a large 
part of that traffic now carried under traditional Wagonload 
conditions. The Speedlink tonnes from 1977 to 198O and the 
percentage relationships with the Wagonload Sector tonnes are 
given in Table 6.9. Speedlink tonnes figures relating to 






















Table 6.9. Freight Business - Speedlink Carryings 
_____________1977 to 1980___________________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
Turning to the Parcels Business, this has also undergone 
considerable change since 19^3. This change is portrayed in 
Table 6.10, where a distinct reduction in parcels tonnes has been 
experienced from 1974 to 198O. Similar figures in respect of 
1963 and 1968 are not available but it is clear from an 
examination of the receipts figures that there was a similar 
trend in the earlier years. This is indicated by adjusting 




1963 1968 1974 1980
Parcels Tonnes (OOO's)










N/A N/A 1.830 1,180
Parcels Loaded 
Train Miles (OOO's) I6 M 7  13 ,834 ;12,677 :10,844
INDEX (100) (84) (77) (66)
Receipts at Actual Prices 
(£m)










5,7.3 38.1 73,.:3. 141.2
Receipts in I98O Prices 280.5 234.8 183.0 141.2
N/A = Not Available
Table 6 ,10, Parcels Business - Carryings, Train Miles 
______________and Receipts 1963. 1968, 1974 and I98O
(Source : BRB internal records)
The reduction in Parcels Train Miles has also been significant 
(34%) but this comparison is rather misleading. A similar 
situation obtained in respect of non-passenger coaching 
vehicles (which are mainly used for carriage of parcels) which 
were reduced from 12,482 to 4,026, i.e. by *68%, between 19^3 
and 1980 (see Table 6.1.) Both are misleading, however, 
because a large number of parcels are carried in passenger 
coaching vehicles, in the guards' compartments. To understand 
this point further, it is helpful to appreciate that the 
Parcels business had been split by the BRB into two distinct 
sectors for planning and control. These are 'Station to 
Station' known as 'S to S' and 'Collection and Delivery' known
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as ’C & D».
The S to S sector includes newspapers, Post Office letter mails 
and parcels and the so-called 'premium' traffics - 'Red Star' 
(involving nominated Passenger trains) and 'R.P.T' (registered 
parcels). The essential feature of the S to S traffic is that 
it does not involve any conveyance by the BRB in road vehicles. 
All the traffic is collected/delivered by the customers or 
their agents. Much of this traffic is conveyed in the non­
passenger coaching vehicles but a considerable amount is 
conveyed in the guards' compartments of passenger coaching 
vehicles.
The C 8f D sector covers general parcels traffic under 
contractual arrangements (e.g. Mail Order Companies) and scale 
charges. This traffic has involved conveyance (collection 
and/or delivery) in road vehicles owned or hired by the BRB.
Up to 1968, the road vehicles concerned were owned by the BRB 
but since that date the collection/delivery has been undertaken 
by National Carriers Ltd. (see Section 6.2). It will be 
observed later (Section 6.3.) that the BRB abandoned the C & D 
sector on 1 July, I98I.
The distribution of traffic between S to S and C & D in the 
years 1968, 1974 and 198O was as shown in Table 6.11. It will 
be observed that there has been a significant relative decline 
in C & D receipts with a greater share of the total being in 
respect of Newspapers, Red Star and RFT traffic within the 
S to S sector.
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Station to Station
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Red Star and R.P.T.
































Table 6.11. Parcels Business - Percentage Distribution 
______________of Receipts 1968, 1974 and 198O___________
(Source : BRB internal records)
In summary, the three businesses comprising the Railways business 
and their largely jointly used assets have undergone consider­
able changes during the years between I963 and I98O. The full 
impact of these changes will be more readily understood once 
the financial history has been portrayed in Section 6.2. The 
significance of the changes on past and future strategic events 
will be dealt with in Chapter 11.
6.1.2. British Rail Engineering Ltd.
British Rail Engineering Ltd. (BREL) is a mechanical and 
electrical engineering company providing a rolling stock 
repairs facility to the Railways business in respect of major 
repairs and the supply of materials for day-to-day maintenance
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at regional maintenance depots. This company also manufactures 
most of the rolling stock for the Railways business. However, 
BREL also trades with third parties in both the maintenance 
and manufacturing fields, but this is a minor part of the 
business transacted. The repair and manufacturing facilities 
are located at installations known as ’main wdrks', of which 
there are currently thirteen which employed a total staff of 
36,367 at the end of I98O. This makes BREL one of the largest 
engineering concerns in the United Kingdom. Part of the 
rolling stock marketing facility is undertaken by 
B.R.E.-Metro Limited, which is a joint company owned by BREL 
and Metro Cammell Laird Limited, who manufacture urban rapid 
transit vehicles.
The size of the Railways business rolling stock heavy repairs 
and building programme was such that the British Railways 
Board transferred the 'main works' to this separate company 
in 1969. Part of the purpose of this was to enable the company 
to develop its distinctive competence to undertake work for 
third party companies and to facilitate the manufacture of 
rolling stock for export. Prior to January 1970» the Railways 
workshops were specifically prohibited by the Government from 
competing with the private sector for the construction of 
rolling stock in the United Kingdom or for export.
At the end of I963,'BREL' employed 61,899 staff. This was 
reduced to 39»213 at the end of 1968, 33»746 at the end of 
1974 and 36,367 at the end of I98O. During that time the
1&5
number of main works was reduced from 28 to 13. These 
reductions were very significant but, nevertheless not as 
striking as the reductions in the number of locomotives, 
coaching vehicles and freight vehicles recorded in Table 6.1. 
This disparity has been largely due to the increased size 
and complexity of the assets currently repaired compared with 
the situation in earlier years. Output statistics are not 
provided here because they would be misleading due to changes 
in the assets being repaired/constructed and the types of 
repairs undertaken. The financial arrangements for BREL are 
such that the Railways business is charged with the full cost 
of work done and materials supplied. Only the profit on 
external sales is left in the BREL books of account and 
reserves.
6.1.3. British Transport Hotels Ltd. (BTH)
British Transport Hotels, Ltd. was created in 1963, inheriting 
the Hotels and Catering business of the BRB. It is a hotel 
and catering company owning hotels in many main centres and 
providing Railway station catering and catering on board most 
Inter-city trains. It is one of the largest hotel and catering 
companies in the United Kingdom.
The station and train catering is undertaken on an agency basis 
for the Railways business and the resulting profit or loss is 
brought to account as part of the Railways business trading 
account. The profit or loss on hotel trading is retained within 
BTH accounts. This difference in treatment recognises the fact
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that the BRB regards the station and train catering activities 
as being part of the rail passenger transport package. Thus, 
the Railways business management is in the initiative in much 
of the decision-maJking, with BTH acting as agent for provision 
of the service.
Some of the key physical statistics in respect of BTH and its 
forebears are given in Table 6.12.
Hotels
Stations at Which 























Table 6.12. British Transport Hotels Ltd. (and Forebears) - 
______________ Physical Resources at Selected Dates____________
(Source : BRB annual reports and accounts)
6.1.4. British Railways Property Board
The British Railways Property Board was formed in 1969 to 
administer the letting of sites and buildings within areas 
being used by the BRB (known as operational property) and the 
letting and sale of sites and buildings not being used 
(non-operational). The ’Property Board' as it is called is 
among the five largest property owners in the United Kingdom 
and undertakes many large development projects, usually near
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the stations of large towns and often with private developers. 
Prior to the creation of this separate business, the property 
management activities were handled by the Railways business.
At the end of 198O, the Property Board portfolio consisted of 
approximately l40,000 individual properties, licences, 
easements and wayleaves. The book value of the non-operational 
property portfolio at the end of I98O was ^172.̂ m, the last 
revaluation having taken place in 1978. Staff numbers employed 
by the Property Board were 1,004 and 1,147 at the end of 1974 
and 1980, respectively.
The letting of operational property is regarded as another 
adjunct of the Railways business and the profit thereon is 
credited to the Railways business trading account. The profit 
on the non-operational account is retained within the accounts 
of the Property Board. This profit results from the letting 
of property declared non-operational and the development and 
sale of sites, all of which would have been declared non- 
operational sometime beforehand. When property is declared 
non-operational its assessed value is credited to the Railways 
business cash flow account and the Property Board capital 
profits thus represent profits in excess of these transfer 
values. Much of the effort of the Property Board is directed 
towards the development of sites in association with other 
organisations.
6.1.3» Sealink (U.K.) Ltd.
Sealink (U.K.) Ltd, is a coastal shipping company formed on 
1 January 1979 which was previously known as the Shipping and
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International Services Division of the BRB, It provides 
passenger and freight services to Northern Ireland, Eire, 
parts of the Continent and some offshore islands, including the 
Channel Islands and the Isle of Wight. In company with the 
French Railways, Zeeland Steamship Company and -Belgian Marine 
Transport Authority, the Company operates services under the 
brand name of ’Sealink' carrying passengers and cars on ten 
routes to Europe. Together they represent the largest shipping 
fleet of its kind in Europe operating, at the end of I98O, ?4 
vessels on 28 routes.
From 1963 to 1968, the shipping services were run by the 
management of the Railways business. However, in 1968, the 
separate Division was created and it became operational in 
1969. Associated with Sealink (U.K.) Ltd, which has its own 
set of accounts, is the harbours account which Is maintained 
separately although mainly run by the Company. This is done 
to establish the economics of the harbours activity which is 
credited with harbour dues and fees for handling services.
The physical facts trends of Sealink (U.K.) Ltd. and its 
forebears are shown in Table 6,13* Ihese figures show that the 
volume of 'Sealink' traffic has not changed much since I963 
except for the advent of motor vehicle traffic. This has 
resulted from the purchase/charter of relatively large 
'roll-on/roll-off ships by each of the 'Sealink' members.
169
Year
19éj 1968 1974 1980
m m m m
Shipping
Passenger Journeys * 18.3 17.0 16.1 l8.4
Passenger Vehicles * 0.8 1.1 1.6 2.1
Freight Tonnes in Rail 
Vehicles * 1.8 2.0 2.7 2.4
Road Haulage Vehicles * - 0.1 0.3 0.6
Import/Export Vehicles * - 0.1 0.1 0.2
1/1/63 31/12/68 31/12/74 31/12/8c
Nos Nos Nos Nos
Ships Owned 92 79 43 30
Ships Jointly Owned - - 3 3
Ships Leased - - 16 17
Staff (Ships and 
Harbours) 10,330 8,631 10,094 10,491
* These figures include the total carryings of the services
operated jointly by the BRB and the other ’ Sealink'
organisations as applicable in the years provided. However, 
the receipts and profits recorded in Section 6.2. represent 
the proportion accruing to Sealink (U.K.) Ltd. and its 
forebears.
Table 6.13. Sealink (U.K.) Ltd. and Forebears - Physical 
______________ Trends and Resources at Selected Dates______
(Source - BRB annual reports and accounts and internal records)
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6.1.6. British Rail Hovercraft Ltd.
British Rail Hovercraft Ltd. was a relatively small company 
which owned and operated two large hovercraft until 25 October 
1981 when it was merged with Hoverlloyd Ltd. (see section 6.3.) 
It was a pioneer organisation having been involved with 
commercial hovercraft since 1966 using smaller craft between 
Southampton and the Isle of Wight. More recently, using two 
larger craft, it has operated across the English Channel, 
working with a S.N.C.F. (French Railways) craft under the brand 
name of ’Seaspeed’.
The physical statistics for I968, 1974 and 198O are provided in 
Table 6.14, where it can be seen that there has been a consider­
able increase in carryings using the larger craft. This has 





Passenger Journeys 298 807 1,333
Motor Vehicles 3 83 I63
31/12/68 31/12/74 31/12/80
Craft 5 4 2
Staff ♦ 321 503
* included with Railways business manpower figures
Table 6.l4 . British Rail Hovercraft Ltd. - Physical 
______________ Trends and Resources at Selected Dates
(Source : BRB annual reports and accounts)
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6.1.7. Freightliners Ltd.
The Freight business of the Railways business commenced develop­
ment of a Freightliner network in I966, seeing it as a means of 
improving its share of the general merchandise traffic in a 
profitable way. In 1968, a new company was formed, 
Freightliners Ltd. which took over the related terminals, con­
tainers and road vehicles. In January 1969, 31?̂ of the shares 
were vested in the National Freight Corporation, the balance 
being held by the BRB. However, in 1978, the company was 
transferred back into the ownership of the British Railways 
Board. (Transport Act, 1973).
During I98O, Freightliners Ltd. forwarded 866,000 containers 
(equated 20 feet units) and, at the end of I98O owned 38 
terminals, 6,798 containers and 3^7 collection and delivery 
road vehicles. It also employed 2,432 staff. The company 
keeps separate books of account and pays the Railways business 
for rail trunk haulage of its containers. This forms part of 
the receipts, tonnes and net tonne miles of the Railways 
Freight business.
It can be seen from the foregoing that the BRB is a complex 
business containing a number of separate businesses, all of 
which have a strong relationship with the main activity - the 
Railways business. To consider the development of these 
businesses more fully, it is necessary to examine their 
financial history and, in that context, consider the impact
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of legislation and other significant events. This analysis 
follows in Section 6.2.
6.2. Financial History
In this section, it is intended to explain the main features of 
the financial history of the BRB from 1963 to 1974 and then 
provide considerably more information in respect of the years
1973 to 1980. This difference in treatment is considered 
appropriate since, up to 1974, it is only necessary to provide 
an historical perspective to the strategic considerations 
discussed in Chapter 11. From 1973, however, it is considered 
necessary to tabulate the actual results in a way that will 
facilitate the success assessment undertaken in Chapter I6,
It is convenient to split this section into three sub-sections 
dealing, respectively, with the years 1963 to 1968, 1969 to
1974 and then 1973 to I98O. Apart from the earlier reference 
to the special requirements in respect of 1973 to I98O, this is 
because of the impact of legislation which created a different 
financial environment in each of these periods.
6.2.1. Financial History 1963 to 1968
When the British Railways Board was established on 1 January 
1963, under the Transport Act, 1962, its inherited financial 
situation was already rather desperate, largely because of 
growing road competition. Substantial deficits had been 
recorded by the British Transport Commission in respect of 
those businesses transferred to the BRB(amounting to £l04m 
before interest in 1962) and it was the intention that the
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BRB would complete and implement a report entitled 'The 
Reshaping of the British Railways' which was designed to reduce 
substantially the deficits that would otherwise occur.
The 'Reshaping Report', as it was called, was published on 
27 March 19&3 and the chairman. Dr R. Beeching, (who had been 
appointed by the British Transport Commission and was largely 
responsible for its underlying strategic content) set out to 
implement its proposals. Not surprisingly, the report also 
became known as the 'Beeching Report' and the subsequent period 
of change as the 'Beeching Era'.
In the words of Dr Beeching (Annual Report and Accounts 19&3) 
the Reshaping Report set out to direct its proposals "towards 
the selection of a pattern of traffics, the development of a 
route system, and of modes of operation which will take full 
advantage of the merits of a rail system and enable it to be 
competitive." This meant dispensing with large parts of the 
traffic and lines (mostly Passenger but including a considerable 
amount of Freight) where the carryings were too light to 
justify the extent of the deficits incurred and where the 
traffic concerned passed predominantly bjr road with associated 
spare road capacity. This was the start of a 'do what you can 
do best approach' which has been fundamental to all subsequent 
strategic effort. It included the first concerted moves 
towards the development of the Freight 'trainload' activity 
which later became so important in strategic terms.
What actually happened in practice was that the implementation
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of the Reshaping Report prevented what would otherwise have 
been a very substantial increase in the deficits of the years 
1963 to 1968, The 1963 deficit was not eliminated and, in 
fact, grew slightly (in actual price levels) by 1968, This 
situation occurred largely because the net effect of the 
savings under the strategy was offset by expenditure price 
increases, mostly in respect of pay. The changes in resources 
were recorded in Table 6.1. and it will be observed that there 
were very substantial reductions in almost every item listed. 
The overall financial results from I963 to I968 are recorded 
in Table 6.13. It can be seen that the results did not improve 
overall and, consequently, deficit grants were received from 
Government to cancel the losses and prevent any growth in the 




1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
£ra £m £m £m £m £ra
Profit/(Loss) of each
activity *
Railways (81.6) (67.5) (73.1) (71.6) (90.4) (83.5)
Ships 4.7 5-1 4.9 5.7 4.7 4.6
Harbours 0.2 0.2 0.1 (0.1) 0.3 0.1








(73.5) (58.7) (64.8) (65.2) (82.3) (75.7)
Other expenditure 2.4 4.0 6.8 ,.1:4 4.4 , 4:1
(75.9) (62.7) (71.6) (70.6) (86.7) (80.2)
Other income 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
(75.8) (62.5) (71.5) (70.5) (86.5) (80.1)
Interest 58.1 58.4 60.9 64.2' 66.5 67.3
Profit/(Loss) (133.9)(120.9)(132.4)(134.7)(153.0)(147.4)
* This is generally the result of each Business, all
differences being negligible in this context. The Railways 
activity includes the surplus on the letting of operational 
property and on station/train catering.
Table 6,15. BRB Consolidated Profit and Loss Account 
______________ 1963 to 1968____________________
(Source ; BRB annual reports and accounts)
To understand this situation further, it is necessary to 
consider the results of the main business, i.e. the Railways 
business, in more detail. The results of that business are 
portrayed in Table 6.I6, where the BRB's assessment 
(unpublished) of the Railways business share of the total 
interest figures have been added to the published figures to 
make them more complete. These interest figures are based on
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cash flow data and are, therefore, quite reasonable.
Year
1963 1?64 1963 1966 1962 1968
£m £m £m £m £m £m
Receipts
Passenger 161.8 167.2 173.0 179.4 179.7 185.1
Freight/Parcels 292.8 291.6 283.9 275.3 250.3 262.4
Miscellaneous 8.5 9.5 9.1 8.7 9.0
463.1 468.3 466,2 463.8 438.7 456.5
Working expenses 550.2 541.6 545.7 542.1 536.1 547.1
(87.1) (73.3) (79.5) (78.3) (97.4) (90.6)
Ancillary income 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.1
Profit/(Loss) 
before interest (81.5) (67.5) (73.1) (71.6) (90.4) (83.5)
Interest 49.0 49.0 52.0 55.0 57.0 58.0
Profit/(Loss) 
after interest (130.5)(116.5)(125.1)(126.6)(147.4)(141.5)
Table 6.I6. Railways Business Profit and Loss Account 
______________ 1963 to 1968________________________________
(Source : BRB annual reports and accounts and 
___________ internal records) _________ _____
In brief, what occurred during the years I963 to I968 was that 
the 9/̂ reduction in Passenger Miles (see Table 6.2.) which was 
related mainly to the impact of the Reshaping Report was offset 
by price increases producing an increase in Passenger receipts 
of £23.3% by 1968. Freight and Parcels receipts declined, 
however, by £30*4m in total, again largely as a result of the 
line closures and service reductions emanating from the 
Reshaping Report. The Freight reduction was matched by a 1% 
drop in net tonne miles, as described in Table 6,2. The 
substantial run-down in resources (see Table 6.1.) for each
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of these businesses did not, however, produce lower net 
expenditure because pay and other price increases in costs 
were substantially in excess of the increases in receipts 
prices. The main consolation to the BRB in this situation was 
the fact that it would have been a good deal worse had it not 
been for the substantial reduction in resources which might 
otherwise have attracted equally high price increases, causing 
a substantial deterioration in the financial position.
During the period 1963 to 1968, the level of capital investment 
in each of the BRB businesses was as depicted in Table 6 ,17.
It will be observed that there was a considerable increase
between I963 and 1963 with reductions dov/n to the 1963 level
by 1967 and a further reduction in 1968,
Year
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
£m £m £m £m £m £m
Activitjy *
Railways 91.0 100.8 114.2 102.8 86.0 79.0
Ships/Harbours 2.0 3.9 3.8 1.7 8.1 4.5
Hotels 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.2 0.9 1.3
Non-operational property 0.1 0.2 - - -
Hovercraft - - - - 0.4 2.4
Interest Charged to 
Capital 1.5 2.4 2.4 0.8
95.5 108.1 121.2 106.5 95.4 87.2
* This is generally the expenditure of each Business, dll 
differences being negligible in this context. Investment 
in Station/Train Catering and 'Main Works' is contained 
within the Railways business figures.
Table 6.17. BRB Capital Investment 1963 to 1968 
(Source : BRB annual reports and accounts)
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However, these figures include inflation and, in order to 
assess the approximate level of volume changes, the Railways 
business and total figures have been re-assessed to average 
1968 price levels (using the Government's Retail Price Index) 










Table 6.I8 . BRB Capital Investment in 1968 Price 
1963 to 1968
Levels
(Source : BRB annual reports and accounts)
It can be seen that,in volume terms, the investment levels 
dropped considerably in I966 and again in 19^7 and 1968. Thus, 
by 1968 the volume of investment and that portion relating to 
the Railways business had fallen by 24.4/i and 29.1/̂ , respectively.
The realisation that the hoped for major reductions in losses 
had not been and probably could not be achieved even after 
such a traumatic reduction in services and resources led to 
the Government and the BRB taking a fresh view of the situation. 
This included a review of the principle of deficit financing.
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6.2.2. Financial History 1968 to 1974
This review led in part to the Transport Act, 1968, which came 
into force on 1 January 1969. The Act contained many 
provisions which were not related to the BRB but those that were 
are summarised below:-
Transport Act, 1968, - Main Provisions Relating to the BRB
(a) A large capital reconstruction designed to reduce 
depreciation and interest charges. This involved writing 
down the value of assets and, together with an increase in 
provisions, this had the effect of reducing the value of 
Government borrowings by £887m.
(b) The calculation of, and 'graint aid' for, the losses on 
selected Passenger services determined to be socially 
necessary. These grants to be paid by Government and the 
newly created Passenger Transport Executives (within the 
metropolitan counties), as appropriate.
(c) The elimination of general deficit financing.
(d) The transfer of the loss-making 'sundries' portion of the
Railways Freight business to the newly formed National 
Freight Corporation. The sundries business was the 'large 
parcels' sector (56 lb. to 5 tons per consignment) which 
usually involved collection and delivery by road vehicle.
(e) The creation of B.R.E.L.
(f) The creation of Freightliners Limited to take over and
develop the small freightliner activity started in 1966.
(g) Payment of a grant to cover the ownership and maintenance 
of surplus track and signalling capacity for a maximum 
period of 5 years aind a maximum total payment of £5Cm.
l8o
The most important feature of these provisions was the fact that 
they gave recognition to the concept of a Passenger 'social 
railway' which could not provide certain Passenger services 
without financial support from Central Government or the 
Passenger Transport Executives. The total deficit grant 
received under these arrangements in 19^9 was £6l.lm. After 
receipt of the grants mentioned above, the overall objective 
provided in the 1968 Act required the BRB to:-
(i) 'Secure that the combined revenues of the authority and 
their subsidiaries taken together are not less than 
sufficient to meet their combined charges properly 
chargeable to revenue account taking one year with 
another.'
(ii) 'secure that their subsidiaries charge to' revenue account 
in every year all charges which are proper to be made to 
revenue account including, in particular, proper 
provision for the depreciation or renewal of assets.'
The emerging financial results were in accordance with these
Act provisions O^ut after charging depreciation only on an
historic basis), for the first three years of its operation.
Later results indicated major financial difficulties. The
overall situation is summarised in Table 6.19.
I8l
Year
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
£m £m £m £m £m £m
Profit/(Loss) of each 
activity *
Railways 48.5 47.4 26.2 17.8 (3.1) (96.9)
Ships 4.5 3.2 2.0 3.3 2.6 (1.8)
Harbours 0.3 (0.1) (0.5) 0.1 0.2 -
Hotels 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2 0.7
Non-operational
property 2.7 3.1 4.1 4.9 3.5 3.3
Hovercraft (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.2) 0.1 (0.5)
B.R.E.L. 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6
Freightliners
(share ) (1.1) (0.4) - (0.2) 0^ -
33.6 34.1 32.9 27.3 3.4 (92.6)
Ancillary income 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 3.9 10.2
Corporate expenses - 2.8 3.3
Profit/(Loss)
before interest 56.2 31.7 30.2 24.9 5.7 (85.9)
Interest 41.^ 42.2 43.6 31.-1 71.9
Profit/(Loss)
after interest 14.7 9.3 (15.4) (26.2) (51.6) (137.8)
Passenger Grant 
included in Railways
figures 61.2 61.7 63.1 68.2 91.4 134.3
* This is generally the result of each Business, all differences
being negligible, in this context. The Railways activity 
includes the surplus on the letting of operational property 
and on station/train catering.
Table 6,19. BRB Consolidated Profit and Loss Account 
______________ 1969 to 1974_______________________________
(Source : BRB annual reports and accounts)
It will be noted that a loss of £26,2m was sustained in 1972 
and this grew to £157.8m by 1974. To understand this 
situation, it is again necessary to examine the results of the 
Railways business, including the BRB's assessed share of the
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total interest charge applicable to that business. The 
appropriate figures are given in Table 6.20.
Year.
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
£m £ffl £m £m £m £m
Receipts 
































332.7 371.3 393.2 632.4 673.1 773.8
Working expenses 491.6 332.0 378.0 625.1 688.6 882.8
41.1 39.3 17.2 7.3 (13.3) (107.0)
Ancillary income 7.9 9.0 10.5 10.4 10.1
Profit/(Loss) 
before interest 48.6 47.4 26.2 17.8 (3.1) (96.9)
Interest 36.0 36.0 38.0 46.0 51.0 65.0
Profit/(Loss) 
after interest 12.6 11.4 (11.8) (28.2) (56.1) (161.9)
Table 6.20. Railways Business Profit and Loss Account 
 _____________1969 to 1974________________________________
(Source : BRB annual reports and accounts and 
internal records)
In fact, the difficulties started in 1971. In that year, 
receipts excluding the Passenger Grant, increased by £22m.
It was estimated by the BRB that this resulted from an increase 
of £55m in respect of the yield from receipts price increases, 
offset by an estimated decline of £33% due to a reduction in 
the volume of Freight traffic carried. Working expenses 
increased, however, by £46m as a result of expenditure price
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increases of £39% (mostly pay awards), partly offset by 
improvements in the volume of expenses of £13m due to resource 
reductions. The Passenger Grant showed a slight increase only.
There was worse to come in 1972, when the combined Passenger, 
Freight and Parcels receipts increased by only £5% excluding 
the Passenger Grant. This resulted from an estimated increase 
of £36m in respect of the yield from price increases, offset by 
an estimated decline of £31m due to a decrease in the volume 
of receipts (mostly Freight). Working expenses increased by 
£47% as a result of expenditure price increases of £39%
(mostly pay awards), again partly offset by improvements of £l2m 
due to economies in the volume of expenses i.e. resource 
reductions. There was one bright, though temporary, feature; 
this was the receipt of a special Government grant for holding 
down prices at their request. This amounted to £27% and explains 
the large increase under Receipts - miscellaneous. The Passenger 
Grant increased by £3m mainly reflecting the expenditure price 
increases. The total interest charge was now beginning to rise 
sharply and the Railways business share in particular. This 
reflected the fact that the new stream of losses had to be 
borrowed from Government as well as the usual borrowing to 
finance investment in excess of the depreciation provisions.
However, the Government also recognised the severe cash flow 
problem which was being created by the remaining BRB loss of 
£26.2% by making a 'Special Grant’ of £32.0%. This was 
recorded on the BRB balance sheet as an interest free capital 
liability since the Secretary of State reserved the right to
l84
require the BRB to refund all or part of it.
In 1973, the Railways business loss, after charging a share of 
the interest figure, amounted to £36,Im compared with £28.2m 
in 1972 and £11.8m in 1971. In fact, the 1973 results were in 
many ways comparable with the 1972 figures because the 1972 
loss would have been £55% without the ’once-off’ pricing grant 
of £27%. Receipts price increases produced £26m in 1973 which 
was hopelessly inadequate to deal with the expenditure price 
increases of £51%. However, receipts volume improved by £l8m 
but this was largely offset by a working expenses volume 
increase of £13%. Much of the overall deterioration was covered 
by the Passenger Grant which increased by £23%, so the net 
difference boiled down in the main to the value of the non­
receipt of the pricing grant for a second year.
Once again, the Government helped to alleviate the attendant 
cash flow problems by providing a Special Grant of £72m. In 
this instance £20.4m was regarded as a capital liability, 
adding to the £32m received in 1972. The balance of £31.6m 
was regarded as a deficit grant and was credited to the profit 
and loss appropriation account, thus offsetting the Group loss 
for the year.
The year 1974 was worse and might be described as a 'watershed'. 
The loss, after interest increased from £31.6% to £157.8% for 
the BRB and from £56.1% to £l6l.9% for the Railways business. 
Receipts price increases in the Railways business produced 
approximately £36% in 1974 which bore no comparison with the
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expenditure price increases which totalled £l84m. These latter 
increases reflected the general level of inflation (including 
oil prices) but mainly consisted of pay awards including a 
September 'comparability' award. This was coupled with further 
receipts volume losses of £l6m and working expenses volume 
increases of £10m. With an economic recession under way, the 
receipts losses were recorded on the Freight and Parcels side, 
but the Passenger business improved by £5m. Industrial disputes 
and the 'three-day week' caused a drop of £l4m and the remaining 
£?m reflected the general economic recession. The Passenger 
Grant increased from £91.4m to £154.3% but, with the remaining 
Railways business loss being £l6l.9m and the overall loss being 
£157.8m, both figures allowing for a further increase in interest, 
it was necessary for further Government action to be taken.
That action stemmed mainly from the provisions of the Railways 
Act, 1974, which is discussed in the next Sub-section. More 
immediately, however, the Government supplied a further deficit 
grant of £157.8m in 1974 to enable the BRB to maintain a 
tenable financial position during the latter part of that year.
The deficit grant was supplemented by a further £57.2m to 
assist the cash flow problems, making the Special Grant £215% 
in all. This part of the grant was again recorded as a capital 
liability making a total over the three years of £109.6m.
It is clear that the deterioration in the financial situation 
which had developed during 1973 and, more severely, in 1974 
was mainly the result of expenditure price increases (mostly 
pay and fuel oil) vastly outstripping receipts price increases.
l86
Changes in the volume of receipts and expenditure were material 
in themselves but of relatively less significance.
In respect of capital investment during the period 19^9 to
1974, the position was as depicted in Table 6.21. 
Year
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
£m £m £m £m £m £m
Activity *
Railways 62.1 78.0 64.9 89.3 90.2 124.3
Ships/Harbours 3.2 3.9 3.1 10.3 9.3 4.3
Hotels 1.3 1.3 2.4 1.6 1.7 1.1
Non-operational
Property . —
Hovercraft - - - 0.1 - -
68.6 85.4 70.4 101.5 101.4 129.9
* This is generally the expenditure of each Business, all 
differences being negligible in this context. Investment 
' in Station/Train catering and 'main works' is contained 
within the Railways business figures.
Table 6.21. BRB Capital Investment 1969 to 1974 
(Source : BRB annual reports and accounts)
These figures again include inflation and, in order to assess 
the approximate level of volume changes, the Railways business 
and BRB total figures have been converted to average 1974 price 











Table 6,22. BRB Capital Investment, in 1974 Price 
______________Levels, 1969 to 1974__________________
(Source : BRB annual reports and accounts)
It is important to note that the BRB had decided to lease 
a number of assets during the period 1971 to 1974 and some 
investment was funded by the PTE's. These factors apart, the 
underlying trend was a volume increase on the 1969 position, 
but the total investment in that year was £47.Cm less than 
in 1968 (in 1974 price levels). Thus, in_each of the years 
1969 to 1974, the investment expenditure was 1ower than that 
incurred in 1968, which was itself the lowest level in any 
year since the creation of the BRB,
6.2.3. Financial History 1973 to I98O
The Railways Act, 1974, the provisions of which took effect on 
1 January 1973» created a considerably different financial 
environment. The main provisions were :-
(a) The establishment of a 'public service obligation'
(P.S.O.) which enabled the Government to give grants to 
the Passenger business as a whole (on top of that already 
provided by the Passenger Transport Executives). This was 
on the understanding that the BRB would 'operate their
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railway passenger system so as to provide a service which is 
comparable generally with that provided by the Board at 
present•.
(b) The requirement that the Non-passenger business (i.e. the 
Freight and Parcels businesses plus ancillary income 
attributable to those businesses) should cover its direct 
working expenses and its share of indirect expenses (track 
and signalling and administration) calculated on an 
avoidable basis. This avoidable cost calculation was 
based on the assumption that the Railways business existed 
primarily for the Passenger business which would, 
therefore, take the balance of the costs.
(c) A further capital reconstruction and shorter depreciation 
lives for wagons, coupled with the reclassification of 
most track and signalling investment (renewals) as 
'revenue investment' (to be charged therefore to working 
expenses) rather than capital investment, as hitherto.
This last item was seen as a step towards inflation 
accounting.
(d) Provision for grants to Freight customers to assist with 
the establishment of new private sidings.
(e) Grant aid arrangements in respect of pension fund 
deficiencies.
The break-even one year with another requirement, contained 
within the Transport Act, I968, remained in force but the 
final profit and loss situation of the BRB was to be 
evaluated after allowing for the above provisions.
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The P.S.O. arrangement was a very significant step, in that it 
was a categorical recognition of an inevitable and necessary 
requirement to provide grants to offset what would otherwise 
be losses incurred by the Passenger business. Indeed, this 
concept and its social connotations were taken further in the 
accounting arrangements whereby the combined Freight and 
Parcels businesses were charged only with their avoidable costs. 
The treatment of direct (train working and terminals) working 
expenses noted above was deemed to be approximately equal to 
the avoidable costs, making the entire charge on an avoidable 
basis. The creation of the unusual category of 'revenue 
investment' was also favourable to the BRB in that, under the 
avoidability rules, approximately 90% of that investment would 
be charged to the Passenger business each year and thus be 
recovered in the annual P.S.O. grant.
It is clear that, as a means of providing a financial lifebelt, 
the Railways Act, 1974, was a very adequate document. Aside 
from the special treatment of pension fund deficiencies (which 
are discussed further shortly), the capital reconstruction 
reduced the debts to the Government by £298.3%» including the 
writing-off of that part of the 'Special Grants' received in the 
years 1972 to 1974 which had been treated as capital liabilities 
The value of the fixed assets was reduced to compensate and the 
assets which were no longer regarded as capital were written 
off» all residual differences being charged to reserves.
Under these new accounting arrangements » the results for the 
years 1973 to 19S0 were as portrayed in Table 6.23. Despite
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Year
1973 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
£ra £m £m £m £m £m
Profit/(Loss) of 
each activity * 
Railways (42.3) 0.1 44.8 37.8 34.2 (28.6 )
Ships (3.2) (2.2) 6.3 9.1 9.6 2.3
Harbours (0.4) 1.0 2.7 3.1 4.0 3.9
Hotels 0.8 0,7 1.3 1.0 0.3 (0.3 )
Non-operational
property 3.3 6.3 7.0 7.0 7.3 8.4
Hovercraft (0.2) - (0.6) (2.2) (0.8) (2.9)
B .R. E . L . 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.1 1.0 0.9
Freightliners 
(share ) 0.8 0 ^ 0.3 0.8 2.0 1.4
(42.1) 6.6 62.8 36.7 37.6 (14.7)
Ancillary income 17.9 10.8 9.7 7.4 8.2 11.2
Corporate
expenses 4.1 4.1 _^.8 4 ^
Profit/(Loss) 
before interest (28.3) 13.7 68.4 38.3 62.3 (8.0)
Interest and 
exchange 
losses/(gains) 32.3 43,4 38.3 31.6 60.8 68:7
Taxation - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Profit/(Loss) 
after interest (60.8) (29.9) 29.7 6.3 1.4 (76.9)
Special grant for 
non-passenger 
deficit 66.3 33.2 3.3
Grant





after interest 5.5 3.3 27.0 6.4 (0.4) (76.9)
*Ihis is generally the result of each Business » all differences 
being negligible in this context. The Railways activity 
includes the surplus on the letting of operational property 
and on station/train catering.
Table 6.23. BRB Group Profit and Loss Accounts 
______________1973 to 1980_______________________
(Source : BRB annual re-ports and accounts)
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the PSO grant and the associated avoidable costs arrangement 
in respect of the Non-passenger business, it can be seen that, 
in 1973, a. loss of £60,8m was incurred (after interest) which 
was funded by a new 'Special' grant to cover the Railways 
business Non-passenger loss, leaving a profit relating to the 
subsidiary businesses of £5.3%. Ihe situation improved in 
1976 when the overall loss of £29.9% (after interest) was 
funded by a similar grant of £53.2%, leaving a profit of 
£5 .3%. It improved again in 1977 and a profit of £29.7%
(after interest) was earned. The Special grant arrangement 
continued and £5.3% was paid. However, during 1977, the BRB 
established with the Department of Transport that £8.2% had 
been overpaid in respect of the 1976 Special grant and that 
amount was repaid. This left an overall profit of £27.0%,
In 1978, the profit was reduced to £6.5% (after interest) and 
to £1.4m in 1979. No further Special grants were received in 
those years. The situation changed drastically in I98O, when 
a loss of £76.9% (after interest) was sustained. Again no 
Special grant was paid and this amount was funded by borrowing 
from the National Loans Fund.
Throughout the years 1973 to I98O , as in earlier years, the 
financial results of the BRB have been dominated by those 
of the Railways business. This is clear from an examination 
of the trends in Table 6.23, particularly in the knowledge that 
the bulk of the interest charge and Ancillary Income are 
related to the Railways business. The results of the other 
businesses, whilst being important in themselves, are of minor 
significance when compared with the results of the Railways
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business. For this reason, it is intended to devote most of the 
remainder of this sub-section to an analysis of the Railways 
business results, explaining the improvement between 1975 and 
1977 and the deterioration between 1977 and I98O. Additionally, 
it is considered useful to compare the 1975 result with that of 
1974, albeit that the financial arrangements were somewhat 
different prior to the new rules relating to the Railways Act,
1974.
The results from 1975 to 1980 are analysed in Appendices l(a) 
to l(c), with data in respect of 1974 added for comparative 
purposes. In Appendix l(a), the financial results are recorded 
in a way which is designed to facilitate the eventual 
comparison with the Railways business ’corporate' plans. This 
includes an analysis of the year on year changes (annual and 
cumulative) split between price changes and volume changes.
The latest (May I981) forecast of the I98I result is also 
recorded but that will not be referred to until Section 6,3 . 
Appendix 1(b) records the investment expenditure including the 
newly created Revenue Investment element. Appendix l(c) records 
the trends of the key physical facts, all those relating to the 
quantity of resources representing year-end situations. 
Additionally, actual movements in selected macro-economic 
indicators are given in Appendix l(d), but these will be 
referred to mainly in Chapter I6 .
In summary form, the financial results given in Appendix l(a) 
are as described in Table 6.24. Before examining the trends 
and causes of change, it is necessary to explain how the
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Year
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980



























631 937 1081 1238 1401 1388
Working Expenses 
(including Interest) 947 1171 1288 1420 1679 1923 2302
Profit/(Loss) before 
Grants (316) (386) (331) (339) (441) (324) (714)
Resulting in:-
PSO Grant 
(including PTE) 324 319 364 434 323 634
Non-Passenger Grant 66 33 (3)
Passenger Profit/(Loss) 4 3 22 (7) 1 (32)
Non-Passenger
Profit/(Loss) -, - (2) (48)
1974 (Loss) before 
Grants (318)
Table 6.24. Railways Business - Profit and Loss Results 
______________1974 to 1980__________
(Source : BRB annual reports and accounts and 
internal records)
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Passenger Profit/(Loss) line of entry arises. It was 
explained earlier that the PiS.O. grant was designed, 
fundamentally, to fund the deficit of the entire Passenger 
business. Whilst this is the case, the rules are somewhat 
complex and they result in a relatively small profit or loss 
emerging at the end of each year.
What happens is that each December, the Passenger proportion 
of the profit and loss budget for the following year is 
converted into a P.S.O. claim figure, which is equal to the 
budgeted Passenger loss. This claim includes the service 
support payments due from the P.T.E's, the balance being 
payable by Central Government. The actual P.T.E. grant 
payments are calculated according to the emerging results, 
but the actual Central Government part of the P.S.O. payment 
is the claim figure adjusted to take account of certain 
matters, most of which are largely beyond the Board’s control. 
The nature and extent of these ’allowable factors' is defined 
in the P.S.O, 'Principles and Procedures’ agreed between the 
BRB and the Department of Transport and includes such items 
as major industrial disputes, major disasters. Government 
intervention on prices, changes in the nature of the 
passenger 'obligation', taxation and N.H.I. changes, 
significant capital expenditure changes, variations in interest 
charges, the first three months plus backdating of pay increases 
in excess of the provision included in the budget, actual 
materials and services price changes and a varying percentage 
of the net sum of other changes, reviewed annually. This last 
item is known within the BRB as the 'taut budgeting' factor.
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Naturally, even allowing for these factors, the final result 
after P.T.E. grants (i.e. the loss before the Central 
Government Passenger grant) is bound to be different to the 
adjusted claim level. Any yearly betterment is shared on a 
percentage basis (the D.Tp. share of the benefit is related to 
the ratio of the budgeted P.S.O. grant to the budgeted 
expenditure in that grant) and the Board's share is declared 
as a profit. Any adverse variance is similarly treated 
(i.e. the D.Tp. make a contribution) and the Board's share is 
declared as a loss. This final adjustment is known in the BRB 
as the 'sweeper', but is recorded on Table 6.24 as the 
'Passenger Profit/(Loss)'. It will be observed that, over the 
years 1975 to 198O the profits have amounted to £30m and the 
losses to £39m.
In 1975, the Railways business financial results contained the 
effect of the new accounting arrangements resulting from the 
Railways Act, 1974. This feature alone caused working expenses 
and, consequently, the loss before grants to increase by £13m. 
This was related to revenue investment and additional pensions 
charges offset partly by reduced depreciation and interest 
charges. Receipts price increases produced a net yield (i.e. the 
gross increase minus customer resistance) of £l71m (Passenger 
£88ra. Freight £62m and Parcels £21m) but working expenses price 
increases amounted to £223m (caused mainly by a 27% pay increase 
from April 1975 and the residual effect of the 1974 pay 
increases) producing a net adverse price change of £52m. In 
fact, as a proportion of the previous year's actual results, 
this could be regarded as a slight improvement, the receipts
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price increases being 27.1% and the working expenses price 
increases amounting to 23.5%.
The volume of receipts declined by £17m. Within this amount, 
Passenger receipts improved by £l6m, largely as a result of 
decreased industrial disputes. However, total passenger miles 
declined from 19,200 million to l8,800 million partly as a 
result of a small change in mix (i.e. fare categories and 
sectors) but mainly as a result of resistance to the price 
increases. Freight receipts declined by £24m and this was 
matched by reductions in net tonne miles (13,700 million down 
to 13,000 million) if not tonnes (177 million down to 176. 
million). Parcels receipts also declined by £9m. However, 
discounting the effect of the accounting adjustments under 
the 1974 Act (an increase of £13m), working expenses were 
reduced by £12m. This was matched by a manpower reduction of 
5,000 staff (2.6%).
In 1976, the net financial results (i.e. Profit/(Loss) before 
Grants) improved on 1975 by £35%, representing a considerable 
improvement in net terms. Receipts price increases produced 
£l60m consisting of Passenger £75% (23.0%), Freight £68m 
(26.O/0) and Parcels £17% (19.3%) and this almost matched the 
working expenses price increase of £l64m. In percentage terms, 
the receipts price increases amounted to 20.4% on 1975 and 
working expenses l4.0%, a real improvement in net terms. The 
lower working expenses price increases were heavily influenced
by the advent of a National pay poLicy which was to
197
significantly reduce the levels of pay increases in those 
years, through its phase 1 (1976) and phase 2 (1977) pronounce­
ments. This pay policy was worked out between the Government 
and the Trades Union Conference and was contained within 
Cmnd 6131 ’The Attack on Inflation' dated July 1973» Its 
phase 1 effectively meant pay increases generally of £6 per 
employee per week (from April 1976) or roundly 8%. Together 
with the residual effect of the 1974 pay increase, the total 
pay increase in the year was approximately 13%, quite close 
to the total price increase in working expenses.
In volume terms. Passenger receipts improved by £lm but 
passenger miles were reduced from l8,800 million to 17,700 
million (3*9%), again mainly as a result of resistance to 
the price increases. Freight receipts dropped by £2m and' 
this was matched by a reduction in net tonne miles from 13,000 
million to 12,800 million (1.3%), whilst tonnes carried 
remained approximately level at I76 million. Parcels receipts 
were reduced by a further £7m. Working expenses recorded a 
volume improvement of £47%. Of this amount, £7% was related 
to reduced engineering maintenance, £27% to reduced Revenue 
Investment and the balance was in hespect of operating and 
administration staff economies. This latter improvement was 
accompanied by a manpower reduction of 7,200 staff (3 .8%).
This was to become the largest annual manpower reduction during 
the 1970's.
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In 1977, the loss before grants improved by £l2m, again 
representing an improvement in net terms. Receipts price 
increases produced £62m on the Passenger side, £32m
(13*9%) for Freight and £l9m (19.4%) for Parcels, making 
£133% (i4.2%) in total. The price increases in working 
expenses amounted to £l30m which represented a relatively 
lower percentage increase of 10.1%. That price increase was 
assisted greatly by phase 2 of the national pay policy under 
which pay rates were increased by only £4 per week per 
employee in April 1977.
The volume of Passenger receipts improved by £27% (3*3%) in 
1977 compared with 1976. This was accompanied by an increase 
in passenger miles from 17,700 million to 18,200 million (2.8/0) 
although they were still a little depressed by resistance to the 
1976 price increases. Freight receipts declined, however, by 
£9% (2.7%) and the net tonne miles were reduced almost 
proportionately from 12,800 million to 12,300 million (2.3%). 
Tonnes carried were reduced from I76 million to 170 million 
(3.4%). Parcels receipts declined by £7% (7.1%). The volume 
of working expenses increased by £2m. This included an 
increase in Revenue Investment of £23% which was partly offset 
by reduced engineering maintenance and operating/administration 
economies totalling £23%. These economies were matched by a 
manpower reduction of 4,300 staff (2.3%).
In 1978, the loss before grants increased by £102m to £44lm.
In fact, part of this increase(£30m) was somewhat artificial in 
that it was related to a form of supplementary depreciation
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which was agreed with the Department of Transport as a means of 
reducing the borrowings in respect of capital investment in the 
Passenger business, between 1975 and 1977» the capital 
investment of the Passenger business was largely funded by 
borrowings from the National Loans fund, the historic 
depreciation recovered in the P.S.O. grant producing only about 
23% of the funds required. Since, under the P.S.O. rules, the 
Passenger business received a grant which was roughly equal to 
the loss, there were no funds being generated to repay the 
loans. Recognition of the inadequacy of this situation led to 
the creation of a Special Replacement Allowance (Cmnd 6836) 
which, by its inclusion in the P.S.O. grant, was designed to 
reduce the cash shortfall to a relatively smaller amount 
(about £30m per annum on average since 1977).
Total receipts price increases amounted to £134m (12.4%).
This included Passenger receipts of £74m (12.3%), Freight 
receipts of £46m (12.4%) and Parcels receipts of £l4m (12.7%).
On the other hand, working expenses price levels increased by 
£l30m (10.3%), including a 10% pay increase from April 1978. 
Thus, in total, the percentage price changes produced a real 
improvement in the loss before grants. In volume terms. 
Passenger receipts improved by £33% (5*5%) compared with 1977* 
This was accompanied by an increase in passenger miles from 
18,200 million to 19,100 million (4,9%). Freight receipts 
fell by £3m (1 .3%), with net tonne miles reducing by 100 million 
to 12,400 (0.8%) and tonnes remaining static at 170 million.
Discounting the Special Replacement Allowance of £30m, the
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volume of working expenses increased by £39%» This included 
increased Revenue Investment of £37%* Staff numbers remained 
almost static at approximately 178,100.
In 1979, the loss before grants increased by £83%. Receipts 
price increases amounted to £l38m (11.1%) consisting of 
Passenger £68m (9*6%), Freight £36m (13*6%) and Parcels £l4m 
(1 1 .8/0). However, working expenses price increases, including 
a l4% pay increase (mainly from April 1979), increased by 
£223% (13*3%), giving a deterioration in net terms.
The volume of receipts improved by £23% (2.0%). This was made 
up of a £30m (4.2%) increase in Passenger receipts partly 
offset by a £4m (1.0%) decrease in Freight receipts and a £lm 
(0.8%) decrease in Parcels receipts. These changes were 
accompanied by an increase in Passenger miles of 8OO million 
to 19,900 million (4.2%). Freight net tonne miles remained 
static at 12,400 million but Freight tonnes declined by 
1 million to I69 million (0.6%). However, this net improvement 
in the volume of receipts was offset by a £23% (1.4%) increase 
in the volume of working expenses. This included increased 
engineering maintenance of £29%. Staff numbers again remained 
fairly static at approximately 177,900.
In 1980, the loss before grants deteriorated further by £190m. 
Receipts price increases produced £236m (l8.3%), consisting of 
Passenger £l40m (17.4%), Freight £89% (19*2%) and Parcels £27% 
(20.3%). However, working expenses price increases totalled 
£363% (19.0%) including a 20% pay increase from April I98O and
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large increases in fuel oil price levels. Thus, in net terms 
the price changes produced approximately equivalent increases 
in both receipts and expenditure.
However, in volume terms, there was a net deterioration of £8lm, 
including a receipts reduction of £69% (4.9%) related mainly to 
the economic recession which was noted as affecting the results 
from about May I980. That latter figure contained a £17%
(2.1%) increase in Passenger receipts but a £69% (l4.9%) 
reduction in Freight receipts and a £17% (12.9%) reduction in 
Parcels receipts. Of the £69% reduction in Freight receipts, 
£28m related to external industrial disputes, notably the 
British Steel Corporation strike in January/March I98O.
Passenger miles reduced by 200 million (1.0%) to 19,700 million 
in 1980, contrary to the small increase in the volume of 
receipts. This was due mainly to resistance to the I98O price 
increases. Freight net tonnes miles and tonnes reduced by 
1,400 million (11.3%) and I6 million (9.3%), respectively, 
both a little lower than the percentage reduction in receipts. 
The volume of working expenses increased by £l2m. This 
included an increase in engineering maintenance of £10m. Staff 
numbers reduced by 3,900 (2.2%) to approximately 174,000,
In summary, it can be seen that there has been a substantial 
deterioration in the loss before grants between 1974 and I98O. 
The variances are totalled in Table 6.23. where,by comparison 
with the data given in Table 6.2., it can be seen that the 
increase in the volume of Passenger receipts (24.1%) has not 
been matched by a similar improvement in passenger miles (2.6%)
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1980 on 1974 
B (Better) / W (Worse) 
£m % *
Cause of Change 





Price Level of Working Expenses W 1255
Net Price Changes in Loss before 
Grants W
Volume of Receipts
Passenger B 124 24,1
Freight W 113 28.3
Parcels W 46 37*8
Total W 3.3
Volume of Working Expenses W 100 3*8
Net Volume Changes in Loss before 
Grants W 135 33*4
* Calculated by compounding the year on year percentage 
increases
Table 6.3* Railways Business - Causes of Change in 
____________ Loss before Grants 1980 over 1974______
(Source ; BRB internal records)
mainly because of resistance in the price increases, 
particularly in 1975, 1976 and I98O. This has had the effect 
of reducing the yield (i.e. the gross increase minus customer 
resistance) on Passenger price increases over the period by 
about 20% or approximately £100m. The decrease in the volume 
of Freight receipts (28.3%) was larger than the reduction in 
Freight net tonne miles (19.8%) and Freight tonnes (13.9%) 
recorded in Table 6 .3. because of a change of mix i.e. in
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higher and lower rated carryings. However, the decrease in the 
volume of Parcels receipts (37.8%) was closely matched by the 
decline in Parcels tonnes (35*5%) recorded in Table 6.10. The 
increase in the volume of working expenses (£100m) included 
the accounting adjustments relating to the Railways Act, 1974, 
£l3m) and the Special Replacement Allowance (which was £69% in 
1980). Allowing for both of these factors, the net increase 
was £l8m .
In terms of loaded train miles and resources, the changes 
between 1974 and 198O are as depicted in Appendix l(c). It 
will be observed that the reductions in Freight and Parcels 
loaded train miles were fairly consistent with the reductions 
in the volume of receipts. The same cannot be said on the 
Passenger side, however, where the 2.6% increase in Passenger 
miles was out of line with the 9*1% increase in loaded train 
miles. This has resulted in a partly unused increase in train 
mileage capacity but not in seats/berths capacity which 
Table 6.1. records as having declined by 1.4% between 1974 and 
1980. The difference was caused by a reduction in the average 
seat capacity of the Passenger rolling stock i.e. reduced 
spare cover and, to some extent, shorter trains. The reduction 
in actual staff numbers between 1974 and I980 (20,900 staff, 
10.7%) was not completely matched by the reduction in manpower 
requirements (l7,400 staff, 8.3%), with the level of vacancies 
having increased, therefore, by 3 ,500*
In respect of rolling stock, the reductions in locomotive 
hauled coaching vehicles (22.2%) reflected the reductions in
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spare capacity and the advent of the H.S.T. sets (the three
A.P.T. sets are not yet in commercial service). The reductions 
in diesel multiple units (5*0%) were closely related to the 
increase in electric multiple units (3.6%), and a result of 
relatively minor new electrification projects in the P.T.E. 
areas and in the L. & S.E. sector. The reduction in 
locomotives (l4.9%) was related to the decline in Freight/ 
Parcels carryings and the introduction of the H.S.T, sets.
Returning to the financial situation, it is clear that the 
Railways Act, 1974, whilst providing a means of funding the 
Passenger business (i.e. P.S.O, grant), did not work 
satisfactorily on the Non-passenger side in 1975, 1976 and 
1977. In those years, the 'break-even' objective was not 
achieved and Special Grants were paid by Government. The 
break-even situation was achieved in 1978 but in 1979 and I98O 
Non-passenger losses of £2m and £48m, respectively, were 
sustained which have not been covered by any form of grants and 
have, consequently, been funded by borrowing. Whilst the 
information was not produced fully in earlier years, the 
Non-passenger losses in 1979 and I98O were analysed by the 
ERE as given in Table 6,26. It can be seen that the losses 
have been related to the Freight business with the Parcels 
business attaining relatively small profits.
In respect of the P.S.O. grant, the Government introduced a 
cash limit arrangement in 1976 (Cmnd 6393)* The level of the 
cash limit has been related to the 1975 actual payment, plus 










Total Profit/(Loss) i2) (48)
Table 6 ,26. Railway's Business 
1979 and 1980
- Analysis of Losses
(Source ; BRB internal records)
and minus declared adjustments. This assessment allowed for 
the fact that the P.T.E. grants were not funded directly by 
Central Government. This has been achieved by calculating the 
Central Government element and then adding the actual level of 
P.T.E. grants for each year. The combined total becomes what 
is described by the BRB as the P.S.O. cash limit.
The inflation element has been calculated by reference to the 
'G.D.P. deflator’ which runs close to the Retail Price Index 
(R.P.I.), but is a more comprehensive inflation index, the 
primary need for which is to reduce the Gross Domestic 
Product of the United Kingdom to constant price levels. The 
Special Replacement Allowance has been described earlier. The 
declared adjustments have arisen from a number of Government 
announcements, viz;-
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Cmnd. 6836 - June 1977
Reduction of £20m in 1976 survey prices, by the end of
the decade.
Hansard Written Answers - 12 November 1979
Reduction of £9%, in 1979 survey prices, in I98O/81.
Cmnd. 7841 - March I98O
Reduction of £13m, in 1979 survey prices, between
1980/81 and 1982/83.
The cash limit forecasts and the actual results from 1976 to 
1980 are provided in Table 6.27* In this Table, minor previous 
year adjustments have been made to establish a more accurate 
comparison between the cash limits and the actual results. Thus, 
the actual P.S.O. levels are a little different to those given 
in Table 6.24. and Appendix 1(a).
P.S.O. Grant (incl. P.T.E.)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
£m £m £m £m £m
Cash Limit 338 404 490 344 634
Actual Grant lil 434 634
Headroom 33 • 42 36 14 ---
Table 6.27. Railways Business - P.S.O. 
and Grants 1976 to I98O
Cash Limits
(Source : BRB internal records)
It will be observed that the BRB was able to work within the 
P.S.O. cash limits between 1976 and 1979, with a considerable 
'headroom' existing up to 1978. This achievement was due
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mainly to the low pay increases in 1976 and 1977 which, as 
a result of national pay policy, were considerably lower than 
the percentage increases in Passenger prices. However, the 
situation changed in 1979 when the pay increase of l4% was in 
no way matched by the yield from the Passenger price increase 
of only 9.6%, causing the headroom to drop to £l4m. In 198O, 
the working expenses price increases (l9% including the 20% 
pay increase), again exceeded the Passenger price increases 
which yielded 17.4%. This was the main cause of the complete 
elimination of the headroom. Indeed, the situation was 
slightly worse than so far portrayed, in that the P.S.O. Grant 
was actually constrained by the cash limit. Thus, the 
Passenger Loss of £32m shown in Table 6.24 was not merely the 
result of applying the 'sweeper', as explained earlier, but 
included £6m for the effect of this constraint.
In respect of the Non-Passenger situation, the Government 
introduced a further cash limit in 1976 to cover the special 
grants which were expected to be paid. This was more arbitrary 
in the method of assessment and was set at £60m for 1976,
£23% for 1977 and nil thereafter. Allowing for previous year 
adjustments, the Non-passenger grants were £27% in 1976 and £3% 
in 19771 both vieil within the cash limits. Again, the main 
reason for this satisfactory performance was the low pay 
increases in 1976 and 1977. In 1978, the break-even situation 
was achieved, almost exactly. However, losses have been 
incurred since 1978 for which no form of Government grant has 
been made available. Thus, as mentioned earlier, the losses of 
£2m and £48m in 1979 and I98O , respectively, have been borrowed.
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Additionally, the Government introduced an overall financing 
cash limit in 1976, known as the External Financing Limit 
(E.F.L.) covering the overall finance requirements of the BR3 
and not just the Railways business. The relative figures 
emerge from the ’Financing Statement and Budget Report’ 
issued by the Treasury on budget day each year. The E.F.L. 
procedures were established under Grand. 6440 in April 1976.
Up to 1979/80 this has not been a particular problem to the 
BRB since the Treasury have based their published figures on
B.R. estimates which have been high enough to meet the 
necessary requirements. The 1979/80 figure, however, was 
broadly based on an estimate provided by the Board in the 
Autumn of 1978 and updated by the Department of Transport to 
reflect their view of inflation. It did not reflect the 
Board’s view of emerging events (particularly the 1979 pay 
increase) and thus became a new and very tough cash limit.
Consequently, during 1979/80 the Board, for all its businesses, 
had to work within an overall E.F.L. of £715%, designed to 
cover all funds required, i.e.
P.S.O. grant (not the P.S.O. cash limit).
Level Crossings Grant (received from Central Government 
since 1975 under E.E.C. Regulation II92/69).
Pensions Grants (£125%).
All borrowings (including an estimate of the full value 
of assets acquired by leasing).
This figure was achieved (actual of £7l4m) by reduced investment 
(revenue and capital), increased sales of assets (including 
property), short-term control of labour costs and a stringent
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control of working capital (notably stocks, debtors and 
creditors ).
In the 1980/81 fiscal year, the Pensions Grant was removed from 
the E.F.L. procedures because of a changed method of funding 
the actuarial deficiencies of the 'closed’ funds (Transport Act, 
1980) which involved deferring the funding until the pension 
funds needed the money to pay the pensions. The E.F.L. was set 
at £750m, (which was equivalent to an increase of 27%) and this 
level was considered to be close to the forecast requirement 
and more consistent with the P.S.O. cash limit arrangements. 
However, following the British Steel Corporation strike in the 
early part of I98O and the effect of the recession, which was 
also becoming evident in BRB finances in the first half of 
1980, the 1980/81 E.F.L. v;as revised by the Government to £790m. 
The increase of £40m was related to the ’borrowings’ part of . 
the E.F.L. and was not a further grant, it being intended as a 
one-off feature which would not influence the assessment of 
the 1981/82 E.F.L. Again, this figure was achieved (there was 
an actual of £790m) but, in this case, this was largely due 
to the speedy sale of a large amount of non-operational property 
which offset the excess requirements of the Railways business.
In concluding this section, note needs to be made of the fact 
that, apart from setting the cash limits which have been 
discussed, the Government agreed with the BRB a number of 
interim financial targets during late 1979 and 198O as 
announced in Cmnd 6836. These were related to the BRB’s 
corporate planning process and were provided as follows:-
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a) The Inter-city sector of the Passenger business should 
improve its contribution to indirect costs (after charging 
all direct costs, provision for full current cost deprec­
iation and amortisation of the assets, interest and the net 
cost of train catering) from £94m in 1978 (£123% in 1980 
prices) to £139% (in I98O prices) by I982.
b) The Freight business should, in 1982, cover two thirds of 
its current cost depreciation and amortisation (with further 
progress thereafter) after meeting its direct costs and its 
agreed contribution to indirect costs.
c) The Parcels business should break-even in 1982, before 
interest but after current cost depreciation and amort­
isation and after meeting its charges for direct and 
indirect costs on the present basis.
d) Sealink UK Ltd. should achieve a real return before interest 
and tax of 3% on the net replacement cost of owned and 
leased ship and harbour assets, excluding services operated 
on behalf of the Railways and other businesses.
These interim targets were designed to supplement the cash 
limit arrangements until I982 and be replaced by longer term 
targets once the BRB had produced an acceptable corporate plan 
for these businesses/sectors. Further details of the relation­
ship with BRB's corporate planning process are given in 
Chapters 10 and 11.
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6.3. Current Financial Situation and Immediate Prospects 
Appendices 1(a) to 1(c) include what is known, within the BRB, 
as the 12 Weeks Outturn forecasts of financial and physical results 
of the Railways business for I98I . This represents an update of 
the 1981 budget as seen by the BRB in May I98I. In Appendices 
1 (a) to l(c), these figures are described as the ’forecasts for 
1981’ and it will be seen in Chapter I6 that they have been 
used in determining the variances between plan forecasts and 
’actual’ results, with the ’forecast for I98I ’ being used in 
place of (and in the absence of) the actual result for that 
year.
This has greatly facilitated the analysis in Chapter I6 , making 
it a reasonably up to date examination. However, during the 
period of finalising and editing the drafts of this thesis, 
further BRB forecasts have become available, making it possible 
to provide data relating to the situation as seen by the BRB up 
to October I98I .
To facilitate the discussions in Chapter I6 , it is now intended 
to discuss the figures as seen by the BRB in May I98I , using 
the pattern established in Section 6.2. However, to bring the 
data up to date, it is intended, later in this Section to state 
briefly how the situation has changed up to October I98I.
The May I981 forecast of the financial result for that year 
(see Appendix 1(a)) was a loss before grants of £844m, a 
deterioration of £130m on the I98O result.
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Receipts price increases were expected to produce £197% (12.4%) 
over 1980, consisting of Passenger £123% (13.0%), Freight £36% 
(11.6%) and Parcels £l6m (11.3%). The Passenger expectation 
was based upon the assumption that the resistance to the 
November 1980 price increase (gross 18.3%) would be 2.8% and 
that that in respect of a planned smaller Autumn I98I price 
increase would be 2.6%. These assumptions accounted largely 
for the 4.1% reduction in Passenger miles recorded in 
Appendix 1(c). Working expenses price increases were expected 
to amount to £319% (13»9%), part of which was related to the 
residual effect of the April I98O pay increase. This meant 
that the net effect of receipts and working expenses price 
increases was expected to be an adverse figure of £l22m.
As noted in Appendix 1(a), in volume terms. Passenger receipts 
were•expected to reduce by £13% and Freight receipts by £12m 
(compared with I980), both largely related to the economic 
recession. The Freight reduction was actually much worse than 
it seemed,since the I98O result included a reduction on 1979 
of £28% related to industrial disputes (notably the British 
Steel Corporation strike). On the Parcels side, the volume 
reduction of £32m was also partly due to the recession but was 
mainly (£26m) related to the decision, noted earlier, to pull 
out of the C & D sector on 1 July 198I. The volume reduction 
in working expenses (£49%) was also partly related to this 
feature, where a net reduction of £l2m v;as expected after 
allowing for once-only outpayments (mostly redundancy) of £11%. 
The balance of the working expenses reduction was in respect of 
revenue investment (£10m) and to reductions in operating and
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engineering expenditure.
The overall volume reduction in working expenses compared with
1980 was reflected in the reductions in loaded train miles and 
resources recorded in Appendix l(c). The most striking figures 
were, however, the anticipated reductions in manpower requirements 
(l4,200) and manpower numbers (5,300). These represented a 
significant improvement over the reductions achieved in recent 
years and were forecast to reduce the I98O vacancy level by 
8,900 to 9,900 posts.
In terms of the cash limits, it was forecast by the BRB that the
1981 PSO requirement would be £47m above the Government’s cash 
limit level. This was despite an increase of £23% in the cash 
limit (Hansard - Written Answers, 10 December I98O) designed
to postpone the I98I Passenger price increase from its proposed 
date (September) to November I98I. On the Non-passenger side, 
the loss was expected to amount to £37m , all of which would 








The 1981/82 overall external financing limit was set by Government 
at £867%. However, this was supplemented by a separate EFL of 
£33% (borrowings only) to allow for the once-off effects of 
implementing the strategy of pulling out of the C & D parcels
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sector. In the event, only approximately £13% of that latter 
figure was thought by the BRB to be required. However, the 
limit of £867m was expected to be exceeded by approximately 
£70m. This has caused a good deal of anxiety in the BRB and 
numerous discussions with Department of Transport officials, 
aimed partly at encouraging the amalgamation of the two limits 
to show a net difference of £32m.
The October I981 forecast of the result for that year suggested 
that the loss before grants would be £834m,with the PSO cash 
limit shortfall being £83% and the Non-passenger loss £29%.
The deterioration in the Passenger forecast compared with the 
12 Weeks Outturn v;as ascribed as being due to further receipts 
volume reductions arising mainly from the economic recession 
(£40m) and, to a minor extent (about £2m), to coach competition. 
The improvement in the Non-passenger business forecast was seen 
to be mainly in respect of the Freight business (£24m) and was 
related partly to increased receipts volume (£12m) and partly 
to reduced (mainly operating and maintenance) expenditure (£12m) 
The manpower forecast was expected to reduce slightly (again 
compared with the 12 Weeks Outturn) by 231 staff but with a 
proviso that current trends indicated a further reduction of 
300 staff.
The overall EFL shortfall was expected, in October I98I, to be 
close to the May forecast with the improved Freight situation 
offsetting the deteriorating Passenger forecast. Additionally, 
action was being contemplated (on the assumption that the 
Government would eventually agree to merge the two external
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financing limits) to close the gap by taking emergency action 
to reduce working capital, investment and maintenance and 
increase the sale of assets, particularly property.
Further, in recognition of the fact that the deteriorating 
Passenger situation was related to the economic recession (and 
was thus beyond the control of the BRB) the Department of 
Transport had agreed to consider increasing the I981 PSO cash 
limit and grant to a level closer to the October 198I estimate, 
provided that the EFL remained unchanged, i.e. enabling the 
grant portion of the EFL to be increased and the borrowings 
portion to be decreased by the same amount. An announcement 
in this regard was expected before the end of 1981.
The- provisional budget forecasts for 1982, also available in 
October I98I , suggested that considerable financial problems 
would ensue in that year, given continuance of the economic 
recession and the need to recover a backlog of essential 
maintenance and renewal of assets. These forecasts suggested 
that the overall financing requirement could be as much as 
£l30m to £200m above the anticipated level of the external 
financing limit. This possibility was also due to the likelihood 
of the 1982/83 EFL being lower than might perhaps be
expected (i.e. allowing for the I981/82 level plus inflation), 
but being based instead on lower forecasts contained within 
the 1980 corporate plan. Further details of this issue are 
given in Chapter I6 , in relation to forecasts contained in 
the draft (May 1981) version of the 1981 Rail Plan and their 
comparison with the I980 Rail Plan.
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Urgent efforts are currently taking place to overcome this 
financial problem, including attempts at persuading the Government 
to increase the anticipated EFL (£900m) to a higher figure. 
However, it is expected by many BRB managers that further 
cut-backs in maintenance and investment, coupled with asset 
disposals will prove to be the only significant available 
solutions. Some further reductions in manpower (i.e. beyond 
the levels included in the provisional 1982 budget) are also 
being sought.
As noted in Chapter 5, some attention is also being paid by the 
BRB to passenger pricing, but on an experimental basis and 
related partly to the increased coach competition. A number 
of quite large scale ’low price’ experiments have been 
introduced on the Eastern, London Midland and Western Regions 
(mainly Inter-city journeys to London) which have been 
considered by the General Managers concerned to have prevented 
volume reductions from being greater than they have been in 
1981 and to have ’paid-off’ in the sense that the generated 
passenger journeys have been proportionately greater than the 
price reductions. It is too soon to tell what will happen Cand, 
certainly one cannot glean any information from the forecasts 
contained in the provisional 1982 budget) but it is being 
speculated, inside the BRB, that the experiments might be 
extended so far that they will form a new strategy and change 
the culture of the Passenger business (or, more correctly, its 
Inter-city sector) into one of low price/high volume rather than 
the other way round.
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This potential change of strategy was noted in the Financial 
Times on 23 October I981 when their Transport Correspondent 
(Lynton McLain) paraphrased an apparent BE comment as follows 
*BR said last night that the exercise was a calculated 
business risk and its results will be reviewed in January. 
By then the new approach to low fares could have hardened 
into a formal strategy under which BR goes all out for a 
high volume, low yield per passenger marketing strategy.'
The author would speculate that such a change of strategy might 
be found to be incompatible with the 'high speed’ developments 
(notably the future introduction of the Advanced Passenger 
Train) contained within all of the recent Rail Plans, which 
have always been related to a 'high price' strategy.
In summary, it will be appreciated that there has been a 
marked deterioration in the BRB's financial situation since the 
end of 1980. This has created what is regarded by many BRB 
managers as a financial crisis situation. It will be seen 
towards the end of Chapter I6 that, without urgent action, 
the crisis will not be overcome in the short term.
To conclude this section and, indeed, this chapter, it is 
intended to provide brief comments on the topic of 
'privatisation' as it affects the BRB. The issues involved 
have stemmed from an announcement by the then Minister of 
Transport on l4 July I.98O to the effect that private capital 
would be introduced into some of the subsidiary businesses of 
the BRB and that a wholly owned holding company would be set
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up, by the 3RB, for implementation of this policy. That 
company, British Rail Investments Ltd. (BRIL) was created in 
November I98O with the intention that, as soon as possible 
after the enabling legislation (Transport Act 198I), the 
following subsidiary businesses would be transferred to the 
ownership of that company:-
- Sealink UK Ltd.
- BR Hovercraft Ltd,
- British Transport Hotels Ltd. (excluding station and
train catering sector)
- Part of the non-operational property portfolio of
BR Property Board
The Government intended that the introduction of private risk 
capital into these subsidiaries would provide investment funds 
which would not otherwise be forthcoming and would, thus, 
greatly assist their development and financial performance. 
Additionally, they have clearly indicated that, following the 
introduction of private 'risk' capital, the BRB should find 
itself in a minority shareholding situation. The words used 
in the Minister's statement were:-
'The Government and the Chairman have now completed a 
a preliminary examination of the opportunities for involving 
private risk capital to a significant extent in financing 
these subsidiaries. We both believe that it will be to the 
advantage of British Rail, as a significant element in the 
economy, its workforce and the public using its services to
take advantage of these opportunities The Government and
the Board recognise that these subsidiary enterprises will not 
secure essential commercial freedom unless private capital is 
attracted in sufficient volume and unless private investors are 
assured of sufficient control through their shareholdings to 
ensure that the enterprises will be able to operate on equal 
terms with competitors in their respective markets.'
The BRB have accepted that privatisation will produce additional
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and much needed investment funds for these subsidiary businesses, 
despite a measure of reluctance to become a minority shareholder 
of each company. Attitudes on this matter have not only been 
conditioned by the investment issue, however, but by the 
prospect of assisting achievement of EFL targets in 1981/82, 
1982/83 and beyond by the proceeds from the sale of each 
majority share holding, or parts of each subsidiary.
Since the formation of BRIL, a bid has been made by European 
Ferries Ltd. to take-over Sealink UK Ltd. That bid is not 
supported by the BRB, who wish to retain a substantial 
shareholding to safeguard the operating and commercial 
relationships between Sealink and the Railways business. The 
bid has been referred by the Government to the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission. Their report is expected towards the 
end of 1981.
Tn respect of BR Hovercraft Ltd., this was merged with 
Hoverlloyd Ltd. (a subsidiary of Brostroms Rederi) in October 
1981,with BRIL and Brostrom each holding a $0% shareholding.
It is intended that SNCF (French Railways) will be allowed to 
acquire shares equally from each of the existing participants. 
This merger was also submitted to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission for consideration but received their approval in 
June 1981.
To assist the privatisation of B.T. Hotels Ltd., the BRB intend 
to transfer the station and train catering sector of BTH to the 
BRB itself as part of the Railways business. In respect of the 
remaining hotels sector, the emerging strategy seems to be
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related to selling individual hotels or, at least, a majority 
shareholding in each hotel. Three of the hotels have already 
been dealt with by the formation of a new independent company 
(Gleneagles Hotels Ltd.) which has acquired Gleneagles, the 
North British and the Caledonian hotels. The BRIL shareholding 
is one-third of the issued share capital.
Tn respect of non-operational property, the privatisation 
principles of part ownership of a large portfolio have largely 
been overtaken by the EFL problems. This has resulted in 
emphasis being placed on the sale of individual properties to 
produce speedy cash flow benefits.
Finally, the possibility of the introduction of private capital 
into Railways business projects is being mooted within the BRB, 
particularly in respect of main line electrification and the 
Channel Tunnel (see Chapter 11). In this connection, whilst 
the BRB have expressed confidence about the financial viability 
of these major projects, problems exist as to how risk capital 
can be introduced, which would require that an accurate return 
on investment be measured. This might be possible in 
connection with the Channel Tunnel where the Railways business 
and SNCF could pay a toll charge to a separate company owning 




NATIONAL FREIGHT COMPANY LIMITED
In order to undertake effectively the proposed examination 
of the corporate planning process and procedures of the 
National Freight Company Limited (NFC), it is necessary to 
provide details of the organisation by way of additional 
background information supplementing the information given in 
Chapter 5» Such a chapter could be lengthy but the author has 
set out to be as brief as possible, identifying the main 
features which adequately describe the nature and size of the 
organisation and its financial situation. Indeed, these two 
features will be used as section headings. This pattern will 
also apply to the next two chapters where, for the reasons 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the amount of historical detail is 
considerably less than that provided in respect of the British 
Railways Board.
Reference will be made in Section 7.1* to the intention of the 
present Government to de-nationalise the NTC, probably in 1982. 
That process has already meant the transfer of the assets of the 
original National Freight Corporation to the National Freight 
Company Limited on 1 October 1980, as a prelude to denational­
isation through the flotation of shares.
7.1. The Nature and Size of the RTC
The National Freight Company Limited was created originally as 
the National Freight Corporation under the Transport Act I968 
and began business on 1 January 1969. On that date, the road
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freight organisations of the Transport Holding Company were 
transferred to the ownership of the Corporation. The main 
organisations transferred were British Road Services Limited, 
Pickfords Limited, Tayforth Holdings (1963) Limited and 
Harold Wood & Sons Limited. Additionally, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, the 'sundries' business of the British Railways 
Board was also transferred in the form of a new company 
National Carriers Limited. Finally, the freightliner business 
of the British Railways Board was made into a limited company, 
Freightliners Limited, and 31/- of its shares were vested in the 
Corporation (only to return to the BRB later, as noted in 
Chapter 6).
The purpose of creating the NFC was to establish an organisation 
which could rationalise that part of the nationalised transport 
sector where road transport of freight/parcels was partly or 
wholly necessary. In the I969 annual report and accounts, NFC 
described the traffics carried by the new organisation as 
consisting of 'parcels and general merchandise carried from door 
to door, and special freight such as household removals, bulk 
liquids or powders, abnormal loads, car bodies and cars and 
other consignments, whether within the United Kingdom or to 
places abroad•'
The arrangements made with the British Railways Board were such 
that the Corporation would employ the BRB to carry some of its 
traffic by rail for part of its overall journey. This arrange­
ment was meant to apply particularly to the 'sundries' business 
transferred from the BRB (see Chapter 6) dealt with by the new
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company, National Carriers Limited. Similarly, the BRB,in 
transferring its fleet of lorries,undertook to employ the 
Corporation (i.e. its National Carriers Limited subsidiary) to 
convey by road that portion of its parcels traffic and remaining 
freight traffic (i.e. excluding ’sundries') for which road 
collection or delivery was necessary. Both these arrangements 
were to be undertaken on a commercial basis, allowing for 
recovery of costs plus profits.
The Government's intention was that the National Freight 
Corporation should be run on a commercial basis, without any form 
of subsidy. Section 42(2) of the Transport Act 1968 stated that 
the Corporation should 'secure that the combined revenues of the 
authority and of their subsidiaries taken together are not less 
than sufficient to meet their combined charges properly 
chargeable to revenue account, taking one year with another.' 
Additionally, it should make 'proper provision for the deprec­
iation and renewal of assets.' However, it was recognised that, 
while the Transport Holding Group Companies were profitable, 
the 'sundries' business of the British Railways Board was not.
It was considered by both BRB and the Corporation that neither 
was the freightliners business, although separate accounts were 
not maintained by the BRB for that aspect of its business.
Losses of approximately £20m per annum for the transferred 
'sundries' business were recorded by the BRB and the freight­
liner loss was thought to be about £3m in 1968. These figures 
were quoted in NFC's annual report and accounts for 1969 in 
support of temporary subsidies that had been agreed with 
Government to cover the expected losses (including interest) of
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National Carriers Limited, This subsidy of up to £60m over a 
period not exceeding five years was also stipulated in the 
1968 Act.
Since its creation in 19&9, the Corporation and, more recently, 
the new Company has become considerably more diversified and 
has carried out extensive rationalisation as was originally 
intended. It has remained the largest road freight haulage 
organisation in the United Kingdom but, in terms of resources, 
it is a smaller organisation. For example, the number of staff 
employed at the date of transfer to the new company was 30,595, 
some 35,500 fewer than those employed at the beginning of
1969.
Indeed, in the annual report and accounts for the nine months 
ended 30 September I980, the Chairman of the NFC explained 
that the Corporation had, since 1969, achieved a substantial 
diversification away from low profit general haulage activities 
into specialised areas with better profit potential. This was 
associated with ’investment and marketing policies which put the 
emphasis on customer-backed and contractual activities.’ The 
pace of the diversification strategy has been increased since 
1975 in an attempt at making NFC more robust in order that the 
financial problems encountered during that year (see Section 7.2.) 
should be short lived and not repeated. By far the most 
significant feature has been the development and extension of 
contract hire of vehicles and contract distribution of freight.
The structure of the National Freight Company has changed over
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the last twelve years but in recent years, in terms of main 
organisational ’groups’, it has been as described in 
Figure 7.1.
N.F.C. Board-
British Road Services Group 
■National Carriers Limited Group 
Roadline U.K. Limited Group 
Special Traffics Group 
Pickfords Removals and Travel Group 
Tempco Group
Fig. 7.1. National Freight Company - Group Structure 
(Source : Discussions with NFC planners)
Each of the Groups is headed by a Group Managing Director, three 
of whom are members of the board of the National Freight 
Company. The new Company board and senior executive structure 
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Figure 7.2 - National Freight Company - Organisation Structure.
(Source; Discussions ?rith National Freight Company Planners).
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The structural relationships with Government are very similar 
to those of the British Railways Board and will remain so until 
de-nationalisation. The position is summarised in Figure 7.3* 
wherein it can be seen that the 'sponsoring* Government 
department is the Department of Transport. The Secretary of 
State of that Department has responsibilities similar to those 
held in respect of the British Railways Board. These include 
establishing and/or agreeing objectives (including cash limits), 
setting policy guidelines, strategy approval, plan approval, 
major investment approval and monitoring the performance of these.
To understand further the nature and size of the National Freight 
Company, it is considered necessary to examine each of the 
Groups in turn and then provide some overall physical statistics. 
The statistics provided will generally be related to the year 
ended 31 December 1979, the last full year for which accounts 
were prepared (accounts were prepared for nine months ended 
30 September I98O i.e. up to the date when the Corporation’s 
assets were transferred to the new Company).
7.1 .1. British Road Services Group
This Group contains the following companies
British Road Services Ltd.
Bridges Transport Ltd.
Eastern British Road Services Ltd.
H S Morgan Transport (Southampton) Ltd.
Islandlink Ltd,
Midlands British Road Services Ltd.
Morton’s (BRS) Ltd.
North Eastern British Road Services Ltd.
North Western British Road Services Ltd.
Southern British Road Services Ltd.
Watson’s (Carriers) Ltd.
Western British Road Services Ltd.












Unbroken lines indicate direct responsibility. 
Broken lines indicate spheres of influence.
Figure 7.? - National Freight Company - Main Relationshins with
Government.
(Source: Discussions with National Freight Company Planners).
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Scottish Road Services Ltd.
Scottish Road Services (Forth) Ltd. 
Scottish Road Services (North) Ltd. 
Scottish Road Services (West) Ltd.
The combined turnover of this Group in 1979 was £l53«3ni made 
up of :-
£m
Freight receipts, including 
contract hire and contract 
distribution 129.1
Warehousing and storage 9*6
Property rentals and 
other items l4.6
153.J
Apart from carriage and warehousing of freight, this Group is 
involved in a number of ancillary activities which have been 
developed in recent years. These include hire of road freight 
commercial vehicles, rescue services, a freight transport 
brokerage service and a freight transport consultancy service. 
Each regional company offers a distribution service in its 
own area, calling upon other Group resources for services which 
extend outside its territory. Where a national distribution 
service is required by any customer, all of the resources of 
the Group can be called upon to produce an integrated service. 
The contract hire and contract distribution services now 
represent the largest part of the trading activity, with the 
general haulage service representing less than one-third of the 
total turnover of the Group. Indeed, ICFC describe the British 
Road Services Group as the market leader in contract hire.
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The Group owned/leased 7»953 powered road vehicles, 3»598 
trailers and 795 containers and other demountable bodies at the 
end of 1979. The aggregate tonnage capacity of this fleet was 
83,090 tonnes and the vehicle miles run during 1979 was 199m. 
Staff numbers were 9,^78 at the end of 1979.
7.1.2. National Carriers Limited Group 
This Group includes four companies, viz :- 
National Carriers Limited 
Fashionflow Limited
Fashionflow (National Carriers) Limited 
P.B.D.S. (National Carriers) Limited
National Carriers Limited is involved in the carriage of ’small 
lots', i.e. consignments up to 3,000 kg. It has, since 1969, 
provided road transport collection and deliverer of parcels for the 
British Railways Board, but this ceased on 1 July I98I when the 
BRB withdrew from their collected and delivered parcels sector.
The reciprocal arrangement of conveying some National Carriers 
Limited traffic by rail for part of its journey had been 
phased out as uneconomic by the mid 1970’s. Likewise, there has 
been a considerable strategic reduction in the amount of BRB 
freight traffic requiring road collection/delivery (by NCL) 
with the level of this traffic being negligible by I98I.
National Carriers Ltd. has increasingly moved into specialist 
freight distribution activities and has negotiated contracts 
with many large firms including «^oolworths , B .M .W . ,
Rowntree-Mackintosh and Boots. The Company has also moved into
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providing road vehicle maintenance facilities for fleet owners. 
The other companies are engaged in contract distribution and 
represent part of the diversification into specialist areas. 
Fashionflow Limited is a service dedicated to Marks and Spencer 
traffic, whilst Fashionflow (National Carriers) Limited was 
created to exploit generally the market for the carriage of 
garments and textiles. P.B.D.S. (National Carriers) Limited 
was acquired in 1979 from Pitman Limited and provides a 
specialist service to the book trade.
The combined turnover of these companies in 1979 amounted to
£113.4m, made up as follows:-
£m
Freight receipts, including 
BRB cartage and contract 
distribution 100.3
Warehousing and storage 3.9
Property rentals and 
other receipts 9.2
113.4
At the end of 1979, this Group owned/leased 3,838 powered road
vehicles, 4,894 trailers and 12 containers. The aggregate
tonnage capacity of this fleet was 37,361 tonnes and the vehicle
miles run during 1979 amounted to 96 million miles. Staff
numbers totalled 12,289 at the end of 1979.
7 .1.3. Roadline U.K. Limited Group
This Group consists of three companies :-
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Roadline U.K. Limited - formerly B.R.S. Parcels Limited 
Eanson Haulage Limited 
Islandlink (Jersey) Limited
Each company deals almost exclusively with the conveyance of 
parcels traffic, handling 4l million packages in 1979. This 
involves a door to door collection and delivery service of 
parcels for industry and commerce using a nationwide network 
of depots. Consignments are consolidated with others bound for 
similar destinations. Some specialist services have been 
developed including express deliveries and the 'break-bulk’ 
and distribution of traffic brought in by customers. Addition­
ally, Roadline has purchased the commercial vehicle fleet of a 
number of firms and provides them with a total delivery service.
The combined turnover of the Group in 1979 amounted to £36m, 
analysed as follows;-
£m
Freight (i.e. parcels) 
receipts 33.0
Warehousing and storage 0,3
Property rentals and other 
receipts 0.3
36.0
At the end of 1979, this Group owned/leased 2,694 powered 
vehicles, 2,197 trailers and 262 containers. The aggregate 
tonnage capacity of the fleet was 17,088 tonnes and vehicle 
miles run during 1979 amounted to 30 million miles. Staff 
numbers totalled 6,773 at the end of 1979.
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7.1.4. Special Traffics Group
This Group consists of the following companies
Cartransport Ltd,
Auto Freight Transport (N.I.) Ltd.
Containerway and Eoadferry Ltd.
Ferry Trailers Ltd, Northern Ireland 
Cotrali - Pickfords Ltd.
Manchester Number One Bonded Warehouse Co, Ltd. 
Cotrali SARL, France 
Lawther and Harvey Ltd, Northern Ireland
Lawther and Harvey (Ireland) Ltd, Republic of Ireland 
Pickfords Heavy Haulage Ltd.
Pickfords International Air Charter Co. Ltd.
Tankfreight Ltd.
Felixtowe Tank Developments Ltd.
Waste Management Ltd.
Waste Clearance (Holdings) Ltd.
Waste Incineration Ltd.
Hedco Landfill Ltd.
Norwaste Ltd. and subsidiaries
As implied by the title of the Group and the names of the 
companies, this Group is a conglomerate which deals with 
highly specialised carriage of goods including cars, wine 
(Cotrali-Pickfords), heavy items, factory removals, traffic 
in tanks and refuse. The turnover in 1979 amounted to £67.4m, 
made up as follows :-
£m
Freight Receipts 31.1
Warehousing and storage 1.7
Property rentals and other 
receipts l4.6
67.4
At the end of 1979, this group owned/leased 1,068 powered 
vehicles, 499 trailers and 4,037 containers and demountable 
bodies. The aggregate tonnage capacity of this fleet was 
22,190 tonnes and the vehicle miles run during 1979 amounted to
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31 million miles. Staff numbers totalled 2,657 at the end of 
1979.
7.1 .5. Pickfords Removals and Travel Group 
This Group consists of Pickfords Removals Limited (and sub­
sidiaries) and Pickfords Travel Service Limited. As these 
titles imply the companies deal respectively with household/ 
industrial removals and with a network of travel agencies. 
Pickfords Removals Limited is described by NFC as the largest 
removal business in the United Kingdom capable of ’moving 
house’ (or office) to any corner of the world. A specialist 
service has been developed within this company dealing with the 
distribution of new furniture. Pickfords Travel Service Limited 
is described by NFC as the second largest travel agency in the 
in the United Kingdom.
The turnover in 1979 amounted to £32.Om, analysed as follows :--
£m
Freight receipts 22.3
Warehousing and storage 3.7
Property rentals and other 
receipts 6.0
At the end of 1979 this Group owned/leased 783 powered vehicles
and 16 containers. The aggregate tonnage capacity of this 




This Group consists of three companies
Tempco International Limited
Tempco T.I. Engineering Services Limited 
Gerdor Limited, Republic of Ireland
These companies provide temperature-controlled storage and 
distribution services and related engineering consultancy 
the turnover in respect of which amounted to £4.2m in 1979» 
This was. analysed as follows:-
£m
Freight receipts 0.7
Warehousing and storage 2.6
Property rentals and other 
receipts 0.9
4.2
At the end of 1979, this Group owned 22 trailers and employed 
182 staff.
7.1.7. International Group and Others
Apart from the main Groups mentioned in Sections 7.2.1. to
7 .2.6 , the NFC has a number of other trading and non-trading 
compsinies, which are described under the above heading. These 
produced a turnover of £5.8m in 1979 and, at the end of 1979, 
the Group employed 289 staff.
The primary sources of income have been obtained from 
diversification into transport and distribution consultancy, 
computer services, commercial vehicle body-building and 
development of instruments and monitoring equipment.
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7.1.8. Overall Situation
It is clear from the foregoing that the NFC is a very large 
organisation which has, since 1969, diversified its general 
freight/parcels road haulage activities into a large number of 
related and, usually, specialist areas. However, it should be 
appreciated that a small part of this diversification process 
commenced before the creation of the Corporation, particularly 
in respect of the household removals, heavy haulage and travel 
agency activities undertaken by Pickfords Limited.
In total, at the end of 1979, the Corporation owned/leased 
18,362 powered road traffic vehicles, 11,218 trailers and 
3,122 containers and other demountable bodies. The vehicle 
miles run during 1979 totalled 392 million. The total staff 
numbers employed amounted to 34,349.
However, as noted earlier, the Corporation ceased trading on 30 
September I98O and all of the assets were transferred to the 
new Company which began trading on 1 October 1930. The net 
balance sheet value of those assets was £73.3m and included 
16,548 powered road traffic vehicles, 9,221 trailers and 5,716 
containers and other demountable bodies. As part of this 
arrangement, a capital debt to the Department of Transport 
(<£100m) was extinguished. After also writing off goodwill of 




Share Capital (held by 
Secretary of State) 3*0
Share Premium and Reserves 6I.I
Debentures and Loans 1.0
Minority Interests 0.9
68.0
The transfer was catered for in the Transport Act I98O with the 
expressed intention of transferring the new Company into the 
private sector. Initially, the £5m share capital is held by 
the Secretary of State for Transport. It had been intended to 
float these shares on the stock market during I98I but the 
Company considered that, with recent financial results being 
depressed by the recession, it would be prudent to delay the 
flotation until late 1982.
More recently, however, the Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive 
of the Company has announced proposals for what the Financial 
Times (19/6/81) has described as ’far and away the biggest 
management buy-out that has ever been organised in the U.K.'
The outline proposal was that the management and staff of the 
NFC provide about £3m for a majority equity holding with about 
£43m to be provided by outside bodies as medium term loans and, 
perhaps, as redeemable preference shares. The total of £3Cm 
was considered by IHTC management to be what the Government 
would obtain from a stock exchange flotation in the Summer of
1982.
The Government has given approval to the management buy-out and
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has announced that the purchase price is to be £33.3m 
(Hansard 19 October I981). A considerable commitment on the 
part of senior NFC managers is anticipated as follows :-
£
Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive 40,000
10 Top Managers (each) 23,000
Next 10 Top Managers (each) 7,000/8,000
2,000 Middle Managers (each) 1 ,300/1,600
(Source : Financial Times 20 October I98I )
This is expected to produce £3.37m and the Deputy Chairman and 
Chief Executive (Mr Peter Thompson) 'hopes that at least 60/j 
of the remaining 24,000 staff will confirm their interest by 
investing in the new company through the use of £200 interest- 
free one year loans' (Financial Times 20 October I98I ). Details 
of the investment by outside bodies (probably a consortium of
banks) have not yet been announced, including whether any part
of this investment will be in the form of an equity holding.
The author is advised by NFC that the prospectus will be issued 
early in December I981.
7.2. Financial Situation of the NFC
In 1979, the National Freight Corporation made a net profit of 
£2.Om, without receipt of subsidy payments of any nature. Thus, 
on face value, the organisation achieved its overall 'break-even' 
objective as laid dovm in the Transport Act 1968, even though, 
as a percentage of turnover, that profit was a very small amount 
(0.3/O. However, part of that financial objective included 
making 'proper provision for the depreciation and renewal of
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assets.’ In that respect, NFC have recorded the fact that their 
depreciation charge in 1979 was £13.2m lower than the required 
replacement level, mainly in respect of vehicles and plant and 
equipment. Consequently, the 1979 result was not in line with 
the Government’s financial objectives.
The same situation applied in 1978, when the net profit was 
only £0.3m, and the depreciation charge was £13.Om lower than 
replacement level. However, both years represented a consider­
able improvement on the results of the first years of operation, 
where subsidies were received (as noted earlier) in respect of 
the National Carriers Limited operations. Indeed, it should be 
noted that a net loss of £l.9m was sustained by the Corporation 
in 1969 after receipt of the NCL subsidy of £l7m. Thus, the 
1979 result was £21m better than the I969 position,
The trend of financial results is given in Table 7.1. where it 
can be seen that the NCL subsidies totalled £42.7m in the 
years 1969 to 1973. Despite these subsidies, losses were 
sustained in the years 1969 to 1971 and only very small profits 
in 1972 and 1973. Largely as a result of the recession in 1974 
and 1973 and the failure of a new French subsidiary company, 
large losses were sustained in the years 1974 to 1977 with the 
1973 loss having been £31.Om. As noted in Section 7.1, it was 
the size of that loss which persuaded NFC management to speed up 
the pace and extent of the diversification programme to provide 
a return to profitability and produce a more robust business, 
capable of dealing more easily with any future recessions.
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Profit/(Loss) Including 













Table 7.1. NFC Profit and Loss Account 
'__________Summary 1969 to 1979_______
(Source : NFC annual reports and accounts)
More immediately, however, NFC was assisted by Government, by the 
provision of cash flow grants which were authorised in the 
Transport (Financial Provisions) Act 1977. These grants 
amounted to £22m in 1976, £30m in 1977 and £20ra in 1978. 
Additionally, in order to reduce the interest charge, the capital 
debt to the Government was reduced in 1978 from £133.Im to 
£lOOm under provisions contained within the Transport Act 1978. 
The commencing capital of the iTFC (on 1 January I969) amounted to 
£91.Cm out of the total outstanding in 1978 before that action. 
This element was reduced to £30ra in 1978 under these arrange­
ments. However, it had originally been intended that this 
capital debt be repaid in 10 annual instalments commencing in 
1976. Such repayments have been made in years 1976 to I98O 
but they have been offset by further Government loans to the 
same value.
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Returning to the 1979 result which was, as discussed above, a 
net profit of £2.Om, it should be noted that the Groups made a 
combined profit of £20.2m. This was before charging interest 
to the Department of Transport of £8.1m and extraneous items of 
£10.Ira. These extraneous items included headquarter's expenses 
(£2.2m), leasing interest (£3.Om) and other interest not payable 
to the Department of Transport (£3.Im) as well as a number of 
exceptional features which were largely self-compensating. Thus, 
the low net profit of £2.0m cannot be said to have been due to 
exceptional items of expenditure. However, the l'ire result was 
affected by the national road haulage strike in January 1979 
and this is stated in the 1979 annual report and accounts to have 
reduced profits by between £4m and £3m in that year. Even 
allowing for this factor, however, the net profit in 1979 was 
well below the required level, i.e. allowing for replacement 
provision.
The distribution of the 1979 net profit figure over the Groups 
was as given in Table 7.2. Both the Extraneous Items and the 
Interest to the Minister of Transport have been allocated, by 
NFC, over the Groups.
It is clear from Table 7.2. that the net profit situation of 
each Group (apart from Pickfords) in 1979 was far from healthy 
in any normally accepted commercial sense, representing a poor 
percentage on turnover. The Roadline U.K. Group result was by 
far the worst. In their 1979 annual report and accounts, NFC 
described the Trading Profit of £20.2m as representing 12.9/^ 
of average net assets (12.8/= in 1978 and 7.6% in 1977). This 
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Table 7*2. National Freight Corporation - Analysis of 
_____________Net Profit/(Loss) 1979_____________________
(Source : NFC report and accounts, 1979)
not a very helpful statistic, except in a comparative sense. It 
did not allow for the increased value of some of the net assets 
(particularly land and buildings) and the fact that most of the 
extraneous items were legitimate, ongoing charges to the Trading 
Profit. There was more sense in leaving Interest to the 
Department of Transport out of that statistic, however, in that 
it could be compared with the 'dividend’ distribution in a 
limited company.
Turning to the financial results for the nine months ended 
30 September I98O, the Corporation made a trading profit of 
£10.3m, much less than the 1979 full year trading profit of
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£20,2m. Interest paid to the Department of Transport amounted 
to £6.6m and extraneous items totalled £11.3m (including 
redundancy £?.3m). Consequently, a net loss of £7.6m was 
recorded, from which was deducted (in the appropriation account) 
a provision of £11.5m for costs that were expected to be 
incurred later in respect of the BRB decision to withdraw from 
the C 8c D parcels sector and proposed rationalisation of the 
parcels distribution network. Thus, the final trading 
position of the Corporation was worse than the 1979 result.
This deterioration was ascribed to 'a period of savage economic 
recession.* The reductions in trading profits were sustained 
in three Groups - British Road Services, National Carriers 
and Roadline. The trading profits of the other three Groups 
improved slightly on an annualised basis.
The balance sheet as at J>Q September I98O (after extinguishing 
the capital debt of £100m, writing off goodwill of £5.5m and 
creating the new share capital) was as given in Table 7•3» It 
can be seen that the net value of the assets was recorded at 
£68m. However, on a current cost accounting basis, the net 
value was described in the I98O report and accounts as £153*8m, 
the increase being related mainly to an increase of £94.2m in 
the value of fixed assets, particularly land and buildings. It 
will thus be observed that the 'going concern' value of £53*3m 
determined by the Government, in connection with the management 
'buy-out' was substantially lower than the net current cost 
value of the assets as at 30 September I98O.
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Share Premium and Reserves 6l.l
Debentures and Loans 1.0
Minority Interests 0.9
68.0
Table 7*3* NFC Balance Sheet as at 30 September I98O 
(Source : NFC annual report and accounts)
of the latest financial situation; in particular that related 
to year ended 30 September 198I. NFC have been reluctant to 
disclose details, not wishing to pre-empt the information to 
be provided in the prospectus to be issued in December I98I. 
However, the author has been led to understand that the result 
for year ended 30 September I981 was a little better than that 




It was made clear in Chapter 3 that the markets and culture 
of the National Bus Company (NBC) are considerably different 
to those of the National. Freight Corporation and even, to 
some extent, the British Railways Board i.e. in respect of its 
Passenger business. These features have heavily conditioned 
the NBC approach to corporate planning and, in order to 
undertake the examination required in Chapters 13 and 13» it 
is intended in this chapter to supplement the information 
provided in Chapter 3 by briefly identifying the main features 
which describe the nature and size of the organisation and its 
financial situation,
8,1. The Nature and Size of the NEC
The National Bus Company was created on 1 January 1969» under 
Section 24 of the Transport Act 1968. On that date, it took 
over 63 companies undertaking local and longer distance bus 
services. It did not take over any municipal bus services.
Some of the inherited companies had been in public ownership 
for some time, within the control of the Transport Holding 
Company, which also transferred some of its companies to the 
Scottish Bus Group. However, the Transport Holding Company 
had only recently taken over the Companies within the 
British Electric Traction Group which were then subsequently 
transferred to NBC. Additionally, in 1969 London Transport's 
'Green Line' and 'Country'bus services were transferred to NBC.
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Before NBC was formed it was clear that the bus companies 
were experiencing financial difficulties caused by declining 
patronage. It was pointed out by Pryke (1981) that 'Between 
1963 and 1968 the undertakings which they (NBC and SBG) came 
to control lost 10% of their traffic' and the 'output per 
worker fell by 6%,' The purpose of forming the NBC was to 
enable the services provided by the companies to be continued 
as far as possible and rationalised. Some of the inherited 
companies were making losses and there was every possibility 
of major reductions in services being implemented by those 
organisations.
Since 1969, the National Bus Company has merged a number of the 
inherited companies as part of the rationalisation process. 
Consequently, the company structure is, in I98I, as depicted 
in Figure 8.1. It can be seen that there are 30 out-based 
operating companies responding to 4 Regions. Additionally, 
National Travel (NBC) Ltd responds direct to NBC headquarters. 
That company provides express bus services between major towns 
and cities, in competition with the British Railways Board and, 
to a minor degree, British Airways.
Each of the four Regions is headed by a Regional Director who 
is chairman of the board of each of the operating companies 
within his Region. The Regional directors report to the 
Chief Executive of the NBC headquarters management group - 






Midlands and West Region 
Midland Red
Potteries Motor Traction 
Oxford/South Midland 






























■National Travel (NBC) Ltd
Figure 8.1. NBC Operating Companies 
(Source ; Discussions with NEC planners)
to the board of NBC. The headquarters organisation structure 
is given in Figure 8.2.
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id Chief Executive *
1 1 iMember Director of Chief Direc 
for Research and Financial Engin 
Personnel Strategic Officer and Tec 
Services* Planning , Serv.
:or of Secretary Regional Non-Executive 
sering of the Directors Directors 
ihnical Board (l) (6)
.ces
y.B. Those officers marked * are also members of the National 
Bus Company Board under the same titles. This also 
applies to one of the Regional Directors.
Figure 8.2 - National Bus Com-oany Headquarters Organisation Structure.
(Source; Discussions with National Sus Comoany Planners).
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The structural, relationships with Government are given in 
Figure 8,3» Whilst the NBC board responds to the Secretary 
of State for the Department of Transport (through which 
contact is made with other main Government departments), it 
receives many directions from the Traffic Commissioners.
These arrangements stemmed originally from the Road Traffic 
Act 1930 (with some relatively minor subsequent amendments) 
but were varied considerably by the Transport Act I98O. Prior 
to the 1980 Act, the Traffic Commissioners were able to 
restrict competition under a system of road service licences, 
and determine fare levels. The 1980 Act abolished road 
service licences for express services and made it easier for 
applicants to obtain road service licences for other services 
restricting, at the same time, the power to "attach thereto 
conditions as to fares."
Prior to I98O, the road licencing system (including control of 
fare levels) was a significant feature in restricting 
competition with the onus of. proof being on the applicant, 
i.e. the potential new operator, to demonstrate at a Traffic 
Commissioners Court that a proposed service would be in the 
public interest. Since the introduction of the 1980 Act in 
October I980, there has been no control by the Traffic 
Commissioners over express services or fares and this has 
given rise to a considerable increase in competition^and 
generally reduced fare levels. These have also impacted on 
the fare levels operated by the BRB as noted in Section 6 .3. 















1 Unbroken lines indicate direct responsibility.
2 Broken lines indicate spheres of influence.
Figure 8.5 - National Bus Company - %ain Relationships
with Government.
(Source: Discussions with National Bus Company
Planners.
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together early in I98I to form British Coachways intending to 
run fast, efficient express motorway services. However, as 
a consequence of NBC price reductions (and more latterly BRB 
price reductions on selected services), there are signs that 
British Coachways is making losses and the individual 
operators are gradually pulling out (Sunday Times, 8 November,
1981).
NBC planners have advised the author that NBC is well satisfied 
with these developments in the express services field and have 
been able to increase both patronage and profits as a result 
of the reduced fares. They consider that NBC has an advantage 
over their new competitors in that they have a good network of 
depots and can spread their overheads over all of their 
services.
They are considerably less happy with the potential impact of 
the 1980 Act on their local services. Under the new arrangements, 
the onus of proof in a Traffic Court, in respect of a potential 
new service by any operator lies with the other (mainly 
existing) operators who, if they wish to oppose an application, 
have to demonstrate that the new service is against the public 
interest. Additionally, apart from reserve powers, the 
exercise of which would need to be 'essential in the interests 
of the public', the Traffic Commissioners would not exercise 
any control over fares. The Chairman of NBC, Lord Shepherd, 
has recently complained (NBC News Release, l4 October I981) 
about the potential impact of this development as follows 
'We were set free by the I98O Transport Act to use commercial
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judgement in the operation of Express Coach services. We rose 
to the challenge presented by the new Act, and the efforts of 
National Express have not only been successful in increasing 
passenger volume, but they have also resulted in a significant
financial contribution to keep some local bus services running -
services which, paradoxically, could be threatened by another 
clause of the same Act.’
He added that 'for 50 years bus operators had practiced internal
cross-subsidisation with profitable routes propping up socially 
desirable loss makers. This had been made possible by sensible 
regulations by the traffic commissioners, and with the general
approval of both local and central Government.' 'There is no
doubt that many bus routes at present aided by internal 
cross-subsidy are under severe threat from increased competition 
for the more profitable elements of our business.' This 
conclusion was evidenced by recent decisions of the Traffic 
Commissioners which 'indicated that it would be impossible for 
objectors to demonstrate at hearings that any new application 
would be against the public interest.'
The net consequence of this was described as creating a situation 
where cross-subsidisation would need to be abandoned and, in 
order to meet financial targets, it would be necessary to price 
'according to the volume of business and the cost of operating 
individual services - or even sections of services, or those at 
specific times of day, days of the week, or for specific groups 
of passengers. This will inevitably mean that the present high 
level of individual cross-subsidisation will disappear. Such
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routes which cannot be justified commercially will only be 
retained by substantial increases in County revenue support, 
and in these difficult times, this seems an unlikely course 
of action. I am not saying that all this will happen overnight. 
The real danger is that the decline in services, especially in 
the remoter less populated areas, could be faster than we have 
seen in recent years, and would mean that our passengers in 
those areas are going to suffer.’
Continuing with an examination of information given in 
-Figure 8.5, the relationships with the local authorities have 
been of particular significance in recent years and have 
stemmed from a number of significant event's. The most 
important was established originally under the Local Government 
Act 1972 which enabled non-metropolitan county councils to 
provide deficit grants in respect of mutually agreed local 
services. This Act also required the county councils to 
prepare annually Transport Policies and Programmes (TPP's) 
which represent broad five-year transport plans for each county, 
stipulating the planned expenditure and service changes of all 
transport operators within the county including the district 
council i.e. municipal bus services. Given that any grants 
provided to operators (bus and rail) were included in the TPP 
and that the content of the TPP was acceptable to the Department 
of the Environment (now Department of Transport), these grants 
would qualify for partial reimbursement by Central Government 
under a Transport Supplementary Grant.
These deficit grants to NBC have continued since 1975 (see
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Section 8.2.) but the enabling legislation is now contained 
within the Transport Act 1978, which, additionally, required 
the non-metropolitan county councils to prepare, annually, 
five year public transport plans in conjunction with the 
operators and to enter into agreements with the operators in 
respect of the ’provision or retention and financing of 
services and facilities which are required by the plan but 
would not, apart from such agreements, be available.’
Clearly, whilst neither NBC nor its companies are executively 
responsible to the non-metropolitan county councils, the 
councils exert considerable influence over the content of the 
plans of the companies and thus the NBC corporate plans.
Further, in recent years, NBC have entered into service 
coordination agreements with local authorities involving joint 
services, pooling and distribution of receipts. These arrange­
ments have involved the PTE’s, and non-metropolitan county and 
district councils. Additionally, and again as a consequence of 
the 1978 Act, NBC has entered into agency agreements with 
non-metropolitan county and district councils whereby single 
coordinated services are run under the aegis of the county 
council. All of these arrangements serve to require a close 
relationship between NBC and local authorities in the planning 
and operation of services.
In respect of laid down Government objectives, similarly to 
the National Freight Company, the National Bus Company is 
required, under the terms of the Transport Act 1968, to
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'secure that the combined revenues of the authority and the 
subsidiaries taken together are not less than sufficient to 
meet their combined charges properly chargeable to revenue 
account, taking one year with another.' In this respect they 
were also required to 'secure that their subsidiaries charge to 
revenue account in every year all charges which are proper to 
be made to revenue account, including, in particular, proper 
provision for the depreciation and renewal of assets.' Whilst 
in their annual reports and accounts only historic cost 
depreciation has been charged in the profit and loss account, 
NBC have always recorded as a note to the accounts (even prior 
to current cost accounting requirements) the additional 
depreciation which should be allowed for on a replacement 
basis. They have recorded this figure under what they have 
described to the author as a correct interpretation of the 
objective given above.
More recently (Hansard 22 May, I98I and as a consequence of 
Cmnd 7131) the Government have announced that NBC will be 
expected to work to an objective of achieving a current cost 
operating surplus before interest of ^l8.5m, in I980 outturn 
prices, by I985 and various milestones (to be agreed) for 
each of the intermediate years. The NEC planners have advised 
the author that there are extreme doubts as to whether this 
objective can be achieved. Additionally, as part of the same 
announcement NBC is required to achieve in I98I a J)% reduction 
(in real terms) in operating costs per vehicle mile. This 
latter objective is considered by NBC planners to be more 
attainable.
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To consider the nature and size of NBC further, it is considered 
useful to provide some overall physical (and some financial) 
statistics. These will relate to the year ended 31 December 
1980. Since the individual companies, with the exception of 
National Travel (NBC) Ltd., undertake the same activities, there 
would be little point, in this instance, of providing physical 
statistics in respect of each operating company. The same 
applies in respect of the Regions and, in any case, NBC do not 
prepare Regional accounts/physical facts reports.
Starting with the level of turnover, this amounted to £580.3111 
in 1980, including grants and other financial arrangements 
which will be explained in Section 8.2. These receipts were 
in respect of 1,649 million passenger journeys of which all but 
62 million were related to stage-carriage services. It will be 
recalled that details of the 1979 NBC passenger journeys and 
passenger miles compared with other bus operators were provided 
in Chapter 5» There it was established that, outside of the 
large cities and towns (where LTE, PTE and other local authority 
municipal services dominate), NBC provides the vast majority of 
the stage-carriage bus services in England and Wales. This 
situation, which was based on 1979 data, also obtained in 1969 
although, since that time, all public operators have experienced 
a reduction in patronage. This reduction, measured in terms of 
passenger journeys, is identified in Table 8.1, where it can be 
be seen that the private operators alone (because of growth in 
the private hire and contract market) have managed to record 











Private Operators 557 709
Total 9823 7100
* 1649 million in I98O
Table 8.1. Passenger Journeys by Buses and Coaches in Great 
Britain in 19^9 and 1979 (Source - 'Transport 
Statistics Great Britain 19^9 - 1979', HMSO, 198O 
and NBC Annual Report and Accounts I980)__________
The main physical facts relating to NBC operations are given 
in Table 8.2. Here, the results in respect of year ended 
31 December 198O are compared, as far as possible, with the 
equivalent 1969 figures. Although there have been improvements 
in recent years, the percentage reductions in vehicle miles and 
resources between I969 and I980 have not kept pace with the 
reductions in passenger journeys. In particular, there has 
been a 4l.8?̂ reduction in passenger journeys, compared with an 
18.9/- reduction in vehicle miles, a 24.5% reduction in public 
services vehicles and a 27*3% reduction in staff numbers during 
the period 1969 to I98O.
This disparity has had a considerable impact on the financial 
results since I969 as will be made clear in the next section 
which deals with the financial situation of NBC. Before 









Other Services   93
787 638
Public Service Vehicles (Nos)
Double deck 5156
Single deck _ 10430
20637 15586
Employees (Nos.at year end) 80344 58399
Table 8.2. NBC Selected Physical Facts 1969 and I98O 
(Source : NBC Annual Reports and Accounts)
the prospect of denationalisation of the Company. This was 
announced by the Government in the 'Queen’s Speech' on 3 
November (Hansard) but it is considered by NBC planners that 
it will be difficult for the Government to proceed with these 
proposals because of the losses (before deficit grants) 
incurred in respect of many local services and the difficulties 
of isolating the resources of the express services which share 
the same depots and garages as the local services.
8.2. Financial'Situation of NBC
On the transfer of the inherited assets to the newly formed 
National Bus Company on 1 January 1969, the Government created 
a capital debt (to the Department of the Environment) in the 
books of the NEC to cover the assessed value of the assets.
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After charging interest on this capital debt and depreciation, 
on an historic cost basis (£9.5®), a profit of £0.8m was 
achieved by NBC in the first year of trading. At that time, 
there were no grants from Local Authorities in respect of 
deficits on selected local services.
By 1980 and, as a result of the declining traffic levels noted 
earlier, this prpfit had been converted to a loss of £11.8m 
after receipt by NBC of Local Authority deficit grants 
totalling £4l.3m. This loss is recorded in a summary of the 
NBC profit and loss account which appears as Table 8.3.
Receipts
Stage carriage operations
Grants under Section 1, Transport Act 1978 
Payments by local authorities in respect 
of concessionary fares 
PTE reimbursements of expenses under 
operating or agency agreements 
District Council reimbursements of 






























Table 8.3. NBC Profit and Loss Account I98O 
(Source : NBC Annual Renort and Accounts I98O)
260
In fact,the loss in I98O of £11.8m was a considerable turn 
around from the 1979 situation which was a profit of £6 ,2m 
after receipt of Local Authority deficit grants totalling 
£37.2m. This was explained in the I98O annual report and 
accounts as being due to the 'failure of revenue grants to 
keep pace with inflation, together with the fall in passengers 
owing to the recession.'
To understand the I98O result and compare it with the 
opening result in 1969, it is necessary to appreciate four 
special features. The first is that, since 1975, NBC has been 
in receipt of the deficit grants from Local Authorities which, 
as noted earlier, were designed to cover the losses on selected 
services which the Authorities would rather subsidise than see 
curtailed or withdrawn. The first grants received in 1975 
totalled £6.6m. It has already been noted that £41.3® was 
received in 1980. The second is that, under the Transport 
Act 1978, County Councils were empowered to pay to transport 
operators grants in respect of concessionary fares granted 'in 
favour of special categories of persons.' These grants totalled 
£28.9® in 1980. The third is that Section 35 of the Transport 
Act 1968 permitted NEC to claim reimbursement of fuel duty.
This has applied in all years and amounted to £27*9® in I98O 
(£7.2m in 1969) which was credited to working expenses. The 
fourth is that Section 32 of the same Act provided that NBC 
should receive Government grants towards the purchase of new 
buses. The amount receivable in I98O was £24.6m (£2.Cm in 
1969) which v/as set against bus acquisitions in that year 
totalling £32.2m included within a total investment of £39.8m.
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It should also be noted that the 1980 loss of £11,8m was 
arrived at after charging historic depreciation of £14.5®. 
However, this depreciation charge was £21.9® less than that 
required on a current cost accounting basis i.e. to provide 
for replacement of the assets under the financial objective 
set in the Transport Act I968. Indeed, this was the major 
feature of the I98O current cost profit and loss account 
adjustments, the historic cost loss of £11.8m being converted
to a current cost loss of £54.7®.
Turning to the I98O balance sheet, this records an increase 
in the debt to the Secretary of State of £52.4m (over the 
opening debt in 1969 of £97.6m) which was in the form of loans 
from the National Loans Fund. This has not resulted to any 
significant degree from losses since, between the. years 19^9 
to 1980, the profits after interest have been sufficient to 
offset the losses which were incurred. This can be seen in 
the trend of the net results as given in Table 8.4.
Instead, the increased debt has resulted mainly from funding
investment, beyond the levels financed by historic depreciation 
and bus grants. As a consequence of the increased capital debt 
and refinancing of the original capital debt of £97.6m, the 
interest charge was £17.1® in I98O compared with £4.8m in 1969* 
In the 1980 annual report and accounts, the Chairman of NBC 
complained about this increasing interest 'burden' describing 
the capital structure as 'unsuitable' and citing the views of 
the Eighth Report of the Select Committee on Nationalised 
















Table 8.4. NBC Profit and Loss Results 1969 to 198O 
(Source : NBC Annual Reports and Accounts)
The reserves at the end of I98O stood at £60.2m on an historic 
cost basis, including a property revaluation reserve of 
£54.9®. However, the working capital situation was not 
satisfactory, being a net liability of £3.4m. On a current 
cost basis, fixed asset values were increased by £243.6m and, 
with other relatively minor changes, this increased the 
reserves to £304.3®.
Finally, turning to the external financing limits which have 
concerned all nationalised industries since the fiscal year 
1979/80 (Cmnd 6440), these were set as follows :-
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82
£m £m £m
New bus grant and local 
authority support 38 66 60
Net borrowing ^  1̂
8 2  ^  Z2
263
The 1970/80 and I980/81 results were external financing
requirements of £80m and £83®, respectively. The limit for
1981/82 has been subject to comment (198O Annual Report and
Accounts) by the Chairman, as follows :-
’While NBC has been able in the last two years to stay 
within the cash limits, it is possible that the limit in 
1981-82 will cause more problems. Should trading conditions 
not improve and if no relief is given from the burden of 
NBC's inappropriate capital structure, it will be necessary 
to make further cuts in the services provided in order to 
keep v/ithin the limits. '
It is possible that some change to the funding arrangements of 
NBC will be made in I982 as a result of a recently announced 
study commissioned by the Department of Transport. The 
Secretary of State has appointed a firm of consultants.
Touche Ross, to investigate the financing arrangements of NBC 
with particular reference to 'the relationship between the 
capital debt and interest charges and the earning capacity of 
the 35 subsidiary local bus companies, how the present 
arrangements affect the local companies* operating or financial 
decision-making, including their relations with local 
authorities, and the prospects for the companies within the 
present financial regime' (Financial Times,l4 October,I98I ).
The Touche Ross report is expected to be made available to NBC 




To conclude Part 2 and facilitate the proposed examination of the 
corporate planning process and procedures of British Airways 
(BA), it is necessary to provide further background details of 
that organisation. Like the other three organisations covered 
in this research, this information supplements that already 
provided in Chapter 5 and is concerned primarily with the 
nature and size of British Airways and its financial situation.
9.1. The Nature and Size of BA
British Airways or, more correctly, the British Airways Board 
was created on 1 April 1972, when it took over the two State 
owned undertakings - British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) 
and British European Airways (BEA), The takeover was undertaken 
following the recommendations of the 'Edwards Committee' in 
1969 (Cmnd 40l8) and it was originally intended that the 
British Airways Board would act as a holding company which 
would direct the operations of the two separate organisations 
(BOAC and BEA) and make some economies of scale, particularly 
in the area of computer systems, including a common reservation 
system. In 1973, contrary to the Edwards Committee 
recommendations, the board of BA decided to merge the two 
companies intending, as a result of this, the creation of 
greater operating flexibility, some rationalisation of services 
and reductions in overhead costs. That process commenced in 
1974 but was not completed until 1976.
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The enabling legislation for the creation of the British Airways 
Board was contained within the Civil Aviation Act 1971. However, 
the relevant provisions within that Act, together with those 
within the Air Corporations Act 1967 and the Air Corporations 
(Dissolution) Order 1973, were consolidated in the British 
Airways Board Act, 1977. Thus, since 1977, the British Airways 
Board has been constituted by and operates under the terras of the 
1977 Act. This Act permits British Airways to operate air 
transport services (passenger and cargo - including mail), 
whether on scheduled services or charter terms, in any part of 
the world.
The main activities of British Airways are conducted by the 
British Airways Board as an operating company but there are also 
a number of important 'subsidiary' companies, which are brought 
together for management information and control purposes into 
groups. The group and company structure is given in Figure 9»1«' 
wherein it will be observed that there are eight groups, some 
of which contain companies which are based outside of the 
United Kingdom. It will be seen in the following paragraphs 
that the Airlines Group is by far the largest and the British 
Airways Board itself is the single most significant operating 





Aviation Support Services Ltd.
Balsa Inc. (U.S.A.).
British Airways Espana Ltd. (Spain).
British Overseas Air Charter Ltd.
Guernsey Airways Ltd.
-British Airtours Ltd.
-British Airways Engine Overhaul Ltd.
• British Airways Tour Conpanies.
Silver vVing Surface Arrangements Ltd.
Flair Holidays Ltd.
Holt Paris Welcome Service S.A. (France).
Martin Rooks & Co. Ltd.
Alta Holidays Ltd.
• British Airways Helicopters Ltd.
■International Air Radio Group.
International Aeradio* Ltd.
Charles R. Lister International Ltd.
Computer World Trade Ltd.
IJl.L. Communications Systems Inc. (U.S.A.).
IJI.L. Digital Systems Ltd.
I.A.L. Gemini Ltd.
I.A.L. Gemini Computer Systems Ltd.
IJl.L. Papua New Guinea Property Ltd. (New Guinea). 
International Aeradio (Far East) (Private) Ltd. (Singapore). 
International Aeradio (North America) Ltd. (Canada). 
International Aeradio (Pakistan) Ltd. (Pakistan). 
International Aeradio (Zambia) Ltd. (Zambia).
Park Air Electronics Ltd.
Technical Electronics Services (Property) Ltd. (South Africa), 
International Aeradio (Caribbean) Ltd. (Trinidad and Tobago).
•British Airways Associated Comoanles Group.
British Airways Associated Companies Ltd.
Airways Aero Associations Ltd.
B.I.H. Ltd.
-Other Companies Grouo.
Travel Automation Services Ltd.
Travicom (South Africa) Property Ltd. (South Africa).
The Airways Housing Trust Ltd.
College of Air Training (Properties) Ltd.
Figure 9.1 - British Airways - Grouo and Company Structure.
(Source; British Airways Annual Report and Accounts 1980/1981).
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The Board membership and executive management structures of BA 
are given in Figure 9.2. The managing director of British 
Airways Engine Overhaul Ltd. reports to the Engineering Director 
who is chairman of that company. The managing directors of the 
two primary British Airways Tour Companies (Silver Wing and 
Martin Rooks), British Airways Helicopters Ltd., British 
Airways Associated Companies Ltd. and International Air Radio 
Ltd. report to the Director of Economic Development. The 
Airlines Group is managed by five General Managers of route 
divisions, each reporting to the Director, Commercial 




d ) Western Routes
e) United Kingdom and Eire
The managing director of British Airtours also reports to the 
Director of Commercial Operations and, in addition to his 
’air tours’ responsibilities, he administers that part of the 
Airlines Group activities which are dealt with at Gatwick 
Airport•
The ’Executive Management’ team is chaired by a Chief Executive 
who is also one of two Deputy Chairmen. He is supported by ten 
executive directors, each with functional responsibilities 
covering the entire organisation. Five of these directors are 





Director, Management Flight 
Commercial Services Operations 
Operations Director Director
Operations Director Part-time 































Figure 3.2 - British Airvays - Board Membership and 
Executive Management Structure.
(Source: British Airways Annual Report and Accounts 
1980/1981).
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Unlike the other three organisations covered in this research, 
the board of British Airways is not accountable to the Secretary 
of State for the Department of Transport but to the Department 
of Trade. The Secretary of State of that Department appoints all 
board members up to a maximum of 15 allowed for in the British 
Airways Board Act 1977. Under the Act, he also has the power 
to
a) give directions to the board in relation to any 
matter appearing to him to affect the national 
interest (e.g. purchase of aircraft manufactured 
in the United Kingdom)
b) direct the board to dispose of any shares or 
stock held by BA
c) direct the board to discontinue, restrict or 
dispose of any part of the organisation.
Under the terms of the Civil Aviation Act 1971» British Airways 
was required to earn sufficient profit after interest and taxes 
to produce a cash flow sufficient to fund its asset replacement 
programme and to pay an appropriate return on its Public 
Divident Capital. The board of British Airways have considered 
that it has been and remains generally accepted by Government 
that this objective is for achievement over the business cycle. 
Thus, in some years, the profit might be better than the 
objective and, in other years, it might be worse. The British 
Airways Board Act 1977 did not stipulate any changes to this 
basic objective but, in common with all nationalised industries, 
cash limits and other additional objectives were to emerge later. 
Details will be provided in Section 9.2.
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The Government and other bodies to which British Airways 
responds are given in Figure 9*3• It will be observed that, 
apart from direct responsibility to the Department of Trade, 
the board of British Airways also has direct responsibility 
to the Civil Aviation Authority. The Department of Trade is 
responsible for civil aviation policy much of which results 
from international agreements which are largely in the form of 
bi-lateral route agreements. Under the overall control of the 
Department of Trade, the Civil Aviation Authority has the power 
to direct British Airways in the areas of the granting of route 
licences, safety standards (including operators' certificates), 
air traffic control and the setting of fares. It also charges 
BA (and other airlines) with fees for air navigation services.
Until 1969, when it was overtaken by United States ’anti-trust' 
legislation, an intenational system of price fixing, relating to 
almost all of the bi-lateral route agreements, existed through 
'traffic conferences' held between the main international 
airlines under the auspices of the International Air Transport 
Association. That association also enabled the international 
airlines to discuss technical matters, a process which still 
continues.
This price fixing arrangement has been commented on by Pryke 
(1981) as follows;-
'The result might simply have been monopoly pricing and 
excessively high profits. However, this did not happen partly 
because most international airlines are in public ownership, 
and have had little incentive to maximise profits, and partly 
because a policy of crude profit maximisation would ultimately 
have led to the withdrawal of the privileges and protection 




















Unbroken lines indicate direct responsibility 
Broken lines indicate spheres of influence.
?i;mre 9.5 - British Airways - Main Relationships
nith Government and Other Bodies*
(Source: Discussions with British Airways Planners)
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that the flag-carrying airlines, whether in public or private 
ownership, came to see their role as the provision of a high 
quality service. In this way they were able, while avoiding 
price competition, to engage in rivalry; they provided themselves 
with a raison d'etre; and were able to satisfy politicians and 
airline users that they were providing something in return for 
the exclusive rights which they possessed and the high prices 
which they charged.
In order to supply a high quality service British Airways and 
other carriers have done their best to provide frequent services; 
to maintain them throughout the year; to ensure that a seat is 
available when it is wanted; to fly to a large number of 
destinations ; to avoid arriving or departing at inconvenient 
times; to keep seating densities low; and to employ an ample 
number of staff at terminals and on cabin duties. One obvious 
consequence (of the first four factors) is that scheduled 
airlines have been put to the expense of supplying a large amount 
of capacity which remains unfilled. Some restriction on the 
provision of extra capacity should have resulted from the 
partnership agreements which were frequently concluded between 
the airlines on a narticular route.'
However, since 19^9 the situation has changed dramatically and 
fares have been generally related much more closely to market 
forces. Although price levels still require the approval of 
the Civil Aviation Authority, the emphasis is now on 
competitive (and much lower) fares, some of which are converted 
through the CAA into bi-lateral agreements tied in with the 
bi-lateral route agreements.
A further significant relationship exists between BA and the 
British Airports Authority (BAA). The latter organisation 
operates the main airports within the United Kingdom, charging 
BA and other airlines landing fees for the use of its airport 
facilities.
Returning to the group structure given in Figure 9*1 » it is 
considered useful to examine briefly each of the groups in 
turn to identify their nature and sizes. As noted earlier.
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the Airlines Group is by far the largest. It provides 
scheduled and some non-scheduled air services both inter­
nationally and within the United Kingdom. The turnover in 
year ended 31 March I981 totalled Sl,704m, of which £l,692m 
was related to scheduled services and £12m to non-scheduled 
services. As noted in Chapter 5» during the nine years which 
have elapsed since the formation of British Airways there has 
been a substantial growth in traffic carried by British Airways 
in its scheduled services.
Details of this growth are given in Table 9.1, where it can be 
seen that passenger miles have increased by 124^ and tonne 
miles of mail and freight by 73% and 85%, respectively. However, 
it will also be observed that there has been a substantial 
increase in productivity (in terms of asset utilisation) in that 
the number of passenger seat miles has only increased by 63%. 
Additionally, available tonne miles (payload capacity of the 
aircraft multiplied by miles flown) has increased by 73^ 
compared with a 117% increase in actual tonne miles. This has 
been brought about partly by aircraft replacements which have 
provided an increased average aircraft capacity preventing an 
increase in flights and hours flown. Additionally, despite 
the increase in average aircraft capacity, there has also been 
growth in the average passenger load factor (17%) and the 
average overall load factor (24%).
The bulk of the non-scheduled air services are provided by 
British Airtours Ltd. which is the 'charter’ arm of British 
Airways. Similar volume of business statistics are not
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Year Ended -31 March
1972 * 1981 Increase
£m £m £m
Scheduled Services
Receipts - Passengers and Baggage 299.3 1489.5 398
- Mail 21.5 4l.O 91
- Freight 41.9 161.7 286
- Total 362.7 1692.2 367
Millions Millions
Passenger Miles 11,125 24,903 124
Seat Miles 20,763 33,796 63
Tonne Mne s - Mail 58.6 102.3 75
- Freight 333.8 618.8 85
- Total (incl
Passengers) 1,380.9 2,989.9 117
Available Tonne Miles 2 ,813.8 4 ,927.8 75
0/ 0//o
Passenger Load Factor 53.6 62.6 17
Overall Load Factor 49.1 60.7 24
* This refers to the result of the merged companies
which formed BA
Table 9.1. British Airways - Scheduled Services Volume 
of Carryings_________________________________
(Source : BA annual reports and accounts)
published but the turnover of this company amounted to £49.7m 
in the year-ended 31 March I981, all of which was related to 
non-scheduled services. The equivalent figure in the year ended 
31 March 1973 when the company traded as BEA Airtours Ltd. was 
£8.6m. Allowing for inflation (using the retail price index) 
this becomes £28.8m in. I980/8I prices. Thus the growth of 
this company has been about 72%.
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Details of the primary operating statistics of what is 
described by BA as the total'airlines activity' (i.e. the 
Airlines Group and British Airtours) are given in Table 9.2.
Here it can be seen that the increase in available tonne 
miles since 1972 (70%) has not been accompanied by similar 
changes in revenue hours flown (decrease of 15%), revenue 
aircraft miles (decrease of 7%), revenue stage flights 
(decrease of 26%) or staff numbers (decrease of 2%).
Additionally, there has been little change in the number of 
aircraft owned, which totalled l8l on 31 March 1981. This 
difference has been brought about by the increased average 
aircraft capacity and, to a limited extent (9%) increased 
average speeds. Both of these factors have been related to 
aircraft replacements, as noted earlier. Thus, on the 
evidence so far provided, it is clear that British Airways 
have, since 1972, been able to obtain considerable growth in 
their scheduled and non-scheduled airline carryings whilst, 
at the same time, making substantial improvements in productivity, 
measured in terms of asset and manpower utilisation.
Moving to British Airways Engine Overhaul Ltd. (BEOL), the 
primary task of this subsidiary is to undertake the major 
overhauls of British Airways aircraft engines. However, it 
also does similar work for other airlines which, in year ended 
31 March I981, amounted to £23m out of a total turnover of £37m.
At the end of March 1981, BEOL employed 1,278 staff.
The British Airways Tour group of companies is described by BA 
as the second largest air-package tour operator in the United
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Year Ended 31 March 
1972 1981 Change
Available Tonne Miles (millions) 3018 5122
%
70
Revenue Hours Flown (OOO’s) 323.2 447.0 15
Available Tonne Miles per
Hour (Nos) 3768 11439 99
Revenue Aircraft Miles (millions) 189.2 173.9 7
Average Speed (raph) 362 393 9
Revenue Stage Flights (OGO's) 284.8 211.1 26
Average Staff Numbers 34,425 53,369 2
Average Tonne Miles per Employee 55,443 95,976 73
Table 9.2. British Airways - Total Airline Operations 
Selected Physical Facts____________________
(Source : BA Annual Reports and Accounts)
Kingdom market. Additionally, its inbound tours department has 
become the largest operator of tours into the U.K. from longhaul 
and European markets. A wide variety of inclusive holidays are 
marketed through the tour operating companies given in Figure 9.1*, 
trading as Sovereign and Enterprise Holidays (Silver Wing Surface , 
Arrangements Ltd), Speedbird Holidays (Alta Holidays Ltd) and by 
Martin Rooks and Company Ltd. Many of the tours utilise the 
aircraft operated by British Airtours Ltd. The turnover of this 
group in year ended 3I March I98I was £l23m and 382 staff were 
employed at the end of that year.
British Airways Helicopters Ltd (BAHL) is mainly engaged in 
the service of North Sea Oil and gas installations. However, 
it also provides scheduled services between Gatwick and 
Heathrow airports and Penzance and the Isles of Scilly. In the 
year ended 3I March 198I, the turnover of BAHL was £32.8m and, 
at the end of that year, it owned 30 helicopters and employed
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879 staff.
The International Air Radio Group (lAC) covers a group of 
companies providing telecommunications, computer and other 
specialised technical services throughout the world. The 
group turnover was £63.9m in the year ended 31 March I98I.
The British Airways Associated Companies Group (BAAC) administers 
British Airways interests in foreign local and regional 
airlines. Its turnover in the year ended 3I March I98I amounted 
to £6.6m. The Other Companies Group consists of the three 
companies listed in Figure 9.1. The combined turnover of these 
companies in the year ended 31 March I98I was £4.6m.
It is considered pertinent to later discussion to make further 
reference to the manpower situation. Overall staff numbers were 
reduced from 55,184 on 31 March I98O to 30,795 on 31 March I981, 
a reduction of 8.0%. This change was, by far, the largest in. 
any direction since the creation of BA, It was noted earlier 
that, despite a relatively static manpower situation overall 
since 1972, manpower productivity has improved because of an 
increased volume of business. However, BA management have been 
of the opinion, in the last two years particularly, that there 
has been scope for a substantial reduction in manpower related 
to changes in working practices. The reduction of 4,389 staff 
in the last financial year is regarded by BA planners as a 
first step in that process. Further details are given in the 
next section in connection with the latest financial situation.
To conclude this section, it is considered by the author to be
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relevant to note that the Secretary of State for Trade has 
announced that it is the Government's intention to change 
British Airways' status to that of a limited liability company in 
which shares will be offered to the public. However, as in 
respect of NFC, the Government recognise that it may not be 
possible to launch a successful flotation in I98I in view of 
the financial difficulties currently being experienced by BA, 
in common with most international airlines. The enabling 
legislation is contained in the Civil Aviation Act I980, but 
BA planners consider that it will be some considerable time 
before firm steps are taken to 'privatise' the organisation.
9.2. The Financial Situation of BA
Unlike the BP.B, IvFC and NBC, British Airways is partly funded by 
State-owned equity capital, known as public dividend capital.
This arrangement was originally granted to 30AC as part of its 
'capital restructuring in I965. The principle was continued on 
a temporary basis in respect of BA under the Civil Aviation 
Act 1971 and made a permanent feature of its financing 
arrangements under the British Airways Act 1977.
On the creation of the British Airways Board, the amount of
public dividend capital was £63m but this was increased to 
£l25m by the end of the first financial year. Subsequent 
increases, which although not specifically linked to the purchase 
and use of Concorde, were regarded by BA as being for that 
purpose, increased the public dividend capital to £280ra by the
31 March 1976. During the last five financial years the
Government has increased the public dividend capital at the rate
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of £lOni per annum (under the arrangements permitted in the 
British Airways Board Act 1977) but also arranged a reduction 
of £l60m (in the Civil Aviation Act 1981)thus reducing it to 
£17Om at the 31 March I98I. This reduction was designed to 
reduce the value of Concorde to nil.
In its first year of trading (year ended 3I March 1973),
British Airways made an operating profit of £32.8m, after 
charging depreciation on an historic cost basis of £32.3m.
This was converted to a profit before interest and tax of 
£33•9m, after taking into account miscellaneous credits and 
charges. After allowing for interest (£19.3%), taxation 
(£8.7m), extraordinary items and minority interests, however, 
the net profit available for appropriation was £5.2m. Of that 
amount, a provision was made for payment of the first dividend 
to the Government of £4.4m.
During the years 1973/74 to 1979/80, the profit before interest 
and tax has fluctuated considerably. During some of these 
years, BA sustained losses after interest and tax and were 
unable, therefore, to declare dividends in respect of the 
public dividend capital. A summary of the results is given in 
Table 9.3, where it will be observed that dividends were not 
paid in respect of three of the financial years.
The result for the last financial year (198O/81) was considerably 
worse than any of the earlier years. A loss before interest and 
tax of £69.9m was sustained. After interest (£73.Im), tax 




































Table 9.3. British Airways Profit and Loss Results 
and Dividends 1973/74 to 1979/80_______
(Source : BA Annual Reoorts and Accounts)
£143.Ira. This loss is analysed in summary profit and loss form 
in Table 9.4. It will be observed that all of the subsidiary 
groups apart from British Airways Tour Companies made small 
operating profits but the main airline activity conducted by 
the British Airways Board itself sustained an operating loss of 
£108.3m. Naturally, in these circumstances no dividend was 
recommended.
In the annual report and accounts for I980/8I, the chairman of 
BA described the deterioration in results as having been due 
to the economic recession, excessive growth in overall 
international capacity resulting in lower average fare levels 
('the resultant over-capacity in some markets accelerated the 
movement towards cheaper and promotional fares'), the inability 
of BA to react quickly in making cost reductions due to the 
substantial level of fixed costs and the effect of the Air
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Receipts 




- British Airtours Ltd
- British Airways Engine Overhaul Ltd
- British Airways Tour Companies
- British Airways Helicopters Ltd
- International Air Radio Group
- British Airways Associated
Companies Group
- Other Companies Group
Operating Profit/(Loss)
Income from Associated Companies 
Income from Trade Investments 
Other Income - Interest Receivable
- Surplus on Disposal of 
Assets/Investments






































Table 9.4. BA Profit and Loss Account - Year ended 
31 March I981____________________________
(Source : BA Annual Report and Accounts I980/81)
Traffic Controllers' dispute. Little real hope was expressed 
in the report and accounts of BA being able to quickly overcome 
these problems, although the remark was made that 'These 
difficulties must be overcome. Our aim is a speedy return to 
profitability: continuing improvement in efficiency, particularly
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in the use of manpower: containment of capital expenditure; 
and above all to meet the requirements of our customers 
throughout the world.'
In fact, the financial situation was considerably worse than 
so far portrayed. On a current cost accounting basis, the loss 
in 1980/81 was £l86m, after allowing for additional depreciation 
of £35m and a gearing adjustment of £36ra (credit). For the 
purpose of calculating the gearing adjustment, public dividend 
capital and reserves were treated as the equivalent of 
shareholders funds. Although it was contrary to the 
Government's instructions to the nationalised industries to 
make a gearing adjustment, it had been agreed that it should be 
done since it was intended to denationalise British Airways.
Turning to the historic cost balance sheet (as at 31 March 
1981), it recorded reserves at £l42.2m. These would be completely 
eliminated if the loss in 1981/82 were equal to the I980/8I 
result. Current liabilities exceeded current assets by £80.2m. 
Additionally, of the capital borrowings outstanding on 31 March 
1981 (which had been accumulated to finance purchase of 
replacement aircraft) of £782.4m only £34.3m had been borrowed 
from the Government. The balance, whilst being supported by
H.M. Treasury guarantees, was in the form of bank loans 
including £633*9m borrowed in U.S. dollars. Thus, apart from 
any possible difficulties concerning fluctuating exchainge rates 
when the loans mature, the Government is not able to undertake 
a capital reconstruction similar to those undertaken in respect 
of the BRB and ÎIFC or hoped for by the NBC, In this case.
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there are few debts to the Government which can be written-off 
(only the loan of £34.3m or perhaps the public dividend 
capital itself of £l70m). Any capital reconstruction would, 
therefore,need to include an injection of additional Government 
funds. Recognition would also need to be given to the 
£434.8m of forward capital expenditure commitments already 
contracted at the end of March 1981, a substantial proportion 
of which is payable in U.S. dollars.
The external financing requirements of BA amounted to £303.6m 
in 1980/81 which was funded by capital borrowings (net) of 
£293.6m and an increase in the public dividend capital of £lOm. 
The author could not obtain from BA an estimate of the I981/82 
profit/loss or external financing requirements but it has been 
speculated that 'a loss of over £lOOm is clearly on the cards' 
(Financial Times l4 August I981) and, given the forward capital 
commitments, it seems likely that the net cash requirements 
in 1981/82 will, be close to the I980/8I level.
Given a further large loss in I982/83, it is conceivable that 
BA would technically be on the verge of insolvency by that 
financial year and would require some form of major capital 
reconstruction. In his annual statement within the annual 
report and accounts for I98O/8I, the chairman of BA has not 
speculated on such an eventuality.
One crumb of comfort can be obtained from an examination of the 
published current cost balance sheet as at 31 March I98I. In 
that statement, the reserves were increased to £663m as a
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result of revaluation of assets, particularly aircraft, to 
current cost levels, minus depreciation on the current cost 
basis. However, the value of these assets would almost 
certainly be substantially less in the perhaps unlikely event 
of their having to be sold in a liquidation situation.
Finally, turning to cash limits and other objectives, the 
Department of Trade (following the arrangements outlined in 
Cmnd 7131) added to the objective noted in Section 9.1. by 
requiring from 1979/80 to I981/82 that BA achieves a *6% return 
on assets revalued on a current cost basis and the resultant 
supplementary depreciation included in costs.' This has not 
been achieved, with the results for 1979/80 and I980/81 being
0.4% and minus 9.7%, respectively.
This objective still exists for I981/82 but BA management are, 
not surprisingly, of the opinion that there will be a major 
shortfall. Attempts are being made by BA management to persuade 
the Secretary of State for Trade to reduce the required rate of 
return to 4%. Additionally, BA are proposing to the Secretary 
of State that two further objectives be established covering the 
years I981/82 to 1984/83, viz:-
a) To achieve an improvement in labour productivity (measured 
in terms of available tonne kilometres per employee) of an 
average of 6% per annum.
b) To achieve a reduction in unit costs (excluding fuel and 
user charges which are considered to be beyond BA's control) 
of an average of 3% per annum in real terms i.e. after 
adjusting for inflation.
283
In respect of the external financing limit (EFL), this was 
originally set for I980/81 by the Department of Trade at 
£219ni. However, in recognition of the fact that the losses in 
1980/81 could not be completely offset by reductions in 
borrowing (i.e. by reductions in capital expenditure in the main), 
the Government agreed to increase the EFL to £304m. The emerging 




CORPORATE PLANNING IN THE BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD
In this chapter, it is intended to provide details of the 
corporate planning practices of the British Railways Board, 
drawing comparisons with the theoretical material provided in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Similar expositions and comparisons will be 
made, in Chapters 12, 13 and l4 in respect of the other three 
organisations covered in this research. However, in the case 
of the BRB it is intended to go one stage further by 
summarising the significant features and forecasts contained 
within recent BRB plans. That information will be provided in 
Chapter 11. Both the theoretical comparison and the BRB plan 
summaries will be seen to be major inputs to the 'success’ 
assessment dealt with in Chapter l6.
In order to structure the theoretical comparisons required of 
this chapter, it is intended to divide it into two sections 
dealing, respectively with:-
1. The Process of Corporate Planning
2. Corporate Planning Procedures
The structure of each of these sections will be largely related 
to the model suid explanations provided in Figure 3»3« of 
Chapter 3 and the theories provided in Chapter 4, respectively.
10.1. The Process of Corporate Planning
The process of corporate planning was formally adopted by the 
British Railways Board in the late 1960's and its use has 
continued since with considerable enthusiasm and effort. Prior
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to that time, the BEB had been involved in a number of 
strategic reviews but not in full and formal corporate planning. 
These strategic reviews included the Modernisation Plan in 1955 
which 'gave rise to a great decade of change (1960/7O) within 
BE' (Bonavia, I981), the 'Reshaping Report' in I963 which gave 
rise to"the so-called 'Beeching Cuts' in unremunerative 
passenger services and lines and a 1968 review of strategy 
for the Freight business. In this latter review, emphasis was 
placed upon the train-load sector at the expense of a partial 
run-down in the wagonload sector of the Freight business as 
recommended in the Reshaping Report, fore-shadowing more recent 
strategic effort.
In order that the process of corporate planning could be 
introduced reasonably quickly and on a firm theoretical footing, 
the BRB and the then Ministry of Transport jointly commissioned 
a firm of consultants to prepare an outline of the nature of the 
task and the recommended procedures for its use. The consultants. 
Cooper Brothers, produced their report entitled 'Corporate 
Planning in British Railways' in 1967, This was submitted to a 
Joint Steering Group of the British Railways Board and the 
Ministry of Transport.
The consultants' report considered a corporate planning system 
in terms of concepts and organisational implications and 
provided a useful outline of the process and procedures which 
should be followed to prepare a corporate plan. Some of the 
salient features are covered in the next few pages. They 
established in their report a series of 'elements' of corporate
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planning and identified the relationship between them and 
summarised their approach in the form of a model, which is given 
as Fig. 10.1. Cooper Brothers explained that forward planning 
is an integral part of executive management's responsibilities 
and they clearly regarded the process as being of overriding 
importance. They regarded strategy formulation as the respon­
sibility of board members and headquarters chief officers and 
action planning by executive management at headquarters and 
regional level.
The conclusions and recommendations in the report were based on 
the assumption that the main objectives and 'planning 
parameters' would be laid down by Government and it was made 
clear that the BRB would generally only find it necessary to 
determine more detailed objectives for parts of the business 
within such overall objectives. Given that assumption, the 
approach summarised in the model dealt with the formulation of 
strategy following an external and internal appraisal, 
preparation of action plans and monitoring and control of 
performance.
In regard to related organisational issues. Cooper Brothers made
a number of recommendations, one of the most vital of which
concerned the creation of a strong corporate planning
department. The terms used were important, viz:-
'The main responsibility of this organisation is to see 
that planning is done by executive management; it must 
clearly have a central role in co-ordinating planning 
activities wherever carried out and in appraising the 
plans formulated. Moreover, the corporate planning 
organisation should be active in stimulating the search 
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In line with this recommendation, a corporate planning 
department was set up in 1968/69 under control of an Executive 
Director, Planning, a senior position just short of board 
member status. At that time, board members were non-executive 
and executive responsibility, within the Railways business, 
was vested in Executive Directors who were in control of the 
various departments, with a Chief Executive carrying overall 
responsibility to the Board. In 1971, the post was redesignated 
Controller of Corporate Planning, but the full Executive 
Director status remained. The Controller of Corporate Planning 
became responsible for coordinating production of the Railways 
business element of the corporate plan (known as the Rail Plan) 
and the consolidation of the overall BRB corporate plan, 
which required a plan from each of the subsidiary businesses.
He also took responsibility for the development of procedures and 
methods by which all of the plans were to be compiled and of the 
planning assumptions on which each would be based. The 
assumptions included such matters as forecast rates of inflation 
(as measured by the retail prices index), output (as measured 
by, for example, gross domestic product and consumers' 
expenditure) and real increases in staff costs (i.e. cost 
increases in excess of the forecast inflation level).
Since the adoption of corporate planning by the BRB, no attempt 
has been made by the BRB to consider overall strategy, objectives 
or goals for the organisation as a whole. This follows another 
important recommendation about procedures and methods related 
to the aggregation of the plans of each business. Cooper 
Brothers recommended that the corporate plan should be the
291
aggregation of the plans of each business, with each ’business 
plan' being virtually a corporate plan within itself in terms of 
being largely self-contained. This situation applies today with 
little stress being laid on the determination of fully corporate 
objectives and strategy with respect to the British Railways 
Board's total business. Thus, the corporate plan of the BRB 
is a consolidated document of the respective plans of the 
businesses and not the overall business taken as an entity.
Cooper Brothers further recommended that the individual business 
plans and the consolidated plan (referred to as the corporate 
plan) be produced annually, thus recognising the need to keep 
the contents up-to-date. This is still the intention, but for 
various reasons there have been only seven formal plans during 
the last eleven years;, these were in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1975, 
1978, 1979 and 1980. A further plan is in the course of 
preparation and will be completed before the end of I98I.
The first plan was described as the First Corporate Plan with 
the Railway business document described as the First Rail Plan. 
The process of preparing the First Plan set a pattern for the 
future. A 'Rail Planning Group' was established which was 
chaired by the Executive Director, Planning (which post later 
became Controller of Corporate Planning and more recently Chief 
Planning Officer) and attended by a small number of b.is staff 
and a senior 'planning' representative from each major 
headquarters department. It will be recalled from Chapter 5 
that many headquarters departments (e.g. Finance and Personnel) 
have corporate responsibilities and do not only represent the
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Railways business. The group continues to meet and discusses 
planning procedures and assumptions to ensure co-ordinated 
action and progress. The members from outside the corporate 
planning department cover finance, investment, passenger, 
freight, parcels, operating, engineering (mechanical and 
electrical, civil, signal and telecommunications), personnel 
and B.R.E.L. They are jointly responsible for the production 
of Rail Plans.
The plans of the subsidiary businesses became the responsibilities 
of the boards of these businesses. Their planning work has taken 
place in similar fashion to those in respect of the Railways 
business, with regular planning meetings at a senior level with 
the guidance of the board of each business. Generally 
speaking, the chairman of each business planning committee or 
his representative will be expected to attend any BRB headquarter's 
corporate planning meeting held to discuss the consolidated plan 
or any guidelines and planning assumptions which have been 
issued to those businesses by the Chief Planning Officer. In 
this connection, the planning assumptions have generally been 
the same as those for the Railways business.
All of the business plans and the overall corporate plan have 
been submitted to the main board on completion. However, in 
1977, it was decided to submit them in draft and final form to 
one of the BRB main board level committees - the Planning and 
Investment Committee (a small committee chaired by the Vice 
Chairman and Member for Finance which had the responsibility for 
approving major investment projects) to strengthen the
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involvement of the board and to ensure their earlier involvement 
in the process. This arrangement was designed to answer the 
complaint by board members that the corporate and business 
plans were presented to them on a 'take it or leave it' basis.
There are a number of significant differences between the process 
of corporate planning undertaken by the BRB and the model 
provided in Figure 3.5* (Chapter 3). Each of these differences 
will be explored but it is considered appropriate first to note 
a model of the process of corporate planning adopted since 1977 
in each of the businesses. The model was produced by the 
BRB's Principal Rail Planning Officer and is given as Figure 10.2.
This model represents the process which was adopted in the 
preparation of the 1978, 1979 and I98O business plans and, 
therefore, the overall corporate plan. An examination of the 
process will be made shortly but it should be noted, at this 
stage, that the central portion of the model is known within 
the BRB as the 'two stage process'. That central portion 
relates to the production of the ten year corporate and 
business plans. Under this arrangement, each of the business 
plans is considered on at least two occasions by the Planning 
and Investment Committee. On the first occasion, each business 
is given strategic guidance and consideration is given to the 
planning assumptions. On the second occasion, each business 
presents its draft business plan for approval or, in some cases, 
revision. If revision is required, the business plan is 
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It is now appropriate to examine the BRB process of corporate 
planning in more detail and, as noted earlier, in comparison 
with the theoretical position summarised in the model provided 
in Figure 3»5« Reference will frequently be made to the BRB 
process embodied in Figure 10.2. and, where appropriate, to the 
Cooper Brothers’ model (Figure 10,1.).
The first element of the model in Figure 3»5« refers to the 
values of the organisation. In its corporate plans completed 
to date, the BRB has made no attempt to assess these values. 
Instead, the implicit assumption had been that this was a 
matter which would be dealt with fundamentally by Government, 
mainly through legislation, who would also be largely 
responsible for setting objectives. This approach was in line 
with that recommended by Cooper Brothers. However, the board 
has recently given some thought to its overall ’aims’. These 
were described in a ’Rail Policy’ (March I98I) publication 
aimed at highlighting the need for 're-equipment and 
modernisation’ of the Railways business. These aims were 
defined as follows:-
’Role of the BR Group
1. The Group is a railway based transportation business.
Its central purpose is to provide railway services 
which meet the needs of industry and the public with
the highest level of efficiency consistent with achieving 
its financial aims, within the framework set by 
Parliament and Government.
2. The BR Group consists of the operational railway business, 
subsidiary activities which are necessary to railway 
operations and others which support and contribute to 
their conduct and survival in varying ways and degrees.
The Group also desires to be associated with private 




3. The overall financial aim of the Group is to be viable 
on a long term basis, after including revenues from 
Government and Local Authorities in their role as 
customers and after taking into account the 
implications of any external borrowing.
4. The Group will encourage all rail business sector and 
subsidiary activities to develop in order that each 
shall make an adequate contribution to the overall 
financial aim in support of its central purpose. 
Financial objectives will be set for each rail sector 
and subsidiary business covering a period of 3 - 5 
years giving clear requirements for profit and cash 
generation. Performance against these objectives 
will be monitored; and the objectives will be reviewed 
at the end of each five year period.'
Clearly these aims are an expression of the values of the 
organisation and it is intended that they form the basis of 
compiling the I98I corporate and Railways business plans. They 
fall short of being a statement of financial and non-financial 
objectives, recognising, instead, the 'framework' set by 
Government and the need to develop financial objectives for each 
sector (i.e. of the Railways business) and each of the subsidiary 
businesses. These financial objectives are intended to be 
'negotiated' with Government following agreement of the strategies 
which result from the Business Strategy Studies, noted in the 
model in Figure 10.2., and discussed further shortly.
No attempt has been made in the corporate planning process to 
explicitly establish policies in line with the theoretical 
situation outlined in Figure 3»5« However, in respect of this 
element of the corporate planning process, it is natural that 
the corporate and business plans have recognised the implicit 
and, where appropriate, explicit policies which have become 
established over the history of the organisation. The most
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significant of these include
1, A requirement for high standard of safety of operation 
of the Railways business which is subject to rigorous 
written rules agreed with, and monitored by, the Railway 
Inspectorate, Department of Transport,
2, Avoidance of compulsory redundancy i.e. manpower 
reductions are expected to be made by matching reduced 
requirements to natural wastage expectations.
In respect of objectives, nearly all of these have been set by 
Government, rather than by the BRB, in line with the Cooper 
Brother's model. Despite the appearance of the word objectives 
in the BRB model (Figure 10.2), hardly any objectives have yet 
been determined by the BRB itself as a central part of the 
corporate planning process. The only exception to this was the 
inclusion in the 1978, 1979 and 1980 Rail Plans of the objective 
of maximising the profit of the Freight business (see Chapter 11 
for details). However, this was not converted into a quantified 
objective.
Instead, the financial objectives set by Government including, 
more recently, the various cash limits, have generally been 
adopted for corporate planning purposes. These were fully 
described in Chapter 6. However, it must be recognised that 
the objectives determined by Government have been the subject 
of discussions with the Board and some were related to the 
various corporate and business plans and strategy studies 
prepared by the BRB. The most significant example of this was 
the requirement that the BRB must break-even one year with
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another after receipt of the Railways Passenger business PSO 
Grant. As noted in Chapter 6, that requirement was embodied in 
the Railways Act 1974 which was itself related to an Interim 
Rail Strategy which was an essential feature of the 1974 Rail 
Plan (see Chapter 11). However, the PSO and EFL cash limits were 
not determined as part of the BRB's corporate planning process. 
Details of the inclusion of these objectives in recent corporate 
plans is given in Chapter 11.
Similarly, the BRB has not attempted to develop non-financial 
objectives as part of its corporate planning process. The only 
non-financial objective which has existed in recent years is 
that relating to maintaining the Railways Passenger system so 
as to provide a public service which is comparable, generally, 
with that operated in 1974. That objective was also contained 
within the Railways Act 1974 (see Chapter 6) and, whilst it was 
set by Government rather than the BRB, it was undoubtedly related 
to the Interim Rail Strategy.
The term goals as identified in Figure 3»5* has not been accepted 
by the BRB as an element of the process of corporate planning. 
Instead, emphasis has been placed upon the financial objectives 
set by Government which have tended to be the same for each 
forecast year of each of the plans e.g. the PSO grant objectives 
which would normally be expected to remain flat in constant 
price levels. Even in respect of the Freight and Parcels 
businesses, where a Government break-even objective has existed, 
goals have not been expressly set even though changing levels 
of profits/losses were forecast in the Rail Plans.
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The BRB have put a considerable amount of effort into the 
development of strategy, in recent years, involving both external 
and internal appraisals. The external appraisals have been 
related primarily to competitive trends and the future expected 
movements in macro-economic indices. These indices, together 
with estimated levels, of investment ceilings and real increases 
in costs have been converted into planning assumptions. The 
internal appraisals have been concerned with strengths and 
weaknesses.
In respect of the external appraisals, one of the main sources 
of reference in recent years has been to a special programme of 
long term studies conducted by the Corporate Planning department 
in 1973. These studies were designed to:-
a) Forecast the total market for Passenger and Freight transport
for the year 2000.
b) Identify and evaluate the market and technological 
opportunities for Railways Passenger and Freight services.
c) Identify Railways business transport options compared with 
non-rail alternatives, evaluated in economic, environmental 
and social terms.
However, the overall approach to strategy selection has not 
been on the same basis as discussed in Chapter 3» The most
significant differences have been that the BRB process has not
involved gap analysis, nor the consideration of contingency 
strategies.
In 1972/73 the strategic effort was directed into the production
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of a Railway Policy Review document (January 1974) which was an 
overall review of the future prospects of the Railways 
business and which defined what was described as the 'interim 
rail strategy'. It attempted to deal with a worsening 
financial situation and recommended a strategy of high 
investment (see Chapter 11 for further details). However, in 
the eventual absence of Government support for this investment,
i.e. increases in investment ceilings were not forthcoming, the 
BRB decided to adopt a new approach (in 1975) which was to 
conduct 'Business Strategy Studies'.
These Business Strategy Studies, which have been related to a 
planning horizon of 15 years, have been conducted between 1975 




Sealink U.K. Limited 
B.R. Hovercraft Limited 
Freightliners Limited
The three Railways business studies were undertaken by the 
members of the Rail Planning Group and have been incorporated 
into the 198O Rail Plan. The Sealink, Hovercraft and 
Freightliner studies were conducted by the management teams 
of those businesses. The Freight Strategic Study was completed 
in 1976 and incorporated in the Rail Plan compiled in 1978 and, 
with some adjustments, in the two plans completed subsequently.
The studies in resnect of Sealink U.K. Limited and B.R. Hovercraft
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Limited have been overtaken by the privatisation developments 
noted in Chapter 6 and the Freightliner study was not 
sufficiently well developed for inclusion in the I98O plan for 
that business.
Within the BRB, the Business Strategic Studies are often
described as the 'sector strategic studies'. This is because,
in respect of the three businesses making up the Railways
business (i.e. Passenger, Freight and Parcels), the studies
have been undertaken in respect of each of their constituent
sectors separately, namely:-
Passenger Freight Parcels
Inter-city Trainload S, to S
L. & S.E. Wagonload C. & D.
P.T.E, Speedlink
Other Provincial
Thus, the Railway business strategy which was contained in the 
1980 Rail Plan was the result of correlating and aggregating 
nine separate sector studies. In each of these studies, a small 
number of potential strategies have been considered leading to 
their evaluation and final selection. The criteria of 
acceptability has not been 'gap closure', in the absence of specific 
long term objectives, but selection of the strategy which produces 
the perceived best financial forecast for each sector. As 
noted earlier, the BRB intend to develop objectives from these 
studies in agreement with the Department of Transport. This 
has not been achieved yet, largely because of the recent 
deterioration in the financial results of the BRB, whereby the 
latest expectation for I981 is considerably worse than that 
contained in the 1980 corporate plan (see Chapter I6 ). It
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should be noted that the interim financial targets, explained 
in Chapter 6 , were originally described as 'interim' pending 
completion and agreement of the Business Sector Studies.
As well as the Business Sector Studies the BRB has, since 1979, 
conducted a number of Long Terra Strategic Studies. In that 
year, they created a Strategic Planning Steering Group and a 
Strategy Unit to undertake a number of long term strategic 
studies related to particular problem areas or opportunities.
The steering group which oversees the studies is chaired by one 
of the part-time board members (M.V. Posner) and consists of the 
deputy chairman, the vice chairman and board member for finance, 
the vice chairman and board member for engineering, the director 
of strategic studies and an external member (Professor John Heath) 
The strategy unit, which undertakes the studies is chaired by 
the director of strategic studies and consists of eight full 
time planners.
Since its creation, the strategy unit, under the aegis of the 
steering group, has produced strategic reports on the following 
issues;-
a) Human Resources
- Availability of Labour (May I980)
- Role and Motivation of Traffic Supervisors (Nov. I980)
- Role and Motivation of Workshop Supervisors at 
Eastleigh, depot (June I981)
b) Railway Infrastructure
- Stage 1 - Analysis (-^pril 1979)
- Stage 2 - Development of Opportunities (November 1979)
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- stage 3 - Evaluation of Opportunities (December I980)
- The Strategic Study of Railway Infrastructure 
(recommending courses of action) (July I981)
c ) Cross London Rail Link (Hay 1980)
d ) London and South East Services (October 1979)
e) Review of Main Line electrification (joint study with 
Department of Transport)
- Interim Report (1979)
- Final Report (1980)
f) Manufacturing and Maintenance Policy (concerning long 
term strategy for design, development, manufacture and 
maintenance of rolling stock (November 1979)
g ) Channel Tunnel Feasibility Study (in conjunction with 
French Railways - SNCF) (I980)
Apart from the Review of Main Line Electrification, which was 
contained within the 1980 corporate and Railways business plan, 
none of the recommendations within these studies has yet been 
incorporated in the corporate and business plans so far completed, 
The main line electrification study has received outline approval 
from Government (Hansard - Ministerial Statement 22 June 1981) 
subject to the BRB being able to make 'immediate substantial 
economy measures’ to alleviate the deteriorating financial 
situation noted in Chapter 6 .
The absence of reference to 'gap analysis' in the strategic 
studies conducted by the BRB has been related to the belief 
(expressed in the BRB model in Figure 10.2.) that it is best 
to conduct the Business Strategy Studies first and then produce 
a series of potentially achievable objectives for discussion 
with Government. The objectives already set by Government, 
notably the cash limits, have been regarded as potentially
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subject to change at short notice. Additionally, it has been 
necessary for the BRB to assume what the cash limit objectives 
will be in the future, in the absence of guidance from 
Government. However, as noted earlier, this has not prompted 
the BRB to develop its own series of objectives for each 
business.
One feature which has been of special concern to the BRB was 
the future level of Government investment ceilings. The BRB 
have not been able to obtain from Government a long term, 
reliable view on the level of future investment ceilings and 
have had to make their own assumptions. It will be seen in 
Chapter 11 that, in most of the' Railways business plans which 
have been produced, the BRB have assumed a steeply rising 
profile of investment. This has amounted to what is known 
within the BRB as a 'bid plan’ arrangement. However, it has 
not produced any increase in the levels of the investment 
ceilings and, as will be seen in Chapter 11, proved to be a 
major source of difficulty in respect of the Railways business 
plans, particularly those produced in 1974 and 1973.
The BRB corporate and business plans produced to date (seven) 
have been very similar to the strategic plans noted in 
Figure 3«3« except that contingency plans have not been 
produced. They have contained information about the latest 
Government objectives including assumptions about how the cash 
limits might vary over time,details of the strategy for each 
business (as so far developed) and forecasts of the outcome 
for the base year (usually the budget for the year of production).
305
each of the next five years and, in some plans, a ’snapshot' 
view of the tenth year after the base year. These forecasts 
have covered financial and physical matters covering all of 
the major aspects of each of the businesses i.e. profit and 
loss, cash flow, market volume, operating and maintenance 
volume/resources, manpower resources and investment.
These plans have generally been produced between October and 
April (i.e. April of the base year) but the I980 Railways 
business plan (and thus the corporate plan) was 're-cycled' on 
a number of occasions in an attempt at improving the forecasts.
The same situation is currently occurring in respect of the 
1981 Rail Plan. Whilst fresh evaluations take place in each 
business plan, many of the forecasts (particularly resources) have, 
recently, been drawn from the Business Strategy Studies.
Contrary to the advice provided by Cooper Brothers, action plans 
are not produced by the BRB. Instead, they have, since 1978, 
adopted a process known as 'budget objectives'. This process 
was originally designed to acquaint the Regions of the 
Railways business with the financial and physical forecasts 
contained within the first year (i.e. the first year after the 
base year) of the Railways business plan. In 1979 the budget 
objectives process was extended to the subsidiary businesses.
That process did not compare with an Action Plan in that 
little attempt had been made at identifying the detailed reasons 
for change, only the expected outcome. However, this expected 
outcome has been used as the criteria for measuring the 
acceptability of the budgets at BRB headquarters level.
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This process has not worked well in that the General Managers 
and senior management of the Railways business regions, 
particularly, have not felt that they have played an adequate 
part in the Railways business plan production. They have also 
considered that they have not been provided with a clear idea of 
the forecasts contained within each Railways business plan, 
how these forecasts were arrived at and what they must do to 
achieve them. Instead, the budget objectives process has been 
seen as a target setting activity with inadequate guidance 
being provided on how to achieve the targets. The net result 
of this has been that, during the last four years, submitted 
Regional budgets have recorded substantial shortfalls 
(particularly in respect of growth in Passenger receipts and 
reductions in operating costs and resources) compared with the 
targets, which have often been described by the Regions as 
unattainable.
As a result of this problem, the BRB budgeting process has not 
been in line with the theoretical position outlined in Chapter 3» 
This problem has been made worse by the fact that the monitoring 
of the budget has been the only feedback process in operation.
No formal attempt has been made to monitor the implementation 
of the entire corporate/business plans. Indeed, the BRB has 
only once conducted a back-check of the forecasts contained 
within their corporate and business plans. That has occurred in 
recent weeks when questions asked by board members concerning 
the deterioration in the financial forecasts contained within 
the draft 1931 Railways business plan (see Chapter l6 ) 
prompted a review of shortfalls in receipts and their
307
relationships with macro-economic assumptions and asset 
replacement programmes. The only other reference to earlier 
plans has been when the forecasts contained within a plan 
have occasionally been compared with those given in the 
previous plan. Even then, only a brief evaluation and 
explanation has been given of the significant changes in the 
forecasts.
Thus control has mainly been exercised through the budget 
procedure, which itself has had an inadequate relationship with 
the plans. Each corporate/business plan has been prepared 
almost as a free-standing exercise, taking into account 
further progress in the Business Strategy Studies and, as will 
be seen in the next section, a later view of likely macro- 
economic circumstances over the period of the plan.
10.2. Corporate Planning Procedures
Moving now to procedural issues, it is intended to provide 
this description in the same order as the theoretical analysis 
provided in Chapter 4.
10.2.1. Forecasting
The forecasting procedures used by the BRB in their corporate 
planning process have not made extensive use of the range of 
techniques provided in Chapter 4. In regard to the special 
long term studies (external appraisal) conducted in 1973, 
however, use has been made of the Delphi technique. Additionally, 
elements of the more recent Channel Tunnel and Main Line 
Electrification studies have made use of multiple regression to
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forecast the changes in working expenses. By and large, however, 
a more judgemental approach has been applied by the individual 
planners involved in the Business Strategy Studies and the 
production of the (strategic) business plans. Further 
details of these procedures is provided in the next few 
paragraphs.
In regard to the business plans, the procedures are summarised 
in the model which appears as Figure 10.3* Whilst this model 
refers specifically to the Railways business plan forecasting 
arrangements, it has also applied in principle to the production 
of the plan forecasts for each of the other businesses. It also 
covers in principle the procedure for evaluating each of the 
strategic options considered during the Business Strategy Studies 
process.
The various stages of the Railways business plan forecasting 
procedure are explained below:-
(1) Planning Assumptions
(a) Strategic guidance from Planning and Investment 
Committee based upon last plan and any Long Term/
Business Strategy Studies completed in the interim. 
Decision on the level of the Government’s investment 
ceiling and its distribution over businesses.
(b) Assessment of macro-economic forecasts.
(2) Investment Specifications by Business/Sector 
Assessment of : -
(a) Capital investment by type of asset.

















(7) Rail Plan Document
Figure 10.5 - Rail Plan Forecasting Procedure.
(Source; Discussions with British Railways Board 
Planners).
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( 3 ) warketin?: Specification by Business/Sector 
Assessment of : -
(a) Receipts in constant prices
- Volume changes
- Real price changes
(b) Passenger loaded train miles by type of traction
(c) Passenger Miles
(d) Freight tonnes by commodity
(e) Freight net tonne miles
(f) Wagon requirements by type
(4) Production Specification - Operations Department - by 
Business/Sector 
«■ssessment of : -
(a) Total train miles (i.e. loaded and empty) by type of 
traction





Production Specification - Mechanical and Fleetrical Engineering 
(H. & S.S.), Civil Bngineerinp: (G.E.) and Signal and 
Telecommunications Engineering (S. & T .2.) Denartments 
assessment of : -
(d) Maintenance expenditure. This is analysed to Business/ 







(a) Other administrative manpower requirements
(b) Vacancy levels to convert the manpower requirements to 
estimated actual manpower levels
(6) Financial Evaluation by Business/Sector
(a) Conversion of the above largely physical data into a 
financial forecast in constant prices 
(?) Rail Plan Document
(a) Summarisation of physical and financial forecasts
(b) Commentary on strategic content, comparison with 
objectives, forecast results and main risk areas. Since 
the 1978 Rail Plan, a formal risk analysis has also been 
undertaken and incorporated in this commentary.
At the Planning Assumptions stage, four crucial forecasts have 
usually been made. The first concerns the expected level of 
the Government’s investment ceiling. Two opposing forces have 
been at work here. The first is that, historically, the 
investment ceiling has not risen throughout the 197C’s and the 
economic state of the U.K. might suggest that large and early 
increases would be unlikely. The second was that the 
strategies which have been developed during the Business 
Strategy Studies process and the earlier Interim Rail Strategy 
have required a rising total investment profile. The BRB have 
always adopted a rising profile assumption, seeing it as part 
of the problem of convincing Government that successful 
strategic change requires investment at a higher level than 
hitherto although the steepness of the slope has varied over
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the plans. It has also been necessary for the Planning and 
Investment Committee to decide on the distribution of the 
forecast investment ceilings between the businesses. This has 
recently been related to the requirements determined in the 
Business Strategy Studies but, in earlier plans, to the 
judgement of the committee based on previous plans.
The second forecast concerns the expected trends of selected 
macro-economic indicators. These have been produced by the 
BRB's senior economist (a member of the staff of the director of 
strategic studies and also a member of the strategy unit) on the 
basis of a comparison of various published economic forecasts 
including those issued by the Treasury. In practice, care has 
been taken to ensure that the BRB forecasts were close to the 
Treasury forecasts since this assists Government understanding 
and acceptance of the plans and underlying strategies. Details 
of some of the main indicators produced are given in Chapter 11 
and in the next few paragraphs.
The third forecast concerns the expected percentage level of 
real cost increases in each year. In the earlier Rail Plans, 
the assumption was made that this feature would only apply to 
staff costs but, in the last two Rail Plans, it has also been 
applied to fuel for traction.
The fourth and final assumption has been the rate of interest 
on borrowings anticipated to be applicable in each year of the 
forecast. This forecast has also been prepared by the senior
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economist, and based on a comparison of other forecasts.
In the investment specification stage, the investment 
requirements stipulated by the Business Strategy Studies, 
sometimes moderated by the Planning and Investment Committee 
to match the latest investment assumption, have been analysed 
by type of asset (capital investment) and category of work 
(revenue investment). This has been necessary to ensure that 
there was a full understanding in all departments of the 
detailed investment intentions which would have a material 
effect on the forecasts of receipts and expenditure. It also 
facilitated reconciliation with a later stage in the BRB 
corporate planning process (10 year investment programmes) which 
will be discussed at the end of this sub-section.
In the marketing specification stage, the forecasts were largely 
a combination of the market research, visionary forecast, 
historical analogy and leading indicators techniques noted by 
Chambers et al. In effect, this amounted to the combination 
forecast technique identified by Hussey, which is not really a 
forecasting technique in itself but merely the aggregation of 
forecasts obtained by various techniques.
Historical analogy has been used in respect of elements of that 
part of the growth in passenger receipts where a reasonably 
analogous situation could be identified. For example, in 
respect of investment in the high speed trains for the Eastern 
Region where the growth in receipts might be expected to be 
similar in percentage terms to that experienced when these trains
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were introduced on the Western Region. Market research has been 
used in respect of Freight and Parcels volume forecasts in that 
regular contact is made with large customers and information 
requested about their future patterns of growth or decline.
Heavy reliance has been placed upon the forecasts of leading 
indicators, in this case the macro-economic forecasts produced 
by the senior economist. The forecast changes in consumers’ 
expenditure has been used to assess in part the non-investment 
related growth in the volume of Passenger receipts and the 
forecasts of changes in gross domestic product and in industrial 
production in the assessment of growth- in Freight and Parcels 
receipts. The forecasts of changes in inflation (i.e. the 
retail price index) has been used to gauge the potential for 
real price increases.
In the final analysis, however, the visionary forecast technique 
(explained by Chambers et al as a technique which is 
’characterised by subjective guesswork and imagination’ and 
described by Fildes et al as the ’subjective estimate method’) 
has been used in respect of each of the marketing specifications. 
The planning officers concerned in each of the three marketing 
departments have overlaid the forecasts, prepared under the 
above techniques, with their own experienced views of what is 
likely to happen.
In the production specification stage, the visionary forecast 
technique has been used almost exclusively by each planning 
officer in each of the departments concerned. One of the most
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significant elements of this stage has been the forecast of the 
manpower requirements of the Operating department. Here 
substantial reductions have been forecast in each Sail Plan in 
connection with the strategies developed during the Business 
Strategy Studies process and earlier Railways business plan 
forecasts. Part of these reductions has been in respect of 
changes in operating practices and conditions of employment 
which have a significant industrial relations connotation. In 
this respect advice has been offered to the Operations and 
Engineering departments’ planners, by the Director of Industrial 
Relations, concerning the timing of these events and the likely 
outcome of the negotiations.
In respect of the manpower specification, the visionary 
forecast technique is used to assess the likely changes in 
administrative manpower in the service departments and the 
overall levels of vacancies. , These levels of vacancies have 
been used to reduce the forecast manpower requirements to 
estimated actual staff numbers. The forecast of the number of 
vacancies has generally been more a question of policy than 
forecasting. In respect of the 1974 and 1975 Railways Business 
Plans an assumption was built into the forecasts to allow for 
additional staff required to meet improvements in conditions 
of service. The additional cost was counted as being part 
of the real staff cost increases. This procedure was not 
followed in the 1978, 1979 or I98O plans, partly because the 
earlier predictions were very inaccurate and partly to preserve 
confidentiality.
In the financial evaluation stage, the forecasting has consisted
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initially of a mathematical conversion of physical facts 
forecasts into money, using derivatives relating to the base 
year (i.e. the budget for the year of compilation of the plan).
Then the remaining two assumptions have been used to calculate 
real expenditure increases and interest. The real expenditure 
increases have been a mathematical overlay to the initial financial 
forecasts and the interest has been based on the forecast cash 
flow.
Throughout the procedures outlined above and summarised in the 
model in Figure 10.3» it is clear that emphasis has been placed 
upon ensuring that each stage is compatible with the one which 
preceded it» Little opportunity has been provided to change the 
forecasts within any of the preceding stages unless the entire 
plan is recycled. The only permitted exception to this has been 
in respect of the investment specification which can be varied 
by features emerging during the marketing and production 
specification stages. However, in practice, the investment 
specification has seldom been changed.
The financial evaluations, which constitute major features of 
the plan forecasts, have always been produced in constant 
prices based on the ’base year’ price level. That base year 
has generally been the budget for the year of completion of the 
Flans but in respect of the 1979 and I98O Rail plans, which were 
’re-cycled’ on more than one occasion, the base was changed in 
each case to an updated budget known as the ’Outturn*. The 
constant price forecasts have allowed for positive and negative 
real price changes, as indicated earlier and, since the 1978
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Rail Plan, efforts have been made to discount (by the forecast 
rate of inflation) those costs which cannot by their very nature, 
increase on account of inflation. In practice, only historic 
depreciation and interest have been so adjusted, representing 
the only significant features needing to be so treated.
In the 1974 and 1973 corporate and Railways business plans, the 
financial forecasts have been converted into estimated actual 
price levels by allowing for the forecast rates of inflation. 
However, this procedure was not applied to the 197^, 1979 or 
1980 plans and in the absence of a back-check arrangement 
(see Section 10.1.) this was not considered by the BRB planners 
to be a significant omission.
In principle, the forecasting procedures of the subsidiary 
businesses have been almost exactly the same to those outlined 
in respect of the Railways business.' Each has been conducted 
at the headquarters level of those businesses.
The involvement of the management of the five Railways regions 
in the production of the Rail Plans has been very small. They 
have produced some of the original input to the forecast of 
the volume of Freight and Parcels receipts but the extent of 
headquarters adjustments and overlays (often for strategic 
reasons not discussed with regions) has been so extensive as 
to make the regional input unrecognisable. The Passenger 
forecast, which in the early plans used to be partly based on 
regional estimates, has recently been produced wholly at 
headquarters level.
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The net result of these arrangements has been that the Railways 
Regions have made little input into the Rail Plan forecasting 
procedures. Also, because the final forecasts have been 
analysed by Business and Sector, it has not been in a form 
which would permit Regional identification. Additionally, very 
little effort has been made to acquaint Regional General Managers 
and their senior managers of the detailed content of each Rail 
Plan. Indeed, the Rail Plans produced in 197^» 1973, 1978 and 
1979 were not made available to the Regions. Some attempts 
have been made in recent months to discuss draft I98I Railways 
business plan figures at Railway Directing Group meetings (meetings 
attended by board members, the five Regional general managers end 
some headquarters chief officers). However, these meetings 
have not been completely successful in acquainting the Regional 
general managers of what they are expected to achievë because 
the forecasts have not been analysed by Regions and the year-on- 
year causes of change have not been adequately described.
During the last four years emphasis has been placed upon the budget 
objectives arrangements as the means of overcoming this 
communication gap. Additionally, in respect of investment, the 
Railways Regions have been asked annually to produce 10 year 
investment programmes covering that portion of investment 
expenditure which is accounted for at regional level, which 
are reconciled approximately to the investment specification 
described in Figure 10.3. This procedure, which has relied on 
a considerable amount of headquarter's advice, is specifically 
mentioned in the model of the BRB corporate planning process 
provided in Figure 10.2.
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This problem of inadequate communication to lower tiers of 
management has been particularly relevant to the Railways 
business because of its vast size and the fact that each Region 
also has Divisional and Area Management. Communication has 
been hampered by the political sensitivity attached to the 
strategic changes and the fact that the forecasts have not been 
prepared on a geographical basis. In respect of the other 
businesses the problem has not been so significant because they 
are much smaller and the forecasts are generally analysed in a 
way which is more easily associated with the management structure 
at lower levels.
The corporate consolidation of the forecasts has merely been the 
aggregation of the summary figures contained within each 
business plan. However, some measure of duplication, of necessity, 
has had to be eliminated. For example, the B.T.H. profit/loss 
on station and rail catering would have been included in the 
B.T.H. forecast and in the Railways business forecast. A 
similar situation has obtained in respect of the letting of 
operational property by the B.R. Property Board which is credited 
to Ancillary Income within the Railways business profit and loss 
account.
To conclude this section, it is intended to discuss briefly the 
BRB procedures in respect of investment appraisal. All 
investment projects are expected to have been included in the 
latest business plan and the investment programme. They are 
also subjected to investment appraisal but only before 
authorisation and not before their inclusion in business plan
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forecasts »
Since I967, the BRB has been using the discounted cash flow 
technique to evaluate certain projects. They were obliged to do 
so under the rules laid down under Cmnd 3^37* The rate of 
return at that time was set by Government at 8%, which became 
10% a few years later. Since 1979, however, a rate of 7% has 
been adopted by the Board. In all cases, the rates have been 
used in real terras, with associated cash flows being expressed, 
therefore, in constant prices.
A distinction has been drawn between projects which are 
essentially of a developmental nature and those which represent 
replacement of worn out assets, more or less like-for-like 
but in modern form. For example the replacement of locomotive- 
hauled trains by the high speed train is regarded as a 
developmental project which should attract additional receipts 
but the replacement of diesel multiple units by equivalent units, 
although more modern, would normally be regarded as a replacement 
project.
The D.G.F. procedure is only used in connection with the 
developmental projects and a positive net present value is 
expected after using the 7/- discount rate. In these cases, 
the project would frequently be measured against the practical 
alternatives which would usually be like-for-like replacement 
in modern form, rather than a non-investment alternative. The non- 
investment alternative has generally been used where the project 
relates to a completely new facility.
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Whilst the cash flows are said to be expressed in constant 
prices, the effect of real price changes has seldom been 
assessed as it has been in the business plans. Further, no 
attempt has been made to assess the Board’s cost of capital, 
with complete emphasis being placed on the discount rates 
mentioned earlier.
The new rate of 7% real emerged from the Board's consideration 
of the impact of the requirement contained in Cmnd 7131 that 
the nationalised industries should achieve a 5/® real return on 
their total investment outlay. The Board considered that the 
7/® rate when applied to developmental projects would be high 
enough to cover the replacement projects to which the D.G.F. 
procedures would not be applied.
The impact of the 3K real 'required rate of return' on BRB 
financial management arrangements has yet to be established.
It was understood by the Board in 1979 that the entire capital 
investment of each of the businesses other than Passenger, as 
contained within each business plan (and thus the corporate plan) 
would be examined against the profit and loss forecasts to see 
whether a p/C real return was being forecast. It was appreciated 
that the profit and loss forecasts might have little to do with 
the capital investment but that point would be ignored, as would 
the treatment of parts of the Railways business investment 
classified as revenue investment. The Passenger situation was
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uncertain, in 1979, because of a statement in Cmnd 7131 that 
the 3% required rate of return would not apply where the 
nationalised industry was performing a social service. However, 
the required rate of return process has yet to be adopted 
between the BRB and Government.
10.2.2. Model Building
Within the context of corporate planning, the significant 
steps taken in this respect have been related to the Railways 
business- Here the approach has been at two levels. The first 
commenced in 1973, when a relatively simple computer model was 
created by the staff of the Corporate Planning department and 
entitled PLATO. That model was designed to enable the Rail 
Plan forecasts, once manually produced, to be input into the 
computer and then revised for changed physical input. This was 
achieved by stipulating a small number of key variables and 
their expected effects on other components of the forecast. Fcr 
example, a reduction in the forecast number of Freight loaded 
train miles would have an impact on the investment specification, 
train crew requirements/costs, fuel and maintenance costs, 
depreciation, interest and receipts. This model has been used 
occasionally to evaluate what are described as 'sub-strategic* 
options but it has been found that it is not sufficiently 
sophisticated to deal effectively with major changes in any 
of the specifications. Additionally, some of the expected 
effects have proven to Oe unfounded or inaccurate.
Consequently, it was decided in 1978 to move towards producing 
a more comprehensive model which would incorporate the manual
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forecasting procedures which themselves simulate the operations 
of the organisation and allow the final forecast to be re-cycled 
much more speedily and effectively. Arrangements were made with 
a computer agency to use their broad planning model and build 
into it the procedures adopted by each headquarters contributor 
to the forecasting model given in Figure 10.3.
The intention was, and remains, to develop a number of inter­
related models to enable each contributor to run his own model, 
using a computer terminal linked by telephone line to the agency's 
computer. This has proved to be an immense task, involving the 
improvement and standardisation of existing procedures and the 
creation of inter-related computer models. About two-thirds 
of the programs are already in operation and it is intended that 
each of the computer models' will be completed by 1982. By that 
time, the time taken to produce the Rail Plan forecasts will be 
reduced by about three months.
Thus, it is clear that the approach now being adopted in respect 
of the production of the Rail Plan is intended to be fully 
integrated into the planning process as recommended by Naylor 
and using the modular approach favoured by Grinyer and Wooller. 
Further, it is anticipated by the BRB that all of the benefits 
highlighted by Grinyer and Wooller will be achieved. The 
limitations also explained by them are appreciated by the planners 
involved but are considered to be completely outweighed by the 
benefits.
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10.2.3. Risk and Sensitivity Analysis
In its earlier business and corporate plans the BRB have used 
a form of sensitivity analysis whereby the major risks have 
been stated and, in a few cases, quantified using approximate 
methods. However, since 1978, the BRB have attempted to move 
to risk analysis and have done so in respect of the 1978, 1979 
and 1980 Railways business plans. The chosen method was the 
'Beta' distribution method explained in Chapter 4. This method 
was chosen because of its ease of operation. Thus minimum 
analysis of receipts and working expenses was required to 
obtain speedy results with a small amount of effort. Under 
this method, the forecast best/mode/worst forecasts for each 









Staff Costs - volume 
Other Costs - volume 
Real Cost Increases
Profit/Loss
Table 10.4. BRB - Rail Plan Risk Analysis Headings
It will be seen in Chapter 11 that some of the actual financial 
results have been outside the ranges of best/worst assessment
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recorded on the normal distribution obtained under this method. 
The BRB planners are satisfied that this has not been the fault 
of the method but of substantially inaccurate assessment of the 
best/worst estimates. Efforts are being made to improve these 
forecasts to ensure the continued and successful use of this 
method. These efforts are related to holding discussions with 
each of the key forecasters involved in an attempt to make them 
appreciate the inadequacy of their earlier best/worst estimates 
and learn from that knowledge.
10.2.4. Budgetary Control
The budgetary control procedures used in each of the BRB’s 
businesses have been substantially in line with the theoretical 
situation explained in Chapter 4. Financial and physical facts 
budgets are built up from receipts and cost centre levels are 
'negotiated' at each level of aggregation. These negotiations 
are called 'budget reviews' and are designed to produce ambitious 
but achievable budgets. They are also designed to produce 
commitment to achievement of the budget at each level.
Monitoring takes place four weekly and at the end of 12 and 32 
weeks an update of the budget is produced at all levels (known 
as the Outturn) to provide the Board with the latest view of 
expected results for the year. However, these outturns are not 
substituted for the budget, which remains the main control 
mechanism.
The only significant exception to the theoretical position has 
already been discussed and relates to the absence of an action
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plan and the inadequate substitution of budget objectives. In 
these circumstances, the budgets produced by each of the Board's 
businesses have never been compatible with the business plans or, 
ultimately, the corporate plans.
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CHAPTER 11
BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD CORPORATE PLANS
In this chapter, it is intended to examine the BRB corporate 
plans prepared in the years 1974 to I98O. The purpose of this 
is partly to discuss further the information given in 
Chapter 10 but mainly to facilitate comparison with the actual 
results. This process is designed to provide a basis on which 
a substantial part of the success assessment can be attempted 
in Chapter I6.
It was noted in Chapter 10 that the corporate plans of the 
BRB consist of the consolidation of separate 'corporate' plans 
for each of the BRB businesses. Additionally, it is clear 
from the information given in Chapter 6 that the dimensions 
and problems of the Railways business are such that they 
completely outweigh the significance of the other businesses. 
For these reasons, plus the fact that they contain large 
elements of the B.R.E.L. and B.T.H. plans, it is intended to 
concentrate on describing the corporate plans of the Railways 
business rather than on the corporate consolidations or on all 
of the businesses separately. The Railways business plans will 
be looked at in considerable detail, with many of the figures 
being recorded in Appendices which contain the main forecasts 
of each Railways business plan in a comparative form.
11.1. Railways Business Plan 1974
The BRB corporate plan produced in 1974 was formally described 
by the BRB as the 'Third Corporate Plan' and that of the
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Railways business, the largest section of the documents, the 
’Third Rail Plan' or the '1974 Rail Plan*. It incorporated a 
strategic review of the Railways business known as the 
'Railways Policy Review' which was undertaken in 1972/73 and 
was fundamental to the financing arrangements embodied in the 
Railways Act, 1974, described in Chapter 6 . The Railways 
Policy Review prescribed in 'Interim Rail Strategy' which was 
accepted in principle by Government (Ministerial statements 
on 28 November 1973 and 24 June 1974 - Hansard). This 
Interim Rail Strategy was concerned with the Railways business 
only and was essentially one of development through investment 
in the replacement of assets in modern form coupled with 
rationalisation of the Freight and Parcels businesses.
The contents of the 1974 Rail Plan will now be considered under 
three headings - objectives, strategy and forecasts.
11.1.1. Objectives
No attempt was made to develop objectives in the 1974 Rail Plan, 
Instead, it was assumed that those laid down in the Railways 
Act, 1974 could be regarded as the fundamental criteria. These 
are summarised in Chapter 6 and basically required the 
Railways business to break-even after receipt of a Passenger 
(P.S.O.) grant designed, fundamentally, to eliminate the losses 
of the Passenger business. The plan contained reference to the 
Inter-city sector of the Passenger business and the entire 
Freight and Parcels businesses being regarded as 'commercial' 
but this concept was not developed in any meaningful way.
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However, mention was made in the introduction to the corporate 
section of the combined 1974 Corporate/Rail Plan document which 
was submitted to the Department of Transport in January 1973, that 
there was an urgent need ’for a clarification and re-definition 
of the Board's objectives', to 'meet the new philosophy stemming 
from the 1974 Act.'
11.1.2. Strategy
In essence, the strategy contained within the 1974 Rail Plan 
was one of renewal of assets in modern form and of changes in 
direction in respect of the Freight and Parcels businesses.
All of this amounted to considerable planned change designed to 
ensure an ongoing and largely modernised Railway.
In more detail, on the Passenger side, these developments were 
concerned with:-
a. Inter-city - Renewal of the rolling stock involving intro­
duction of, high speed trains on principal
routes. Real increases in fares of 3% in 1973
r
and about 2.3% per annum thereafter.
b. Local Passenger Services - Major improvements again mainly
related to renewal of rolling stock, plus some 
electrification and new rolling stock in London 
and P.T.E. areas. No real price increases.
Clearly, these requirements were heavily dependent on a consider­
able amount of investment in the replacement of rolling stock, 
in modern form (capital investment), and in progressive renewal 
of the infrastructure (revenue investment).
330
On the Freight side, the proposed changes were summarised in
the 1974 Rail Plan as follows :-
"(a) to continue to develop all worthwhile trainload
opportunities (to which sector of the freight transport 
market rail freight services are principally directed), 
improving progressively the standards of transit 
performance ;
(b) to continue to provide wagonload services - albeit on a 
selective rather than a systemwide basis - restoring 
customer confidence by the progressive introduction of 
modern rolling stock and by demonstrating a consistently 
high standard of transit performance. The wagonload 
network would be based primarily, although not exclusively, 
on the marshalling yards which would be required to support 
trainload operations;
(c) to renew the freight rolling stock fleet generally with new 
higher capacity airbraked stock designed to meet emerging 
customer demands;
(d) to compete for traffics requiring door to door conveyance 
mainly through Freightliners; otherwise to provide road 
collection and delivery services only on a selective basis 
and to withdraw from the present uneconomic general C & D 
services ;
(e) to disengage at an appropriate time from those traffics 
which, whilst currently worthwhile, cannot support 
re-investment when this becomes necessary;
(f) to withdraw services from terminals - both private siding 
and railway depot - where throughput is low in relation 
to operating expenses."
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This strategy amounted to the withdrawal of wagonload services 
from the 'green field areas at the periphery of the railway 
system, e.g. from the West Country west of St Austell and in 
North Devon, from Mid-Wales and from Scotland north of 
Invergordon'. It involved the abandonment of wagonload traffic 
opportunities of '1.3m tonnes in 1979, 6 .9m tonnes in I98I and 
9.8m tonnes in I983'. It also encompassed the intention to 
obtain large real price increases, particularly in the trainload 
sector.
On the Parcels side, the strategy was referred to as the 
'National Parcels Plan' which involved the continuation of a 
nationwide service but on a 'rationalised' basis. This 
rationalisation involved considerable investment and 
concentration on a streamlined service covering a reduced 
number of terminals. The National Parcels Plan drawn up on 
this basis was submitted to the Department of the Environment 
(at that time the Transport Ministry was covered by that 
Department) in October 1973. The Minister of Transport had 
required that 'the forward plans of the BRB and the NFC in 
the parcels field were compatible and would be jointly 
progressed'. An assurance to this effect had been supplied 
by both the BRB and the NFC on the joint understanding that 
the BRB would provide 'a high-speed countrywide collected and 
delivered network for parcels broadly in the weight range from 
0 - 30 lbs, together with the continued development of premium 
services in the station-to-station market'.
The terminals concentration proposal which required investment
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funds was designed to improve the quality of service, reduce 
costs and was predicted to increase the volume of C 8c D 
parcels from 63m packages in 1974 to 82 million in I98I, with 
that level maintained in I983. Red Star parcels traffic was 
expected to improve over the same period by 30% in volume and 
75% in receipts - the latter because of real price increases.
On the other hand. Post Office letter mail and newspaper 
receipts were expected to remain constant, with Post Office 
parcels expected to decline as a result of that organisation's 
plans for greater use of freightliner and road services.
The overall strategy as outlined above was described in the 
1974 Rail Plan as being compatible with the Interim Rail 
Strategy except to the extent that it was considered that the 
prospects of the Freight business had improved because of the 
impact of the Coal Industries Act, 1973 and the energy crisis 
that developed late in that year. It was expected, in the 
1974 Rail Plan, that coal and coke traffic would fall from 
around 100m tonnes in 1973 to 94m tonnes in 198I and 93m tonnes 
in 1983, rather than to 76m tonnes and 63m tonnes as anticipated 
in the Railway Policy Review. This revision of expectations 
meant a small increase in the investment requirements for the 
renewal of locomotives and wagons.
11.1.3» Forecasts
The 1974 Rail Plan and supporting papers contained extremely 





1983 Described as the 'snapshot'
Some figures, such as investment, were forecast for the 
intermediate years 1982 to 1984.
These forecasts are summarised in Appendices as follows
Appendix 2(a) - Profit and Loss Forecasts in Constant 
Prices
2(b) - Investment Forecasts in Constant Prices
2(c) - Selected Physical Facts Forecasts
2(d) - Main Planning (Economic) Assumptions/ 
Forecasts
3(a) - Profit and Loss Forecasts in Estimated 
Actual Prices
3(b) - Investment Forecasts in Estimated Actual 
Prices
These Appendices will also be used to summarise the forecasts 
contained within the later plans, for ease of reference and 
comparison. It will be noted that the layout is comparable 
with that of Appendices 1(a) to l(d) described in Chapter 6 . 
This is designed to facilitate the comparisons between 
forecasts and results which will be undertaken in Chapter I6, 
Appendices 3(a) and 3(B) will be referred to mainly in 
Chapter I6, rather than in this chapter.
In summary form, the constant price financial forecasts given 
on Appendix 2(a) are described in Table 11.1.
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1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1985

























Total 667 Z2Z 212 Z6l 222 811 812 212
Working Expenses 
(including 
Interest) 867 997 1033 1094 1089 1112 1146 1268
Profit/(Loss) 
before Grants (200) (290) (1 2 1) (1 1 1) (297) (297) (1 2 9) (328)
Resulting in:-
P.S.O. Grant 287 306 334 309 317 332 363
Non-passenger 
Profit/(Loss) (3) 3 1 12 20 23 33
N.B. No forecast prepared for 1973
Table 11,1. 1974 Rail Plan - Profit and Loss Forecasts
______________1974 to 1981 and 1983 (in 1974 Price Levels)
(Source : BRB internal records)
It can be seen that, in constant prices, working expenses were 
expected to increase faster than receipts. This was forecast 
to result in an increased level of P.S.O. grant support partly 
mitigated by an improvement in the profitability of the 
Non-passenger business. In terms of resources, considerable 
changes were forecast as shown in Appendix 2(c), These 
included substantial reductions in locomotives, freight 
vehicles, parcels coaching vehicles and manpower requirements.
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in line with the declared strategy.
The forecast reductions in locomotives were expected to come 
from the rationalisation of the Freight and Parcels businesses 
and the development of the high speed train (H.S.T.) and 
electric advanced passenger train (A.P.T.). The reductions in 
Freight vehicles and Parcels coaching vehicles were also a 
reflection of the rationalisation of those businesses. The 
reductions in locomotive hauled coaching vehicles were in 
respect of the H.S.T. and A.P.T. developments, the 'sets' 
referring to power cars and coaches combined. The increase in 
electric multiple unit numbers was related to further 
electrification in the London and South East and the P.T.E, 
areas, which explains the increased electrified route miles 
and the reductions in the diesel multiple unit fleet. The 
relatively small reductions in total route/track miles were 
expected to result from the Freight business rationalisation.
The manpower requirements forecast was a little more complex 
in that the changes relating to the strategic issues mentioned 
earlier were expected to be partly offset by the need for 
16,000 additional staff, by I983, to cover changes in conditions 
of service (i.e. shorter working week and longer holidays).
The net reduction between 1976 and I983 of roundly 12,000 was 
explained as follows:-
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Rationalisation, investment and productivity 
improvements. - 30,000
New services (mostly L. & S.E. and P.T.E.) + 2,000
Conditions of Service. + l6,000
-  12,000
Underlying these forecasts, were the macro-economic 
predictions, prepared by the BRB's economist, given in 
Appendix 2(d). In terms of economic activity, these were 
generally quite favourable but, as will be seen later, far from 
correct. Inflation (R.P.I.) was forecast to move at a rate 
considerably below the eventual actual result but, nevertheless, 
was still quite high. The forecast real increases in receipts 
and working expenses (staff costs only) were based on the 
presence of National inflation forecasts of this dimension.
Equally crucial, were the forecasts in respect of investment 
which are given in Appendix 2(b). As noted earlier, the 
proposed increases in Revenue Investment were very large and, 
together with the forecast real increases in staff costs and 
interest relating mainly to borrowings for capital investment, 
these had a major impact on the forecast of working expenses.
For selected years, this increase in working expenses is 
summarised in Table 11.2.
Looking at each of the businesses in turn, the financial 
forecasts can now be examined further, in the light of the 
















Table 11.2. 1974 Rail Plan - Summary of Forecast Increases
in Working Expenses 1976, 1981 and 198$ (in 
 _____________1974 Price Levels )______________________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
The Passenger business was, as noted earlier, expected to 
require an increased level of P.S.O. grant support (Table 11,1) 
This was despite a large increase in receipts expected to 
result from real pricing and volume improvements (see 
Appendix 2(a) - page 3)» This was forecast to result from 
real increases in staff costs (recorded as ’real price level of 
working expenses' in Appendix 2(a) - page 3), increased revenue 
investment, increased depreciation, interest and maintenance 
costs (as a result of capital investment) and the extra staff 
required to match the forecast improvements in conditions of 
service. The predicted manpower reductions discussed earlier 
were not significantly related to the Passenger business but 
were expected to result mainly from changes in Freight and 
Parcels businesses. The net situation was that there was a 
predicted increase in the P.S.O. grant from a budgeted level
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of £203m in 1974 (there was no such grant in 1974 but the 
budget for that year was converted to a P.S.O. basis for 
comparative purposes) to £332% in I98I and £363% in 1983*
This level of P.S.O. grant support was described in the 1974 
Corporate Plan as being ’not far removed from those considered 
in the Railway Policy Review'. Attention was, however, drawn 
to the fact that this level of support was 'over £330% more 
than the top limit of £1,300m included in the 1974 Act' during 
the six year period 1973 to 198I inclusive. That remark was 
somewhat misplaced in that the £330m figure was a product of 
the Plan forecasts in 1974 constant prices but the £1,300m 
was never stated by Government to be in constant prices. A 
clearer idea of the problem can be gained from using the 
forecast P.S.O. grant levels in estimated actual prices, which 
are reproduced on page 2 of Appendix 3(a). On the evidence 
of those figures, the £l,300m would run out at the end of 1978 
and not 198O as the remark suggested.
In terms of the volume of trading, it is interesting to note 
that the Passenger receipts forecast quoted in Table 11.1, 
required a very large increase. This is reflected in the 
volume increases in receipts recorded in Appendix 2(a) - 
page 3 but is further emphasised by examining the forecast 
passenger miles shown in Appendix 2(c) page 1 and analysed 
over the four Passenger sectors in Appendix 2(c) page 3» It 
will be observed that very large increases were forecast in 
respect of the Inter-city, L. & S.E. and P.T.E. sectors. It 
should be noted, however, that the investment forecasts related
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to the planned growth in F.T.E's passenger miles were to be 
funded directly by the P.T.E’s and did not form part of the 
investment forecasts provided in Appendix 2(b),
The Non-passenger business was expected, as stated in Table 11.1, 
to achieve a steady, if not dramatic, increase in profitability. 
This level of performance, whilst being based upon the Interim 
Rail Strategy, did not match the forecast profitability 
expectation contained within the financial forecasts relating 
to that strategy (Railway Policy Review document presented to 
the Board on 22 January 1974). Over the six years 1976 to I98I , 
the forecast profit in the Railv/ay Policy Review had dropped 
from £293% to £36m in the 1974 Rail Plan. This decline was 
caused partly by an increased forecast for real staff cost 
improvements, increased estimates of resource requirements 
(mainly manpower) and an increased level of interest related to 
a higher than anticipated commencing figure and a higher 
predicted rate of interest. However, the most significant 
feature related to the fact that, in the Railway Policy Review, 
the level of indirect costs (track and signalling and 
administration) which would be charged to the Non-passenger 
business under the avoidability rules of the P.S.O. grant, was 
underestimated. Thus, whilst it appeared that the 1974 Rail 
Plan P.S.O. grant was close to the Railway Passenger Review 
forecast (an increase of £ 30m over the six years 1976 to 1981), 
it was acknowledged in the 1974 Rail Plan that a significant 
proportion of the Non-passenger difference (£123%) really 
related to the Passenger business.
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The forecast profits of the Non-passenger business were, in 
fact, related largely to the Parcels business, as can be seen
from the figures given in Table 11.3.
Forecast Profit/(Los s )
1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1983
£m £m £m £m £m £m £m £m
Parcels business 8 3 13 13 16 21 23 36
Freight business (5) (8) (10) (14) (4) (1) - (1)





forecast 11 12 14 18 12 12
Table 11.3. 1974 Rail Plan - Analysis of Non-Passenger
Business Profits 1974, 1976 to 198I and 1983 
______________ (in 1974 Price Levels)_______________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
In common with subsequent practice, the Ancillary Income 
relating to the Non-passenger business was credited to the 
Freight business (since its elements such as profits on the 
letting of Operational Property are nearly always ancillary 
to the Freight activity) but it can be readily observed how 
much worse the forecast would have been without that feature.
In the 1974 Rail Plan commentary, the Board expressed its 
disappointment with the forecast profit results of the Freight 
business but added that 'Nevertheless, the results confirm the 
conclusions of earlier studies in the Railway Policy Review
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that, in the longer term, a Freight business continuing to 
provide both trainload and modernised wagonload services will 
bear its appropriate share of system expenses.’ This remark 
was based on the assumption that the Ancillary Income should be 
counted as part of the Freight business profitability 
assessment.
In terms of the volume of business, it was anticipated that 
Freight receipts would increase, in constant prices, from £243m 
in 1974 to £260m in I981 and £269m in 1983. However, these 
figures included Ancillary Income of £llm, £l8m and £17m, 
respectively. Thus, in traffic terras, the Freight receipts 
forecasts were £232m in 1974, £242m in I981 and £232m in I983.
These figures allowed for a considerable level of real pricing, 
as recorded in Appendix 2(a) - page 3 and a reduction in the volume 
of receipts. This reduction was related mainly to the reduction 
in higher-rated wagonload traffic offset by a similar quantity 
of lower-rated trainload traffic, much of which was expected to 
be carried in privately owned wagons (37m tonnes in I98I 
compared with 37m tonnes in 1973)*
In terms of tonnes, it was forecast that these would be as 
portrayed in Appendix 2(c) page 1 and analysed in Appendix 
2(c) page 6;that is a substantial reduction in wagonload 
traffic offset by an even larger increase in trainload traffic.
Working expenses were forecast to decline as a result of the 
resource reductions but this improvement was predicted to be 
offset by real staff costs increases, improvements in conditions
342
of service, depreciation and interest on new locomotives and 
wagons and a small proportion of the increased revenue 
investment. Interest alone was forecast to move from £llm 
in 1974 to £30m in 1981 and £43m in 1983 as a result of cash 
shortfalls caused by capital investment not being funded by 
profits and having, instead, to be borrowed.
The Parcels business was seen as the big potential success area 
of the Non-passenger business with the working expenses
reductions producing the large improvements in profits given
in Table 11.3. Because of these forecast profits, it was 
estimated that, in the later years of the Plan, the Parcels 
business would 'earn’ rather than pay interest and would, in 
practice, be lending its surplus funds to the Freight business. 
The interest forecasts were £lm (paid) in 1974, £6m (earned) in 
1981 and £l7m (earned in 1983. As can be seen in Appendix 
2(a) - page 1, Parcels receipts were forecast to decline 
slightly in 1976 but steadily grow to £4m more than in 1974
by. 1981 and £9m more by I983.
There was no risk analysis or sensitivity analysis prepared in 
respect of the 1974 Rail Plan. However, a number of references 
to risk areas were made in the supporting text.
In respect of the Passenger business, the main risk areas were 
seen as being:-
(a) The possibility of further Government price restraint. The 
Plan assumed that none would operate from 1 January 1976.
(b) The lack of commitment by the Government to the levels of
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investment which were an essential feature of the Interim 
Rail Strategy. It was pointed out that 'Government 
acceptance of the principle of the interim strategy was not 
accompanied by any commitment to the levels of investment 
needed to implement it.'
In respect of the Freight business, the risk areas identified 
were : -
(a) The possibility that the macro-economic assumptions on 
which the plan was based might not be achieved.
(b) Doubts about the ability of the National Coal Board to 
achieve the planned higher levels of output within the 
timescale envisaged.
(c) Further Government price restraint.
On the Parcels side, only one risk was identified and that 
related to the ability of the Board to implement the depot 
rationalisation programme, because of its attendant industrial 
relations difficulties in the timescale planned (by 1977).
In a separate 1974 BRB Corporate Plan commentary, under the 
heading of 'Areas of Risk and Uncertainty', these risk areas 
were repeated and three others were mentioned, viz:- 
'(a) The possibility of industrial disputes, for which no 
provision was made in the Rail Plan or any of the other 
business plans.
(b) Uncertainty about the level of real increases in staff 
costs.
(c) The possibility that insufficient allowance had been made
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for real price increases to keep pace with real cost 
increases, particularly during periods of high-rate 
inflation•’
In fact, by the time the consolidated Corporate/Rail Plan 
document-was finally put together (dated December 1974 - 
entitled the 'Third Corporate Plan'), the BRB were able to 
include a number of further comments which were related, to a 
large extent, to the risk areas mentioned. In a 'Corporate 
Appraisal' section of the consolidated document, the then 
latest situation was summed up in the following paragraph:- 
'Since the preparation of the Plan was started early in 1974, 
there have been changes which have affected the base of the 
Plan and for which adjustment should be made: the principal 
features are (i) the economic indicators used for forecasting 
have changed considerably; and (ii) the emerging results for 
1974 have recorded a widening gap between the level of 
expenses and receipts.'
Additionally, in the Investment section of the Rail Plan text, 
attention was drawn to the fact that it was already clear that 
the Government might not support the investment intentions of 
the Rail Plan as evidenced by then recent cuts in the programmed 
investment ceilings up to 1977. These were compared with the 
Rail Plan intentions as shown in Table 11.4.
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Total Investment (£tn)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Rail Plan Forecast l6o 210 254 274 311
Interim Railway Strategy 226 269 287 301 304
Latest Government 
Ceiling (July 1974) 16O 180 217 239 300 *
* Estimated by the BRB in the absence of a firm Government 
ceiling.
Table 11.4. 1974 Rail Plan - Investment Comparisons 1974 to
______________1978 (in 1974 Price Levels)_____________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
These issues were to prove crucial to the emerging results and 
to the integrity of the 1974 Rail Plan and, as a consequence 
the 1974 Corporate Plan. The emerging results will not be 
examined here but will form a significant part of the analysis 
which will be conducted in Chapter I6 , Instead, it is intended 
to move on to the next Railways business plan which was 
prepared in the light of the developing circumstances.
11.2. Railways Business Plan 1975
The 1975 Bail Plan (or Fourth Rail Plan) v/as only ever completed 
in draft form because its forecasts were unacceptable to the 
BRB. Consequently, it became known as the Draft 1975 Bail 
Plan or, like some of the subsequent plans, the 1975 Bail 
Beview. Consequently, there was no 1975 Corporate Plan. The 
draft plans of the businesses were consolidated, however, in 
a brief document entitled ’Business Planning Data 1976 - I981’, 
dated December 1975» In this document, attention was drawn to 
the inadequacy of the forecasts, notably for the Railways
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business and emphasis was placed on the fact that the 
consolidated document was: not a corporate plan. For this 
reason, unlike the 1974 Corporate Plan, it was not formally- 
submitted to the Department of the Environment.
However, since it was an important milestone in the corporate 
planning activities of the BRB, it is now intended to analyse 
the content of the 1973 Railways Business Review. This will 
be done in a similar manner to the 1974 Rail Plan.
11.2.1. Objectives
No attempt was made to develop objectives in the 1973 Bail 
Review. Instead, the 'Business Planning Data 1973 - 198l' 
document merely stated that 'The draft business plans assumed 
a broad continuation of the primary objectives of the Board 
on which previous Corporate Plans were based.'
11.2.2. Strategy
In strict terms, the 1975 Bail Beview did not encompass a 
fresh strategy, nor did it confirm the strategy developed in 
the 1974 Rail Plan. Instead, it gave recognition to the 
serious problems which had emerged since the 1974 Rail Plan 
was completed. The words used in the 'Business Planning 
Data 1976 to 1981' document were as follows:-
'.....In particular the draft plans followed the Interim 
Rail Strategy outlined in the Railway Policy Beview, 
although it is now clear that this strategy must be 
regarded as having been abandoned by Government. No 
alternative long-term rail strategy has yet emerged.'
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The term 'abandonment’ was related to the adjustments to the 
1974 Rail Plan strategy which the BRB felt compelled to 
include in the 1975 Rail Review. These adjustments were as 
follows :-
(a) Passenger
(i) Inter-city - A slow down in the introduction of KST
and APT sets.
- Additional real pricing, leading to
significant reductions in passenger miles.
(ii) Local Passenger Services - A slow down in major
- improvements, including electrification 
and new rolling stock in London and P.T.E. 
areas. Significantly higher real fare 
increases and consequent reductions in 
passenger miles.
(b) Freight
Continuation of the trainload/selective wagonload concept 
but with a substantial decrease in investment, involving 
delay in construction of new air-braked wagons and 
locomotives.
(c ) Parcels
Continuation of the National Parcels Plan strategy but with 
implementation scheduled for 1978 rather than 1977. More 
restrained view of real pricing potential in the S to S 
sector with a bigger share of Post Office parcels than 
previously anticipated.
11.2.3. Forecasts
The 'Business Planning Data 1976 to I98I' document did not
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contain as much detail as the 1974 Rail Plan. However, by- 
reference to supporting papers and files, it has been possible 





Again, some figures such as investment were forecast for the 
intermediate years I982 to 1984.
As for the 1974 Rail Plan, the 1975 Rail Review figures are 
recorded in Appendices 2(a) to 2(d), 3(a) and 3(t>). In summary 
form, the constant price financial forecasts given as Appendix 
2(a) are described in Table 11.3.
Similarly to the 1974 Rail Plan, it was anticipated that working 
expenses would increase faster than receipts, in constant 
prices. This was again forecast to result in an increased level 
of P.S.O, grant, partly mitigated by an improvement in the 
profitability of the Non-passenger business. However, the 
P.S.O. forecast trend was at a much higher level owing to the 
change of price base (1974 budget to 1973 budget). Addition­
ally, the 1975 Rail Review commenced with a large Non-passenger 
loss (£68m) which was not a feature of the 1974 Rail Plan. 
However, since this was considered to be a feature which was 
largely related to a temporary recession and because of higher 
anticipated real price increases, the profits forecast for I98I 
and 1983 were close to (in fact a little above) those contained 
in the 1974 Rail Plans.Unusually, the deferment of locomotive
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____________________ Year____________________










































844 890 92Z 960 990 1017 1048 1149
1233 1284 1539 1369 1401 1431 1448 1583
(411) (124) (412) (409) (411) (414) (400) ( ^ )
343 333 373 396 4o4 420 428 48l
(68) (41) (39) (13) (7) 6 28 47
Table 11.3. 1973 Rail Review - Profit and Loss Forecasts 
______________1974 to 1981 and 1983 (in 1973 Price Levels)
(Source: BRB internal records)
replacement was seen as of medium-term benefit to the Non­
passenger business, in that it reduced the depreciation and 
interest charge without a proportionate decline in receipts.
The key resources changes contained within the 1973 Rail Review 
are provided in Appendix 2(c). Compared with the 1974 Rail 
Plan figures, also recorded in Appendix 2(c), the 1973 Rail 
Plan forecasts reflected the revisions to the implementation of 
the overall strategy. In particular, the following aspects can 
be readily observed:-
a) Slowing down of locomotive reductions until I98O after which
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a faster rundown was expected,
b) Slowing down of H.S.T. construction again until 198O.
c) Slowing down of A.P.T. construction with 32 fewer sets in
1983.
d) Slowing down of electric multiple unit construction and 
related reduction in diesel multiple units.
e) Slowing down of the reductions in manpower requirements up
to 1980 with a faster rate of change from I98I mainly
related to lower forecast improvements in conditions of 
service (+13,360 compared with +l6,000 contained within 
the 1974 Rail Plan).
Again, underlying these forecasts were the macro-economic 
forecasts which are given in Appendix 2(d). In terms of 
Gross Domestic Product, Industrial Production and Consumers' 
Expenditure, these were considerably less favourable than 
those used in the 1974 Rail Plan,
The reduction in the investment forecasts between the 1974 
Rail Plan and the 1973 Rail Review were very considerable.
These can be seen in Appendix 2(b) and stem from the points 
made earlier about the Government supporting the Interim Rail 
Strategy but not necessarily the investment required to 
implement it. However, it can be seen that both revenue and 
capital investment were still forecast to increase over the »
Review years. As in the 1974 Rail Plan, this factor was 
accompanied in the 1973 Rail Review by large forecast increases 
in Real Staff Costs and Interest. For selected years, the 







Revenue Investment 5 57 52
Real Staff Costs 11 113 203
Depreciation (13) 17 53
Interest 14 75 127
Other Items (mainly resource 
reductions) ii (69) (109)
29 191 128
Table 11.6. 1973 Rail Review - 








(Source : BRB internal records)
Looking at each of the businesses within the Railways business 
in turn, the 1975 Rail Review financial forecasts can now be 
examined further in similar fashion to the description of the 
1974 Rail Plan.
The Passenger P.S.O. grant, which was forecast to increase, in 
constant prices, from £^43% in 1975 to £428m in I98I and £48lm 
in 1983, was very heavily influenced by the working expenses 
increases summarised in Table 11.6. These were forecast not 
to be wholly counteracted by the real price increases and 
volume growth figures recorded in Appendix 2(a) - page 3» In 
terms of the volume of business, as demonstrated by increases 
in Passenger Miles, the forecasts were as given in Appendix
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2(c) - page 1 and analysed over the four Passenger sectors in 
Appendix 2(c) - page 3* It will be observed that the combined 
P.T.E./other Provincial sectors Passenger miles were similar 
to those forecast in the 1974 Rail Plan. In respect of the 
Inter-city and L. & S.E. sectors, however, the growth 
expectations were considerably lower, reflecting the changes 
in the strategy and the revised macro-economic forecasts 
(particularly Consumers' Expenditure) recorded in Appendix 
2(d).
The Non-passenger business was expected, as stated in Table
11.3 , to gradually convert the budgeted loss of £68 in 1973 
to a profit of £6m in 1980, £28m in 1981 and £47m in 1983.
Much of this improvement was expected to result from real 
price increases in the Freight business rather than improve­
ments in the volume of carryings (see Appendix 2(a) - page 3)» 
The analysis of the profit and loss forecast was as depicted 
in Table 11.7. In comparing these figures with those given in 
Table 11.3, it will be clear that the substantial deterioration 
in the forecasts affected both Freight and Parcels. However, in 
the 1973 Rail Review the Freight profit/loss was forecast to 
recover much faster and, by 198I, be £l7m higher than the 1974 
Rail Plan prediction. This recovery was also forecast to 
continue to 1983 which was expected to be £36m higher. The 
Parcels forecasts remained considerably lower than those 
contained in the 1974 Rail Plan.
In terms of the volume of business, it was anticipated that 
Freight receipts would increase from £294m in 1973 to £347m
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Forecast Profit/(Loss)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1983
£m £m £m £m £ra £ra £ra £m
Parcels business (9) (8) (6) 4 9 10 11 12
Freight business (29) (21) (21) (17) (16) C4) 17 22




forecast 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 11
Table 11.7. 1975 Rail Review - Analysis of Non-passenger
Business Profits 1975 to I981 and I983 (in 
______________1975 Price Levels)____________________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
in 1981 ajid £354m in 1983 but that this would include real price 
increases of £34m by 198I and £33m by I983. Thus, in strict 
volume terms,, a reduction of £lm was forecast by I98I and an 
improvement of £7m by I983, both compared with the 1975 base 
year (see Appendix 2(a) - page 3 ). The associated tonnes 
forecasts were as depicted in Appendix 2(c) - page 6 . It can 
be seen that marginally higher tonnes were forecast, compared 
with the 1974 Rail Plan, from 1977 onwards. The expected 
reduction in wagonload carryings was very close to the 1974 
forecast.
Once again, the forecast receipts volume improvements were lower 
than the forecast tonnes would suggest. This was related to 
the forecast increases in lower-rated trainload traffic being 
offset by decreases in the higher-rated wagonload traffic.
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Working expenses were forecast to decline sharply as a result 
of the resource reductions, offset partly by increases in real 
staff costs, improvements in conditions of service, depreciation 
and interest on new locomotives and wagons and a small propor­
tion of the increased revenue investment.
The Parcels business profit forecast was seen by the BRB as 
being particularly disappointing, especially compared with the 
1974 Rail Plan prediction. The problem basically stemmed from 
a change in the base position. The 1974 Rail Plan was based 
on a budgeted profit of £8m in 1974 (Table 11.3). By the time 
the 1975 Rail Review was prepared, the recession and the working 
expenses price increases (notably the 1974 and 1975 pay 
increases) had eroded that profit and a loss of £9m was 
budgeted for 1975 (see Table 11.7). The rate of recovery was 
in many ways consistent with the rate of improvement in the 
1974 Rail Plan but the change in the base position meant 
forecast losses up to 1977 and much smaller profits thereafter. 
For this reason, these profits no longer contained ’earned* 
interest as contained in the 1974 Rail Plan.
There was no risk or sensitivity analysis prepared in respect 
of the 1975 Rail Review. However, a number of areas were 
raised in the Business Planning Data 1976 - I98I document and 
in an internal report to the Chief Executive Railways prepared 
in the Corporate Planning Department, dated 2 September 1975. 
These risk areas were:- ,
a) Investment - Although the investment forecasts were lower
than those contained in the 1974 Rail Plan, it
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was considered likely but not certain that the 
predicted .increases included in the 1975 Rail 
Review would be allowed by Government.
b) Economic Activity - It was considered that there was some
possibility that the recovery in the economy 
anticipated in the macro-economic assumptions 
(see Appendix 2(d)) would not be achieved.
c) Real Staff Costs Improvements - These could be higher or
lower than forecast, as could be predicted 
improvements in conditions of service.
d) Industrial Disputes - None was contained within the forecasts.
e) Parcels Business - The whole of the National Parcels Plan
was considered to be at risk because of the
deterioration in the base profitability, 
continued delays in implementation (largely 
connected with the industrial relations 
implications) and a re-appraisal of the market 
potential, in relation to other publicly owned 
parcels carriers.
f) Freight Business - The rate of cost escapement could be too
ambitious. This could worsen the results by as 
much as £l03m over the six years 1976 to 198I.
These risk areas, coupled with the general dissatisfaction of 
the BRB with the forecast results, made it impossible for the 
Board to adopt the 1975 Rail Review as a formal plan and it was 
instead decided to pursue the search for an alternative strategy 
for each of the three Railways businesses. This search began in 
earnest in 1975 and was to take about four years to complete.
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11.3. Railways Business Plan 1978
During the years 1975 to 1977 most of the strategic effort was 
put into the Freight business through an attempt to develop a 
strategy which would ensure a much more satisfactory financial 
future than was suggested in the 1975 Rail Review. The 
'Passenger Business Strategy Studies' and the 'Parcels Business 
Strategy Studies' discussed in Chapter 10 were not completed 
when the decision was made to compile a 1978 Rail Plan. For 
this reason, it was decided later to use the terra 'Review' 
rather than 'Plan' to describe the final document. Production 
of the 1978 Rail Review commenced in October 1977 and it was 
completed in late Spring 1978.
The BRB Corporate Plan (later referred to as the Corporate Review) 
was completed in the Autumn of 1978 and submitted to the 
Secretary of State for Transport on l4 November 1978. That 
document contained the main elements of the 1978 Rail Review, 
although a few (relatively minor) changes were incorporated 
mainly to allow for a later view of the base year (1978) 
forecast and updated expectations for 1979»
An intermediate 'review' had been prepared in 1977, known as 
the 'Special Autumn Plan - Railways Business'. That document 
updated the Passenger and Parcels forecasts under the old 
strategies and adopted the newly developed Freight strategy. It 
was prepared very quickly to give some guidance as to the 
overall position of the Railways business pending completion 
of the 1978 Rail Review. Because it was not different in a 
strategic sense to the 1978 Rail Review and was not regarded by
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the BRB as a formal part of what was meant to be an annual Rail 
Plan production process, the Special Autumn Plan 1977 will not 
be referred to further in this chapter.
11.3.1. Objectives
The 1978 Rail Review document did not identify any new 
objectives for the Parcels business but, in respect of the 
Freight business, the statement was made that 'The Business 
Plan for Freight is based upon the strategic objective of the 
Freight Sector Study: a business catering predominantly for 
trainload bulk traffic, but also providing selective wagonload 
services which aim at maximising profit after satisfying its 
requirements for re-investment.' However, recognition was given 
to the newly created P.S.O. cash limit (see Chapter 6) in that 
comparisons were made between the forecast P.S.O. grants and the 
likely levels of that cash limit.
11.3.2. Strategy
Pending completion of the strategic reviews of the Passenger 
and Parcels businesses, only an interim strategy could be 
declared for those businesses. However, as noted earlier a 
revised strategy had been prepared for the Freight business.
This had, in fact, been discussed with civil servants from the 
Department of Transport and was accepted as the appropriate 
course of action.





Improvements in train speeds through continuing (albeit 
more slowly than originally intended because of lower than 
expected investment ceilings - past and future) introduction 
of H.S.T, trains followed by commencement of the 
introduction of the A.P.T. in 1982. Real price increases in 
association with these developments.
London and South East -
Some electrification projects and replacement of a small 
number of electric multiple units. Real price increases 
of J)% per annum.
P.T.E's -
Extensions to the electrified commuter networks in Glasgow, 
Liverpool and Manchester (funded by the P.T.E's).
Other Provincial -
No direct investment but some improvements resulting from 
the 'cascading' of rolling stock from other sectors. 
Withdrawal of a proportion of lightly used services with 
an associated reduction in receipts of approximately £4m.
(b) Freight 
Trainload -
Continued concentration on maximisation of all opportunities 
in this sector.
Wagonload -
Elimination of all traffic requiring handling or cartage at 
B.R. depots by pricing action by 1983.
Withdrawal of wagonload services from all 'greenfield' 
areas by I988.
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Development of a 'line of route' wagonload service using 
air-braked wagons, described as 'Speedlink', In fact this 
line of route development had started in a small way in 
1972 and was implicit in the air-braked wagon construction 
programme contained within the 1974 Rail Plan and the 1975 
Rail Review. Now it was anticipated that the Speedlink 
service would be expainded to about 100 services by I982 
serving most industrial centres.
Continuation of any local wagonload services which would 
command 'satisfactory revenues and resources productivity 
standards'.
(c) Parcels
C 8e D Parcels -
Recognition of increasing losses in this sector, due to 
intense competition and the low investment ceilings, had 
produced the view that it would be better to withdraw from 
this sector but this view was rejected because of 'industrial 
relations constraints'. Instead, it was decided to 'use 
price increases to regulate traffic where the drop in the 
amount of traffic will allow a high proportion of costs to 
be saved quickly. The intention is to save £10ra by the end
of 1982.'
S to S Parcels -
Maintain high quality of service in Red Star and R.P.T. 
parcels to 'keep growth at 3/̂  per annum over the next four 
years while permitting further real price increases.
Thereafter, growth will be less with no pricing opportunities.' 
Lower Post Office letter mails due to development of Post 
Office road haulage, but maintenance of Post Office parcels
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market share.
Maintenance of Newspapers market share by real price 
reductions.
11.3.3. Forecasts
The 1978 Rail Review contained detailed forecasts in respect 
of the following years:-
1978 Base (budget)
1979 to 1983 
1988
Again, some figures such as investment were forecast for the 
intermediate years 1984 to I987.
The forecasts are recorded in Appendices 2(a) to 2(d), 3(a) 
and 3(b). However, in summary form, the figures given in 
Appendix 2(a) are as described in Table 11.8. It can be seen 
that, in this Review, it was forecast that the P.S.O. Grant 
would stay fairly level until 1983 but would increase to £493ni 
in 1988. This increase was related mainly to real staff cost 
increases. The Review estimated that the newly created P.S.O. 
cash limit would be £490m in 1978 and £470m in I983, the 
forecast results being within those amounts. It did not contain 
an estimate of the 1988 P.S.O. cash limit but speculated that 
the forecast result would be in excess of the limit and that 
’the requirement would exceed the ceiling by about I986’. On 
the Non-passenger side, the 1978 Rail Review forecast very large 
increases in profits from £7m in 1978 to £124m in 1980 and £173% 
in 1988. These were based mainly on the large resource 
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Total 1238 1280 1313 1336 1371 1403 1497
Working Expenses 
(including Interest) 1674 1691 1682 1702 1713 1722 1813
Profit/(Loss) before 
Grants (436) (411) (372) (366) (242) (317) (318:
Resulting in:-
PSO Grant 443 431 438 431 443 441 493
Non-passenger 
Profit/(Loss) 7 40 66 83 103 124 173
Table 11.8. 1978 Rail Review - Profit and Loss Forecasts
______________1978 to 1983 and 1938 (in 1978 Price Levels)
(Source : BRB internal records)
Indeed, contrary to the trends in the 1974 Rail Plan and the 
1973 Rail Review, the 1978 Rail Review anticipated that working 
expenses would not increase faster than receipts, despite large 
increases in real staff costs. This was based largely upon 
volume increases in Passenger receipts (better £l66m by 1988) 
and decreases in the volume of working expenses (better £119% 
by 1988), the latter figure relating mainly to the reduction in 
Freight resources.
The key resource changes contained within the 1978 Rail Review
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are provided in Appendix 2(c). A comparison with the 1975 
Rail Review is not particularly important at this stage and, 
in any case is rendered difficult by the changes in the years 
being forecast. Suffice it to say that the reductions in 
manpower and Freight Vehicles were more ambitious than hitherto 
and were related mainly to the new Freight strategy. The 
forecast reductions in route miles also reflected that strategy, 
together with the withdrawal of a relatively small number of 
Other Provincial Passenger services.
The macro-economic forecasts are given in Appendix 2(d) where, 
it can be observed that a fairly buoyant economy was predicted, 
as measured in terms of Gross Domestic Product, Industrial 
Production and Consumers' Expenditure. The improvements were 
forecast to be similar in dimension to those contained within 
the 1974 Rail Plan.
The investment forecasts are provided in Appendix 2(b). Once 
again, it was forecast that increased investment would be 
permitted by Government with the 1978 budget of £311% increasing 
to £372m in 1983 and £398m in 1988 (in 1978 constant prices). 
Nearly all of the increase was planned to be spent on capital 
investment, with almost all of this increase being related to 
Passenger rolling stock, including H.S.T./A.P.T. construction, 
and related maintenance facilities.
Total working expenses were not forecast to increase as much 
as in the 1975 Review because of the expected reduction in 






Increase/(Decrease) over 1978 Budget in
Revenue Investment 1 - 4
Real Staff Costs 120 260
Depreciation/Replacement Allowance 16 47
Interest (14) (38)
Other Items (mainly resource reductions) (22) (r^)
Total Working Expenses 48 l4l
Table 11.9. 1978 Rail Review - Summary of Forecast Increases
in Working Expenses 1983 and 1988 (in 1978 
______________Price Levels)_____________________________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
The forecast improvement in ’other items’ was related to the 
resource reductions mentioned earlier. The improvement in 
Interest reflected the large forecast Non-passenger profits 
which were expected to place that business in an interest 
’earning’ capacity amounting to £llm in I983 and £36m in 1983. 
This latter figure was not far short of the expected interest 
payment forecast (£6lra) of the Passenger business.
Looking at each of the three businesses within the Railways 
business in turn, the 1978 Rail Review forecasts can now be 
considered similarly to the 1974 Plan / 1973 Review.
In respect of the Passenger business it has already been noted
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that the P.S.O. grant was forecast to remain fairly constant 
between 1978 (£443%) and 1983 (£44lm) but to increase by 1988 
to £493%, all figures in 1978 price levels. During those years, 
receipts were forecast to increase very considerably, mostly in 
respect of volume (£88m by 1983 and £l66m by 1988) but also in 
respect of real prices (£23% by 1983 and £34% by 1988). This 
was not anticipated, however, to be sufficient to pay for the 
Passenger share of the forecast increases in real staff costs.
In terms of the volume of carryings, as demonstrated by 
Passenger Miles, the forecasts were as given in Appendix 2(c) - 
page 1 and analysed over the four Passenger sectors in 
Appendix 2(c) - page 3» It will be observed that the 
expected pattern of growth was similar to that recorded in 
respect of the 1973 Rail Review, allowing for a lower base 
level in 1978. This reflected a similar pattern of growth in 
U.K. Consumers’ Expenditure to that forecast in the 1973 review - 
see Appendix 2(d).
The Non-passenger business profit forecast, which provided for 
the large improvement discussed earlier was analysed as shown 
in Table 11.10. It can be seen that the Parcels business profit 
of £3% in 1978 was forecast to improve to £12% by I983 but fall 
back to £6m by 1988. This deterioration was expected to result 
from an inability to match real staff cost increases with either 
real price increases or volume growth.
The Freight business profits forecasts were in marked contrast 
to those contained within the 1973 Review (see Table 11.7») 
reflecting the forecast apparent success of the chosen strategy.
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Forecast Profit/(Loss)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1985 1988
£m £m £ra £m £m £m £m
Parcels Business 3 7 7 8 12 12 6
Freight Business _2 21 29 22 _91 112 l6i
Ancillary Income 
Included in Freight
40 66 m 124 122
Business Forecast lit 1 1 15 1 6 12 18 20
Table 11,10. 1978 Rail Review - Analysis of Non-passenger
Profits 1978 to I983 and I983 (in 1978 Price 
_______________Levels )_______________________________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
The forecast interest ’earned’ amounted to £9% in I983 and £31m 
in 1988, as a consequence of the anticipated profit (before 
interest) being greater than the investment requirements of the 
Freight business. The associated tonnage forecasts for the 
sectors of the Freight business were as depicted in Appendix 
2(c) - page 6. It can be seen that the overall carryings 
were expected to be considerably lower than in the earlier 
forecasts, reflecting major reductions experienced in the four 
years prior to the base year 1978 and a lower wagonload tonnes 
forecast as a result of the revised strategy.
Unlike the 1974 Plan and the 1973 Review, the changes in total 
tonnes up to I983, compared with the base year, were fairly 
consistent with the receipts volume growth (see Appendix 2(a) - 
page 4). This was because of the considerably lower wagonload 
content at the start of the 1978 Review and the smaller
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reductions predicted up to 1983. However, the high-rated 
wagonload tonnes forecast reductions between 1983 and 1985» 
offset by the low-rated trainload increases, show the previously 
discussed pattern of reduced volume of receipts between those 
years.
The Parcels business profit forecast was seen by the BRB as 
being disappointing in that the forecast low profits were not 
sufficient 'to provide for replacement-cost depreciation.'
A formal risk analysis was conducted in respect of the 1978 
Rail Plan using the statistical method noted in Chapter 10. A 
summary of the net effect of applying this method is provided 
in Table 11.11. It will be observed that, at 'worst', the 
P.S.O. grant requirement would increase from &424m in 1978 to 
£494m in I983 and £549m in 1988, all figures in constant prices. 
Given these results, the expected P.S.O, cash limit would be 
exceeded in I98I and in each subsequent year. However, on the 
Freight side, even the 'worst' profit forecasts were considerably 
better than all previous Rail Plan/Review expectations. It will 
be seen in Chapter I6 and in the next two sections that the 
parameters forecast within this risk analysis were far from 
accurate.
It was noted at the beginning of this section that the 1978 
Rail Review was not regarded as a Plan because of its inadequate 
strategic content i.e. the Passenger and Parcels Sector 
Strategic Studies were not completed. Nevertheless, it was 
accepted by the BRB as a major milestone in the development of
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___________________ Year____________
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1988
£m £m £m £m £m £m
431 438 431 443 441 493
461 430 466 461 46l 488
449 434 444 434 428 427
473 466 488 488 494 349
33 59 77 91 112 169
4 38 60 77 98 148
11 48 73 93 118 188
(3) 28 47 51 78 108
7 7 8 12 12 6
1 5 6 10 11 8
3 7 8 13 14 13
(1) 3 4 7 8 3
Passenger - PSO Grant 
Rail Review
Risk Analysis - Mean
- Best
- Worst
Freight - Profit/(Loss) 
Rail Review
Risk Analysis - Mean
- Best
- Worst
Parcels - Profit/(Loss) 
Rail Review
Risk Analysis - Mean
- Best
- Worst
Table 11.11. 1978 Rail Review - Summary of Risk Analysis
_______________1979 to 1983 and 1988 (in 1978 Price Levels)
(Source : BRB internal records)
the Freight business. It also indicated that the Parcels 
business could make small profits and that the Passenger 
business could work within its forecast P.S.O. cash limit until 
about 1986,
11.4. Railways Business Plan 1979
The 1979 Rail Review was produced in August 1979 and consolidated 
into the BRB Corporate Review document which was submitted to 
the Minister for Transport on 23 October 1979. In many ways, it 
was an update of the 1978 Rail Review, the revised Passenger and
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Parcels strategies still not having been finally determined,
11.4.1. Objectives
No fresh objectives were developed during the production of the 
1979 Rail Review and those used in the 1978 Review were carried 
forward i.e.
- Passenger P.S.O. to be within the forecast cash limit.
- Freight Profit to be 'maximised'.
- Parcels business to at least break even.
However, late in 1979, the Interim Targets for Freight, Parcels 
and the Inter-city sector of the Passenger business, discussed 
in Chapter 6 , were agreed between the BRB and the Department of 
Transport and were quoted in the Corporate Review. It was too 
late for any significant further direct reference to be made to 
these interim targets which were merely noted in the introduction 
The necessary calculations were not made in the remainder of the 
Rail Review document to make a direct comparison with those 
interim targets.
11.4.2. Strategy
The strategy contained within the 1979 Rail Review was as follows;
(a) Passenger
System Size -
Service levels to be adjusted to recognise views of traffic 
growth emerging from the Passenger Business Strategy Study 
(slightly higher than those envisaged in the 1978 Rail 
Review). Withdrawal of 40 Other Provincial services which 




On Inter-city services only where product improvement 
occurs.
On London and South East - 1% in 19&0 and 3% per annum 
thereafter.
Investment -
Lower over overall investment compared with the 1978 Review 
(3% overall) permitting:-
Construction programme for H.S .T./A.P.T. of about 20 sets 
per annum.
Replacement of about 173 diesel multiple units per annum 
from 1974.
Continuation of minor electrification projects included in 
the 1978 Rail Review.
(b) Freight
Continuation of the Freight strategy contained within the 
1978 Rail Review.
( c ) Parcels
Continuation of the 'holding* strategy contained within the 
1978 Rail Review.
11.4.3. Forecasts






Unlike the 1978 Reviev/a risk analysis (using the same method as 
in the 1978 Review) was fully incorporated into the forecasts 
and the final figures were the mean forecasts of the risk 
analysis. This process was very time consuming and was neither 
repeated in the 1980 Rail Plan nor, it is understood, will be 
used again. Instead, in future, the risk analysis forecasts will 
be used by the BRB as supplementary data, as in respect of the 
1978 Rail Review.
The forecasts are recorded in Appendices 2(a) to 2(b), 3(a) 
and 3(b). However, in summary form, the figures given in 
Appendix 2(a) are described in Table 11.12.
Year
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1989


























Total 1379 I4l4 1443 1476 1303 1332 1602
Working Expenses 
(including Interest) 1883 1925 1978 1989 2001 2045 2131
Profit/(Loss) before 
Grants ( ^ ) (511) ( i l l ) (513) (496) (313) (329:
Resulting in ;-
PSO Grant 502 313 363 560 332 376 633
Non-passenger 
Profit/(Loss) (2) 4 32 47 36 63 104
Table 11.12. 1979 Rail Review - Profit and Loss Forecast
_______________ 1979 to 1984 and 1989 (in 1979 Price Levels)
(Source : BRB internal records)
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It can be seen that, in this Review, the P.S.O. Grant was 
expected to increase from £502m in 1979 to £576ra in 1984 and
to £633™ in 1989, all figures in 1979 prices. The P.S.O.
cash limit forecasts, again in constant prices, were substan­
tially lower than the expected P.S.O. grant requirements.
Details of the differences are given in Table 11.13* It will be 
noted that the shortfalls against the cash limits were in marked 
contrast to the situation forecast in the 1978 Review, where
P.S.O. cash limit shortfalls were not expected to occur until
1986.
Year
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 .1989
£m £m £m £m £m £m £m
P.S.O. Cash Limit 497 487 483 483 483 483 483
P.S.O. Grant 
Requirement 302 560
Shortfall 28 82 _ZZ. 69 130
Table 11.13* 1979 Rail Plan - P.S.O. Cash Limit and Grant
Forecasts 1979 to 1984 and 1979 (in 1979 
_______________ Price Levels)___________________________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
On the Non-passenger side, it was forecast that the loss of 
£2m budgeted for 1979 would be converted into a profit of £63m 
by 1984 and £l04m by 1989. Again, these forecasts were 
substantially worse than those contained within the 1978 Rail 
Review. In this case, the main contributory cause was the 
deterioration in the start position i.e. the forecast for 1979 
which had changed from a profit of £40m in 1978 price levels to
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a loss of £2m in 1979 price levels. This was largely associated 
with a 9 million reduction in Freight tonnes.
The key resource changes contained within the 1979 Rail Review 
are summarised in Appendix 2(c). Compared with the 1978 Review, 
a slower introduction of H.S.T. and A.P.T. sets was forecast 
and, consequently, a slower withdrawal of locomotives and 
locomotive hauled coaching vehicles. On the other hand, because 
of lower Freight tonnes expectations, larger reductions in 
Freight wagons were forecast. However, the most significant 
change related to manpower, where both the requirements and the 
estimated actuals were predicted to be considerably higher than 
forecast in the 1978 Review. This change was most marked in the 
base year (1979) where a 9,000 increase in both was recorded 
between the two Reviews.
The macro-economic forecasts are given in Appendix 2(d). These 
were close to those used in the 1978 Rail Review.
The investment forecasts are provided in Appendix 2(b). Whilst 
these were lower in real terms compared with those forecast in 
the 1978 Review, once again considerable growth v;as forecast.
The 1979 budget level of £307% was expected to increase to 
£396m by 1984 and £393% in 1989, all figures in 1979 price levels. 
Again, the bulk of the increase was planned to be spent on 
capital investment, in particular Passenger rolling stock 
construction and related maintenance facilities.
Total working expenses were forecast to increase much more
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than anticipated in the 1978 Rail Review. This was partly due 
to the inclusion of real increases in traction fuel costs (for 
the first time) and also due to lower resource reductions 
(particularly manpower) which reduced the savings contained in 
’Other Items’. These aspects, in turn, increased the interest 
forecast. A summary of the forecast changes in respect of 




Increase/(Decrease) over 1979 
Budget in_____________________
Revenue Investment 8 13 (I6)
Real Staff and Traction Fuel Costs 120 134 319
Depreciation / Replacement 
Allowance 12 17 43
Interest 6 7 -
Other items (mainly resource 
reductions) (28) (31) (98)
Total Working Expenses II8 I62 248
Table 11.l4. 1979 Rail Review - Summary of Forecast
Increases in Working Expenses I983, 1984
_______________ and 1989 (in 1979 Price Levels)_______
(Source : BRB internal records)
Looking at each of the three businesses, within the Railways 
business, in turn, the 1979 Rail Review forecasts can now be 
considered further.
As noted earlier, the P.S.O. grant requirement was forecast to
374
increase considerably over the years of the Review. The 
forecast real price increases in Passenger receipts were a 
little lower than those contained within the 1978 Review. 
Similarly lower improvements were expected in respect of the 
volume of receipts. Both of these features can be observed in 
Appendix 2(a) - page 4. In terms of Passenger Miles, the 
forecasts were as shown in Appendix 2(c) - page 1 and analysed 
over the four Passenger sectors in Appendix 2(c) - page 3»
The forecast pattern of growth was a little lower than that 
contained within the 1978 Review, allowing for a higher base 
year forecast. This was due to the marginal changes in 
strategy noted earlier.
The Non-passenger business profit forecasts were analysed as 
shown in Table 11.13. It can be seen that the deterioration, 
compared with the 1978 Review (Table 11.10.), was related 
mainly to the Freight business. The Parcels profit forecasts 
were fairly similar for the middle years of the Review, with 
smaller profits in 1979 and I98O but larger profits in 1989 
compared with 1988 in the earlier Review.
It was noted earlier that the deterioration in the Freight 
Profit forecasts was due mainly to the poorer start position 
in respect of receipts and tonnes. This was reflected in the 
Freight tonnes forecast as shown in Appendix 2(c) - pages I*- 
and 6, which v;ere expected to remain generally lower than the 
1978 Rail Review expectations. Similarly to the 1978 Review, 
however, the forecast increases in Freight tonnes were fairly 
consistent with the volume increases in receipts given in
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Appendix 2(a) - page 4.
Forecast Profit/(Loss)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1989
£m £m £m £m £m £m £m
Parcels business 1 1 6 9 10 10 14
Freight business ii) 26 18 46 11 _22
C2) _4 12 47 lâ É1 104
Ancillary Income 
Included in Freight 
business Forecast 19 19 20 22 12 2i 26
Table 11.13. 1979 Rail Review - Analysis of Non-passenger
Profits 1979 to 1984 and 1988 (in 1979 Price 
_______________ Levels)_________________________________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
The Parcels business profits were not described as 
'disappointing' as in the 1978 Rail Review but as a situation 
which 'will provide the breathing space required to take 
decisions on the results of the Study and implement them.'
The 'Study' referred to was, of course, the Parcels Sector 
Strategic Study.
As noted at the beginning of this sub-section, a risk analysis 
was undertaken in respect of the 1979 Rail Review and the mean 
estimates became the Review forecasts. The results of this 
risk analysis are recorded in Table 11.16.
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Year
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1989
£ra £m £m £ra £m £m
Passenger - PSO Grant
Rail Review / Mean 313 363 360 332 376 633
Risk Analysis - Best 302 349 340 327 349 372
- Worst 328 381 380 377 603 694
Freight - Profit/(Loss)
Rail Review / Mean 3 26 38 46 33 90
Risk Analysis - Best 20 4l 33 60 68 113
- Worst (14) 11 23 32 38 63
Rail Review / Mean 1 6 9 10 10 14
Risk Analysis - Best 3 8 13 16 17 33
- Worst (1) 4 3 4 3 (3)
Table 11.16. 1979 Rail Review - Summary of Risk Analysis
_______________ 1980 to 1984 and 1989 (in 1979 Price Levels)
(Source : BRB internal records)
Given results as portrayed under the 'worst* heading above, large 
shortfalls would be sustained against the anticipated PSO cash 
limit amounting, for example, to £l20m in 1984 and £211m in 
1989, in 1979 price levels. However, once again, even the 
'worst' profits on the Freight side were expected to be generally 
better than the forecasts contained within the 1974 Plan and the 
1973 Review.
IL.3» Railways Business Plan I980
The 1980 Corporate and Rail Plan was completed in September I98O 
and was made available for public distribution. It was regarded 
by the BPB as a 'Plan' rather than a 'Review' because, in 
respect of the Railways business, it fully incorporated the 
strategies developed in the Passenger/Freight/Parcels Strategic
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Studies, was intended to be implemented and contained forecasts 
which were within the anticipated cash limits. It was seen as 
a major milestone in corporate planning within the BRB, 
particularly in respect of its Rail Plan content.
11.5.1. Objectives
No fresh objectives were developed by the BRB in the I98O 
Rail Plan. Instead emphasis was placed on the P.S.O. cash 
limit, the ’commercial’ nature of the Non-passenger business 
and the newly emerged External Financing Cash Limit. The 
External Financing Cash Limit has been explained in Chapter 6 
and was first set by Government in the fiscal year 1979/80. 
Mention was made in the Plan text of the interim financial 
targets which were also discussed in Chapter 6.
The Board’s intention was to prepare a ’realistic plan' and 
in doing so decided to 'exceed the present investment ceilings 
while seeking to stay within the over-riding external financing 
limit and, albeit with more difficulty, within the present level 
of P.S.O. grant.' It will be seen later that assumptions were 
made about increases in the E.F.L. and P.S.O.. cash limits to 
allow for main line electrification which became a 
significant feature of the Railways business strategy.
11.5.2. Strategy
The 1980 Rail Plan was based upon the following strategies.
(a) Electrification
Main line electrification 'envisaging the electrification 
of 52%" of the total network by around the year 2000.'
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(b ) Passenger
System size ’almost identical’ with that which existed in
1980.
Continued H.S.T./A.P.T. development but at a slower rate 
than that anticipated in the 1979 Review.
A ’very small number of service withdrawals' totalling 
'about 60 route miles by 1985 which will have only a modest 
effect on the Passenger business.'
Real price increases in the Inter-city sector (related to 
investment) and in the London and South East Sector.
( c ) Fre-ight
Enhancement of the Freight strategy contained within the 
1978 and 1979 Rail Reviews, to incorporate a complete 
withdrawal from the wagonload sector (i.e. excluding 
Speedlink) by 1990 and recognition of the lower wagonload 
tonnes carried in I98O (compared with the level forecast in 
the 1979 Review) which would produce lower volumes in each 
of the Plan years.
(d) Parcels
Withdrawal from the Collected and Delivered sector on 
1 July 1981.
A marginal expansion of the share of premium market but 
continuation of the present newspapers and Post Office traffic 
levels.
11.3*3» Forecasts
The 1980 Rail Plan content of the Corporate Plan did not contain 
enough information for the purpose of this sub-section and 
substantial additional information was obtained from file records.
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Many of the Plan forecasts were prepared only for the years 
1980 (base), 1981 and I983 and intermediate forecasts were 
calculated by the BRB by interpolation. A ’snapshot' forecast 
for 1990 was prepared during the early stages of the planning 
process but was not continued into the later stages of the plan 
production process. Thus, forecasts for 1990 are not contained 
within this section.
A summary of the forecasts given in Appendix 2(a) is provided 
in Table 11.17. It can be seen that a fairly flat P.S.O. grant 
was forecast, despite medium term increases in revenue 
investment associated with main line electrification. Also, 
the Non-passenger loss of £43%, anticipated for I98O, was 
predicted to be converted into profits of £36% by 1982, £101m 
by 1984 and £l36m by 1983, all figures in I98O price levels. 
Despite the poorer start point, the Non-passenger profits forecast 
for the later years were better than those in the 1979 Rail 
Review because of the impact of the new ParceDs strategy.
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Year
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1983























Total 1608 1621 1690 1738 1777 1818
Working Expenses 
(including Interest) 2312 2244 2282 2267 2306 2312
Profit/(Loss) before 
Grants (704) ( ^ ) (392) (|29) (529) (494)
Resulting inr-
PSO Grant 661 608 628 615 630 630
Non-passenger 
Profit/(Loss) (43) (15) 36 86 101 136
Table 11.17. 1980 Rail Plan - 
1980 to 1985 (in




(Source : BRB Corporate Plan 1981-83 and internal records)
A comparison against the cash limits is not given in Appendix
2(a) but is provided in Table 11.18. This table ;records P .8.0.
surpluses over the cash limit which were in sharp contrast to
the shortfalls recorded in Table 11.13, relating to the 1979 
Review. Additionally, reference is made to the E.F.L. (Rail 
share assessed by the BRB) for the first time. Again surpluses 
are recorded.
Much of the improvement in the forecasts was in respect of 
working expenses reductions relating to reduced resources. 
Details of the resource changes are contained in Appendix 2(c).
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Year
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1983
£m £m £m £m £m £m













Surplus/(Deficit) (26) _19 10 _11 29
* including effect of main line electrification
EFL Cash Limit /
Before main line 
electrification 700 700 700 700 700
Main line 
electrification 16 _21 44 _89 92
Total 716 723 744 789 792
EFL Requirement 691 687 663 671 621
Surplus/(Deficit) _21 81 128 167
/ Rail Share of BRB total Estimated by Board
Table 11.l8. 1980 Rail Plan - Comparison of P.S.O./E.F.L
Cash Limits and Requirements I980 to 1983 
________________(in 1980 Price Levels )________________________
(Source - : BRB Corporate Plan I98I-85)
By far the most significant feature was manpower, where changes 
on the 1980 base year estimate were predicted as follows :-
Manpower (000*s) 
Requirements Estimated Actual 
By 1983 - 24.3 - 18.4
By 1983 - 38.3 - 31.0
As can be seen in Appendix 2(c), these reductions, which 
incorporated the strategic changes mentioned earlier, were far 
more ambitious than those contained within the 1979 Review.
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The macro-economic forecasts are given in Appendix 2(d). These 
were not as favourable as those used in the 1979 Review but, 
nevertheless, showed an economic growth situation.
The investment forecasts are shown in Appendix 2(b). These 
were considerably lower than in the 1979 Rail Review in respect 
of revenue investment but higher in respect of capital, the 
latter relating largely to the main line electrification 
strategy. In total, however, they were slightly lower than in the 
earlier Review despite the electrification strategy, the 
change in price level being more than offset by a switch of 
part of the revenue investment to maintenance (see note on 
Appendix 2(b)).
Total working expenses were expected to move very little over 
the five year period, with resource savings offsetting the 
increases in revenue investment and real staff/traction fuel 
costs. Details for the years 1984 and I983 are given in 
Table 11.19.
Looking at each of the businesses in turn, the forecasts can 
now be considered in more detail.
The Passenger PSO grant forecast was relatively favourable 
(compared with the 1979 Rail Review) because of larger real 
price and volume increases and lower real increases in 
expenditure, see Appendix 2(a) - page 3. In terms of business 
volume, the forecast Passenger miles were as recorded in 







Revenue Investment (allowing for 
switch to maintenance) 37 51
Real Staff and Traction Fuel Costs 76 123
Depreciation/Replacement Allowance 12 19
Interest 15 l4
Other Items (mainly resource reductions) (l46) (207)
(6 )
Table 11.19. I98O Rail Plan - Summary of Forecast
Increases in Working Expenses 1984 and I985 
__________________(in 1980 price levels)__________________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
sectors in Appendix 2(c) - page 5» The growth in Passenger 
Miles was not as pronounced as in the 1979 Review, which seems, 
therefore, to contradict the volume increases in receipts 
between two forecasts.
Discussions with the planners concerned have indicated that 
the 1979 Rail Plan passenger miles forecasts were not accurate 
and were out of line with the growth in receipts.
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The Non-passenger business profit forecasts were analysed by 
the BRB as shown in Table 11.19. Here it can be seen that, 
despite the substantial deterioration in the base year position, 
the Freight business was expected to make profits in the later 
years of the Plan which were similar to those forecast in the 
1979 Review (see Table 11.13). This improvement was expected 
to accrue from resource reductions and a lower level of real 
increases in expenditure than forecast in the 1979 Review.
Forecast Profit/(Loss)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1983
£m £m £m £m £m £ra
Parcels business 4 (9) 23 48 31 37
Freight business (4Z) 16) 1 1 18 79
(41) (11) 1É. 86 101 136
Ancillary Income
Included in Freight 
business forecast 21 21 27 22 29 12
Table 11.19. 1980 Rail Plan - Analysis of Hon-passenger
_________________ Profits 1980 to 1983 (in 198O Price Levels)
(Source ; BRB internal records)
The forecast tonnes are shown in Appendix 2(c). It will be 
observed that they were considerably lower than those contained 
within the 1979 Review, because of the reductions experienced in 
1980 and the changed wagonload strategy. However the trainload 
growth trend line was similar.
The Parcels business forecasts were much better than hitherto.
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reflecting the financial improvement expected to result from the 
withdrawal from the C & D sector. The profits predicted in the 
later years contained a considerable amount of 'e a r n e d ' interest 
(£8m in 1984 and £l3m in 198$).
A formal risk analysis, again using the.method outlined in 
Chapter 10, was conducted in respect of the I98O Review. A 
summary of the results of that exercise is given in Table 11.20.
Year
1981 1982 1985 1984 1983
£m £m £m £m £ra
Passenger - PSO Grant
Rail Plan 608 628 613 630 630
Risk Analysis - Mean 616 643 633 634 663
- Best 389 391 360 362 330
- Worst 642 693 • 706 746 776
(6) 13 38 30 79
(10) 6 33 43 67
33 37 88 108 123
(33) (43) (19) (22) (30)
(9) 23 48 31 37
(9) 24 46 49 33
(7) 33 34 39 63
(12) 12 37 40 42
Freight - Profit/(Loss) 
Rail Plan
Risk Analysis - Mean
- Best
- Worst
Parcels - Profit/(Loss) 
Rail Plan
Risk Analysis - Mean
- Best
- Worst
Table 11.20 198O Rail Plan - Summary of Risk Analysis
________________ 1981 to 1985 (in 1980 Price Levels)_________
(Source ; BRB internal records)
It can be seen that the ’worst' level of the Passenger PSO grant 
requirement was predicted to be beyond the expected cash limit 
levels, as follows:-
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Additionally, it was forecast that the Freight business could 
continue making losses under the 'worst' conditions, although 
in the years I983 to I983 these losses would not be as large 
as the 'worst’ profits of the Parcels business. Further 
reference will be made to these risk analysis forecasts in 
Chapter I 6 .
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CHAPTER 12
CORPORATE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FREIGHT CCI-IPANY
In describing the practice of corporate planning within the 
National Freight Company, it is again intended to draw comparisons 
against the theoretical material provided in Chapters 3 and 4.
This will be undertaken under the headings established in 
Chapter 11, as in respect of the BR5, The information given 
in this chapter was obtained from the NFC mainly in response 
to the questions listed in the structured interview programme 
discussed in Chapter 2.
12.1 . The Process of Corporate Planning
The National Freight Company or, as it then was, the National Freight 
Corporation, commenced its corporate planning in 1976 and, although 
no formal report was produced on planning methodology the 
organisation was advised at the outset by David Hussey of 
Harbridge House. A corporate planning department was created 
in 1976 consisting of 4 persons headed by what is now described 
as the Director of Corporate Planning. That post is part of the 
senior management structure of the NFC and responds directly to 
the post of Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive (see Figure 7.2.),
Since 1976, plans have been produced annually for each of the 
six groups as well as a corporate plan. Additionally each 
company within each group prepares a plan. These are consolidated 
into the group plans. As in the BRB, each company plan is 
produced as a separate ’corporate' plan and the NFC corporate 
plan is the consolidation of those plans via the consolidation
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of the group plans. To understand the situation more fully, it 
is intended to explain the process by reference to the theoretical 
model given in Chapter 3, as summarised in Figure 3»3*
The first element of the model in Figure 3«3. refers to values.
The NTC adopted this element in 1978 and converted it into 
what they described as a 'statement of m i s s i o n ’. This is 
summarised by the author as follows :-
The National Freight Corporation intends t o : -
- be more diversified
- trade internationally
- be a free standing business
- increase its earnings and net worth per share
At first sight, these values might seem to be pious and open- 
ended statements. However, it will be made clear that, in part 
at least, they have been converted into more definitive and 
positive objectives. Additionally, they portray quite vividly 
the culture of the organisation which has developed since 1969, 
as described in Chapter 5» In discussing the statement of 
mission with NFC, the author was struck with the intensity of 
the seemingly corporate desire, which has been prevalent for 
some years, to get away from what was generally described as 
the inefficient, subsidised, nationalised industry past and 
behave like a thrusting company in the private sector. This was 
also described as being an essential stance, given the 'cut-th r o a t ' 
nature of the public haulage competitive environment.
Moving to policies, these have not been explicitly determined.
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The statement of mission is regarded as covering this element 
adequately and NFC do not consider that it is necessary to add 
to that statement in order to produce effectively their 
corporate p l a n s . However, further discussion with NTC 
elucidated that they see it as absolutely essential to adhere 
to the many and varied road traffic rules and regulations laid 
down by Government (often related to European Economic 
Community decisions and regulations) even though many of their 
smaller competitors are less willing to do so. Additionally,
NFC does not accept the * no-compulsory redundancy’ policy 
adopted by the BRB, That is seen as being inconsistent with 
their values and objectives and would have jeopardised the 
strategic change already achieved had it been adopted.
In respect of objectives, there were initially set by Government 
in the Transport Act 1968. They remain in force and, as noted 
in Chapter 7, require the NFC to break-even in its profit and 
loss account one year with another after’ making a proper 
provision for the depreciation and renewal of assets. Throughout 
the corporate planning process, the NFC has accepted this 
financial objective but, in I9S0, they developed further 
objectives in anticipation of the company structure and eventual 
privatisation. These objectives were that : -
a) there should be a gearing ratio of 70%
b) dividends should be covered twice over
c) the profits before interest and tax should be 
three times the interest charge.
However, no particular time limit was related to these objectives,
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Additionally, there are no non-financial objectives, nor any 
plans to produce any. Instead, it was felt by the NFC planners 
that the statement of mission adequately covers this feature. 
However, on further discussion, it was accepted by NFC that 
there would be merit in expanding and clarifying the statement 
of mission by specifying, through the process of determining 
non-financial objectives, objectives in respect of market shares 
in specialised fields and the physical changes expected in 
respect of resource utilisation.
An important feature of the financial objectives noted above 
(including the break-even objective set by Government) is the 
fact that NFC have not distributed them over the six groups,
(and thus not to the companies within the groups) nor have they 
expected the groups themselves (or the companies) to determine 
their own objectives and agree them at headquarters level.
Instead, emphasis is placed on an informal and implicit acceptance, 
at all levels, of the statement of mission which, although only 
developed in the last three years, has been the 'understood 
situation' for much longer. However, again after discussion,
NFC accepted that their approach could be improved by 
determining and agreeing financial and non-financial objectives, 
with an associated timescale of achievement, between 
headquarters and the six groups and requiring the groups to do 
the same in respect of the individual companies.
The term goals has not been adopted by the NFC as a separate 
element of the corporate planning process. Thus they have not 
been identified at any level. This is not surprising given
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the lack of attention paid to the development of a timescale for 
achievement of the new financial objectives set in I980 and the 
lack of emphasis on objectives in earlier years. Again, 
however, after discussion, NFC planners accept that it would 
be of benefit, at all levels, to determine and agree goals 
which relate to the objectives, once action has been taken to 
improve the objectives.
The development of strategy has largely taken place in an 
unstructured way without the benefit of strategic reviews, 
designed to incorporate an internal and external appraisal. 
Instead, reliance has been placed upon 'ideas' for strategic 
change being generated by the management teams of the groups 
and companies and at headquarters. The diversification 
strategy, which was discussed in Chapter 7, and is formalised 
in the statement of mission, was basically attributed to the 
ideas produced by the Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive and 
by the managing directors of each of the groups. Discussions on 
these 'ideas' have taken place not so much as part of the 
corporate planning process but in headquarters/group meetings 
of a more general or specific nature and in informal discussions.
A general strategic review was attempted in 1978 when a matrix 
was prepared by the Director of Corporate Planning to compare 
market opportunities with competitive potential in respect of 
each group. This did not incorporate any form of gap analysis 
and it did not produce any new strategic direction. However, 
it was considered in NFC to have confirmed generally the 
strategy of each group and clarify their intentions. However,
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the Director of Corporate Planning would like, in the next two 
years, to put more effort into the strategy development. He 
feels that the NFC should spend a great deal more time deciding 
where it wants to go as an organisation, rather than allowing 
each of the groups to develop its strategy with inadequate 
central coordination. He considered also that the present 
arrangements allowed the NFC to be surprised by the developments 
introduced by its competitors.
Moving further down the model in Figure the corporate,
group and company plans produced annually by the NFC have been 
very similar to the strategic plans identified in the model.
At group and company level, they have contained a broad outline 
of the strategy and forecasts for the current year and for each 
of the next three years. These forecasts have covered financial 
and physical facts in respect of all of the major aspects of 
each of the groups' activities i.e. profit and loss, cash flow, 
market volume, operating and maintenance volume/resources, 
manpower resources and investment. The annually prepared 
corporate plan has been a consolidation of these group plans 
and, at this stage only, has a comparison been made with the 
overall financial objectives of the NFC. Contingency plans have 
not generally been prepared, the major risks not having been 
isolated during the strategy stage in most of the company/group 
plans.
The production of the annually prepared plans at the company/ 
group/corporate level takes about 7 months, although the 
approval procedure extends this period to 11 months. Details of
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the arrangements are as follows*-
January - The Director of Corporate Planning takes a critical look 
at the corporate and group plans produced the 
previous year and submits a paper to the NFC 
headquarters Executive Committee (consisting of 
the directors of the NFC and of the Groups). This 
paper comments on the up-to-date financial situation 
and points to areas where improvement is particularly 
urgent.
- The Executive Committee considers the paper and 
discusses possible significant strategic changes 
and items requiring further examination.
February - The paper and subsequent amendments are agreed at 
Board level.
- Separate meetings are held with the management teams 
of each group to agree any significant strategic 
changes. These meetings are attended by all of the 
headquarters functional directors.
March - Macro-economic forecasts issued to groups by the
Director of Corporate Planning. These are further 
distributed to company level.
- Strategic advice provided by groups to individual 
companies.
March to - Individual companies prepare their plans which are 
June
consolidated into group plans and submitted to NFC 
headquarters in June.
July - Each Group plan is discussed in detail in separate
meetings attended by Chief Executive and his 
directors and the management teams of each group.
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Occasionally, modifications to the forecasts are 
made at this stage.
August - Group plans are consolidated into the overall
corporate plan. At this stage, some overlays are 
undertaken particularly where the receipts forecast 
by the groups are considered by the headquarters 
directors to be optimistic.
September - The corporate and group plans are submitted to the
Executive Committee for final approval.
November - The corporate and group plans are submitted to the
NFC Board for final approval.
Each of the corporate plans has been submitted to the Department
of Transport, accompanied on some occasions by a presentation. 
This has led to little debate, although the Director of Planning 
has indicated that the plans submitted in 1976 ajid 1977 were
looked at more closely and would have had a bearing on the
capital reconstruction in 1978.
It has been made clear that the overall plan production process 
involves the companies within each group. Thus, each of the 
individual companies has a three year plan which is a constituent 
part of the plan for the group within which it is located. The
Director of Corporate Planning considers that,, whilst this
integration is necessary and beneficial, the quality of many of 
the individual company plans has been poor. Consequently, this 
has impacted upon the quality of the group plans. This problem 
has not generally been one of strategic content but of 
substantially inaccurate forecasting and poor presentation.
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The forecasts for the first year (i.e. the first year after 
the current year) have been converted by each group into a 
detailed operating plan in line with the model (action plan) 
given in Figure 3«3 » These operating plans have also been 
produced by each of the separate companies which exist within 
each group. The operating plans have contained a detailed series 
of planned events expected to take place during the year. Dates, 
physical values and financial values have been ascribed to 
these events.
The NFC budgeting process is in line with the theoretical 
position outlined in Chapter 3 and the one year budgets are 
completely integrated with the operating plans, at all levels.
The feedback process, in respect of the plans, has been exercised 
only through monitoring the one year operating plans and budgets. 
No attempt has been made to formally monitor the general 
implementation of the strategy and no back-check has ever been 
undertaken of the implementation of the strategic plans. 
Informally, the Director of Corporate Planning considers that he 
has been able to keep abreast of major failings which can be 
dealt with at the early stages of the next annual cycle. He 
does not consider, therefore, that a formal back-check is 
necessary.
Whilst there have been no formal contingency plan arrangements 
required as part of the corporate planning process, some of the 
group/company plans have occasionally identified possible 
courses of action if certain declared events were to obtain.
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After discussion, the Director of Planning agreed that there 
would be considerable merit in preparing contingency 
plans but he considered it would be best, at this stage, to 
concentrate on strategy development and measures to improve 
the integrity of some of the plans of the individual companies.
To conclude this section, it must be stated that, in the opinion 
of the Director of Corporate Planning and, notwithstanding the 
theoretical deficiencies discussed earlier and a measure of 
inaccurate forecasting, the corporate planning process of the 
MFC is well respected throughout the organisation. It is 
generally considered to be a vital part of the overall management 
of the company and totally in keeping with the management style 
that the Chief Executive wants to maintain and enhance. Ke has 
added that there is a strong feeling of independence within the 
company and a desire to prevent the financial difficulties 
experienced in its early years from ever returning again. This 
has prompted a need to be progressive and develop strategies 
which will ensure long term stability and robustness. Indeed, 
he considered that much of the financial improvement experienced 
up to 1979 has been due to the corporate planning process and 
it has enabled the Company to ’ride out' the recession, so far, 
reasonably well - and much better than would otherwise have been 
the case.
12.2. Corporate Planning Procedures
In respect of procedural issues, these will again be dealt with 
in order of the theoretical description provided in Chapter 4.
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12.2.1. Forecasting
All of the forecasting undertaken by the NFC, at each 
organisational level, has been undertaken on what is described 
as a 'judgemental* basis. No 'attempt has been made at using the 
array of techniques which are listed in Chapter 4. In effect, 
this means that the visionary forecast technique (see Chambers 
et al in Chapter 4) has been used as was the case, largely, 
in respect of the BRB, The Director of Planning is happy 
with this technique in principle since he regards the forecasts 
made by company/group experts, provided in the knowledge of 
macro-economic indicators (U.K.wholesale price index, gross 
domestic product and manufacturing output), is likely to be 
the best which can be made available. However, as indicated 
earlier, he considers that, in some of the companies, insufficient 
time, effort and coordination has been put into the production 
of the forecasts by those who have the responsibility and 
ought to have the expertise.
'The structure of the forecast procedure in respect of the outline 
strategic plan is similar to that described in the model provided 
in Figure 10.3. in connection with the BRB procedures. The main 
difference is that there is no separate investment specification. 
Instead, the investment intentions have emerged as a result of 
the marketing specifications. The final outcome of this 
procedure has been an investment programme which has not been 
constrained by pre-set ceilings. This situation has been able 
to be sustained since the investment requirements of each 
corporate plan to date have not exceeded the expected Government 
investment ceilings.
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Another significant difference compared with the BRB procedure 
is that the forecasts have been produced in estimated actual 
prices. This procedure has relied heavily upon central advice 
supplied by the Director of Planning (after consultation with 
his fellow board members) about the likely levels of pay 
increases and the general levels of inflation. Receipts price 
increases and non-staff costs increases above and below the 
rates of inflation have been left to the judgement of the 
individual groups and companies.
In regard to investment, all major projects are expected to 
have been included in the group/company plans, prior to being 
authorised. DCF procedures are applied to all investment 
projects at Group level. Each of the Groups has an authority 
level of £100,000 per project. Any projects above that level 
have to be referred to NFC headquarters to be approved by a 
Projects Appraisal Committee. This committee is chaired by 
the Director of Administration and attended by the Directors 
of Finance, Personnel and Corporate Planning. This committee 
vets the projects, checking to ensure that they are consistent 
with the latest Group plan.
A DCF rate of 20/o is applied in respect of all projects. This 
rate is in real terms and, consequently, the cash flow forecasts 
are in constant prices. However, no arrangements are made to 
ensure that real price changes are allowed for in the forecasts.
There are no formal arrangements to monitor the outlay on 
investment projects but the Groups are expected to ensure that
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the forecast outlays and benefits are incorporated in their 
three year strategic plans, annual operating plans and 
budgets.
The NFC are unhappy with their investment authorisation and 
appraisal arrangements and feel that the project submissions 
frequently include inflated benefits in order to achieve the 
20/O discount rate. Also they are not happy that the benefits 
are correctly included in the three year plans at group level. 
Consequently, a back-check procedure has recently been designed 
in order to specifically evaluate the overall effect of individual 
projects, starting with those having an outlay of over £100,000. 
This procedure has not been introduced yet but will be in 1982.
In the opinion of the Director of Corporate Planning, it is
likely to lead to the application of differential discount rates
for various classes of project. Also, it seems likely that 
forecast cash flows will be required in estimated actual prices 
to facilitate a closer reconciliation with the three year 
strategic plans, operating plans and budgets of each Group.
This would, of course, require (for discounting purposes) the 
use of a money rate of return rather than the present method of
a real rate of return.
The NFC do not intend to assess the organisation's cost of capital 
to determine the discount rate because of the complexity of that 
task. Instead, artificially high rates of return will be 
expected to apply to selected projects as a means of allowing 
a headroom for risk.
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12.2.2. Model Building
The NFC has not used computer models for any part of the 
corporate planning process and there are no plans to do so in 
the immediate future.
12.2.3» Risk and Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analyses have not been formally prepared but some 
of the companies/groups have occasionally provided details of the 
major potential risk areas within each of their strategic plans.
A risk analysis, as described in Chapter 4, has never been 
attempted and there are no plans to do so. After discussion, 
the Director of Planning accepted the merits of risk analysis 
but stated that it would be more fruitful, at this stage, to 
concentrate upon developing, more formally, the sensitivity 
analysis procedures and then related contingency plans.
12.2.4. Budgetary Control
The budgetary control procedures used in each level of the 
organisation are similar to the theoretical situation outlined 
in Chapter 4, Unlike the BRB, however, these procedures are 
fully integrated with an annual operating plan procedure. The 
annual budgets are built up from company level and review 
procedures take place at group and NFC headquarters level. The 
group budgets are finalised in the Autumn and submitted 
together with the operating plans to NFC headquarters in 
November. They are discussed at the December Executive 
Committee meeting where care is taken to ensure that each group 
budget is compatible with the strategic plan (i.e. the group 
plan) and the operating plan. The budgets contain profit and
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loss account, investment expenditure and cash flow statements, 
supported by details of key physical facts.
Monitoring of the budget takes place at all levels on a four 
weekly basis and of the operating plan quarterly. This 
monitoring procedure is based upon the upward submission of 
variance statements with related explanations. This leads to 
discussion at Executive Committee meetings and equivalent 
meetings at group level and, where appropriate, corrective 
action, as far as possible.
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CHAPTER 13
CORPORATE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL BUS COMPANY
As in respect of the BRB and NFC, it is intended, in this chapter, 
to describe the practice of corporate planning in the National 
Bus Company, using the headings established in Chapters 10 and 
12. The information provided in this chapter was obtained from 
the NBC mainly in response to the questions listed in the 
structured interview programme discussed in Chapter 2.
13.1. The Process of Corporate Planning
The National Bus Company commenced its corporate planning in 
1974 and has produced a corporate plan annually since that 
year. At the outset, a decision was made by the NBC board 
to appoint a firm of management consultants to advise on the 
nature of the process and how it could be best applied in the 
NBC. In the event, P.A. International were appointed in 1973 
to produce a report on the process and procedures. Their 
report has not been made available to the author but it has 
been explained by the Director of Research and Strategic 
Planning that their recommendation for a heavily centralised 
process with a large corporate planning department at NBC 
headquarter’s level was not acceptable to NBC, This was 
because it was felt by the NBC board that it would be contrary 
to the culture of the organisation which placed a heavy 
emphasis on the individual companies serving the local 
communities and obtaining, where possible, financial support 
from Local Authorities.
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Instead, it was decided to proceed on a totally decentralised 
basis and produce ’corporate' plans at each company level.
These plans have been consolidated at headquarters level but not 
at the intermediate regional levels. In the consolidated NBC 
corporate plan I980, it was explained that corporate planning 
in NBC is designed to meet three distinct requirements.
These are stated below:-
' i) The imposition on each operating company of an
examination, on a regular basis, of the future bus and 
coach service requirements of the areas they serve, 
identifying those parts of the business which can be 
expanded, or continue to be provided, given the 
financial target expected by the Government and the 
anticipated levels of local authority financial support, 
and making the necessary plans for capital expenditure, 
manpower deployment and training, and service provision 
to meet forecast requirements, 
ii) It enables NBC central management to identify particular 
areas of difficulty and to decide where the resources of 
the Group can best be used to meet the NBC Group objective, 
iii) It provides a basis for the forecasts of financial outturn, 
capital expenditure and borrowing requirements which are 
requested annually by central government.’
To coordinate the corporate planning activities the then existing 
research and economics department was expanded by the addition 
of a planning manager and four staff. The planning manager • 
describes himself as a ’bus-man’ and he is currently supported 
by an economist, a general planner, a land use planner and a
4o4
statistician. Apart from the corporate planning activities, 
this department attends to planning studies on behalf of the 
companies including analysis of county council structure 
plans. However, the main task is coordination of the corporate 
planning and this department issues plan instructions, 
provides economic forecasts and consolidates the plans of the 
individual companies into the corporate plan. The Director 
of Research and Strategic Planning who heads this expanded 
department is a member of the main headquarters management 
team i.e. a director of National Bus Management Limited (see 
Chapter 8 for organisation structure).
Moving now to the comparison with the model in Figure 3*3., 
the first element to be considered is values. This term has 
not been formally adopted by ITBC as a fundamental part of the 
corporate planning process but recent plans have adopted the 
term implicitly in the form of an ’overall planning objective’ 
which is given below:-
’This (1980) corporate plan seeks to satisfy the same overall 
planning objective as its predecessors,’ which is ’to meet the 
NBC’s financial objective, as defined by statute and in 
agreement with the Secretary of State for Transport by 
promoting maximum patronage of the Company’s services by 
revenue earning passengers (defined as passengers contributing 
to revenue, either directly through the fares they themselves 
pay, or indirectly through grants and payments to secure 
provision for their conveyance) and minimising the resources 
used directly or indirectly to provide for their conveyance 
when and where required, whilst working where applicable within
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the framework of local authority policies and plans and the 
Traffic Commissioners' authority,'
Policies have not been explicitly developed and it is considered 
by the Director of Research and Strategic Planning that it 
has not been necessary to stipulate policies in the manner 
set out in Figure 3»5» Instead, the 'overall planning 
objective' was considered to be sufficient for this purpose, 
because there has been a general understanding at all levels 
of the significant items which might be included under this 
heading. These have included strict adherence to road traffic 
rules and regulations laid down by Government and the licences 
granted by the Traffic Commissioners. Additionally, in regard 
to manpower reductions, the policy has been to minimise their 
impact by finding alternative employment, management of 
wastage and recruitment, early retirements and voluntary 
redundancy. However, in the last resort, the policy has been 
to use compulsory redundancy as the means of achieving planned 
savings, subject to full consultation with the Trade Unions 
and local representatives of the staff concerned. Perhaps the 
most important implicit policy, however, has been that concerned 
with full cooperation with the local authorities, particularly 
the county councils. Given the level of deficit grants that 
have been paid in recent years, and other financial arrangements 
(see Chapter 8), these relationships have become of vital 
importance to the survival of NBC.
In respect of objectives, these have only been created by 
Government and not NBC itself. As for NFC, these were set
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for NBC under the Transport Act 1968 and required the NBC to 
break-even in its profit and loss account one year with another 
after making a proper provision for the depreciation and 
renewal of assets, NBC have accepted this financial objective 
and have been particularly conscious of the need for including 
a provision for the replacement of assets in their internal 
management accounts. However, this provision has not been 
incorporated in the published accounts since it would have 
been contrary to normally accepted accountancy practice. Instead, 
the additional depreciation which would have been charged on a 
replacement basis was shown as a note to the accounts for the 
years 1969 to 1978* In the subsequent accounts, the additional 
depreciation has been recorded in the current cost accounts 
statement, in common with all nationalised industries and most 
large organisations.
Additionally, since the fiscal year 1979/80, NBC have adopted 
the Government's external financing limit (EFL) as an additional 
financial objective. However, this has created difficulties 
since this objective is only clearly available for one year 
ahead and is not considered by NBC to be compatible with a 
longer term planning process. NBC do not estimate the EFL 
levels for later years, as is done by the BRB. Instead, the 
attitude has-been taken that the external financing requirements 
produced as a result of the corporate planning process represent 
the levels which have to be negotiated with Government. Thus, 
in this way, one of the key financial objectives has been a 
product of the completed corporate plan and not one of its 
earlier vital stages.
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The recently announced additional financial objective (to 
achieve a current cost operating surplus before interest of 
£l8,5m, in 1980 prices, by 1985) has not been incorporated 
into any of the completed corporate plans but is being 
recognised in the plan currently in production which is due 
to be completed in December I981/January 1982. It is anticipated 
by NBC that the plan forecasts will not achieve this objective.
There have been no non-financial objectives set by ÎIFC board, 
by the individual companies or by Government.
In terms of the individual companies* objectives, these have
been set only in financial terms at the outset of each
planning'cycle. They have amounted to target contributions to 
headquarter's charges (including interest) after making a 
provision for the renewal of assets. These targets have 
generally been related to intended achievement of the overall 
'break-even' financial objective by the end of the plan period 
but have not always been matched by the plan forecasts produced 
by each company. This has been because they have been seen as 
targets which should be 'aimed at' and not rigorous objectives 
which must be achieved. The new targets (following the 
additional Government objective noted above) have recently 
been issued by NBC for adoption in the current plan, reflecting 
an analysis of the required 'operating surplus' between the 
regions, with the Regional Directors distributing these to
company level according to their views on the potential for
achievement in each company.
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As part of this process of setting company objectives, goals 
have been set by NBC headquarters for a level of financial 
attainment required in respect of each of the years of the 
plan for each company. Again, these goals have not always been 
matched by the forecasts which have been submitted.
All strategic development has generally been left to the
management of the individual companies in discussion with their
Regional Directors. Apart from a ’Market Analysis Project' 
conducted in 1978, there have been no centrally conducted 
strategic reviews and NBC do not intend to create a situation 
where strategic direction is determined at headquarters level.
The thinking behind this is that each of the companies is 
working within its own environment and should produce a strategy 
which best fits its circumstances. In this strategic development, 
the companies have been advised to undertake internal and external 
appraisals in an attempt at producing the most appropriate 
means of strategic change. They have been expected to work 
closely with the Local Authorities and ensure that their plans 
are compatible with the Structure Plans and Transport Policies 
and Programmes of each metropolitan/shire county in which they 
operate.
To assist with the company external appraisals, the Planning 
Manager has issued, annually, macro-economic forecasts covering 
the U.K. gross domestic product and the retail price index. 
However, all other assumptions have been created by the 
management of the companies as they have deemed necessary.
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The development of strategy, at company level, has not been on 
a structured basis involving gap analysis, strategy creation, 
strategy evaluation and strategy selection but on the basis 
of generating 'ideas for change' i.e. schemes and investment 
projects to reduce resources and vary service levels in 
conjunction with local authorities. These have generally been 
tactical rather than strategic.
The Market Analysis Project (MAP) conducted in 1978 has been 
the only widescale and formalised strategic event. It was 
conducted by a separate team (since disbanded) reporting to 
the Director of Research and Strategic Planning and has been 
described as a 'once and for all' attempt at assessing the 
demand for bus travel within the orbit of each company and 
seeking to match that demand as far as economically possible, 
with financial support (where considered relevant) from the 
local authorities. It has been described by the Planning 
Manager as an exercise which 'checked up on the then existing 
managerial judgement of each company'. The MAP studies were 
not conducted, fundamentally, with a view to establishing 
company strategies which would achieve the overall financial 
objectives, although the financial contribution of each 
service was a significant feature. They were, instead, 
intended to match more closely supply and demand. The MAP 
studies resulted in the securing of significantly greater 
financial contributions from local authorities, since they 
indicated that a number of services should be withdrawn on 
financial grounds, but which the local authorities were reluctant 
to see withdrawn.
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Moving further down the model in Figure the plans produced
annually by the NBC and its individual companies have been very 
similar to the strategic plans identified in the model, except 
that contingency plans are not produced. At company level, 
they have contained details of the strategy and forecasts for 
the current year (i.e. the budget for that year) and for each 
of the next four years. They have also contained financial 
and physical forecasts covering all of the major aspects of each 
company’s activities i.e. profit and loss, cash flow, market 
volume, operating and maintenance volume/resources, manpower 
resources, investment and grants. In the.supporting commentary 
to each company plan, the general manager of each company has 
been required to comment on the forecast achievement, or otherwise, 
of the objectives and goals set by NFC headquarters. These 
comments are expected to be agreed before-hand with the 
appropriate Regional Director.
The corporate plans, which have also been produced annually have 
been consolidations of these company plans. The consolidations 
have been undertaken by the Planning Manager. At this stage, 
a comparison has been established between the forecast 
expectations and the overall financial objectives. The external 
financing requirement has also been established in recent years 
and an overall commentary written by the Director of Research 
and Strategic Planning.
The production and discussion of the annually prepared 
company/NBC plans has usually taken about seven months. Details 
of the arrangements are as follows:-
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July - Instructions for the compilation of each Company plan
are issued by the Director of Planning and Research. 
These instructions relate to procedural issues and 
do not include guidance on strategic matters.
- Macro-economic forecasts issued by Director of 
Planning and Research. These cover Gross Domestic 
Product and Retail Price Index which have been 
discussed informally and agreed broadly with 
Department of Transport and Treasury economists.
A decision is also taken by the General Executive 
Committee (made up of all of the executive directors) 
on the extent of real increases in pay which are to 
be included in the forecast. The percentages 
involved are included with the economic forecasts 
as a general planning assumption.
- Company General Managers informally discuss 
strategic/tactical suggestions with their Regional 
Director.
- Regional meetings held (chaired by each Regional 
Director) to clarify instructions and to allocate 
the objectives and goals referred to earlier.
September - Each company plan is submitted to NBC headquarters.
There are no formal meetings held to discuss these 
plans. Any major deficiencies are dealt with 
informally and plans revised as necessary.
October - Company plans are consolidated into the overall NBC 
corporate plan.
- Corporate Plan is submitted to the General Executive 
Committee where some changes are occasionally agreed.
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December - Corporate Plan is submitted to board for final 
approval.
January - Corporate Plan submitted to the Department of 
Transport.
Discussions take place, between the Director of Research and Strat­
egic Planning and the Director of Finance and Department of 
Transport officials on the corporate plan in an attempt to 
obtain general agreement of the stretegic content and acceptance 
of the external financing requirements. These discussions have 
not produced an acceptance of the corporate plan but merely 
an acknowledgement of its forecasts and broad approval of the 
strategic direction.
The forecasts for the first year of each plan (i.e. the first 
year after the year of production) have been converted by each 
company into an Operating Plan, in line with the model given 
in Figure This has been done to ensure a structured
and disciplined interface between the strategic plans (i.e. the 
company plans) and the budgets for that year. The Director of Research 
& Strategic Planning bas described the operating plans as 
a series of firm intentions to be implemented by each company 
to meet, as far as possible, the first year goals which have 
been laid down. He has added that the forecasts contained 
within the remaining three years of the four year company 
plans have been generally far from firm.
The annual budgets prepared by each company have been fully 
compatible with the operating plans and, together, they have
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represented the main feed-back process. Budget data is monitored 
four weekly and the implementation of the action plans have been 
monitored by the Regional Directors on a quarterly basis. No 
other arrangements have existed to monitor the implementation of 
the strategy. The Director of Planning and Research considers 
that it is appropriate to consider each company plan as a 
free-standing event which could be much different to its 
predecessor, if economic circumstances change. Thus, under 
these arrangements only the first year goals are monitored and 
no attempt has been made to monitor the progressive achievement 
of the company objectives. However, the objectives set for the 
following plan take account of informal indications of the 
overall progress of each Company towards achievement of the 
four year objectives.
As noted earlier, there are no contingency plan arrangements 
included in the company plans or, consequently, the corporate 
plan of the NEC. However, the Director of Research and Strategic 
Planning considers that some company plans have contained 
pessimistic forecasts as a means of ensuring that they are 
unlikely generally to produce a result which is worse that their 
predictions.
To conclude this section it is useful to state the views of the 
Director of Research and Strategic Planning on the NEC corporate 
planning process. He considered the process to be worthwhile 
in the context of the one year operating plans which ensure 
that the Company budgets are well conceived and constructed. 
However, he regarded the company strategic plans and the
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corporate consolidation as a 'piece of nonsence produced for 
the Department of Transport'. This opinion was based upon 
his views of the uncertainties which attend longer term 
forecasts. Additionally, he considered that each company is 
working in a different climate (politically i.e. in connection 
with local authority grants, economically and geographically).
In these circumstances, he did not feel that there was much 
room for long term objective setting by NBC headquarters or, 
indeed, for much central direction over the development of 
strategy. Further, he has added that the board of NBC resisted 
Department of Transport pressure for introduction of corporate 
planning for a few years but the then Chairman relented in 1973*
However, he was happy to state that he also considered that the 
NBC companies who have put the most effort into their strategic 
plans and, more importantly, their one year operating plans 
'have weathered economic storms the best'. Consequently, he 
believes that the performance of NBC has benefitted from the 
corporate planning process.
13.2. Corporate Planning Procedures
In respect of procedural issues, these will again be dealt with 
in the order of the theoretical description provided in 
Chapter 4.
13.2.1. Forecasting
All of the forecasting undertaken by the Companies in the 
preparation of the four year strategic plans, operating plans 
and budgets has been undertaken by what is described by NBC
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as a 'judgemental' basis. As in respect of the NFC, discussion 
of this issue established that this was in line with the 
visionary forecast technique described by Chambers et al (see 
Chapter 4). The Director of Research and Strategic Planning 
considered that this had generally proved satisfactory and that 
there is sufficient expertise at company level to undertake these 
forecasts effectively, given reasonable time and application.
He added that reference would be made, at company level, to the 
macro-economic indicators, i.e. as leading indicators, but the 
extent to which these have been used in the forecasts has been 
left to the management team of each company. Additionally, at 
NFC headquarter's level, regression analysis has occasionally 
been used to provide the companies with guidance on the likely 
impact of levels of real fares increases.
As in the NFC, the structure of the forecasting procedures in 
respect of the NBC company plans is very similar to the model 
provided in Figure 11.3. in respect of the BRB procedures.
Once again, the only significant difference is the fact that 
the investment specification is not regarded as an input to 
the forecasting procedures. As for the NFC, each Company's 
investment specification results from the requirements of the 
marketing specification. The outcome of this arrangement is 
that the investment intentions of each Company are not constrained 
by pre-set targets. However, if it is perceived by the Regional 
Directors that any one Company is contemplating an investment 
programme which will jeopardise the achievement of the likely 
Governments investment ceiling for NBC as a whole, then cuts 
in the programme are requested by the Regional Director.
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At the corporate plan consolidation stage, the total investment 
intentions are summarised in the NBC corporate plan as an output 
of the planning process and compared with the likely investment 
ceiling figures last advised by the Department of Transport. The 
differences have been generally quite small (the plan requirements 
being larger than the likely ceilings) and related to the later 
years of the corporate plan. No action has been taken to reduce 
the investment forecasts, the assumption having been that by the 
time those years arrive the circumstances could well be different.
Similarly, the total external financing requirement is regarded 
as an output of the NBC plan rather than an objective. In this 
case, this is because the EFC cash limit is only known for one 
year ahead and because of the uncertainty surrounding local 
authority grants in the later years of the plan.
As in the BRB, but unlike the NFC, the company plan and NBC 
corporate plan forecasts are prepared in constant prices with 
allowance being made for real fares increases (assessed by each 
company) and real pay increases using the assumption issued by 
the Director of Research and Strategic Planning. The base 
price level used has been the average price level of the first 
year of each company plan including price changes expected 
during that year.
In respect of investment projects, DCF procedures have been used 
at all levels in NBC in connection with all projects other than 
the purchase of buses. ’ The reason for excluding buses is that 
such projects have generally been related to their replacement and
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because they could last for a very long time if they are 
adequately maintained. The rate of discount used is 10% and the 
cash flows are forecast in constant prices. No reference is 
made to the organisation's cost of capital. Before authorisation, 
all investment projects are checked to ensure that they are 
contained within the Company plans and those above £750,000 
are referred to the Department of Transport for approval.
The concept of a required rate of return, announced in Crand 7151 
(see Chapter 10 for related discussion in respect of the BRB) 
has not been applied to NBC„
15.2.2. Model Building
It is the intention of NBC that each of its companies becomes 
heavily involved in computerisation of its day-to-day 
administrative and accounting procedures. However, in terms of 
model building, the only project being developed is in connection 
with the optimisation of bus crew scheduling. In the opinion 
of the Director of Research and Strategic Planning, it will be 
ten years before NBC gets round to using computer models for 
its corporate planning.
15.2.3. Risk and Sensitivity Analysis
No form of risk or sensitivity analysis has been undertaken by 
NBC or any.of the Companies in their plans. Additionally, it 
is not presently the intention of NBC to do so. This deliberate 
omission has been explained as being due to the fact that emphasis 
is placed, in NBC, on the integrity and achievement of the one 
year operating plans and budgets. The longer-term forecasts
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(i.e. years 2 to 4) are not regarded as being of great significance 
and, almost inevitably, subject to amendment when the next plan 
is produced. These remarks also apply to the absence of 
contingency plans.
15.2.4 . Budgetary Control
The budgetary control procedures used in each of the Companies 
and NBC headquarters are similar to the theoretical position 
outlined in Chapter 4. As noted earlier, they are fully 
integrated with the annual operating plans. The budgets are 
built up from company level and submitted to NBC headquarters 
where they are reviewed. This review takes the form basically 
of ensuring that they are in line with the operating plans.
Monitoring of the budget has taken place on a four weekly basis, 
through the upward submission of variance statements and related 
explanations. This has led to discussions at regional and 
headquarters level on what action to take to improve the 




CORPORATE PLANNING IN BRITISH AIRWAYS
To conclude this part of the study, it is necessary to describe 
the practice of corporate planning in British Airways. The 
pattern of the description will be similar to that provided in 
Chapters 10, 12 and 13, in respect of the other three 
organisations covered in this research. This will facilitate 
the comparison undertaken in Chapter 15, wherein the approaches 
to corporate planning of the four organisations are compared in 
summary form against the theoretical material provided earlier 
and against each other. The information given in this chapter 
was obtained from BA mainly in response to the questions listed 
in the structured interview programme.
4.1. The Process of Corporate Planning
Corporate planning has been undertaken in British Airways by 
the production of five-year plans in each year since its 
creation in 1972. Indeed, corporate plans were produced by 
both of the merged companies (BOAC and BEA) in 1971, providing 
a basis on which to start the process.
It was decided by BA that, from the outset, the process of 
corporate planning would be undertaken largely at headquarters 
level and a relatively large corporate planning department was 
created under a Planning Director who became responsible to 
Director of Economic Development. It will be observed in 
Figure 8.2., that the Director of Economic Development is a 
member of the board of BA. An outline organisation structure
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of the Planning Directors department is given in Figure l4.1
Planning Director
Head of Corporate Planning
Head of Economic Research
—  Head of Airport Policy Planning
—  Advisor, Future Aircraft
Figure l4.1. BA - Outline Structure of Planning 
Directors Department_______________
(Source : Discussions with BA planners)
The main functional, responsibility for the production of 
corporate plans is located with the Head of Corporate Planning 
who has a staff of 21. All of these staff have an airline 
background and two are qualified accountants. Some of the 
responsibilities are located with the Head of Economic 
Research who is assisted by seven economists, all with airline 
experience and some with statistics and systems analysis 
experience. Additionally, some of the corporate plan production 
responsibility is undertaken by the Head of Airport Policy 
planning (with 6 staff) and the Advisor, Future Aircraft (with
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5 staff).
The five-year plans of the Airlines Group, are prepared mainly 
in the Planning Director’s department. The plans of the other 
groups are prepared by the management teams of these groups; 
each coordinated by a Planning Manager within the group. The 
Head of Corporate Planning, with the assistance of the Finance 
Director's department, which attends to the consolidation of 
the financial and physical forecasts, is responsible for the 
annual production of the five year 'Airlines Group' plans and 
the overall corporate plans. The corporate plans consist of 
the consolidation of the plans of the Airlines Group and the 
seven smaller groups.
Overseeing these functional responsibilities, in respect of the 
production of the Airlines Group plan, there is a strategic 
steering group. This group is chaired by the Director of 
Economic Affairs and consists of the members of the executive 
management team given in Figure 8.2., except the Deputy 
Chairman and Chief Executive, the Secretary and Legal Director 
and the Public Relations Director.
Moving to the comparison with the model in Figure 3.5», the 
first element to be considered is values. These have never 
been expressly determined by BA. However, the implicitly 
accepted values have been explained to the author by the 
Head of Corporate Planning as being related to the persuit of 
growth in international and domestic market shares, financial 
viability, high service quality, operation of modern aircraft.
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competitive price levels and, until recently, protection of the 
existing route structure.
Likewise, policies have never been explicitly determined.
Apart from those which represent the values noted above, 
however, the Head of Corporate Planning has explained that, 
implicitly, they have included a very high regard for air 
safety and strict adherence to UK and international safety 
laws, and acceptance of the need for noise control. Until 
recently (i.e. the I981/82 corporate plan which is currently 
being prepared, covering the five years from L982/83 to 
1986/87) other implicit policies have been to have no 
compulsory redundancy and to progressively improve real pay 
levels. These latter policies have recently been abandoned 
because of the financial difficulties which obtained during 
the financial year I980/81.
In moving towards a policy of compulsory redundancy, in recent 
months, BA decided first to ascertain how many of their staff 
would be prepared to take early retirement or leave the 
organisation voluntarily, in both cases with redundancy 
settlements. The target reduction was 9,000 staff between 
September I981 and June 1982, with the proviso that, unless 
sufficient volunteers come forward, the new compulsory 
redundancy would be operated. The author has been advised by 
BA planners that up to early November I98I, more than 9,000 
staff had volunteered to accept the redundancy arrangements.
In regard to the new policy of not progressively improving real
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pay levels, EA planners have advised the author that a policy 
of negative real increases is under discussion and will 
probably be operated during the next few years. Indeed, the 
Deputy Chairman of BA has already announced that ’There will 
be no pay increases for anyone until at least the end of 
September 1982’ (Financial Times, 11 September I981).
In respect of objectives, it was stated in Chapter 9 that the 
Government has required BA to earn sufficient profit after 
interest and taxes to fund its asset replacement programme and 
pay an appropriate return on the public dividend capital.
Within recent corporate plans, this has been converted into a 
’paramount financial objective’ which has been to:- 
’pay interest on loans 
pay currently payable tax 
pay dividend on public dividend capital 
fund asset replacement programme
fund reasonable proportion of capital for growth’
Additionally, BA have created non-financial objectives, viz:- 
’raaintain our share of major markets in a competitive 
environment,
ensure compliance with legislated and publicly acceptable 
noise levels’
Prior to the corporate plan currently in production, there was 
a third non-financial objective which was to:-
’maintain stable employment by increasing staff productivity 
and remuneration levels’
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It was noted in Chapter 9 that BA have proposed to replace this 
latter objective with one which seeks to improve labour 
productivity by 6% per annum in each of the years I981/82 to 
1984/85. This is designed to allow for the major reductions 
in manpower currently being discussed and being included 
in the 1981/82 five year-plan.
With the exception of the last item, the objectives referred to 
above have been somewhat open-ended. A far more definitive 
objective was that set by Government in 1979, following 
Cmnd 7131 (see Chapter 9) which required a 67c return on assets 
(re-valued at a current cost basis, with the resultant 
supplementary depreciation included in costs) in the years 
1979/80 to 1981/82. However, this objective has not been 
included in the corporate plans since it has been regarded as 
unattainable. However, BA now are seeking to persuade the 
Department of Trade to accept a k% return for I982/83 and 
beyond. If agreement is reached, this financial objective will 
be included in future plans.
A further, and more definitive, objective has been the 
Government's external financing limit (see Chapter 9). This 
has not been included in the corporate plans because it has 
only been set for one year ahead. Instead, as for NBC, the 
financial forecasts included in the corporate plans have been 
regarded as the external financing requirements which then 
have to be agreed with the Department of Trade as being suitable 
for use as the external financing limits.
425
All of the objectives referred to above relate to BA as a whole. 
No attempt has been made by BA to sub-divide them over the groups 
Instead, the assumption has been made that the overall 
objectives are suitable for the corporate plan, and also for 
the Airlines Group plan which covers the bulk of the trading 
position. The smaller 'subsidiary* groups have been expected 
to produce their own objectives. They have also been required 
to produce their own strategies and plans without the 
involvement of the Strategic Steering Group.
BA have not set goals as part of the corporate planning process. 
Indeed, it is accepted by BA planners that, to do so, would 
require more definition in the objectives. Instead, they have 
considered that goals emerge from the plans in that the 
forecasts of profit, investment and resources (particularly 
manpower) become the goals which each group is expected to 
achieve.
In respect of the determination of strategy, a considerable 
number of strategic studies have taken place which have dealt 
mainly with elements of the activities undertaken by the 
Airlines Group and the British Airtours Ltd. Group. Strategy 
development in respect of the other Groups has been undertaken 
by the management of those Groups without central coordination.
BA have preferred to conduct their strategic studies on a 
piecemeal basis rather than overall strategic reviews of the 
entire organisation or the individual groups. The outcome of 
each of these studies has been fundamental to the production 
of the Airlines Group plans and, thus, the corporate plans. To
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quote the Head of Corporate Planning 'each successful strategy 
is fed into the next plan,'
These strategic studies have been conducted in the Planning 
Director's organisation in and between each of the four 
departments within that organisation, as appropriate. They 
have been overseen by the strategic steering group which has 
also provided final approval of each strategy. In essence, 
each study has incorporated an internal and external appraisal 
but only in respect of the particular issues under consideration 
and not strategic development of the overall organisation or, 
even, of its Airlines Group. In recent years, these
studies have included separate examinations of, and the 
development of variations in the strategy, in respect of:- 
route structure 
aircraft replacement 




selected unprofitable networks 
manpower productivity 
operational performance
Some of these 
studies have also 
covered the British 
Airtours Ltd. Group
The Head of Corporate Planning and the Head of Economic Research 
consider that this approach has been easier to adopt. They 
accept the author's view that the piecemeal approach is not 
as satisfactory as an overall strategic study but feel that 
it would be very difficult and time-consuming to undertake a
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comprehensive strategic study for BA or even just the Airlines 
Group. In the circumstances, gap analysis has not been used. 
Additionally, contingency strategies have not been developed.
Moving down the model in Figure 3.5*» the plans produced 
annually by BA and its groups have been very similar to the 
strategic plans identified in the model. Five-year plans have 
been prepared by the management of each group, except the 
Airlines Group where the plans have been prepared in the 
Planning Director's department. With the assistance of the 
Finance Department (consolidation of financial and manpower 
forecasts), the plans of the Airlines Group have been 
consolidated with the separate plans of the other groups,forming 
the overall corporate plan.
The production of the Airlines Group plans has usually taken 
about six months. Details of the main elements of the process 
are as follows:-
July - Preparation and issue of plan assumptions by
Head of Economic Research. These assumptions have 
generally covered:-
macro-economic forecasts (UK and major 
international economies) 










aviation fuel costs 
pay levels
August to
September - Forecast of markets, market share and receipts,
recognising any strategic changes (resulting from
the strategic studies) agreed by Strategic Steering 
Group since the previous plan was prepared. These 
forecasts are prepared by the Director,
Commercial Operations in conjunction with the 
General Managers of each route division.
October to
November - Forecast of resources and costs prepared by Head
of Corporate Planning, again recognising strategic 
changes agreed by Strategy Steering Group.
November - Advance summary of plan forecasts submitted to
Strategic Steering Group for discussion of the 
reasonableness of the forecasts.
December - Final summary of plan forecasts incorporating any 
changes agreed by the Strategy Steering Group. 
Presentation of the plan forecasts to the Strategy 
Steering Group.
The plans of the other seven groups have been prepared by the
management teams of those groups and not by the Director of
Planning. However, the same plan assumptions have been used.
Again market share forecasts have been calculated first, then
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the resources by each department and finally the financial 
evaluation by the Finance department.
Consolidation of the plans of the eight Groups has generally 
taken place in January / February, thus enabling them to be 
presented to the ’Executive Board' (i.e. the executive management 
team shown in Figure 9.2.) in March and the full Board in April.
After discussion at the full board meeting the corporate plans 
have been submitted to the Department of Trade. Subsequent 
discussion with Department of Trade officials has generally 
centred around the strategic developments and the financial 
forecasts. At no time has this led to formal agreement to the 
plans but merely a noting of its contents and an acknowledgement 
that there are no fundamental objections to the strategic content. 
The plan assumptions/forecasts on which the plans are based 
have usually been discussed with Department of Trade officials 
at the outset to ensure that they have no serious objections 
to these vital elements.
Action plans, called 'cost revenue estimates' have been prepared 
annually by the Airlines Group and the British Airtours Ltd.
Group, but not by any of the other Groups. These have 
covered the first year of each Group plan i.e. the first year 
after the base year. In respect of the Airlines Group, these 
cost revenue estimates have been prepared in the Director, 
Commercial Operations department. In the earlier plans, these 
cost revenue estimates were prepared by route division in 
consultation with the six General Managers of the route divisions.
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However, this has not been the case in recent years. The cost 
revenue estimates for British Airtours Ltd. Group has been 
produced by the management team of that group.
All of the Groups have prepared one-year budgets annually 
(summarised within the finance function) and, in respect of 
the Airlines Group and the British Airtours Group, these have 
always been reconciled with the cost revenue estimates. The 
monitoring of the budgets and the cost revenue estimates have 
represented the only plan feedback process which has been 
undertaken. No back-check reports have been prepared to monitor 
progress in implementing strategy.
Contingency plans have not been prepared and there are no 
intentions to do so. Instead, the Head of Corporate Planning 
considers that the fact that the plans are updated annually 
renders that part of the process unnecessary. However, he 
has acknowledged that the deterioration in results in I980/81 
compared with the forecasts contained in the 1979/80 corporate 
plan might have been handled more readily had a contingency 
plan been prepared to deal with such a large drop in receipts.
Indeed, what has occurred recently is that production of the 
1981/82 Airlines Group plan has been speeded-up to deal with an 
emergency financial situation. This plan is described in BA 
as the 'survival plan' and it incorporates the results of a 
strategic study in respect of manpower productivity which 
prescribes major manpower reductions in 1982, negative real 
increases in staff costs and some route withdrawals.
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When questioned about the general lack of involvement of the 
headquarters' departments and the route divisions in the 
production of the Airlines Group plan, the Head of Corporate 
Planning stated that the BA approach was a conscious decision 
which was generally well supported. He felt that the expertise 
and strategic knowledge needed to produce the Airlines Group 
plan lay in two headquarters' departments only - Director of 
Commercial Operations and Planning Director. He added that 
it was perhaps appropriate to bring the route divisions into 
the process only at the cost revenue estimate (action plan) 
stage but, as noted earlier, even that has not occurred in 
recent years.
The Head of Corporate Planning also advised the author that the 
Airlines Group and corporate plans produced in the early and 
mid-seventies were quite good in that they predicted growth 
and related productivity improvements and these occurred. 
However, those produced since about 1977 have not been accurate 
for two reasons, viz:-
1) They did not predict the 1980/8I economic recession.
2) Whilst the abandonment of 'price fixing' was forecast, 
it had not been assumed that it would occur as early as 
1979 and with the severity of price-cutting which has 
ensued.
In future plans, a much greater emphasis will be placed upon 
cost reductions, particularly in respect of manpower savings. 
These cost reductions are seen as being crucial to the survival 
of the organisation.
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14.2. Corporate Planning Procedures
In respect of procedural issues, these will again be dealt with 
in the order of the theoretical description provided in 
Chapter 4.
14.2.1. Forecasting
The bulk of the forecasting in respect of the Airlines Group 
plans has been undertaken through the use of computer models. 
These use leading indicators (i.e. selected plan assumptions) 
as the main input to assess the size of the overall market 
and, through a pattern of assessed pre-determined relationships, 
the market share and receipts are calculated. These forecasts 
have frequently been adjusted in the Director, Commercial 
Operations department on the basis of their expert opinion 
(again the visionary forecast technique) of the course of future 
events. The results of this procedure have then been used in a 
second computer model which, again through a mechanism of 
pre-determined relationships (themselves largely based on the 
visionary forecast technique), has been used to calculate 
resources and costs. All of the computer modelling has taken 
place within the Planning Director's department.
The forecasting in respect of the other Group plans has been 
undertaken manually using a forecasting structure similar to 
that applied in the BRB, NFC and NBC. In this case, however, 
unlike the BRB, the investment specification has resulted from 
the marketing specification and is not regarded as an initial 
input.
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Most of the forecasting in respect of the strategic studies has 
been of the visionary forecast technique type with some use of 
the models referred to above. Additionally a computer model 
has been designed by the Head of Economic Research which 
measures income and price elasticity for each major route, 
fare category and journey direction. This model has been used 
in the strategic studies in respect of markets/market share 
and fares.
All of the corporate/group plan and cost revenue estimate 
forecasts produced by BA have been in estimated actual prices 
and not in constant prices.
In terms of appraisal and control of capital investment, it has 
been the practice to ensure that all projects have been included 
in the Group plans before they are authorised. All large 
projects (80/c- of investment relates to aircraft purchase) 
have to be approved by a headquarters Capital Expenditure 
Committee and those for the purchase of aircraft (and major 
infrastructure projects) have also to be submitted to the 
Department of Trade for approval.
A discount rate of 6/ real has been used to evaluate all 
projects, with the cash flows being expressed in estimated 
actual price levels and the discount rate being increased 
to a money rate of return by the addition of a (varying) 
forecast rate of inflation. No attempt has been made to assess 
the organisation’s cost of capital.
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The Government investment ceilings have been ignored in the 
corporate planning process, the assumption having been that 
one of the purposes of the corporate plan has been the need 
to acquaint Government of the investment needs and overall 
external financing requirements.
14.2.2. Model Buildin£
The progress in this direction has already been noted. Further 
developments are anticipated (but not yet developed) to produce 
models which will assist further in strategic studies and in the 
production of the plans of the seven smaller Groups.
14.2.3» Risk and Sensivity Analysis
No form of risk analysis has been undertaken by BA. The head 
of corporate planning has advised the author that it had been 
tried a few years ago but it was found to be too difficult 
to assign probabilities to what were perceived to be a large 
number of interactive variables. Instead, a decision was taken 
to include a sensitivity analysis in each corporate/Group plan 
identifying the major areas of risk and the possible extent of 
those risks separately. The areas normally dealt with in this 
way have been aviation fuel prices, exchange rates and the
market shares in vulnerable routes. However, as noted earlier,
this has not led to the production of contingency plans,
14.2.4. Budgetary Control
The budgetary control procedures used in BA are in line with 
the theoretical position outlined in Chapter 4. However, as 
noted earlier, they are integrated with the action plans (cost
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revenue estimates) only in respect of the Airlines Group and the 
British Airtours Ltd. Group.
The budgets are built up from company level (and cost centres 
within each company) and reviewed at Group and headquarters 
level. They contain profit and loss account, investment 
expenditure and cash flow details, supported by details of 
key physical facts.
Monitoring takes place at all levels on a monthly basis. This 
monitoring is based upon the upward submission of variance 
statements with related explanations. This leads to discussion 
at headquarters, group and company levels and, where appropriate, 




COMPARISON OF THE APPROACHES TO CORPORATE PLANNING
I
In Chapters 10, 12 13 and l4, details were given of the 
practice of corporate planning in the four organisations 
covered in this research. In respect of each organisation, a 
comparison was made between theory and practice, with many of 
the differences being supported by the views of the planners 
concerned.
It is now proposed to take that analysis further by examining 
what the author judges to be the main features of the 
theory versus practice differences which have been identified, 
in respect of each of the four organisations. This examination 
will be structured around the first six hypotheses given in 
Chapter 1 .
However, before moving to the hypotheses, it is considered, by 
the author, to be useful to commence by isolating what appear 
to be the primary reasons for undertaking corporate planning 
within each of the four organisations. Quite clearly, one of 
the main reasons has been that the sponsoring departments 
(Department of Transport and Department of Trade) have required 
each of the four organisations to provide information about 
the strategies they intend to follow, which have to be politically 
acceptable, and the expected financial results, which have to be 
consistent with future expectations of overall public spending 
limits.
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From the point of view of the four organisations, however, the 
motivation has been different. Here, from the outset, it has 
been far more a question of survival or, at least, a 
demonstration that survival is both justified and possible.
In respect of the BRB, with its deteriorating financial and 
trading situation in the 1960’s, corporate planning was entered 
into earnestly and enthusiastically. It was seen as a process 
whereby the BRB could demonstrate that its Railways business 
still had a vital role to play in the economy and, given certain 
strategies (including a good deal of investment), could enhance 
that role.
In the NFC, corporate planning was seen as the appropriate 
meansof demonstrating and ensuring that the organisation could 
move from an era of losses and Government support to an era 
of complete financial viability and, as far as possible, 
independence. Aggressive strategies of product/market 
selection, coupled with major surgery of the operating practices 
and resources were seen as the means of achieving this.
A totally different situation has existed at NBC who were 
reluctant to get involved in corporate planning but were finally 
persuaded to do so by the Department of Transport. From the 
outset, NBC has not placed as much stress on the need for, or 
usefulness, of their plans as have the other three organisations. 
However, they have acknowledged that it has helped them to 
demonstrate to the Department of Transport that survival, which 
has been seen as almost guaranteed for purely social reasons, 
depends on continued injections of funds by Government at
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central and local authority level.
Finally, in BA, corporate planning has been seen as the means 
of demonstrating that the organisation could expand in the 
highly competitive international air transport environment.
At the same time, it could keep up to date with changing 
technology and be financially viable. More recently it is seen 
as the mechanism for demonstrating that the current financial 
crisis can be overcome.
Turning to the hypotheses, the first of these was that "The 
four organisations studied may have developed corporate planning 
processes and procedures which are at variance with generally 
accepted theory and also differ one with another.’ This is, in 
fact, the case, the differences being both numerous and varied.
Looking firstly at the process of corporate planning, the 
examination of the determination of values in the corporate 
planning activities of the four organisations has shown that it 
is a stage in the process which has received varied attention.
In the BRB, it took until March 198I for the first formal 
statement of values to be promulgated; eleven years after the 
start of corporate planning. In the NFC,the situation was 
found to be closer to established theory in that a ’statement 
of mission’ was prepared in 1978. Similarly, in the NBC, the 
’overall planning objectives’ which is really a statement of 
values has been developed in its recent plans. However, in BA 
no attempt has been made to explicitly determine values.
439
A common feature of the values which have been formally determined 
has been the fact that they have resulted mainly from ’in-house’ 
considerations and not from formal joint discussions with the 
sponsoring Government departments. Consequently, they only take 
on board what are perceived to be the values of Government.
In respect of policies, in explicit terms, these are notable 
for their absence in the four organisations. Instead, each 
organisation has developed a series of implicit policies which 
are considered to have always been taken into account when 
strategy has been determined. However, it was very interesting 
for the author to witness the degree of difficulty those 
planners interviewed had in articulating what those implicit 
policies were. This suggested that advantages, at least in 
communication, could be obtained from ensuring that a 
comprehensive list of policies is prepared in respect of each 
corporate plan.
In respect of financial objectives, these have been a mixture of 
Government targets and ’self-set’ objectives, both determined 
without reference to mutually and formally agreed values. The 
starting point in each case has been the Government set objective 
in the enabling legislation. The BRB have since been set a 
PSO cash limit, which was not based on any corporate planning 
considerations, and an external financing limit (from 1979/80) 
which, although only set for each ’base’ year (i.e. the budget 
year), has recently been estimated forward by the BRB as a 
vital financial objective without the agreement of the 
Department of Transport. However, the ’break-even’ requirement
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of the Non-passenger business (Railways Act 1974) can be said to 
have emerged from the corporate planning activities, in that 
it was based upon the Interim Rail Strategy contained within 
the Railway Policy Review (and thus the 1974 Rail Plan), The 
same has applied to the interim financial targets, although 
these were declared as 'interim* pending completion and 
acceptance of the Business Strategy Studies.
In NPC, it has taken until 1980 to develop a more challenging 
objective to that originally set (1968) by Government and even 
then without the benefit of a timescale of achievement. In 
NBC, the original Government objective (1968) was followed by 
annual external financing limits (from 1979/80). More recently, 
the original objective has been enhanced by the 1985 
'contribution' target, but that also did not emerge as a 
consequence of their corporate planning activities. In BA, 
the Government set objective was converted by the organisation 
into an open-ended 'paramount financial objective'. This was 
accompanied in 1979/80 by a more definitive Government target 
return on assets but this has not been incorporated into the 
corporate planning process. Additionally, BA has also been 
subjected to annual external financing limits since 1979/80.
The author's view on the financial objectives so far determined 
by, or set by Government to, the four organisations is that they 
have not been wholly consistent with the normative model which 
requires that they be long term, ambitious (to the extent 
specified by the explicit or implicit values) and be well 
defined. Too much reliance has been placed on Government
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target setting, rather than a concerted 'in-house* effort to 
determine what should be achieved or joint determination with 
the sponsoring Government departments.
This has applied equally to non-financial objectives, where 
little progress has been made in the four organisations. In 
the BEB, no attempt has been made to determine non-financial 
objectives and the Passenger 'service level* objective included 
in the Railways Act 1974 has been regarded more as a constraint 
than an objective. In NFC, there are no non-financial 
objectives, nor any plans to produce any. This has also applied 
in respect of NBC. In BA, however, efforts have been made to 
create non-financial objectives in respect of market share, 
noise pollution and maintenance of manpower levels, the last 
objective having been changed recently to a labour productivity 
target which requires considerable manpower reductions.
Quite clearly, the development of long term, ambitious and 
clear-cut non-financial objectives has not been considered to 
be particularly important in the BRB, NFC and NBC. Instead, 
they have given paramount attention to their financial 
objectives, however well defined.
Similarly, little attention has been paid to the establishment 
of intermediate goals as marker points on the road to 
achievement of the objectives. In the BRB, NFC, and BA, this 
has not been adopted as part of the process. Only in NBC have 
goals been established, whereby the overall financial objective has 
been converted into a series of annual profit 'targets' for each
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of the NBC operating companies. However, insufficient emphasis 
has been placed on the essential need to produce company 
, forecasts which achieve these targets.
The development of strategy has been the subject of considerable 
attention in each of the four organisations, involving to a 
considerable extent, internal appraisals of strengths and 
weaknesses and external appraisals of the environment but 
not starting with a gap analysis. In each organisation, a 
piecemeal approach has been adopted rather than an overall
strategic review. This has been partly because of the size
of the overall task but also because the four organisations 
have considered that their ^implicit) values, which have 
taken account of the perceived values of Government, have not 
generally permitted radical strategic changes.
For example, aside from the current and also piecemeal 
developments on privatisation (brought about by Government 
directives and not corporate planning), the BRB have not felt 
it appropriate to consider strategy in an overall study 
perhaps leading to the elinination of one or more of its subsidiary 
businesses. Instead, the survival of each business has been 
taken for granted. The subsidiary businesses have largely been
expected to develop their own strategy and, only in respect of
the Railways business,has there been extensive headquarters 
involvement (i.e. the Business Strategy Studies). In NFC, the 
strategic efforts have been unstructured and have relied upon 
strategic ideas being generated by the management teams at all 
levels. Here again, however, the basic assumption has been
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made that each of the groups should survive and, indeed, is 
primarily responsible for developing its own strategy. In 
NBC, all of the strategic effort has taken place at company 
level, apart from the 'once-off Market Analysis Project 
conducted in 1978. In BA, the piecemeal approach has been of 
two kinds. Firstly, the seven smaller groups have been required 
to produce their own strategies. Secondly, the strategy 
development of the Airlines Group has been undertaken at 
headquarters level by strategic studies dealing with facets 
of the business activity, e.g. route structure, aircraft 
replacement and markets/market share, rather than a complete 
review of Group strategy.
The corporate/business/group/company plans produced by each of 
the four organisations have been very similar to the strategic 
plans noted in the model in Figure 3*5* Bach has contained, 
not only an outline of the strategy, but forecasts of the 
expected outcome, in physical and financial terras for the years 
of the plan. Both the BRB and BA have considered it necessary 
to produce these plans covering a five year period and, in 
respect of the BRB a 'snapshot' view of the tenth year has 
generally been produced. NBC have chosen to forecast four years 
ahead to suit the financial forecasting requirements of the 
Department of Transport. IfFC, however, have chosen to forecast 
three years ahead.
Three out of the four organisations have prepared detailed action 
plans in line with the model in Figure 3«5« NFC have prepared 
one year action plans which have represented a detailed
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programme of events agreed between headquarters, group and 
company levels, designed to ensure implementation of the first 
year of the strategic plan, A similar one-year action plan 
has existed at ITBC between its headquarters and company level 
and, at BA, between headquarters and group level (or, more 
accurately; only the Airlines Group and the British Airtours 
Ltd. Group). None of these organisations has considered it 
necessary to produce action plans covering a period longer than 
one year i.e. for the medium term of say 2 to 5 years as 
recommended in Chapter 3«
The fourth organisation, the BRB has not produced action plans 
and has chosen, instead, to set one year 'budget objectives' 
to the five Regions of the Railways business and to the 
subsidiary businesses. In respect of the subsidiary businesses, 
this has not been a fundamental problem since they have produced 
their own strategic plans and thus have had a clear idea of 
their outline intentions for the first year of those plans.
In respect of the much larger Railways business, however, the 
absence of action plans agreed between headquarters and the 
five regions has caused considerable difficulty, particularly 
when coupled with a lack of communication of the content of 
the strategic plan of the Railways business and a lack of 
explanation of how the budget objectives have been established. 
This issue will be dealt with further in Chapter l6 .
The budget process for each of the four organisations has been 
in line with the theoretical position given in Chapter 3, 
except that in respect of the BRB there has been no action
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plan with which this budget can be reconciled. In respect of 
feedback and control, the emphasis in the BRB has been placed 
completely on the budget monitoring. No back-check arrangements 
have existed in respect of the earlier stages of the corporate 
planning process. In the other three organisations, the 
feedback and control has been exercised through monitoring the 
action plans and the budgets. Again, no back-check arrangements 
have existed in respect of the earlier stages of the corporate 
planning process. In all four organisations, the strategic 
plans have, instead, been regarded as free-standing plans 
without much regard for the need for a formal and structured 
review of the progress made in implementing the previous plans 
and the lessons to be learned. The view has generally been 
taken by the planners concerned that, informally, there has 
been a general understanding of how well the strategies and 
strategic plans have been implemented and that this understanding 
would have been taken into account in preparing the next plan.
It will be seen in Chapter l6, that, in respect of the BRB, 
benefits might have been obtained from adopting a more 
structured approach, given the dimensions of the differences 
between the planned and actual results.
Finally, none of the organisations has produced strategic 
contingency plans largely because of the difficulties of 
preparing such plans and the general feeling that, whatever 
goes wrong, can be dealt with in the next strategic plan.
It can be seen from the foregoing that the approaches to the 
process of corporate planning have been at variance with
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established theory in a number of respects in each of the four 
organisations. The significant differences have been related 
to the determination of values, objectives, contingency plans 
and, in respect of the BRB, action plans.
In the opinion of the author, these differences have been 
related to the nature of the four organisations i.e. the fact 
that they are nationalised industries which do not have as 
much freedom as non-public corporations to develop their own 
values and have to rely heavily on Government legislation and 
direction. For corporate planning to be effective in these 
circumstances, the aspirations of the Government and each of the 
organisations must be combined to produce mutual agreement in 
respect of what is required to be achieved and mutual commitment 
to the means of achievement. However, it is evident from the 
research, as noted in the foregoing paragraphs of this chapter, 
that this has not been the case.
In essence, there is a fundamental dilemma which has resulted 
from a clash of values which has pervaded the atmosphere in 
which corporate planning is conducted. This clash has been 
connected with the existence of political and economic 
influences at national level which have been crucial to 
Government decision making but not, of necessity, to the 
nationalised industries. In particular, the Government, for 
political and economic reasons, have historically taken an 
essentially short terra view of most aspects of its handling of 
the economy. Whilst it has produced, annually, its spending 
forecasts for four years ahead, these forecasts have been
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changed at least annually and often at short notice as economic 
events and political influences (including changes of 
Government) are brought to bear. Additionally, since the fiscal 
year 1979/80, the Government have attempted to control 
expenditure in the public sector (including nationalised 
industries, as noted in earlier chapters) through the use of 
external financing limits. These limits have only been set 
for one year (fiscal year) ahead. Additionally, they have often 
been arbitrarily assessed, reflecting target cuts to reduce 
the public sector borrowing requirement and have not necessarily 
been consistent, therefore, with the stated requirements of the 
organisations concerned. Thus, the four organisations covered 
in this research cannot be certain of their SFL targets for more 
than one year ahead and yet they represent what will become 
fundamental financial objectives for all the years of their 
strategic plans.
This approach has been grossly inconsistent with the strategic 
requirements of the nationalised industries who, following 
preparation of their strategic plans, have needed long term 
Government commitment to the financial consequences of those 
plans. This commitment has not been established and the net 
result of this has been that a partnership situation has not 
been established. Yet, a partnership is really essential since 
none of the nationalised industries can implement ̂ ts plans 
unless it has ongoing acceptance of the Government of the 
'means' as well as the 'ends'. By and large, these means have 
a Government price tag, covering issues such as capital 
investment ceilings and external financing limits; areas where
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long term commitment has been essential but not forthcoming.
This situation is highlighted by the fact that the sponsoring 
Government departments, on receipt of the corporate plans of 
the four organisations have generally only given broad approval 
to the underlying strategies (sometimes after questioning some 
elements) but effectively, merely noted the financial forecasts. 
These forecasts have,on some occasions, been incorporated in the 
next Government expenditure review only to be varied in 
subsequent reviews, often at short notice, as other events 
take precedence. It will be seen in Chapter l6 that this 
fundamental dilemma has impacted heavily on the strategic plans 
of the 3R5 and thus the success thereof.
Looking secondly at corporate planning procedures, the examination 
of the forecasting procedures of the four organisations has 
shown that they have made little use of the panoply of 
techniques which are covered in the literature. Indeed, 
there has been a close similarity of approach between the 
organisations with 'in-house' macro-economic forecasts often 
being used as leading indicators but with the final forecasts 
most often having been produced through the use of the 
visionary forecast technique. This has placed a heavy emphasis 
on the expertise of the individual forecasters.
In regard to the macro-economic forecasts which have been 
produced by each of the organisations, these have invariably 
been based on externally published forecasts (including those 
of Government) but, in the final analysis they have also been
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the result of the use of the visionary forecast technique. It 
is interesting to note that, in each organisation, the 
macro-economic forecasts have generally been discussed with the 
sponsoring Government department before their use in the 
strategic plans. These discussions have never led to a major 
disagreement, suggesting that they have received broad, if not 
actual, support.
In respect of investment appraisal, whilst each organisation 
has made extensive use of DCF procedures, none has been 
concerned with the concept of cost capital. However, in each 
organisation, steps have been taken to ensure that projects 
being authorised are contained within the strategic plans.
In regard to the use of computer models in the preparation of 
strategic plans, the research has showed that the BRB and BA 
have used models, of the simulation type, extensively and are 
planning further developments. On the other hand, in IIFG and 
NBC, computer models are not used and there are no plans to do 
so.
Moving to risk and sensitivity analysis, only the BRB has 
made use of a risk analysis technique, although, as will be 
seen in Chapter l6 , not without difficulty. NFC and BA have 
made limited use of sensitivity analysis through 
identification of the likely major risks. However, this has not 
led to the production of contingency plans. NBC, however, have 
not used sensitivity analysis and do not intend to do so.
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Finally, in respect of budgetary control, the procedures in each 
of the four organisations were found to be compatible with the 
outline theoretical description provided in Chapter 4.
It can be seen from the foregoing that some of the approaches 
to corporate planning procedures have been at variance with the 
established theory. However, in the judgement of the author, 
these differences are not as significant as those noted in 
respect of the process of corporate planning. One important 
exception, however, is seen as being the lack of a sensitivity 
analysis in NBC plans. This can be a major input into the 
development of contingency plans, which are considered by the 
author to be a significant element of the corporate planning 
process.
The second hypothesis was that ’Bach organisation may have found 
it necessary to develop its corporate planning process and 
procedures according to its own perceived needs rather than 
with central guidance.' This hypothesis has been found to be 
correct with not one of the four organisations having received 
specific guidance from Government on the corporate planning 
process and procedures. The sponsoring Government departments 
have adopted a passive role, occasionally commenting on what 
they have received and not what they consider ought to be 
provided in the corporate plains.
This issue was raised in a National Economic Development Office 
(NEDO) report entitled 'A Study of UK Nationalised Industries' 
in 1976, wherein it was stated that 'There are no specific
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statutory provisions for the nationalised industries to submit 
corporate plans’ although section 4 of the Railways Act 1974 
’implies that the Minister should approve the board’s long 
term plans,’ The Government’s response to that report (Cmnd 7151) 
commented that ’development plans and investment programmes 
of the nationalised industries, covering periods of 5 years 
ahead, have increasingly been formulated within the wider 
context of both the industries’ and the Government's objectives 
and policies.' Joint discussions of these plans and the 
economic/industrial prospects on which they were based was 
encouraged. Additionally, the response went on to say that 
’The Government considers that the corporate plan, and the 
examination of strategic options, should have a central place 
in the relationship between the nationalised industries and 
their sponsoring departments.' However, a framework for the 
preparation and discussion of nationalised industry corporate 
plans did not emerge from this initiative.
Further, the Government response did not provide an effective 
indication of how mutual agreement of and commitment to the 
nationalised industries' plans could be achieved.
The closest the response came to creating a climate of 
commitment was in respect of investment ceilings where it 
was stated that Ministers had 'agreed that they would aim to
give the industries ....  approval for 100^ of their agreed
investment programme for one year ahead, for the second
year and 70% for the third year (for which under the previous 
procedures, no approval had been given at all),' The author
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considers that this approach was far short of the mutual 
agreement and commitment which should, ideally, be expected. 
Indeed, it will be seen in Chapter l6, that the lack of 
Government commitment to the investment content of the 1974 
and 1975 Railways business plans (despite earlier Government 
statements indicating support for the underlying strategies) 
has had a material impact on the strategic problems of the 
BRB.
Prior to the NEDO report (1976), there had been a Select Committee 
attempt at providing some specific guidance to the nationalised 
industries (or more particularly the British Steel Corporation). 
That was contained in the First Report of Nationalised Industries 
Session 1972/73 in respect of the British Steel Corporation 
which contained reference to what was known later as the 'Benson 
Brochure procedure' which was a planning procedure recommended 
for use in respect of the British Steel Corporation.
That procedure was summarised in a model produced by Harris and 
Davies (I98l) which is reproduced in Figure 15.1. Harris and 
Davies pointed out that 'The system recommended an annual three 
tier system of planning' involving long term strategic plans, 
medium term development plans and annual operating plans. These 
were to be accompanied by quarterly progress reports, linked to 
annual budgets (which were themselves related to the annual 
operating plans). The main interface between the BSC and 
Government was seen as being related to the long term strategic 

























Figure 15.1» Benson Brochure Procedure 
(Harris and Davies, 198I )
However, this initiative, did not take on any significance as 
far as the four organisations covered in this research were 
concerned and, as noted earlier, no direct guidance from 
Government has been forthcoming to them to enable them to 
produce their corporate plans in any particular way or form. 
Instead, it only led, in part (and along with other Select 
Committee observations) to, the Government giving some 
clarification to the definition and purpose of corporate 
planning. That was provided in Cmnd 6IO6 (1975) as follows : -
(a) Definition
‘Corporate planning is a continuous process under which an 
industry can set objectives and priorities to form a 
coherent strategy for its business as a whole, organize 
the actions needed to achieve its objectives, and monitor 
the results of its actions against those objectives.'
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(b) Purpose for the Industry,
’Benefit from considering individual actions against the 
background of an up-to-date strategic plan covering the 
whole business. There should be a greater sense of 
cohesion between the various parts of an organization if 
managers are enabled to take a comprehensive view of the 
aim of the business and the future development of the 
industry.’
(c) Purpose for Government
’Easier for government to see the strategic options open 
to each industry and fully developed corporate plans 
ought to provide a better framework for the annual review 
of 5-year investment plans. The knowledge that the industry 
is pursuing a well thought out strategy should enable the 
government to concentrate on major issues without resorting 
to the examination of relatively detailed matters.’
In Cmnd 6IO6, the Government indicated that the evolution of 
corporate planning in the nationalised industries would take 
time. It did not deal with the problem of creating some form 
of mechanism for producing Government commitment to achievement 
of agreed nationalised industry plans.
The third hypothesis was that ’There may be little evidence of 
the organisâtions contributing to a wider nationalised transport 
sector corporate planning activity,’ Before testing this 
hypothesis, it is useful to consider what would be the purpose 
of such an arrangement. The author’s view is that although the 
process of corporate planning was created and developed to deal 
with the future development of corporate entitities such as a 
company, nationalised industry, local authority, etc., there is 
no fundamental reason why the process cannot be extended to 
encompass two or more organisations, jointly. Such a suggestion 
has some logic and possibly even merit in respect of groupings of 
nationalised industries because they are all ultimately 
responsible to the Government and some can be grouped together
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in a meaningful fashion.
Such a grouping might be useful for example in respect of those 
UK nationalised industries concerned with energy i.e. the 
National Coal Board, British Gas and the British Electricity 
Boards. Each of these responds to Government through the 
Secretary of State for the Department of Energy and some form of 
coordinated corporate planning might well be beneficial, possibly 
also involving the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority.
Returning to the organisations covered in this thesis, however, 
a less clear cut grouping might be useful in respect of 
nationalised transport or, at least, the domestic transport 
elements (i.e. within Great Britain), of nationalised transport. 
Assuming the latter, it being the more clear-cut suggestion, 
this would involve coordination, in some way, of the corporate 
planning activities of the following nationalised industries : - 
British Railways Board 
National Freight Company 
National Bus Company 
British Airways 
Scottish Bus Company 
Post Office
Of course, each of these organisations is not only involved 
in domestic transport within Great Britain. In the case of the 
BRB, the bulk of its Sealink UK Ltd. subsidiary activity is 
concerned with Continental and Irish traffic. Part of the NFC 
receipts are generated from overseas journeys. The bulk of
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British Airways traffic is in respect of international air 
services. The Post Office is mainly concerned with mails and 
counter services but also has a large parcels network, all of 
which handle international traffic. Nevertheless, it seems 
quite possible for the Government to require of these 
organisations that they produce separate plans as part of their 
corporate plans for that portion of their business which is 
concerned with domestic transport of passengers, freight and 
parcels within Great Britain, to facilitate some form of 
coordination.
Such an arrangement would, of course, require to have a purpose. 
This might be to enable the Government to optimise utilisation 
of publicly owned resources, reduce Government expenditure, 
improve coordination between modes or a combination of all 
three. Such considerations would almost certainly take into 
account the Government’s transport responsibilities aside from 
those vested in the nationalised industries, i.e. road building 
and maintenance. It would also require some form of central 
governing body with the ability to direct one of the nationalised 
industries to do what it would not otherwise choose to do for the 
’greater good’ of the nationalised transport sector. The 
predominant Government department in this context is the 
Department of Transport which could, conceivably, reach an 
understanding with the other departments concerned about the 
operation of such an arrangement.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to judge whether such a 
development would be of overall benefit or to make
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recommendations. Instead, it is intended only to consider 
whether the past corporate planning activities of the four 
organisations covered in the research have provided any evidence 
of moves in this direction.In previous chapters, there has been 
only one mention of this issue. That was a reference in 
Chapter 11 to the need for the 'forward plans of the BRB and 
NFC in the parcels field’ to be ’compatible’ and ’jointly 
progressed.’ This was related to the 1974 Rail Plan and 
assurances were given to Government to that effect. However, 
they were quickly forgotten and became of no importance in the 
ongoing planning activities.
However, aside from the formal corporate planning activities
discussed in earlier chapters, there has been one further
attempt at establishing some form of coordinated planning in
the nationalised transport sector and that was connected with
the creation of the Freight Integration Council (FIC) under the
Transport Act 1968. The FIC membership consisted of the
chairman of the BRB, the chairman of the NFC, an independent
chairman and four other members appointed by the Secretary of
State for the Department of the Environment (at that time the
Ministry of Transport was part of the Department of the
Environment). Its remit was as follows :-
’it shall be the duty of the Council to consider any matter 
relating to the provision and operation by the relevant 
transport authorities (that is to say, the Freight Corporation, 
the Railways Board, the Docks Board, the Waterways Board, the 
Scottish Group, the British Overseas Airways Corporation, the 
British European Airways Corporation, the British Airports 
Authority and the Postmaster General) and by the subsidiaries 
of those authorities of an integrated freight transport 
service, being a matter -
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(a) which is referred to the Council for their consideration 
by the Minister or by any of the relevant transport 
authorities or, being a matter relating to the 
Scottish Group, by the Secretary of State; or
(b) which appears to the Council without any such reference 
to be a matter which requires or may require 
consideration by the Minister or, being a matter 
relating to the Scottish Group, by the Secretary of 
State,
and, where it appears to the Council to be desirable, to make 
recommendations with respect to that matter to the Minister, 
and, where that matter relates to the Scottish Group, to the 
Secretary of State; and -
(i) the Minister may give to the Freight Corporation, the 
Railways Board, the Docks Board or the Waterways 
Board, and
(ii) the Secretary of State may give to the Scottish Group,
such directions as appear to him to be requisite in 
consequence of any recommendation of the Council.’
Clearly, under these arrangements, it was intended that there 
should be an attempt at coordinating the plans of the 
organisations mentioned above, in respect of freight transport, 
(in this context, the terra freight included parcels). The 
ultimate objective was seen as ’integration’ of freight transport 
and not merely coordination.
Only one report was produced by the FIC (or rather McLintock,
Mann & Whinney Murrey on behalf of the FIC, in 1970) and that 
was a parcels traffic study in the null area. In fact, as 
reported in the Second Report from the Select Committee on 
Nationalised Industries - National Freight Corporation 
(November 1975) the FIC, whilst it had
’held a number of meetings in the early days of its 
existence and produced one Report, since the summer of 1970 
it has been almost completely inactive. The last meeting 
was held on 30th June 1971. Since then a Second Report
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has been agreed to, but this was done without the Council 
holding a meeting. There are no references outstanding 
and the Council itself has no plans of its own for future 
work,’
The Committee went on to recommend that the FIC be abolished 
which was done in the Transport Act, 19SO. Had the FIC 
fulfilled the original intentions, it may be that this would 
have led to a degree or coordinated corporate planning. It might 
indeed have been a step towards the full coordination of 
nationalised transport industries’corporate planning.
In the circumstances, the author is bound to conclude that the 
hypothesis is proven.
The fourth hypothesis was that ’Elements of the general theory 
of the process of corporate planning may need to be modified 
to suit the special needs and characteristics of the 
organisations’. In the light of the research and of discussions 
with planners within the four organisations, detailed in 
previous chapters, the author’s judgement is that the general 
theory of the process of corporate planning does not need 
modification to deal with the corporate planning requirements 
and practices of the four organisations.
However, two issues have been noted earlier which, in the opinion 
of the author, demand further consideration in this context, 
in order to clarify this judgement. The first concerns the 
question of the determination of values and, what was described 
earlier as the ’fundamental dilemma’. In the synthesis of the 
theory of the process of corporate planning given in Chapter 3»
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the author remarked that, in the nationalised industries, 
values are often partially imposed by rules and regulations, 
which reflect the values of another tier of management (i.e. 
the Government) which equally often have fundamentally 
different motives, aspirations and timescales to those of 
commercial organisations or indeed, to the boards of the 
nationalised industries. The essential feature is for these 
values to be discussed and agreed before corporate plans are 
prepared, ^
It would be too easy to say that the corporate plans of the 
four organisations require some modification of this 
theoretical situation to recognise that full discussion on, and 
agreement of, values has not been achieved in the past and 
therefore cannot be in the future. To do so would be to admit 
that the corporate plans of the four organisations would not be 
reasonably firm intentions but merely a statement of what 
might happen, and the organisations would like to happen, if 
the Government do not prevent it by producing annual EFL targets, 
investment ceilings, etc. which prevent it.
That may be a reasonably view in the light of what has occurred 
but his thesis is concerned, in this context, with what ought 
to happen. In that respect, and in the judgement of the author, 
the established theory is correct. This requires that full 
discussions take place between the Government and the four 
organisations to establish mutually agreed values, leading to 
agreed objectives and commitment to the means of their 
achievement.
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The second issue concerns the level at which strategy is 
determined. In the theoretical description of this element 
of the corporate planning process this was described as being 
essentially a headquarters process. Yet the subsidiary companies 
of the BRB, the groups and companies of the NFC, the companies 
of the NBC and the smaller groups of BA, have been in the 
lead in the development of strategy, albeit with the ultimate 
authority resting at headquarters level.
This has been the result of
a) Placing headquarters emphasis on the main activities i.e. 
in respect of the Railv/ays business of the BRB and the 
Airlines Group of BA, the smaller activities being regarded 
as of lesser importance.
b) A conscious decision in NFC and NBC that the companies/groups 
are best able to attend to this task given broad guidelines 
and, in the case of NBC, 'target' objectives.
c ) An assumption that what exists will probably always exist
and, to a large extent, merely needs improvement/rationalisation/ 
development.
The author would not wish to decry these approaches but it needs 
to be stated that they can militate against an organisation 
taking radical decisions, such as divestment of a company. On 
balance, therefore, it is the author’s view that the theoretical 
situation is sound and does not need to be changed for this 
issue.
The fifth hypothesis was that ’Each organisation is likely to
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be committed to computerisation of much of the corporate planning 
process/procedures to provide more thinking time and evaluation 
of alternatives.'
It was found that this hypothesis was not correct in that 
neither NFC nor NBC are in any was committed to the development 
of computer models for corporate planning purposes.
The sixth hypothesis was that ’There may be in each case a lack 
of attention paid to the development of non-financial objectives.’
This hypothesis was found to be generally correct. As noted 
earlier, in respect of NFC and NBC, there has been no attempt to 
develop non-financial objectives. This situation has also applied 
in respect of the BRB although, as stated in Chapter 6, the 
Government set a single non-financial objective, in the Railways 
Act 1974, in respect of maintaining passenger services at the 
level which existed in 1974. In respect of BA, however, some 
effort has been put into the development of non-financial 
objectives and further progress is intended.
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CHAPTER 16
ASSESSMENT OF THE SUCCESS OF CORPORATE PLANNING 
IN THE BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD
The author has given considerable thought to the question of 
how to assess the success of corporate planning, in any 
organisation, in order that this task can be tackled in respect 
of the British Railways Board. Reference was first made to the 
literature and it was found that it consists, basically, of two 
types.
The first type is a description of how particular organisations 
are tackling the production of their corporate plans and are 
dealing with the theoretical elements of the process and 
procedures discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. Articles 
of this kind have tended, generally, to be descriptions of what 
happens or is about to happen and give little or no insight into 
the success with which corporate planning has been undertaken.
The implicit assumption in such articles is often that ’this 
is what we do and we like it.’
The second type, which seems to the author to be more useful in 
this context, are the sample surveys of attitudes to the 
corporate planning activities in a number of organisations. 
Details of such surveys were given in Chapter 3» where it will 
be observed that evidence has been accumulated which suggests 
that (a) organisations undertaking corporate planning do better 
than those which do not; (b) corporate planning has produced 
improvements in awareness of problems, strengths and weaknesses,
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profits and growth and other listed benefits; (c) corporate 
planning has been undertaken with varying but generally 
favourable degrees of perceived success and produced varying 
but, again generally favourable, degrees of perceived benefit.
However, the author is bound to conclude that there would be 
little gained by attempting to measure the success of corporate 
planning in the British Railways Board merely by simulating 
these surveys or even adding the four organisations covered 
in this research to the samples. Such a course of action 
would not add much to knowledge in this area. For example, 
using the Higgins and Finn survey approach, it transpired that 
the BRB, NFC, NBC and BA senior planning executives consulted, 
perceived their corporate planning activities to have been 
of ’benefit’ and of ’limited success’. None was able to describe 
them as having been of ’great benefit’, or as a ’great success’ 
or even ’success’. Additionally, by way of a further example, 
the senior planning executives consulted provided answers to the 
questions originally posed by Shawki and Grinyer as given in 
Table l6.1.
The posing of these questions caused difficulties in that the 
planners consulted considered that most of the responses were 
only marginally correct. Only in a few instances (particularly 
questions 1 and 6) were unqualified responses received. The 
remainder were provided as ’on-balance’ replies.
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BRB NFC NBC M
Perceived improvements in -
1. Awareness of problems, strengths 
and weaknesses. Yes Yes Yes Yes
2. Profit and Growth, Yes Yes No Yes
3. Information and communication. Yes No Yes Yes
4. Systematic resource allocation. Yes Yes No Yes
5. Coordination and control. Yes Yes Yes Yes
6 . Morale and industrial 
relations. No No No No
7. Quantification Yes No Yes Yes
Table I6.I. Perceived Improvements Resulting from
Corporate Planning (based on Shawki and Grinyer)
(Source : Discussions with BRB, NFC, NBC and BA Senior 
__________ Planning Executives)__________________________
The author formed the view that a more detailed analysis would 
be required to assess the success of corporate planning within 
the BRB, involving the establishment of criteria of 
acceptability from first principles, incorporating as much 
objectivity as possible. These considerations have produced 
four criteria of acceptability which are expressed, in 
question form, a*s follows
1) What theroetical deficiencies have arisen from the theory 
versus practice analysis, in respect of the BRB process of 
corporate planning, discussed in Chapters 10 and 15, and 
what are the views of BRB planning executives and the 
author on these deficiencies?
2) What theoretical deficiencies have arisen from the theory 
versus practice analysis, in respect of the BRB corporate
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planning procedures, provided in Chapters 10 and 15, and 
what are the views of BRB planning executives and the 
author on these deficiencies?
3) Have the recent Railways business results, in financial 
and non-financial terms, been consistent with the forecasts 
contained in recent Rail plans/reviews?
4) In the opinion of BRB planning executives and the author, 
has the BRB corporate planning process and procedures 
provided 'spin-off* benefits which would not otherwise 
have been available?
Dealing with the third criterion occupies the greatest part 
of this chapter. The author has taken the view that 
achievement or non-achievement by the BRB of its own 
forecasts is a realistic and objective success assessment 
process. In line with the data provided in Chapter 11 and 
for the reasons explained in that chapter, attention will 
be paid to the Railways business forecasts/results rather than 
to the overall BRB situation or the smaller subsidiary 
businesses. Where significant differences have arisen between 
the forecasts and actual results details will be provided of 
the relevant circumstances and, as considered appropriate, 
the views of BRB planners and the author.
The first and second criteria arise from the matters discussed 
in Chapters 10 and 15» Whilst this is essentially a 
theoretical analysis of success, the views of the planners 
consulted and of the author are provided.
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As will be clear from the information provided, the fourth 
criterion is considered to be an essential adjunct to the 
theory versus practice analysis. Again, this issue is tackled 
from a largely theoretical view, as far as possible. However, 
in this area also, the views of BRB planners and the author are 
expressed.
Before considering the performance of the British Railways Board 
(or, more particularly, the Railways business) in respect of 
these criteria, it must be added that, since the organisation 
has only been undertaking formal corporate planning procedures 
for about eleven years, it would be unfair to expect perfection, 
or anything approaching it. It has been made clear that 
corporate planning is an extremely difficult process to 
introduce quickly, particularly in a large and complex 
organisation and more so in a difficult economic climate. 
Nevertheless, it would not be unreasonable to expect 
considerable progress.
It should also be noted that, whilst this chapter contains a 
series of 'findings' and discussions thereon, in respect of 
each of the four criteria noted above, the author's conclusions 
concerning the success of corporate planning in the BRB will 
be delayed until Chapter 17. This will lead to a number of 
recommendations which will also be contained within that 
chapter.
It is convenient to tackle the tasks outlined in the order of 
the four criteria of acceptability provided. .
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l6.1. ERE Corporate Planning Process - Theoretical Deficiencies 
In Chapter 10, a comparison was made between the theoretical 
nature of the process of corporate planning and its application 
in the BRB, That information was summarised and discussed 
further in Chapter 15, where comparisons were also made with 
the approaches adopted by NFC, NBC and BA. A number of 
significant differences between theory and practice were noted 
and it is now proposed to briefly list these and set 
alongside them the deficiencies which would, theoretically, 
be expected to arise.
Differences Between 
Theory and Practice
1. Lack of development of jointly 
agreed values between BRB and 
Government
2. Insufficient development of 
jointly agreed long term 
financial and non-financial 
objectives between BRB and 
Government
3. Lack of development of inter­
mediate goals between BRB and 
Government
4. Lack of development of 
strategy in the plans 




Inadequate development and 
agreement of mutual needs
Inadequate development and 
agreement of purpose
Inadequate development and 
agreement of purpose
Inadequate "directional content 
of plans
469
5. Absence of contingency Inadequate allowance made for
plans unexpected events
6 . Absence of action plans Inadequate communication with
the management levels required 
to implement the plans
7. Lack of systematic Inadequate knowledge of
checking of progress in progress in implementing
implementing plans plans and of failings to be
overcome in future plans.
Each of these differences and the deficiencies they would 
theoretically produce have been discussed with BRB planners 
and it is now intended to reproduce their views together with 
those of the author, as judged to be appropriate.
Items 1 and 2 Both the differences between theory and practice 
and the resulting theoretical deficiencies were accepted by the 
BRB, with the discussions revolving around the 'fundamental 
dilemma' discussed in Chapter 15. The BRB planners agreed that 
the financial objectives set by Government were inadequate for 
planning purposes in that:-
a) The overall break-even (after grants) objective was regarded 
by the BRB as being superseded by the cash limits.
b ) The EFL cash limits were only set for one year ahead (i.e. 
the budget year which is the base year of the plans) and no 
firm or clear idea could be obtained for their future levels.
c) Whilst the PSO cash limits were also forecast four years 
ahead, they could also not be regarded as firm and were 
quite likely to change, as indeed they had in recent years.
d) Whilst investment ceilings were forecast by Government for 
four years ahead, they could not be regarded as firm and.
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in any case, were judged to be insufficient.
The BRB planners explained that they had grown used to this 
unsatisfactory state of affairs and had developed a reaction 
of making their own assumptions in the corporate and Railways 
business plans, to cover the absence of agreed objectives. These 
assumptions have variously included a rising investment ceiling 
profile, a flat PSO cash limit (in real terms), and more 
recently (the 1980 Rail Plan) rising PSO and EFL cash limits.
The purposes of doing this have been to create long term 
objectives on which to base the plans and also to assist in 
persuading Government about the investment and external 
financing levels that have been considered to be required.
They agreed that this has placed the corporate and Railways 
business plans on a precarious footing, as will be demonstrated 
later in this chapter when the individual Rail Plans are 
discussed further. They are pessimistic about the prospects 
of being able to improve the situation because of the short 
term time horizons adopted by Government. Nevertheless, they 
accept the author’s view that corporate planning in the BRB is 
bound to continue to suffer considerably unless this problem is 
resolved.
In regard to non-financial objectives, the BRB planners agreed 
that it would be of benefit to create objectives in connection 
with market share and manpower productivity since these items 
are considered to be of fundamental importance. They accepted 
that the absence of such objectives in the past has produced a
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theoretical deficiency but added that the absence of adequate 
and mutually agreed financial objectives has been of 
considerably more importance because of the poor financial 
results of the Railways business (see Chapter 6).
However, they agreed with the author that it is appropriate to 
attempt to develop non-financial objectives, in conjunction with 
Government, at the same time as future financial objectives are 
discussed.
Item 3 The BRB planners agreed in principle with the theoretical 
deficiency which is noted above and agreed that intermediate 
goals would be useful in the future. However, they considered 
that the issue had largely been rendered irrelevant by the 
inadequacy of the objectives. The author was bound to agree 
that it would be essential to establish improved long term 
objectives before this element of the process could be 
introduced.
Item 4 This theoretical deficiency was fully accepted and it 
was agreed that, consequently, the Railways business plans 
produced in 1975, 1978 and 1979 were not adequate plans in 
terms of their strategic direction, forecasts or the desire 
of the management to see them implemented. For this reason, 
they were described as Rail Reviews. It is useful to note 
that this problem arose from lack of full Government commitment 
to the investment requirements contained within the 1974 Rail 
Plan (Interim Rail Strategy) despite an apparent acceptance of 
the underlying strategy. Further details are given in
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Chapter 11 and later in this chapter.
Item 5 This theoretical deficiency was accepted and it was 
further agreed that, in the light of the experience of previous 
Rail Plans (discussed later in this chapter), the preparation 
of contingency plans in future years should receive urgent 
consideration.
Item 6 It was observed by the BRB planners that, in order to 
establish an interface between the Rail Plans and the budgets, 
some form of communication of the forecasts for year 1 between 
BRB headquarters and the Regions would be necessary. Experience 
has shown that the 'budget objectives' process has not worked 
(see Chapters 10 and 15 for details) and it has been recognised 
that it is essential to produce action plans (in conjunction with 
Regional management) at least for one year ahead, to ensure 
that there is fuller knowledge of, and commitment to. Rail Plan 
intentions at Regional level. Discussions with the author during 
the course of this research have helped persuade BRB planners 
to arrive at this decision which the BRB intend to implement 
in 1982.
Item 7 The BRB planners have considered in the past that as 
long as the plans are updated annually, there has been little 
need to produce a back check report on each of the plans to 
establish what lessons can be learned before the next plan is 
prepared. However, recent experience in respect of the I980 
Rail Plan has forced them to take a different view in that a 
'post mortem' has been requested by the board to explain why
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the 1982 expectations as seen in the draft I981 Rail Plan are 
so much different to those contained in the I98O Rail Plan.
Further information in respect of the draft I98I Rail Plan 
is provided later in this chapter.
Additionally, the BRB planners have accepted that, in order to 
successfully compare plan forecasts with actual results, it is 
useful to produce the forecasts in estimated actual prices, 
i.e. allowing for forecast inflation. The author shares the 
view held by BRB planners that the plans are more understandable 
when expressed in constant prices, but they now agree that it 
is necessary to recommence the procedure, dropped in 1979, 
whereby the constant price level forecasts are also converted 
into estimated actual prices.
16.2. BRB Corporate Planning Procedures - Theoretical Deficiencies 
As in respect of the process of corporate planning, a comparison 
was made in Chapter 10 between the corporate planning procedures 
of the BRB and the theories related thereto. That information 
was summarised in Chapter 13, where comparisons were also made 
with the approaches adopted by NFC, NBC and BA.
The only item which the author considers should be noted in 
this context is that, in respect of investment appraisal, the 
BRB have been using an arbitrary discount rate instead of 
attempting to assess their cost of capital. The view of the 
BRB planners in this respect was that the 7% real discount 
rate which has been applied to all 'developmental* projects 
might be well beyond the cost of capital but this has been of
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little consequence when the annual investment ceilings have been 
so far below required investment levels. The author accepts 
this view and considers that there are no significant problems 
created by operation of the BRB procedures in the 
circumstances outlined.
16.3» Railways Business Results Compared with Forecasts 
Contained in Recent Rail Plans/Reviews 
Apart from the theoretical issues which have been discussed in 
this chapter, it was considered by the author to be particularly 
important in the success assessment to compare the Railways 
business results with the forecasts included in recent Rail 
Plans/Reviews. The object of this was to discover whether 
there have been any differences which were so significant as to 
confirm a theoretical failure or identify a practical failure 
of the BRB corporate planning process or procedures.
The findings of this part of the research are given in some 
detail in this section, with reasons given for the major 
differences which were found to exist. Each Rail Plan/Review 
prepared since 1974 will be considered separately to establish 
financial and physical differences. In order that the financial 
differences can be established without undue difficulty, 
reference will be made to the BRB forecasts expressed in 
estimated actual prices, rather than the constant price 
forecasts which were given in Appendices 2(a) and 2(b). This 
will be achieved through the use of the forecasts given in 
Appendices 3(a) and 3(b) which represent the same forecasts 
but in estimated (by the BRB or, in respect of the 1974 Rail
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Plan, the 1979 Rail .Review and 198O Rail Plan, the author using BRB 
indices) future prices.
16.3.1. 1974 Rail Plan Forecasts Compared with Actual
Results 1976 to 1980 and Latest Forecast 198I 
The financial and non-financial results of the Railways business 
from 1976 to 1980 and the latest expectations for I981 (as seen 
in May 1981) were all considerably different to the forecasts, 
in estimated actual prices, contained within the 1974 Rail 
Plan. In terms of the PSO Grant and the Non-passenger profit 
and loss forecasts/results, the situation was as described in 
Table l6.2. This table also contains the forecasts/results 
for 1974, since the forecast (budget) for that year was used as 
the Plan base.
The figures given in Table 16.2. show that:-
a) The actual PSO grant and Passenger profit and loss figures 
combined . (i.e. the loss before grants attributable to the 
Passenger business) were much larger than the Rail Plan 
forecasts.
b) The actual Non-passenger profit/loss was much worse than 
forecast. Additionally, it had not been predicted that 
Government grants would be needed in 1975 to 1977 to 
eliminate the losses in those years.
Combining the Passenger and Non-passenger figures produces
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Year
1974 1973 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 *
£m £m £m &,ni £m
203
Passenger 
1974 Rail Plan 
PSO Grant 

























10 11 32 32 63
(2) (48) (37)
66 53 (5)
* Latest Estimate - May I98I 
/ Forecasts not produced for 1973
Table l6.2. 1974 Rail Plan Forecasts Compared with Actual
Results 1974 to 1980 and Latest Forecast I981 
Financial Summary______________________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
variances from the Rail Plan forecasts as shown in Table l6.3*
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£m
Variance from Plan Forecast






1981 w 516 ♦
* Latest Estimate - May I98I 
B = Better W = Worse than Plan forecast
Table l6.3« Variances Between Actual Results 1974 to I98O 
(and Latest Forecast 1981) and Rail Plan 
Forecasts 1974 to 198I - Financial Summary
(Source ; BRB internal records)
These figures are analysed further in Appendix 4(a) - page 1 
which splits them between price variances (inflation and real 
price increases combined) and volume variances^ as a structure 
for further analysis. The figures in Appendix 4(a) have been 
arrived at by comparing the price/volume variances in the 1974 
Rail Plan in estimated actual price levels, i.e. the variances 
given in Appendix 3(&) with the actual variances recorded in 
Appendix 1(a), allowing for the difference between the base year 
forecast and the actual result. *
From this added information, it can be seen that, by I98I, the 
net price variance (W £l65m) was almost matched by the volume 
variance (W £151m) and that both recorded a pattern of
4?8
improvement in the years 1976 and 1977. It is now proposed 
to examine the trend of these figures, drawing upon data 
contained in some of the other Appendices.
Looking first at the price variances, it can be seen that the 
increases in the receipts variances reached very high levels 
(B £5l8m) by I98I. The fundamental cause of this was incorrect 
estimation of the rate of inflation. This is clear from a 
comparison of the RPI forecast used by the BRB, shown in 
Appendix 2(d) with the actual change in the RPI recorded in 
Appendix 1(d). Adjusting the original Rail Plan figures in 
Appendix 3(a) - page 1, by the difference in the rate of 
inflation (and using for I98I an inflation rate of 11.8% 
over 1980, as used by the BRB in preparing the 'latest' 








(B = Better, W = Worse than plan forecast)
These figures were, in fact, higher than the total price 
variances from 1977 onwards. This meant that the real price 
increases in receipts contained within the 1974 Rail Plan 
(recorded in Appendix 2(a) in 1974 price levels) were not 
achieved. The values of this element, in the actual price 
levels for each year, were as given below;-
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Passenger Freight Parcels Total
£m £m £m £m
1976 W 20 B 9 B 5 W 6
1977 w 34 B 1 B 3 W 48
1978 w 43 B 6 B 7 w 30
1979 w 88 W 3 B 1 W 92
1980 w 123 w 18 w 3 W 146
1981 W 143 W 44 W 12 w 199
(B = Better, W = Worse than Plan forecast)
It can be seen that the largest differences have occurred in 
respect of Passenger receipts but also Freight receipts in 
1980 and 1981. In effect, this has meant that the real price 
increases incorporated in the 1974 Rail Plan (see Appendix 2(a) 
page 3 for details in 1974 price levels) have not been achieved, 
However, it will be recalled from the information given in 
Section 11.1.2. of Chapter 11 that real pricing was a 
significant feature of the strategy contained within the 1974 
Rail Plan. It is considered by BRB planners that much of the 
non-achievement of these real price increases (particularly 
Passenger) has been related to non-implementation of planned 
capital investment and thus non-achievement of train service 
improvements. This issue will also be considered shortly in 
respect of its impact on planned receipts volume growth.
However, irrespective of the extent to which the lack of 
achievement of forecast growth in passenger miles and freight 
tonnes has been related to investment problems, the lower 
volumes themselves have impacted heavily upon the ability of 
the BRB to achieve the expected levels of real price increases.
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For example, the I98O level of passenger miles and freight net 
tonne miles was expected to be 24,400 million and 208 million, 
respectively. The respective results turned out to be 19,700 
million and 153 million, giving a much lower volume on which 
to obtain real price increases.
In respect of working expenses, the variances reached an 
even larger total of W £683m by I98I. Again, incorrect 
estimation of the rate of inflation was the primary cause. By 
making similar calculations, the values of this element are 








(B = Better, W = Worse than Plan forecast)
It is evident from the above that the forecast real price 
increases in working expenses (recorded in Appendix 2(a) - 
page 3 in 1974 price levels) were not incurred. The value 










(B = Better, \•I = Worse than Plan forecast)
The fundamental causes of this feature were the low pay awards 
in 1976 and 1977, which were constrained by National pay policy 
(see Chapter 6) and a general pattern of pay awards with a 
lower real element than provided for in the Plan forecasts.
Turning now to the volume variances, it can be seen, in
Appendix 4(a) - page 1, that the increases in receipts variances 
reached a total of W £347m by I98I. It is not possible to
identify and measure all of the reasons for this since the
BRB did not produce sufficient data on causes of change 
(Rail Plan or actual results). However, some reasons can be 
gleaned from the material collected in the Appendices and in 
Chapter 11.
In particular, it seems reasonable to assume that the volume 
variances in Passenger receipts were, to some extent, 
connected with large differences between the forecast and 
actual levels of U.K. Consumers' Expenditure (see Appendices 
l(d) and 2(d)). Using the year I98O as an example, the 
Consumers' Expenditure index was forecast at 117.1 when the 
actual index turned out to be 110.5. Converting this into a
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financial variance produces W £46m compared with the total of 
V  £69m recorded in Appendix 4(a). Further, in respect of the 
latest (May I981) forecast for the year I981, the BRB assumed 
that the Consumers’ Expenditure Index would be 112.4 compared 
with a Plan forecast of 120.0 Again converting this into a 
financial variance produces W £62m compared with the total of 
W £l28m - recorded in Appendix 4(a). This evidence suggests 
that as much as half of the Passenger receipts volume 
variances have been caused by over-estimation of growth in 
general economic activity, as measured by the Consumers’ 
Expenditure Index.
From an examination of the Plan forecasts, however, it is 
clear that a further large part of the shortfall has stemmed 
from non-achievement of investment-linked growth particularly 
in the Inter-city Sector. This is evident from a comparison 
of the forecast and actual trends of passenger miles and 
APT, EST and electric multiple unit resources, given in 
Appendices 1(c) and 2(c). The profile of capital investment 
recorded in Appendix 1(b) remained fairly flat in real terms 
in all years up to 198I. This was contrary to the expectations 
contained within the strategy (see Section 11.1.2. of Chapter 11) 
and the forecasts recorded in Appendix 2(b). The lower 
investment levels were related to Government investment 
ceilings not being increased as expected. This undermined 
completely one of the main elements of the then Passenger 
business strategy.
It also seems reasonable to assume that the volume variances
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in Freight and Parcels receipts were to a large extent connected 
with the difference between the forecast and actual levels of 
U.K. Industrial Production. Again, using the year I98O as an 
example, this index was forecast at 123*3 (including oil) when 
it turned out to be 99*8 (including oil). Converting these 
indices to financial figures produces variances which would 
almost exhaust the Freight and Parcels variances recorded in 
Appendix 4(a). Thus, the main problem in connection with 
Freight and Parcels receipts seems to have been incorrect 
forecasting of the general volume of available business in 
Great Britain and, more particularly the downturns experienced 
in 1973 and 198O. A further downturn has recently been allowed 
for in the latest (May I98I ) forecast for I98I , amounting to 
2.3%, compared with I98O. This figure was based on the 
Industrial Production index 'excluding oil' and, whilst it 
cannot be accurately compared with the 'including oil' Rail 
Plan forecast increase of 3-3?̂ , which can be calculated from 
the figures given in Appendix 2(d), it serves to indicate the 
extent to which the over-estimation of economic growth has 
continued to be the main cause of Plan/actual volume variances.
In respect of working expenses, it is again not possible to 
provide an accurate analysis of the variances but it is clear 
that the main cause has been a massive underspending on 
revenue investment, brought about by Government investment 
ceilings being considerably lower than the level assumed in 
the Plan, The impact of this can be assessed by re-calculating 
the forecast revenue investment expenditure levels contained 
within Appendix 2(b) (using actual RPI and the 'latest
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forecast’ for I981) and comparing these figures with the actusü. 
level of expenditure. This produces variances on the planned 






1980 B l48 ) allowing for partial
1981 B 173 ) switch to maintenance
(B = Better, W = Worse than Plan forecast)
these variances from the volume variances in








(B = Better, W = Worse than Plan forecast) 
Examination of detailed records and discussions with the BRB 
planners concerned,reveal that these balances were the result 
of a combination of features, but particularly varying levels 
of maintenance and lower depreciation and interest charges 
related largely to reduced capital investment. Unlike in 
some of the subsequent plans, non-achievement of forecast 
manpower reductions was not a significant problem (see 
Appendices l(c) and 2(c). This was due to almost total
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non-achievement of the forecast increases in staff due to 
improvements in conditions of service offsetting extensive 
non-achievement of forecast reductions expected to result from 
investment and economy measures.
16.3«2. 1973 Rail Review Forecasts Compared with Actual
Results 1976 to 1980 and Latest Forecast 198I 
The financial and physical results of the Railways business from 
1976 to 1980 and the latest (May I98I ) expectations for I98I 
were considerably different to the forecasts, in estimated actual 
prices, contained within the 1973 Rail Review. In terms of the 
PSO Grant and the Non-passenger profit and loss position, the 
situation was as described in Table l6.4. The differences 
between the forecasts and the actual results were not as 
marked as they were in respect of the 1974 Rail Plan. 
Nevertheless, in regard to Non-passenger business, they were 
particularly large in I98O and 198I .
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Base
1973 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981*
£in £di £ij1 £in £m £ni £m
Passenger 
1973 Hail Review
PSO Grant j43 409 489 374 643 731 81I
Actual PSO Grant 324 319 364 434 523 634 740
Actual Profit/
(Loss) 4 3 22 (7) 1 (32) (47)
Non-Passenger 
Profit/(Loss)
1975 Hail Review (68) (44) (43) (2) l4 46 102
Actual - - - (2) (48) (57)
Actual Non-
Passenger Grant 66 33 (3)
* Latest Estimate - May 1981
Table 16.4. 1973 Hail Review Forecasts Compared with Actual
Results 1973 to 1980 and Latest Forecast 198I - 
Financial Summary_______________________
(Source ; BRB internal records)
Combining the Passenger and Non-passenger figures produces 












* Latest estimate - May I98I
(B = Better, W = Worse than Review Forecast)
Table I6.5. Variances Between Actual Results 1975 to I98O
(and Latest Estimate I98I ) and 1975 Rail Review 
Forecasts 1975 to I981 - Financial Summary_____
(Source : BRB internal records)
These variances are analysed between price and volume factors 
in Appendix 4(a) - page 1, where it can be seen that, by I98I , 
the price variance was B £54m. However, this did not match the 
volume variance of W £l89m. Both showed betterments (i.e. 
better than forecast) in 1976 and 1977 and it was not until 
1980 that the adverse volume variance grew to a level which was 
greater than the positive price variance.
It is now proposed to examine these variances further in 
similar fashion to the 1974 Rail Plan analysis. Looking first 
at the price variances, it can be seen that there were adverse 
variances in total receipts in all of the years. In order to 
determine the impact of inflation, it was again necessary to
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adjust the Rail Plan figures recorded in Appendix Jtia) - page 1 
for the difference in the rate of inflation using the forecast 
indices given in Appendix 2(d) and the actual indices in 
Appendix l(d) and using for 198l the inflation rate of 11.8% 
over 1980, as used by the BRB in producing the latest (May I98I ) 









(B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast) 
Deducting these figures from the total receipts price 
variances in Appendix 4(a), produces an assessment of the real 
price differences in the price levels of each year. These 
figures are given below;-
Passenger Freight Parcels Total
£m £m £m £m
1976 w 23 W 3 B 1 W 27
1977 w 70 W 16 B 2 W 84
1978 w 37 W 20 B 3 W 72
1979 w 91 W 40 - ■ w 131
1980 w 117 W 69 W 3 W 191
1981 W 120 W 101 W 11 w 232
(B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast)
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It can be seen that the adverse variances on forecast real 
price increases have been very large and have occurred mainly 
in respect of the Passenger and Freight business receipts 
forecasts.
The Passenger variances were similar to those in respect of the 
1974 Rail Plan, reflecting non-achievement of even larger 
real price increases, included in the 1973 forecast. As in 
respect of the 1974 Plan, these adverse variances were 
brought about by lower volumes of carryings. For example, the 
Passenger miles forecast for I980 was 20,400 million but the 
actual turned out to be 19,700 million. These lower carryings 
have been related by the BRB planners concerned largely to 
non-achievement of the planned increases in capital investment 
as a result of Government investment ceilings. However, in 
respect of this 1973 Review, the most significant cause of the 
Passenger real pricing variance was non-achievement of an 
optimistically high level of real price increases included in the 
Review. It can be seen in Appendix 2(a) — page 3 that much 
higher real price increases were forecast compared with the 
1974 Plan, which accounted in part for the lower forecast 
levels of passenger miles (i.e. related to assessed 
resistance to these increases).
The sidverse Freight variances were larger than those in * 
respect of the 1974 Plan, also reflecting higher real price 
aspirations in the 1973 Review (see Appendix 2(a) - page 3 ) 
and a wider margin between forecast and actual carryings-. The 
differences in carryings were very large e.g. the forecast
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for 1980 was 214 million tonnes but the actual was only 
153 million, this difference representing (as agreed by the 
BRB planners concerned) the largest part of the adverse 
variances under the real pricing heading.
In respect of working expenses, the effect of incorrect -
estimation of the impact of inflation (assessed by making








(B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast)
By deducting these variances from the total working expenses
price variances recorded in Appendix 4(a ), it is possible to
assess the differences between the forecast and actual levels








(B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast)
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Similarly to the outcome of 1974 Rail Plan forecasts, these 
variances reflected the low pay awards in 197  ̂ and 1977 
(National pay policy) and a continued tendency to overestimate 
the extent of real pay increases in the Rail Plan/Review 
forecasts.
Turning now to the volume variances, it can be seen in 
Appendix 4(a), that the receipts variance reached W £109m by 
1979 and W £354m in 1981. Again, for the reasons quoted 
earlier, it is not possible to identify and measure all of 
the reasons for this but some reasons can be deduced from the 
data collected in the Appendices and in Chapter 11.
In respect of Passenger receipts, it would appear that the 
volume variances, which were adverse in all years (W £115m 
by 1981), were not generally caused by overestimating growth 
in UK Consumers' Expenditure. Using the years 1979 and I98O 
as examples, the Consumers' Expenditure index (Appendix 2(d).) 
was forecast at IO8.6 and 110.6, respectively when the actual 
index (Appendix 1 (d)) turned out a little higher at 110,6 and 
111.3» However, in I98I itself, it was a material factor 
in that the Review forecast of 113.3 was much higher than the 
BRB estimate of 109.6 used in preparing the latest (May I981) 
receipts forecast for that year. The approximate impact on 
the Passenger receipts in I98I was W £39m or about one-third 
of the total variance.
Instead, this volume variance has seemingly been brought about 
by lower investment and by non-achievement of an inconsistently
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large (and possibly very optimistic) forecast increase in the 
volume of receipts (see Appendix 2(a) - page 3) which, unlike 
in the 1974 Plan, was not accompanied by such a large forecast 
increase in Passenger miles (partly due to forecast resistance 
to the larger real price increases).
The impact of the capital investment reductions can be seen by 
comparing the forecasts for HST and APT sets and electric multiple 
units given in Appendix 2(c) with the actual numbers recorded in 
Appendix 1(c). For example, electric multiple units were 
planned to increase by over 1,200 vehicles by 198I but the 
actual increase turned out to be only ll4 vehicles. It will 
be recalled that the higher investment profiles were a major 
part of the Passenger strategy contained within the 1975 Hail 
Review.
Turning to Freight and Parcels receipts, the adverse variances 
{£l31m by I98I) cannot seemingly be explained by inaccurate 
forecasts of increases in UK Industrial Production, except in 
respect of I98O and I98I. The large drop in Industrial 
Production in I98O recorded in Appendix l(d) was not predicted 
and was clearly a substantial cause of the Freight and Parcels 
receipts volume variances. A similar situation obtained in I98I 
as noted in the previous section. However, it should be noted 
that the Freight results in I98O were distorted by the BSC 
strike which reduced the receipts for that year by £28m.
The adverse Freight variances in the years 197& to 1979 and, 
to a proportionately lesser extent in I98O and I981, were
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largely connected with the shortfall experienced in the base 
year - 1975 (see Section 6.2.3. of Chapter 6 ). That amounted 
, to W £32m which became a higher figure each year because of 
inflation. This variance is not evident from comparing the 
Industrial Production Indices in Appendices 1 (d) and 2 (d) 
because the former started off with the actual for 1975 and the 
latter with the BRB forecast for that year. In fact, the BRB 
forecast turned out to be higher than the actual index, the 
extent of the recession not being adequately forecast, 
accounting for the receipts shortfall of £32m. This 'base 
year' problem has not been of any major significance in 
respect of the receipts forecasts contained within any of the 
other Plans/Reviews discussed in this chapter.
The same situation applied in respect of the volume of parcels 
receipts where an adverse variance of £3m, related to the 
recession, was recorded in the base year. However, the major 
shortfalls which followed were greater than the impact of 
this shortfall. This has been explained by BRB planners as 
being related to over-optimistic forecasting of growth, 
particularly in the S to S sector, withdrawal from the C and D 
sector (1981) and the recession in I98O and I98I.
Moving to working expenses, it is again clear that one of the 
main causes of the betterments recorded in Appendix 4(a) which 
amounted to £l43m by I98I, was a massive underspending on 
revenue investment, as a consequence of Government cuts to 
the BRB forecast of that expenditure. The impact of this can 
be assessed by re-calculating the forecast revenue investment
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expenditure levels using actual inflation (RPI) indices (and 
the ’latest' BRB forecast for 1981) and comparing these figures 
with the actual expenditure. This produces variances on the 






1980 B 33 ) allowing for
1981 B 83 ) switch to
) maintenance
(B = -Better, W = Worse than Review forecast)
Deducting these amounts from the volume variances recorded in








(B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast) 
Examination of detailed records and discussions with the 
BRB planners concerned reveal that these balances were the 
result of a number of features including lower maintenance 
and lower depreciation and interest charges (related partly 
to cut-backs in capital investment). They also included 
betterments caused by over-achievement of manpower reductions
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(see Appendices 2(c) and 1(c)). However, these were 
caused by almost total non-achievement of the forecast (13,3&0) 
increases in staff relating to expected improvements in 
conditions of service.
16.3.3. 1978 Hail Review Forecasts Compared with Actual
Results 1978 to 1980 and Latest Forecast I98I 
The financial and physical results of the Railways business from 
1978 to 1980 and the latest (May I981) expectation for I98I 
were also considerably different to the forecasts contained 
within the 1978 Rail Review, in estimated actual price levels.
In terms of the PSO Grant and the Non-Passenger profit and 
loss situation, the position was as described in Table I6 .3 . 
Again, it can be seen that the actual results were considerably 
worse than the forecasts. Indeed, allowing for the impact of 
inflation, they were also considerably worse than the ’worst’ 
estimates contained within the risk analysis, described in 




1978 1979 1980 1981*
£m £m £m £m
443 503 340 603
434 523 634 740
(7) 1 (32) (47)
7 43 81 114
— (2) (48) (57)
Passenger
1978 Rail Review - PSO Grant 
Actual PSO Grant 
Actual Profit/(Loss)
Non-Passenger Profit/(Loss)
1978 Rail Review 
Actual
* Latest Estimate - May I98I
Table 16.5. 1978 Rail Review Forecasts Compared with Actual
Results 1978 to 1980 and Latest Forecast I981 - 
Financial Summary________________________________
(Source : BRB internal records)
Combining the Passenger and Non-Passenger figures produces 
variances from the Rail Review forecasts as shown in Table I6.6
£m
Variance from Review
Year 1978 W 5
1979 W 64 •
1980 w 235
1981 W 353*
* Latest Estimate - May I981
B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast
Table I6.6. Variances between Actual Results 1978 to I98O 
(and Latest Estimate I98I )& 1978 Rail Review 
Forecasts 1978 to I98I________________________
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These variances are analysed between price and volume factors 
in Appendix 4(a) - page 2. It can be seen that the price and 
volume variances became W £110m and W  £243m, respectively, 
by 1981, with the largest changes occurring in I98O and I98I.
It is now possible to examine these variances further in similar 
fashion to the 1974 Plan and 1975 Review.
Looking first at the price variances, it will be observed that 
there was an adverse variance in Passenger receipts in 1979 
which became betterments in I98O and 1981. In Freight and 
Parcels receipts the variances were negligible in 1979 but 
became large betterments in I98O and 1981. In order to 
determine the impact of inflation, it is again proposed to 
adjust the Rail Review figures recorded in Appendix 3(a) by 
the difference in the rate of inflation using the forecast 
indices (RPI) given in Appendix 2(d) and the actual indices in 
Appendix 1(d) and using for I98I the inflation rate of 11.8/0 
over 1980, as used by the BRB in producing the latest (May I981) 






(B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast)
Deducting these figures from the total receipts price variances 
in Appendix 4(a) produces an assessment of the real price
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differences, in the price levels of each year, as given below:-
Passenger Freight Parcels Total 
£m £m £m £m
1979’ W 40 W 4, W 4 W 48
1980 W 49 W 16 W 2 W 67
1981 w 45 w 43 W 3 w 93
(B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast)
Once again, the variances on forecast real price increases 
were both large and adverse. However, they were not as large 
as those relating to the 1975 Review mainly because of lower 
forecast improvements in Passenger and Freight carryings. In 
turn, these lower carryings, mainly on the Passenger side, were 
related to lower investment levels compared with the 1975 
Review, as discussed in Chapter 11. However, the reduced 
carryings (i.e. actual compared with forecast) only represented 
a logical explanation of the Freight receipts real price 
variances, e.g. the forecast tonnes in I98O were l84 million 
but the actual result was 133 million. In respect of Passenger 
miles, the carryings were higher than forecast in the Review 
in all years except I981, representing another inconsistency 
in the forecasts.
In respect of working expenses, the impact of incorrect 
estimation of inflation (assessed by making similar calculations) 






(B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast)
By deducting these variances from the total working expenses 
price variances recorded in Appendix 4(a), it is possible to 
assess the differences between the forecast and actual levels 





(B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast)
Thus, similarly to the outcome of the 1974 Flan and the 1975
Review, the I98O variance reflected a continuing tendency to 
over-estimate the extent of real pay increases.
Turning to the volume variances, it can be seen in Appendix 4(a) 
that these were very substantial, reaching W £201m and W £243m 
in 1980 and I981, respectively. Again it is not possible to 
identify and measure all of the reasons for this but some 
reasons can be deduced from the data collected in the appendices 
and in Chapter 11.
In respect of Passenger receipts, the increase in 1979 of £33m
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was consistent with underestimation of the Consumers' 
Expenditure Index (which stood at 104,7 compared with a 
forecast of 102.3 ) and by an improvement in the base year 
situation of £23m« The forecast of the Consumers' Expenditure 
Index for I980 was very close to the actual and the variance 
of B £24m was related mainly to the base year underestimate. 
The deterioration in 198I was as a result of the recession 
which was not forecast, partly offset by the base year under­
estimate. The fall off in the Consumers' Expenditure Index 
('latest' estimate of 103.7 compared with a forecast of 107.l) 
represented a loss of receipts of approximately £33%.
In respect of Freight receipts, the adverse variances can be 
largely explained by comparing the forecasts of UK Industrial 
Production (including oil) with the emerging results. The 
forecasts for 1979 and 1980 were indices of 103.3 and IO6.6 
respectively. The actual result was 102.6 and 93.8. This 
down-turn in industrial activity did not explain the whole 
of the variance of W £112m in 1980 but the balance was largely 
accounted for by the BSC strike (W £28m). The further decline 
in 1981 has stemmed from continuation of the recessionary 
downturn in Industrial Production.
Differences between forecast and actual Industrial Production 
indices also largely explain the Parcels volume variance in 
1980 (W £l3m) and part of the 1981 downturn. However, à large 
part (£26m) of the I98I variance was related to the decision 
to withdraw from the Parcels C & D sector, which was not 
forecast in the 1978 Pail Review.
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Moving to working expenses, because of lower forecasts, these
have not been heavily affected by overestimation/underspending
of revenue investment, as applied in respect of the 1974 Plan
and the 1973 Review. (An exception to this was 1979 where
actual revenue investment was £22m lower than forecast). This
explains why the total volume variances were adverse and not
betterments as on the two previous occasions. The explanation
for these variances lay very largely in non-achievement of
forecast reductions in some resources, (see Appendices 2(c)
and 1(c)). This feature was most marked in respect of
manpower where the differences were as follows:-
Manpower Numbers (OOP's)
1978 Rail Review Variances on
 F orecast  Actual F precast
1978 Base 173*3 178.1 + 2.6
1979 169.4 177.9 + 8.5
1980 165.3 174.0 + 8.7
1981 161.0 168.7* + 7.7
* Latest Estimate - May I98I
It is necessary to note that, unlike in respect of the 1974 
Plan and the 1973 Review, no allowance was made in the 1978 
Review (or subsequently) for any additional staff relating to 
improvements in conditions of service. Thus, in the absence 
of any significant actual improvements, the variances with 
the forecasts reflected a clear indication of non-achievement 
of manpower reductions.
502
16.3.4. 1979 Rail Review Forecasts Compared with Actual
Results 1979 to I98O and Latest Estimate I981 
The financial and physical results for 1979 and I98O and the 
latest expectations for I981 were also considerably different 
to the forecasts contained in the 1979 Rail Review. Tn terms 
of the PSO Grant and the Non-Passenger profit and loss situation, 





1979 Rail Review - PSO Grant 502 366 677
Actual PSO Grant 523 634 740
Actual Profit/(Loss) 1 (32) (47)
Non-Passenger Profit/(Loss) 
1979 Rail Review (2) 4 38
Actual (2) (48) (57)
* Latest Estimate - May I981
Table I6.7. 1979 Rail Review Forecasts Compared with Actual
Results 1979 to 1980 and Latest Estimate I98I - 
Financial Summary________________________________
Again, it can be seen that the actual results were worse than 
the forecasts, in estimated actual price levels. Indeed, as 
in respect of the 1978 Review, the 1979 Rail Review forecasts 
(allowing for the impact of inflation) were again considerably 
worse than the 'worst' estimates contained within the risk 
analysis, described in Chapter 11, again in respect of
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Passenger and Freight receipts.
Combining the Passenger and Non-Passenger figures produces 
variances from the Rail Review forecasts as shown in Table I6 .8,
£m
Variance from Review
Year 1979 W 20
1980 w 152
1981 w 203
* Latest Estimate - May I98I
(B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast)
Table 16.8. Variances between Actual Results 1979 and I98O 
(and Latest Estimate I981) and 1979 Rail Review 
Forecasts 1979 to 1981___________________
Again, these variances are analysed between price and volume 
factors in Appendix 4(a). It can be seen that, in I98O, the 
net situation was dominated by a volume variance of W £134m.
In 1981, both the price and volume variances were large at 
V/ £83% and W £l20m, respectively.
Looking first at the price variances, it will be observed that 
there were betterments in Passenger, Freight and Parcels in 
each of the years 1979 to I981. In order to determine the 
impact of inflation, it is again proposed to adjust the Rail 
Review figures recorded in Appendix 3(a) by the difference in 
the rate of inflation, using the forecast indices (RPI) given 
in appendix 2(d) and the actual indices in Appendix l(d), and
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using for I98I the inflation rate of 11.8/b over I980, as used 
by the BRB in producing the latest (May I98I) forecast. This 




(B = Better, W = Worse than Rail Review forecast)
Deducting this figure from the total receipts price variances 
in Appendix 4(a), produces an assessment of the real price 
differences as given below:-
Passenger Freight Parcels Total 
£m £m £m £m
1980 W 3 B 16 B 8 B 19
1981 B 1 W 3 B 6 B 4
(B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast)
Contrary to the experience noted earlier in respect of the 1974 
Plan and the 1975 and 1978 Reviews, the differences were largely 
betterments on this occasion. This was partly because 
considerably smaller real price increases had been included 
in the 1979 Review forecast compared with earlier forecasts 
(see Appendix 2(a) - page 4),
In respect of working expenses, the impact of incorrect 






(B = Better, W = Worse than Review forecast)
It can be seen that these figures were relatively close to 
(but less than in I981) the total price variances (W £13Om 
in 1980 and W £262m in I981). This was contrary to the 
experience of the previous Plan/Reviews where there had been 
a tendency to over-estimate the extent of real cost increases.
Moving to the volume variances, Appendix 4(a) shows that they 
were very substantial, reaching W £134m in 198O and W £120m 
in 1981. Again, it is not possible to identify and measure all 
of the reasons for this but some can be deduced from the data
collected in the appendices and Chapter 11.
In respect of Passenger receipts, the variances were quite small 
in 1980 (B £2m) despite the fact that Consumers' Expenditure 
which was forecast to increase by 2.7%, only increased by 0.6%. 
In the opinion of the author this contradiction was partly 
brought about by inaccuracies in the BRB's price/volume split 
of the 1980 variance over 1979 (used in Appendix 1(a) and 
thus in Appendix 4(a)). This split is arrived at by BRB on a 
subjective judgement basis and it is acknowledged by BRB 
planners that it cannot, by its very nature, be as accurate 
as can be calculated in respect of Freight and Parcels receipts 
or working expenses. It is considered by the author that this 
issue was probably material to the two 'inconsistencies' noted
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earlier. The variance in I981 was again related to the 
recession with a reduction in the Consumers* Expenditure 
Index (of 3.3% compared with the Review forecast) more than 
accounting for the variance of W £31m.
In respect of Freight receipts, the adverse variances can again 
be largely explained by comparing the forecasts of UK Industrial 
Production (including oil) with the emerging results. The 
forecasts for I980 was an index of IO3.3 compared with an actual 
index of 93.3. Coupled with the effect of the BSC strike 
(W £28m), this downturn in industrial activity closely matched 
the 1980 shortfall (W £88m). The further deterioration to 
£l06m in I98I was similarly related to the recessionary downturn 
in Industrial Production,
The Industrial Production indices also largely explained the 
Parcels volume variance in I98O (W £l3m) and part of the 19&1 
variance. However, a large part (£26m) of the I98I Parcels 
variance was caused by the decision to withdraw from the 
Parcels C & D sector, which was not forecast in the 1979 Rail 
Plan.
Moving to working expenses, the pattern of variances was 
unusualwith adverse variances in the base year - 1979 (W £31m) 
and 1980 (W £33m) but becoming a betterment of £62m in 198I.
In this instance, adverse variances cannot be attributed to 
non-achievement of forecast resource reductions which, manpower 
included, were not evident to any significant degree. The 
answer in 1979 and I98O was related largely to higher than
507
anticipated levels of maintenance expenditure. In I98I, the 
situation was reversed with cuts being made in revenue 
investment (£32m), maintenance expenditure and operating 
overtime to help alleviate the worsening financial situation.
16.5.5. 1980 Rail Plan Forecasts Compared with Actual
Resùlt 1980 and Latest Estimate I98I 
The financial and physical results in I98O were close to the 
base forecast used in the production of the I98O Rail Plan.
This was not surprising since the base forecast was an 'outturn' 
update of the 198O budget compiled in September I98O. However, 
the latest expectation of the 198I result was considerably 
different to the Plan forecast. Indeed, a total adverse 
variance of £l47m was anticipated (in May I981). The summarised 
Plan forecasts compared with the I98O result and I98I latest 
estimate are shown in Table I6.9.
The forecast for I981 was again worse than the 'worst' forecast 
contained within the risk analysis section of the I98O Rail 
Plan, allowing for inflation. This repeated a failure which 
was evident in the 1978 and 1979 Rail Reviews although, in 
this particular case, the difference was confined to the 







- PSO Grant 633 68O
- Profit/(Loss) (26)
Actual PSO Grant 634 ?40
Actual Profit/(Loss) (32) (47)
Non-Passenger Profit/(Loss)
1980 Rail Plan (43) 17
Actual (48) (37)
* Latest Estimate - May I98I
Table l6.9. I98O Rail Plan Forecast Compared with Actual 
Results 1980 and Latest Estimate I981 - 
Financial Summary____________________________
(Source ; BRB internal records)
Continuing with the process of analysing the variances, which 
are shown in Appendix 4(a) between price and volume, it is 
intended to examine first the I98I price variance of £71m.
In doing this, it is evident that virtually the whole of the 
receipts variance (W £l8m) was related to non-achievement of 
forecast real price increases. Similarly, the working expenses 
variance (W £33m) was related to real increases in expenditure 
(mainly pay) expected to be beyond the forecast level. The 
difference between the forecast rate of inflation in the Plan 
and the Board's latest estimate was not material. (11.8% 
latest estimate compared with 11.9% Plan forecast, both 
compared with 1980).
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Moving to the 1981 volume variances, these were almost entirely 
confined to receipts and to the recession, the depth of which 
was not forecast in the 1980 Rail Plan. Indeed, it can be seen 
in Appendix 2(b) that the BRB expected growth in the UK 
Industrial Production (excluding oil) and Consumers* Expenditure. 
The latest results for I981 used in Appendices l(a) and 4(a) 
assumed reductions in these indices of 11.8% and 1.4% 
respectively, rather than the growth previously anticipated.
At first sight, the reductions in these indices seem out of 
line with the Passenger and Freight receipts volume variances 
given in Appendix 4(a). On the Freight side, the difference 
was caused by the BSC strike in I98O which was not present in 
the 1981 figures. On the Passenger side, the author considers 
.again that the BRB price/volume split of the 198I variance over 
1980 (used in Appendix 1(a) and thus in Appendix 4(a)) was not 
accurate. If this was the case, then the resistance to the 198O 
Passenger price increases was greater than that declared by 
the BRB.
16.3*6. Latest Rail Plan I98I Forecasts
It was noted in Section 6 .3. of Chapter 6 that the May 198I 
estimate of the Railways business finauicial results for I981 
was considerably worse than the I980 situation. This 
deterioration has impacted itself on the I98I Rail Plan, the 
May 1981 draft version of which shows a set of forecasts 
which are considerably worse than those contained within the 
published 1980 Corporate/Rail Plan (see Chapter 11 for details 
of the 1980 Plan).
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Whereas the I98O Flan indicated that the Railways business 
could (a) work within the estimated PSO cash limit level (b) 
work within the estimated EFL (Railways business share 
estimated by the BRB) and (c) make a profit in the Non-Passenger 
business, all during the years I982 to I983, the draft 198I 
Plan comes to a different conclusion. Instead it suggests 
that, in I98I price levels, (a) there will be a PSO 'deficit' 
of £91m in 1982 which might not be eliminated during the next 
five years, (b) there will be an EFL 'deficit' of £123ra in 
1982 reducing to £43m by 1986, (c) the Non-Passenger 
business will not break-even until 1983 and (d) the 1982 
interim financial targets' would not be achieved.
As a consequence of these problems, the I98I Rail Plan was not 
completed even as late as October I98I and efforts are still 
continuing to find means of improving the situation. As 
noted in Chapter 6, further cut backs in maintenance and 
investment, asset sales and additional manpower reductions 
are likely to be decided upon before the end of I98I. Certainly 
the 1981 Rail Plan will not be finalised until its forecasts 
are considerably improved.
The great problem for the BRB now seems to be that, as long 
as the economic recession lasts, it will be necessary to trim 
investment expenditure far below required levels and even 
below the Government investment ceilings to stay within the 
EFL, Since the BRB already perceive that the investment 
ceilings need to increase substantially, for a large number of 
years, to catch, up on a back-log of renewal to avoid extensive
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speed restrictions and even line closures, the physical state 
of the assets is likely to continue to decline.
16.3.7. Summary
In summary, there have been considerable differences between 
the Rail Plan/Review forecasts and the actual results. The 
areas containing the most significant differences have been:-
a) Passenger receipts growth/real pricing.
b) Freight receipts growth.
c) Real price increases in working expenses (mainly pay).
d) Macro-economic forecasts relating to a), b) and c).
e) Volume of investment (revenue and capital).
f) Manpower reductions.
g) The 'worst' forecasts built into the risk'analyses.
All of these points were accepted, after discussion, by the 
BRB planners consulted. They emphasised that the receipts 
volume and real price variances were partly the result of 
non-achievement of expected growth in the UK economy (macro- 
economic indicators) and partly through non-acceptance by 
Government of the forecast increases in the investment 
ceilings. In respect of the macro-economic indicators, 
they added that the BRB forecasts had been close to those 
produced, at the same time, by the Government and other 
forecasters. In respect of the investment ceilings, this was 
related to the problem discussed earlier whereby the BRB have 
assumed investment profiles which match their estimated 
requirements in the hope that increases in the investment 
ceilings will be permitted by Government. In the event, no
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such increases have been forthcoming.
The differences in respect of real price increases in working 
expenses which occurred in the 1974 Rail Flan and the 1975 
and 1978 Rail Reviews, were largely a result of overestimating 
the likely real increases in pay levels. The low pay increases 
in 1976 and 1977 resulting from National pay policy were not 
forecast by the BRB; instead real increases were forecast for 
those years.
In respect of the non-achievement of forecast manpower 
reductions in the 1974 Plan and the 1975 Review (allowing for 
the ’conditions of service' increases that were not implemented) 
and in the 1978 Review, the BRB planners were of the opinion 
that an optimistic view had been taken in those plans of the 
ability of the BRB to achieve the savings relating to strategic 
changes. However, that optimism had been sufficiently well 
founded for the BRB to announce in 1976 ('Transport Policy - 
An Opportunity for Change') even larger reductions than that 
contained within those plans. Compared with an approximate 
number of staff of '190,000 on 1 January 1976' a 'gross manpower 
reduction of 40,000 (over 20%) by 198I' was forecast in that 
document. That announcement contained a caveat concerning an 
offsetting increase in respect of 'conditions of service' which 
was not quantified, but in the period 1976 to 1981 this has 
not proved to be a material, factor. Consequently, the 'latest 
estimate' of 168,700 staff at the end of I98I is some 18,700 
above the level that was once expected. Additionally, it has 
been strongly recommended (Pryke and Dodgson, 1975) that
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reductions of 60,000 to 70,000, within a shorter tinescale, 
were capable of achievement.
BRB planners have explained to the author that difficult 
industrial relations implications of progressing change, 
coupled with a lack of clarity on the intentions (i.e. no 
detailed action plans agreed with those who have to implement 
the changes), have militated against achieving manpower 
reductions at the desired pace. However, sizeable reductions 
in manpower numbers had been achieved in 198O and I98I (latest 
estimate), in line with the forecasts contained within the 1979 
Rail Review and the 1980 Plan. These reductions had been 
motivated by the developing financial crisis.
Finally, in respect of the differences in the risk analysis 
forecasts, it was agreed by the BRB planners that this was 
not the fault of the chosen method but of inaccurate 
forecasting. They added that every effort was being made to 
learn from this experience and produce more accurate best/worst 
estimates in future plans.
16.4. Spin-Off Benefits
Despite the theoretical and practical inadequacies noted in 
this chapter, it is considered by the author, and agreed 
by the planners consulted, that the BRB corporate planning 
process and procedures have produced two important spin-off 
benefits.
The first is that the plans have become one of the most important
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items of communication between the BRB and the Government. As 
a result, Department of Transport officials are gradually 
acquiring a better understanding of the problems of the BRB, 
how they have been created and how they might be solved. This 
might auger well for future decision making.
The second is that the planning process has created the need for 
and, to a large extent resulted in, the appointment of managers, 
particularly at headquarters level, who have a forward-looking 
attitude and are anxious to make change happen. This does not 
apply just to the professional planners but to most managers, who 
see planning as a vital part of their job. Again, this might 
auger well for the future.
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CHAPTER 17
CONCLUSIONS AIID RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Chapter l6 , it was established that:-
1. There have been a number of theoretical deficiencies in the 
BRB’s corporate planning process which have adversely 
affected the success with which they have performed that 
process. These deficiencies have been related to:-
a) Inadequate determination of values, objectives and goals 
(jointly with Government).
b) A lack of strategic direction in the plans prepared 
during the years 1975 to 1979.
c) An absence of strategic contingency plans.
d) An absence of action plans, thus preventing the full 
and committed involvement of Regional management.
e) An absence of a formal back-check system to ensure that 
failings in any one strategic plan become lessons for 
the next.
2. There are no major theoretical deficiencies in the BRB’s 
corporate planning procedures.
3. There have been a number of major differences between 
Rail Plan/Review forecasts and actual results, since 197^.
4. There have been two significant ’spin-off benefits of the 
BRB’s corporate planning process.
In establishing these conclusions, the author set out to test 
the remaining four hypotheses. In his opinion, this 
requirement has been achieved in that:-
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Seventh Hypothesis
It has been demonstrated that there are generally accepted 
measures of success which can be used to assess the success 
of the application of corporate planning.
Eighth Hypothesis
These success criteria have been fully capable of being used 
in respect of the British Railways Board.
Ninth Hypothesis
Because of external economic factors, the corporate plans 
produced by the British Railways Board have not been 
successfully implemented and have undergone considerable change 
This has applied particularly in respect of the 1974 and 1975 
Corporate/Rail Flans where, for economic reasons, the 
Government were not able to honour the investment requirements 
relating to a strategy to which they had previously agreed.
Tenth Hypothesis
As a result of the two 'spin-off benefits noted above and 
detailed in Chapter l6 , the value of corporate planning to 
the BRB has, to some extent, been in the process itself and 
not just in the plans.
In the final analysis, however, the author has had to assess 
the success of corporate planning in the BRB. His opinion, 
based on all of the evidence martialled in this thesis and 
summarised in Chapter l6 , is that it has been largely 
unsuccessful. On a subjective scale of one, for unsuccessful.
517
to 10, for completely successful, the author considers a mark 
of 3 would be reasonable indication of the relative success 
rate.
However, the author considers that the BRB can overcome the 
theoretical and practical deficiencies noted in Chapter l6 ,
To assist in this regard, this thesis is concluded by 
identifying a number of positive steps which the BRB should 
take. Discussions with BRB planners indicate that each 
recommendation is acceptable but that some will be adopted 
much sooner than others.
In brief, the author recommends that the BRB should take steps 
as speedily as possible to:-
a) Develop and agree with Government definitive, long-term 
financial and non-financial objectives for each business and 
for the four sectors of the Passenger business.
b) Similarly develop and agree intermediate goals.
c) Update the current business strategies to take account of the 
recent strategy studies, agreeing the revisions with Government.
d) Fully describe the objectives, strategies and related 
forecasts to managers at all levels and Trade Union officials/ 
representatives.
e) Develop 2 or 3 year Railways business action plans, in 
conjunction with Regional management, which are complimentary 
to the strategic plans (i.e. the Rail Flans).
f) Develop similar action plans in respect of the subsidiary 
businesses.
g ) Develop a system of back-checking on implementation of each
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strategic plan to ensure that lessons are learned at the 
commencement of the next annual planning cycle.
h) Develop a system of monitoring progress on implementing the 
action plans, at intervals coincident with the 12 week and
32 weeks Outturn production.
i) Develop contingency plans in each strategic plan (associated 
with the risk or with sensitivity analysis) to ensure that 
considered corrective action can be taken if the action plan 
monitoring system records significant adverse variances to
the forecasts.
j) Attempt to improve the quality of forecasting, particularly 
•in respect of:-
Kacro-economic trends
Real price increases in receipts
Real price increases in expenditure
Receipts volume growth
Revenue and Capital Investment
Manpower reductions
Risk analysis range forecasts
It is clear from discussions with BRB planners that, whilst all 
the recommendations are considered correct and acceptable, the 
first and last will be the most difficult to adopt. In regard 
to the first recommendation, the opinion held by BRB planners is 
that it will be a considerable time before Government can 
liaise with the BRB in the manner required. That might demand 
not only a change of attitude but probably also a more buoyant 
national economy which would alleviate the pressures of the 
public spending borrowing requirement and permit investment
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ceilings and external financing limits to be closer to 
perceived requirements.
In respect of the last recommendation, the point is stressed 
by BRB planners that it is extremely difficult to forecast 
the macro-economic indices and even the Government gets them 
wrong by large margins. The author's rejoinder to this comment 
is that considerably more caution should be applied in respect 
of the macro-economic forecasts, irrespective of Government 
forecasts - which by their very nature tend to be optimistic.
An associated point which is fully accepted by BRB planners is, 
however, that irrespective of the difficulties associated with 
macro-economic trends, there is a tendency in the BRB to produce 
optimistic forecasts in respect of receipts growth/real price 
increases and resource reductions - particularly manpower.
With typical good humour, this is known within BRB headquarters 
as the 'hockey-stick syndrome', referring to 'bottom-line' 
graphs which record that the recent past has become progressively 
worse but the forecast future will produce excellent results 
with a very steep trend line. Most of the forecasts contained 
within Chapter 11 came into this category.
To conclude, the author considers that the BRB should place 
considerable stress on the risk analysis procedure (or 
sensitivity analysis), the associated preparation of contingency 
plans and the preparation and monitoring of action plans. The 
risk analysis procedure requires far better forecasting. It is 
almost absurd to have noted that financial results within a
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year or two of the respective forecasts have turned out to be 
outside (adverse variances) the ranges of the risk analysis 
forecasts prepared, in theory at least, to three standard 
deviations. Given that these forecasts are better prepared 
or, alternatively, that sensitivity analysis is used with 
some accuracy, the contingency plans could be related to 




Ackoff R L, A Concept of Corporate Planning, Wiley - Interscience, 
1970
Air Corporations Act 1977, HMSO
Air Corporations (Dissolution) Order 1977, HI'IS0
Anderson R G, Corporate Planning and Control, Macdonald and 
Evans Limited, 1975
Argenti John, Systematic Corporate Planning, Thomas Nelson and 
Sons Ltd., 1974
Argenti John, Practical Corporate Planning, George Allen and 
Unwin, I98O
ANSOFF H. Igor, Corporate Strategy - An Analytical Approach to 
Business Policy for Growth and Expansion. Penguin 19&5
Ansoff H. Igor, Brandenberg R G , Portner F E and Rodosevich R , 
'Does Planning Pay - The Effect of Planning on Success of 
Acquisitions in American Firms', Long Range Planning, Volume 3» 
Number 2, December 1970
Ansoff H. Igor, 'Strategy as a Tool for Coping with Change', in 
Taylor B and Hawkings K (eds), A Handbook of Strategic Planning, 
Longman, 1972
Ansoff I. Igor, Strategic Management. The Macmillan PressLtd.,
1979
Anthony Robert N and Herslinger, Regina, Management Control in 
Non-Profit Organisations, Richard D, Irwin Inc., 1975
522
Anthony R N and Dearden J, Management Control Systems,
Richard D. Irwin Inc., I98O
Aquilar F J, Howells R C and Vancil R F, Formai Planning 
Systems - A Progress Report and Prospectus.Harvard University 
Press, 1970
Bains Report - The New Local Local Authorities - Management 
and Structure, HMSO, 1972
Bierman, Harold Jnr and Smidt, Seymour, The Capital Budgeting 
Decision : Economic Analysis and Financing of Investment 
Projects. The Macmillan Company, 1971
Bonavia, Michael R, British Rail - The First 25 Years, David and 
Charles, 1981
British Airways, Annual Reports and Accounts, 1972/73 to
1980/81
British Airways Board Act 1977, HMS0
British Railways Board, Modernisation Plan, January, 1955
British Railways Board, The Reshaping of British Railways, 
('Beeching Report'), BRB, 23 March, I965
British Railways Board, Annual Reports and Accounts, I963 
to 1980
British Railways Board, Third Corporate Plan, incorporating 
1974 Rail Plan, December 1974 (Unpublished)
523
British Railways Board, Railway Policy Review, incorporating 
'Interim Rail Strategy', January 1974, (Unpublished)
British Railways Board, Transport Policy : An Opportunity 
for Change, BRB, 1976
British Railways Board, Business Planning Data 1976 - 1981, 
incorporating 'Draft 1975 Rail Plan', December 1975» 
(Unpublished)
British Railways Board, Special Autumn Plan - Rail Business, 
September 1977» (Unpublished)
British Railways Board, 1978 Rail Review, Spring 1978, 
(Unpublished)
British Railways Board, 1978 Corporate Review, incorporating 
an update of the 1978 Rail Review, Autumn, 1978, (Unpublished)
British Railways Board, 1979 Corporate Review, incorporating 
1979 Rail Review, October 1979» (Unpublished)
British Railways Board (jointly with the Department of 
Transport), Review of Main Line Electrification - Interim 
Report, 1979
British Railways Board (jointly with the Department of 
Transport),Review of Main Line Electrification - Final 
Report, 1980
British Railways Board, Corporate Plan I98I-85, September I980
524
British Railways Board (in conjunction with SNCF), Channel 
Tunnel Feasibility Study, I98O
British Railways Board, Rail Policy, March I98I
Bromwich Michael, The Economics of Capital Budgeting, Penguin
1976
Carsberg, Bryan, Analysis for Investment Decisions, Accountancy 
Age Books, 1974
Central Statistical Office Economic Trends Annual Supplement 
1981 Edition and Various Editions of Monthly Digest of 
Statistics, HMS0
Chambers, J C , Mullick, S K and Smith, D D, 'How to Choose
I
the Right Forecasting Technique',Harvard Business Review, 
July - August, 1971
Chandler A D, Strategy and S fcructure, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, I962
Civil Aviation Act I98O , HMS0
Coal Industries Act 1973, HMSO
Cooper Brothers, Corporate Planning in British Railways, 
internal report to BRB and Ministry of Transport, I967
Cmnd 3437, Nationalised Industries : A Review of Economic 
and Financial Objectives, HMSO, 19^7
Cmnd 40l8, British Air Transport in the Seventies, Report of 
the (Edwards) Committee of Inquiry into Civil Air Transport, 
HMSO, 1969
525
Cmnd 6106 Capital Investment Procedures. The Government's 
Reply to the Select Committee, 1973/1974, HMSO, 1975
Cmnd 6393» Public Expenditure, HMSO, February, 1976
Cmnd 6440, Cash Limits on Public Expenditure, HMSO, April 1976
Cmnd 6836, Transport Policy, HMSO, June 1977
Cmnd 71511 The Nationalised Industries, HI4S0, March, 1978
Cmnd 7&4l, The Government Expenditure Plans I980/8I to 
1983/84. HMSO, March, 198O
Cyert R M and March J C, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, 
Prentice Hall, I963
Denning B W, Corporate Planning - Selected Concepts,
McGraw-Hill, 1971
Drucker P ,.The Practice of Management, Wm. Heinemann Ltd.,
1955
Drucker P F , 'Notes on a Discipline of Business Enterprise’,
The Journal of Business, vol 31» No. 2, April 1958
Drucker Peter F , Managing in Turbulent Times, William Heinemann,
1980
EEC Council Regulation II92/69» 1969
Eighth Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised 
Industries, Session 1977-78 - National Bus Company, HI4S0, 1978
526
Fayol H, General and Industrial Management, Pitman, 19^9
Fildes Robert, Jalland Mike and Wood Doug, 'Forecasting in 
Conditions of Uncertaingy', Long Range Planning, vol 11,
No. 4, August 1978
Financial Times, 'Britain’s Biggest Buy-Out', 19 June I98I
Financial Times, 'Why BA Nosedived Into The Red’, 8 August 198I
Financial Times, 'British Airways to Axe 9000 Jobs and 
Freeze Pay', 11 September I98I
Financial Times, 'Touche Ross to Probe Debt at National 
Bus Co.', l4 October I981
Financial Times, 'National Freight Managers Raise £3«57ni 
for Buy-Out', 20 October I98I
Financial Times, 'Rail Fares to London to be Cut', 23 October
1981
Financial Times, 'World's Airlines Lose 01,1 bn and Face 
Further Bleak Year', 26 October I98I
First Report of the Select Committee on Nationalised 
Industries Session 1972/73, British Steel Corporation, HMSO, 
February 1973
Flower, John, Computer Models for Accountants, Accountancy 
Age Books, 1973
527
Grinyer, Peter H and Wooller Jeff, Corporate Models
Today - A New Tool for Financial Management, The Institute of
Chartered Accountants, 1978
Hansard, John Peyton, Ministerial Statement, HMSO, 28 November
1973
Hansard, Fred Mulley, Ministerial Statement, HMSO, 24 June 1974 
Hansard, Written Answers, HMSO, 12 November 1979
Hansard, Written Answers, HÎ4S0, 10 December I98O
Hansard, Written Answers, HMSO, 22 May I98I
Hansard, Norman Fowler, Ministerial Statement, HI4S0, 22 June
1981
Hansard, Norman Fowler, Ministerial Statement, HMSO l4 July 198I
Hansard, David Howell, Ministerial Statement, 19 October 198I
Hansard, Government Statement (Queen's Speech"), HMSO,
3 November I98I
Harris, D J, 'Risk Analysis and Financial Planning',
Management Accounting, July/August, 1979
Harris, D J and Davies, B C L, 'Corporate Planning as a Control 
System in the United Kingdom Nationalised Industries', Long 
Range Planning, Vol. l4, No. 1 , February I98I
Hertz, D B, 'Risk Analysis in Capital Investment',
Harvard Business Review, January 1964
528
Higgins J C and Finn R, 'The Organisation and Practice of 
Corporate Planning in the U K -  Some Recent Survey Results', 
Long Range Planning, volume 10, Number 4, August 1977
Higgins J C, Strategic and Operational Planning Systems, 
Prentice-Hall, 1980
Hillier, E S, 'The Derivation of Probabalistic Information for 
Evaluation of Risky Investments', Management Science, 19^3
Hopwood Anthony G, 'Budgeting and Control' in Topics in 
Management Accounting, Ed, J Arnold, B Carsberg and R Scapens, 
Philip Allan, I98O
Hussey David, Corporate Planning Theory and Practice,
Pergamon Press, 1974, p 21
International Air Transport Association - World Air Transport 
Statistics, 1980, Reprinted in Financial Times, 27 July, I98I
Local Government Act 19^2, HMSO
McKinsey and Company (Joint report with the British Railways 
Board), Restructuring the Railway Field Organisation, 1971 
(Unpublished)
McLintock, Mann & Whinney Murrey, Parcels Traffic Study on 
Behalf of the Freight Integration Council, FIC, 1970
529
Merrett, A J and Sykes A, Capital Budgeting and Company Finance, 
Longman, 1973
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, British Rail Hovercraft 
and Hoverlloyd, HMSO, June I98I
National Bus Company, Annual Reports and Accounts, 19^9 to
1980
National Bus Company, News Release, l4 October, I98I
National Economic Development Office, A Study of UK Nationalised 
Industries : Their Role in the Economy and Control in the 
Future, HI4S0, 1976
National Freight Corporation/Company Ltd,, Annual Reports 
and Accounts,- 19^9 to 1979 and Nine months Ended 
30 September, 1980
Naylor, Thomas H, Corporate Planning Models, Addison - Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1979
Otley D T, Behavioural Aspects of Budgeting, I C A E W 
Accountants Digest No. 49, 1977
Pryke, Richard and uodgson, John, The Rail Problem,
Martin Robertson, 1975
Pryke, Richard, The Nationalised Industries - Policies and 
Performance Since 1968, Martin Robertson, I981
Railways Act, 1974, HMSO
Road Traffic Act, 1930, HMSO
530
Second Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised 
Industries Session 1972/73, National Freight Corporation,
HMSO, November 1973
Shawki Al-Bazzaz and Grinyer P H, 'How Planning Works in 
Practice - A Survey of 48 U K Companies', Long Range Planning, 
Volume 13, Number 4, August I98O
Steiner, G A, Top Management Planning, Macmillan, 19^9
Steiner, G A and Schollhammer H , 'Pitfalls in Mult-national 
Long Range Planning', Long Range Planning, Volume 8, Number 2, 
April 1975
Steiner, G A and Miner J B, Management Policy and Strategy, 
Macmillan, 1977
Stewart, J D, Management in Local Government'- A Viewpoint, 
Charles Knight, 1971
Sunday Times, 'Fast Coach, Slow Profits', 8 November 198I
Sutton, C J, Economics and Corporate Strategy, Cambridge 
University Press, I98O
Thomas, R E, Business Policy, Philip Allan, 1977
Thompson, A W J and Hunter, L C, The Nationalised Transport 
Industries, Heinemann Educational Books, 1973
Thune, S S and House, R J, 'When Long Range Planning Pays Off 
in Taylor B and Hawkins K (eds) A Handbook of Strategic 
Planning, Longman, 1972
531
Transport Act 1962 , HMS0 
Transport Act 1968, HMSO
Transport (Financial Provisions) Act 1977, HMSO 
Transport Act, 1978, HMSO 
Transport Act, I98O, HMSO
Transport Statistics : Great Britain I969 - 1979, HMSO, 198O
Urwick, L F , The Pattern of Management, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1956
Wàgle, B, ’A Statistical Analysis of Risk in Capital Investment 
Projects’, Operational Research Quarterly, 1967
Welsch G A, Budgeting : Profit Planning and Control, 
Prentice-Hall, 1971
Wood, Douglas and Fildes, Robert, Forecasting for Business : 
Method and Application, Longman Business Series, 1976
532
TABLE OF APPENDICES
There are eleven Appendices immediately following this Table 
which have been produced in support of information contained 
in Chapters 6 , 11 and l6. The sources of the data are varied 
and, in a number of instances the author has had to make 
calculations, using BRB data and methods, in order that the 
presentation can be on a common basis. Brief details of the 
sources and the calculations which were necessary are given 
below in respect of each Appendix.
Appendix Title/Element Source of Data
A B C D E
l(a) BRB - Railways Business Profit 
and Loss Results 1974 to I98O 
and Forecast 1981
- Results 1974 to 1980 X X
- Forecast I98I x
- Year on Year causes of.
change x x
- Cumulative causes of change x
l(b) BRB - Railways Business
Investment Expenditure Results 
1974 to 1980 and Forecast I981
- Results 1974 to 1980 X
- Forecast I98I x
1(c) BRB - Railways Business Selected
Physical Facts Results 1974 to 
1980 and Forecast 198I
- Results 1974 to 1980 X X
- Forecast I98I . x
l(d) BRB - Railways Business Actual
Results of Items Used in Main
Planning Assumptions x
2(a) BRB - Railways Business Profit
and Loss Forecasts in 
Constant Prices
- Forecasts x x
- Causes of change x x
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Appendix Title/Element
2(b) BRB - Railways Business
Investment Forecasts in 
constant prices
2(c) BRB - Railways Business
Selected Physical Facts 
Forecasts
2(d) BRB - Railways Business Plans/
Reviews Main Planning 
Assumptions/Forecasts
3(a) BRB - Railways Business Plans/
Reviews Profit and Loss 
Forecasts in Estimated Actual 
Prices





- Causes of change
3(b) BRB - Railways Business Plans/
Reviews Investment Forecasts 
in Estimated Actual Prices





4(a) BRB - Railways Business Profit and
Loss Results 1974 to I980 and 
Forecast I98I compared with 
Plan/Review Forecasts in 
Estimated Actual Prices
Source of Data 



















A = Annual Report and Accounts
B = Internal BRB Management Information Systems 
C = BRB Files and Working Papers
D-s: Author's calculations using BRB data or actual 
inflation indices (RPI)
E = Central Statistical Office Economic Trends Annual 
Supplement,1981 Edition and April I98I Edition of 
CSG Monthly Digest of Statistics (HMSO)
Appendix 1 (a) - Page 1
po -a 















































? Jc 1 ■F+> c0) 1)0 rH
câ
m p h +>
p5 6 3
3 I -
II O -F  ®
I
CM -# ir\
Appendix 1 (a) - Pa*e 2
-a Q>r- CD(T\ cdm
-a l A L A CM -a (— t- L A
s
L A p L Am S' CM S' CO CM (A L A _a VO o CA o CM
V£) -a VA LA o
m pq pq pq > > pq > > > > > pq pq pq pq > > pq > > > > >
■LA _a O L A CM CO CA CAo CA ■LA CM -a O CA S o CO CA
1 A CA CA CM OZ 00 o
n pq pq pq 3 > pq > > > > > pq pq pq pq > > pq > > > > >
\ A VO o _a _a -a CO J- (A -a L A CM p pLO ôo CO CA CA LA o _a s CO L A ÇM VO O CA
CO VO
pq m pq pq > > pq 3 > pq > > pq m pq pq > > pq > > pq > >
o CA L A VO p -a <A VO
ON CM CA VO s -a CM VO l a L A CM -a CM
CM \ A VO -a
pq pq pq pq > > pq > > pq > > pq pq pq pq > > pq > > pq > >
J _a LA _a _a o A- o -a CO -a LA CO
CM » l A VD L A la -a CA CM CA CA CM -a -a
CM _a ■LA CM CM
pq pq pq pq > > pq > > > pq pq pq pq pq pq > > pq > > pq pq pq
o CO VO VO L A VO CO o -a A- SrA œ ■LA CM -a S vO VO .a
pq pq pq pq 3 > pq > > > pq pq pq pq pq pq > > pq 3 > > pq pq
CM <A
CO L A CM






CM J -  \ A  vX)


















g %fp<! w &3
CM -a lA l£>







IPL q •f r-(o> be 0) rH0) a O 0)
a Q) H 4»
(S £ 6 3 g
S
I





Appendix 1 fa) - Page h
(6 -F mg -g) ®











Appendix 1 (c) - Page 1
UN o (A »- CM
T- CM VO C— 
^  CA œ œ
l a
l a
CM CM T- o CM _a r . OV c- r a- r r
O  <3 OC— T- r
\o t- XA OO CO CM CO XA CTN O 00 -dPN ?— CO OO XA 'X) m m J mXA CO -d CA r̂ CM r-ctn CMXA -d
«- a  r r oa U\ LA CACA «- a CO CA CA CM cÔ t— CM CM
CO CD VO CM CM CA VO OLAÇ v vO CN
n - C O C O C O  CM OO CM fA
•• On r**- ^  CM r -  *L
CO CM - d  r -
c o  VO • •  • •%- CM CM CM V- CM- o CD rLA CM r
CA t— Ĉ CM
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